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Nicoll, Don oral history interview

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Interview with Don Nicoll by Mariah Pfeiffer

Interviewee

Nicoll, Don

Interviewer

Pfeiffer, Mariah

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Portland, Maine

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Biographical Note

Donald Eugene "Don" Nicoll was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on August 4, 1927, and grew up in the West Roxbury section of the city. He is the son of George and Mary Nicoll. He attended Robert Gould Shaw Junior High School and Boston English High School and graduated from Colby College in Waterville, Maine in 1949, majoring in History with a minor in Government. Don met his future wife, Hilda Farnum, also a Colby student, when they worked in the resort town of Ocean Park, Maine, in the summer of 1944. Nicoll began his graduate work at Pennsylvania State College in 1949, where he received a teaching fellowship in the Department of History. His graduate studies concentrated on American history, specifically the period from the Revolutionary War to the Civil War .. His M.A. (1952) thesis was on the Alien and Sedition Acts.

Starting in 1951, Nicoll and his family settled in Buckfield, Maine where he picked apples and taught part time at Stephen's High School, located in Rumford. Nicoll began working as an announcer for WLAM radio in Lewiston, Maine. He became a reporter and then news editor for WLAM and WLAM-TV. In June 1954, Nicoll left WLAM to become Executive Secretary of the Democratic State Committee at the request of Frank M. Coffin, who has just become chairman. Mr. Coffin was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives from Maine's Second Congressional District in 1956 and Nicoll went to Washington, DC, as his administrative assistant, continuing in that post until December 1960, the end of Congressman Coffin's second term. Mr. Coffin ran for governor in 1960 and was defeated. After the election Senator Edmund S. Muskie asked Nicoll to join his staff as legislative assistant and news secretary. Nicoll served in that position until 1962, when he became administrative assistant. He continued in that post until 1971, when he became personal advisor to Senator Muskie. He left the senate office in mid-1972.

From 1972 until his retirement in 2005 Nicoll worked as a program and policy planner, first as a consultant (1972-73), then as chairman and chief executive officer of the New England Land Grant Universities Joint Operations Committee (1973-1975), then as coordinator of planning and vice president for planning and public affairs for the Maine Medical Center (1975-1986), then as a consultant (1986-2005). His clients were primarily in the non-profit sector and included universities, libraries, education associations, health care organizations and social service agencies. He also worked as a volunteer, heading a variety of public policy projects, including the Maine Task Force on Government Reorganization, the Maine State Compensation Commission, the Maine (Mental Health) Systems Assessment Commission, the Maine Consortium for Health Professions Education, the Southern Maine Community Television Consortium, the Maine Special Commission on Government Reorganization (co-chair), the Board of Visitors of the University of Southern Maine's Edmund S. Muskie School of Public Service, the Maine-Aomori Sister-State Advisory Council and the Governor's Allagash Wilderness Waterway Working Group.

From 1998-2005, Don Nicoll was the Director of the Edmund S. Muskie Oral History Project at Bates College.

Scope and Content Note

This interview covers Nicoll's education; Nicoll's work with WLAM: his various positions and interviewing Judge Coffin; Nicoll's work for the Democratic Party: his various positions, reasons for joining, volunteering for Governor Muskie's office, his personal growth and satisfaction; Judge Coffin's political career; the Democrats' involvement with environmental issues: rising party support in the 1960s, Governor Muskie's authority in environmental politics; the state of the Androscoggin: the River in the 1960s and early 1970s, sources of pollution, the River in the 2000s, and Nicoll's thought on the river's future; and the politics of river health: "payrolls or pickerel," river classification, "pollution control" vs. "environmentalism," assimilative capacity analysis, process change, persuading large businesses, and the League of Women Voters.

ANDROSCOGGIN RIVER ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

Q: ... conversation type thing, but, kind of basic background information on you, name, where did you grow up, things like that.

Donald Nicoll: My name is Donald, D-O-N-A-L-D, E., Nicoll, N-I-C-O-L-L. I was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1927, and grew up there, attended the public schools, graduating from the English High School in 1945, and went to Colby College, received my bachelors degree in 1945, then went to Pennsylvania State College and worked on my master's in history and government, and received my degree from Penn State, which by then had become Pennsylvania State University, in 1952. And I came to Maine permanently, as it were, in 1951, when my wife and I and young son moved to Buckfield in Oxford County. Our association with the Androscoggin River continued from that point forward.

I worked at WLAM Radio starting in the fall of 1951, became news reporter that winter, spring of '52, and then in 1953 news editor for radio and television, when WLAM established a UHF television station in Lewiston, as well as the station the Hoys (*sounds like*) owned in Portland at the same time. In 1954, June, I became the executive secretary of the Maine Democratic Party. The State Chairman at the time was Frank M. Coffin, C-O-F-F-I-N, now U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Coffin. I worked for the State Committee, which included, in addition to the 1954 and 1956 campaigns, some really volunteer work for Governor Muskie, who at that time had very limited staff, a sign of the times if you will, and worked on legislative matters with his staff from '55 through '56.

Nineteen fifty six, Mr. Coffin was elected to the House from Maine's Second District, and I went to Washington with him as his administrative assistant and was in that position through the year 1960, when he ran for governor of Maine, was defeated. And after that election Senator Muskie, who'd been elected to the Senate in '58, asked me to join his staff and I went to work for him in January of '61, was his legislative assistant and news secretary for one year, then his administrative assistant until 1971, continued on his staff until the middle of '72, when I moved off the Hill. And through that entire period had encounters and involvement with the Androscoggin. And we are now living in Portland, Maine, 65 Delaware Court, Portland, 04103.

Q: How did you first get involved with volunteering for Muskie? How did that come about?

DN: Well, it came about through Mr. Coffin. He was a young practicing

lawyer in Lewiston, had a solo practice, and I guess by 1953 he had been recruited by the Portland law firm, at that time it was Verrill, Dana, Walker, Philbrick, and Whitehouse, now Verrill and Dana, and they needed a young trial lawyer to back up their senior trial lawyer who had become ill. And so he was dividing his practice time between Lewiston and Portland, and at the same time maintaining an interest in Democratic politics. He was the grandson of Frank Andrew Morey, who had been Speaker of the House in Maine in the 1911 legislature and came from a tradition of Democratic politicians. He had also served as corporation counsel for the City of Lewiston and was sought out to speak at party events.

He made a speech in 1953 in Westbrook, in which he exhorted the Democratic Party, that hadn't won a major election in twenty-plus years, to rise up and regain its former strength. I interviewed him for WLAM, and since I'd been covering the State House that last year or two for the station, I knew a little bit about what was happening in Maine politics, and was convinced that he could win the congressional seat in the Second District very easily. I thought the candidate there was vulnerable, and I also thought that the Republicans were highly vulnerable at the time because of internecine warfare in the Republican Party and the fact that it really had become very stodgy and essentially the servant of a small group of large industries in Maine – pulp and paper, the Central Maine Power Co., Bangor Hydro Electric and a couple of others. And so I urged him to run, when we finished the interview and we turned off the recording devices, I urged him to run, and he said no, he wasn't in a position to do it, he had a young family, just starting his practice and he couldn't take that on.

Over the next several months I kept after him, pushing him, and he finally agreed. First he chaired the pre-convention platform committee, and then was elected to the State Committee and elected as State Chairman, at which point he came to me and said, you've been on my back all these months, now I want you to go to work for me and the party. And he raised a thousand dollars in a single pledge, plus another nine hundred coming in, and on the strength of that he offered me a job for the party. And I horrified my wife, who was taking care of our two young sons at this point, by saying I'd decided to quit the radio station, radio and television station, and go to work for the Democratic Party. So we worked on the '54 campaign when Mr. Muskie ran for governor and was elected, and one of the principle planks in the Democratic platform that year was a cleaning up the rivers plank. Environmental protection we call it now, but it was pollution control and cleaning up the rivers.

Then, in 1955, when Governor Muskie took office, he was faced with the fact that he had for staff two secretaries, a news secretary, and an administrative assistant, and because of the way department heads were appointed in those days, he really didn't have a cabinet of his own. Most of the department heads had been appointed by his predecessors, and only over time, as they came up for reappointment, would he have a opportunity to replace them. So, it was not really feasible for him, with a minority of legislators, very small group of Democratic legislators, to depend fully on the

departments. He had to work things out with those department heads.

So several of us, including Mr. Coffin and I and Irving Isaacson of Lewiston, Tom Delahanty, a few others literally did volunteer work for the State, drafting legislation, working on revising speeches, brainstorming, et cetera., a kind of a kitchen cabinet. And the Androscoggin was high on the list in those days for cleaning up. Then, '56 to '60 was a time when we really, in Mr. Coffin's office, were not terribly involved in pollution control, or, actually because of the committee assignments, partially because at that time the federal legislation was extremely limited on pollution control.

In 1961, when I went to work for Senator Muskie, pollution control was high on his list of priorities, but he had a very limited role to play, because the Public Works Committee that have jurisdiction in that area was chaired by a senator from New Mexico, Dennis Chavez, and really run by senator from Oklahoma, Robert Kerr, who was the number two Democrat but the power on the committee. And they had no interest, essentially, in pollution control. And things sort of bumped along until 1963 when, within a few weeks of each other, both Senator Chavez and Senator Kerr died. And the third ranking Democrat on the Public Works Committee was Senator Pat McNamara of Michigan, who had a strong interest in pollution control, and so did his Chief Clerk, Ron Linton, L-I-N-T-O-N, and they decided for several reasons to have Senator Muskie head up a new subcommittee on air and water pollution.

Senator McNamara, who was a very liberal Democrat, was a plumber by trade, was also a skinflint when it came to spending money in the Congress. So he told Senator Muskie, Ed, I want you to chair this committee but there's no money for staff, you'll have to figure out how to do it. Ron Linton, the chief clerk, will be available, and to the extent he can give you clerical help, that's there, but you will have to work out the rest. So we arranged with Senator Caleb Boggs of Delaware, who was the ranking Republican on the subcommittee, for his legislative assistant, Bill Hildebrand, H-I-L-D-E-B-R-A-N-D, and me, as Senator Muskie's administrative assistant, to serve as the staff, the so-called professional staff. And from 1963 until '66, that was the staffing arrangement. At that point the subcommittee was able to hire Leon Billings, who came to the committee head of the staff, and I stepped back, still provided some supervision from the Senate office, but Leon was the driving force and the operating head of the committee staff. And Leon, incidentally, later became Senator Muskie's administrative assistant several years after I left the staff.

I guess, if we're talking about the Androscoggin in that period, in my own encounters with it, impressions of it, first of all, there were two things that one felt about the river. One was that, when you looked at it, it was dark in color, turgid color, all the way through from Brunswick certainly, so, slightly cleaner upstream from Rumford, but only because you had a single pulp and paper plant in Berlin and a fair amount of flow from tributaries as well as the main river. And foam on the river, by the time you got – particularly, there was a bit at Rumford and more as you got downstream, and

particularly just below the falls, the Great Falls in Lewiston, because of the buildups of the (*unintelligible*) in the Gulf Island area. So, that was one thing.

The other was smell, and the odor from the river, particularly in warm weather, mixed, as you got near places like Rumford, with the smell of the sulfite emissions from the stacks. When you thought about the river, there was the gross pollution which you could see and which you could smell, and there's a very funny family story of ours, of Hilda's. My wife's aunt and uncle lived in Rumford, and we would go to visit them from Buckfield. And the route from Buckfield to Rumford took you up through Canton, and along the river through Peru and into Rumford. And on one particular journey, this would have been late 1951, early '52, we were driving to Rumford, and it was a coupe with a little, almost like a jump seat in the back, 1941 car, and our son Hugh – well, this would've been the fall, probably October, and our son Hugh, who was still in diapers, was in the jump seat in the basket. And we're driving along, and we got to the vicinity of Canton and just beyond and I said to Hilda, I think that Hugh's diapers need to be changed. And she checked him and said no, he's bone dry. Okay. And we drove on, and I'm sure his diapers need to be changed, Hilda. And she checked again. No, he was absolutely dry and needed no changing. A few more miles, oh, the paper mill. That's what we were smelling. It's hard to imagine that sometimes today.

That also reminds me that, when we were at Colby, we started on the old campus, which was down by the river, and there was a Hollingsworth and Whitney paper mill across the river in Winslow. And that first year that we lived on the old campus, before moving up to Mayflower Hill, you could predict the weather by the smell from the mill. When the wind shifted to the east, the smell from the mill came across the river, and it was pretty potent. But people's reactions to pollution in those days were based largely on these assaults on your senses, and of course it was multiplied when you got to Lewiston because you had the discharges from Brown Paper Company in Berlin, Oxford and Rumford. Then, I think it was International Paper at the time in Jay, and then you had the mill in Lisbon Falls, and another mill at Pejepscot – I don't remember the name of the mill in Lisbon Falls, but then the Pejepscot in Brunswick. And you had this cumulative load on the river, plus the municipal sewerage, particularly from Lewiston and Auburn, discharging into the river untreated.

And there was a lot of anxiety, a lot of agitation to clean up the river. On the other side, you had the concerns of both the mill owners and the employees of mills, who felt that any effort to require cleanup would mean the loss of jobs, the mills would shut down and so forth. And I'm sure you've heard many times the "Payrolls or Pickerel" slogan that goes around. And the other was, "that's the smell of money," when talking about the odors.

Q: You said that Muskie ran on a campaign that was talking about pollution control, what kind of rhetoric, I guess, did that work off of, was that working off the senses thing, or was that more working off of -?

DN: It was directed primarily at cleaning up the dirty rivers, and there would be references to restoring the conditions that people didn't necessarily actually remember, but they had heard about the productiveness of the rivers in the days before the mills and before the dams. And the first steps were trying to get classification of the streams, which recognized that not all streams were pure and not all streams could, at that time or in the foreseeable future, achieve a kind of clean state that you might want, though you had the A, B, C, D classifications. And that was the first technique used, and then it became obvious that there was no way you were going to clean up the municipal waste, the sanitary problems on the river, until you got federal grants. And so the municipal sewerage grants were the next big stage, and that started, there was some of that in the fifties, as I recall, but then it really took off in the sixties under the Kennedy-Johnson administration and the new efforts in Congress. And one was trying at the same time to get grants at the state level to match federal and local grants.

Q: When you were working for the news station, you were working on political, or following Maine politics anyway, would you say that the attitude before the Muskie campaign was pushing for environmentalism, or was there some other -?

DN: It was pushing for pollution control. There were two very separate efforts in those days. One was pollution control, that was directed both at air and water pollution control based largely on acute clinical effects of, particularly, air pollution, and disease threats from the sanitary waste pollution. And the gross pollution that you saw, the foam on the rivers in some cases, particularly where there were large chemical plants, the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, that literally burned on one occasion. So the effort was, let's at least get this to the point where it's liveable. And the second stream was the concern over conservation of land, the protection of national parks, of dealing with the problems of clear cutting and restoring a sense of wilderness in some areas of the country. And those were quite separate, and there was very little public perception of the ecological interests of conservation and pollution control and environmental protection. And at that time, we talked a little bit about the theme of "Payrolls or Pickerel," at that time there was a lot of emphasis by industry in particular on the assimilative capacity of streams, so-called.

Q: What does that mean exactly?

DN: It means that, if you put organic materials into a stream of water and there is sufficient movement and oxygenation, the chemical processes brought about by the presence of the oxygen in the water will break down the organic materials, and ultimately the water is pure, the germs will be killed in time. Or, let's assume there are no pathogens in the water, at least the chemical, the organic chemicals, the carbon, the hydrogen chemicals, will be broken down and the water will be swimmable, drinkable, et cetera.

And this leads to a story involving Dr. Lawrence, of Bates, who was appointed river

master on the Androscoggin. He was an advocate of the assimilative capacity approach, and in I think it was 1965, a problem arose on the Presumpscot River, that flows on the east side Portland into Casco Bay. As you come south on Interstate 295, you cross the Presumpscot as you're coming out of Falmouth, and to your left you will see a large estuary, and then it flows through the Martin's Point Bridge and into Casco Bay. Between 295 and the shoreline, there's a section of Falmouth called Falmouth Foreside. Falmouth Foreside is where people wanted to build homes, because it was a beautiful spot close to Portland, and many of the property owners there were bankers, insurance company executives, lawyers, you name it, the establishment of the Portland area.

They generally had taken the position, when the arguments came up over the S. D. Warren Paper Company plant in Westbrook, which was on the Presumpscot, upstream, that "Payrolls or Pickerel" and assimilative capacity would take care of it, and they did not want people putting S. D. Warren out of business and they called for cleaning up the Presumpscot. Well, around 1964, '65, the organic load on the Presumpscot reached a point where the flats in this tidal estuary started generating hydrogen sulfide, which is not very pleasant to smell. It reacts with lead to form lead sulfide, which is black. It reacts with silver to produce a silver sulfide that turns black. The people who had beautiful white painted houses in Falmouth Foreside discovered that their homes were turning black, that the hydrogen sulfide was giving off, and that their family heirloom silver was turning black. They were outraged.

Sometime around the 4th of July, there was enough agitation in the town of Falmouth that a big public hearing was called, to which the executives from S. D. Warren were invited, and Professor Lawrence was invited as an expert, and state officials. The hearing was held in what was then the auditorium of the high school. I was in the state and went to the hearing, just to observe it for Senator Muskie, because we were by then deeply involved in the legislation. And it was in a way, for me, one of the amusing events I've ever attended, because here you had the S. D. Warren officials, particularly their technical personnel, including a very nice guy who was there, a research director with whom we did a lot of work from time to time, being grilled by these business leaders from the Portland area, who were being most unpleasant. They were practically swearing at them, and accusing them of every kind of malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance, demanding change.

And then they called on Professor Lawrence to explain what was going on, and I will never forget him standing up and explaining the use of assimilative capacity to this audience, and saying at one point, we use the assimilative capacity, the natural way to clean the rivers, but sometimes the river will reach a point where its over-saturated, and the river turns over, and then you have a hell of a time to correct the problem. And it was a classic lesson in dependence on one way of dealing with the problem, and it led ultimately to the cleanup. The Presumpscot is now a very clean river. They've taken out a couple of the dams on the lower reaches, and its regarded as a beautiful

recreational area now. But it took a long time to get there, and it took this really gross pollution problem to drive the lesson home.

Q: How did business interests react initially to Muskie's campaign?

DN: The general reactions, I guess, were twofold in the case of Senator, well, Mr. Muskie running for governor, and then as governor. On the one hand, there were from some of the more conservative business people assaults on the Democratic platform, assaults on candidate Muskie. On the other hand, a number of the business leaders had known him when he served as director of the Office of Price Stabilization for the state of Maine. That was a federal position, during the Korean War, and he had built a reputation for fairness and reasonableness in dealing with their needs. He was not a patsy, he wasn't soft on them, but they knew that he would listen, he would act on the facts and the law. And so, a number of the business leaders who were inclined to be opposed to the policies he advanced, were at the same time not inclined to simply dump on him so they sought compromise, and he was very skillful at that.

There wasn't a great deal that you could do until the federal government stepped in, however. The state didn't have the financial resources – we're talking about an enormous investment – and the corporations had not reached a point that, if the mills had not reached a point where they were particularly sophisticated about changing their chemical processes to reduce the load, in addition to installing the kinds of filters and treatment ponds that would produced the best results. And my own feeling is that it was not until people really started thinking about process changes that you got to a point where you can say you have an effective and economically desirable way of dealing with industrial waste generation.

Q: When did they start thinking about these kinds of changes?

DN: This has been in the 1980s and nineties, more in the nineties.

Q: How have you seen the business interests change up until – well, I'm assuming that you've been following some of this more -

DN: You still face the basic conflict, and it will always be there. It doesn't matter what the situation is. The people who are managing the companies, the executives, the managers, feel that, no matter how strongly they feel about a community responsibility, their primary responsibility as executives and managers is to the stockholders. And therefore, they will measure any proposal against an estimate of what the costs will be. And generally speaking, it seems to me they treat those cost question in isolation from other aspects of the business, where you might save money and have enough cash flow to offset some of those additional costs and not really hurt the bottom line for the company.

Large businesses in particular are every bit as bureaucratically driven as any government agency. It's an illusion that these entrepreneurs in business are somehow different from the bureaucrats in government. Well, if you look at them very carefully, they are just as rigid, just as habit-driven as people in the Defense Department or the Department of Human Services, it doesn't matter, it's human behavior. And they will look for, all the things being equal, they will look for the easiest way to do something, generate the profit, and not be bothered by these external demands. So you're never going to completely change that point of view. You can, however, by marshaling the facts, by what I call the Muskie Rule, patient, persistent, persuasion, you can move people to different modes of behavior, more sensitivity, more willingness to consider alternatives. And it takes a combination of standards of performance, enforcement, and persuasion in the sense of thinking of alternatives for the way you produce material. Getting away from the sulfites, anyway. The chlorine based bleaches is a good example.

Q: Have you been interested in pollution control type things before volunteering with the Muskie campaign, or did that sort of foster the interest?

DN: Only those of a citizen involved. I was not involved in any particular environmental protection volunteer organizations, and there were very few around. In fact, the conservation groups, the people who were pushing for national parks, reserves, were active before we had large groups working on pollution control. The League of Women Voters, I think, was as far out in front on those issues as any group.

Q: And you also mentioned Doctor Walter Lawrence, (*unintelligible*), was that your only contact with him or did you -?

DN: We corresponded with him, and you might find some things in the Muskie Archives involving exchanges with him. But, I didn't have any meetings with him, and was not involved in his being brought to the meeting.

Q: What kind of things would you say you got most out of working for these issues during the Muskie campaign, with Mr. Coffin?

DN: Well, in terms of personal satisfaction, a large part of it, just the fact that the work we did in the early to mid sixties, and was carried on with even greater effect later, plus what was done in groundwork starting in 1954, that you were able to see enormous changes in the environment. I can't drive across the bridge between Lewiston and Auburn or across the Presumpscot, as I do fairly regularly now, without a sense of satisfaction that those rivers are relatively clean, and I am sure will improve in time. To look in Auburn at the Riverside Park, just below the bridge, and the park on both sides of the bridge, or Main Street just by the bridge in Lewiston, those never could have happened in 1951, 1960, 1970. People would not have found it at all pleasant to sit there or to spend time there. So, that's a great source of satisfaction, to have played

some role in that. The other great benefit, from my point of view, was being able to work with and learn from someone like Judge Coffin and like Ed Muskie. These are remarkable people in terms of their dedication to public service, and the skills that they brought to the work they did.

Curiously enough, neither Frank Coffin nor Ed Muskie had a career plan. They concentrated on excelling at whatever they were doing, and then going for or responding to a challenging opportunity, generally for public service. And that was consistent throughout Senator Muskie's life, and still is true with Judge Coffin. Both happen to be Bates graduates.

Q: Which kind of changes have you seen have been most dramatic or most significant for you?

DN: In terms of the Androscoggin?

Q: Yeah, right, I guess so.

DN: I think it's been most dramatic in the Lewiston Auburn area, because of the cumulative impact on a large population. And it's also noticeable when you get down to Lisbon Falls and the Brunswick-Topsham area. But I think that's where the impact was felt. It's less obvious in the Rumford-Mexico area, because the extent of the problem wasn't as great.

End of side A

Side B

You no longer hear the "Payrolls or Pickerel" slogan. There are expressions of concern about the impact of different pollution control recommendations or changes in the dams, for example, but the rhetoric has changed. Businesses no longer feel free to use these casual slogans. They have to appear to be very objective in their responses. And the second piece of it is that the nature of the problems have shifted, and it's a more difficult problem in some ways to get to the next stage. In part, because it's always much more difficult to get that last ten percent of the problem corrected than the first ninety percent. And second, you're dealing with problems that are created largely by non-point sources of pollution, and by the activities of a lot of people, some of whom haven't the foggiest notion of how much they're contributing to the difficulties, and therefore, it's much harder to get population interested and excited.

It's no great sweat when the smell from the mill and the smell from the river, and the foam and the ugly stuff in the river assaults you. But, if it's a subtle effect, and it's not clear what the source is, then it's much tougher getting at the roots of it and convincing this mass of people, some of whom contribute a very small part individually, but collectively cause the majority of the problem, hard to get them to recognize this, and to

accept paying the cost. What I said about the executives in the companies applies to every one of us, when we're the ones paying the bill.

Q: What kind of things do you see for the future of the river?

DN: I suspect that, in time, on the river you will see a couple of things happen. One, is that I think the pulp and paper companies, to the extent they can survive, not because of pollution control requirements but because of the supply and cost of materials and competition in the global market, to the extent that they can survive, they will achieve a pretty near total clean up, largely through changes and processes, recovery of materials. Even IP, which is notoriously bad as a company, is doing a lot of that.

The other thing I think, as time goes on, we will see more and more of the dams upstream removed as the economic feasibility of those dams as power sources diminishes. Inevitably, dams result in buildup of silt and materials behind them, and they lose their effectiveness as sources of power, and then become more costly to maintain.

Q: With more silt, that is?

DN: You begin to lose a lot of the water head that you had, and so the cost of trying to dredge it out would be enormous, and the cost of maintenance of the dams would be substantial. As a consequence, I suspect we'll see more of the dams taken out, which will, again, affect the river courses. And I also expect that it will become apparent to more individual citizens that changes have to be made in common practices, everything from road construction and design, to parking lot design, to the maintenance of the land and woods along the rivers, to prevent erosion and siltation, and to prevent the runoff of chemicals, including phosphates from fertilizers. Beginning to see pressures on farmers, for example, and you'll see more pressure on people who run golf courses, and individual families who are trimming their lawns and fertilizing them regularly.

Q: This is to prevent some of the non point source things coming in?

DN: Yeah.

Q: So from here on out, you see the majority of the problem being the non point source things?

DN: That's a major problem. And I hope we get away from always trying to point our fingers at *them*. One of the lessons that I learned working at Senator Muskie was, in a very real and profound way, Ralph Nader got it wrong, and campaigning always against *them*, the enemy. He was not happy, is not happy, unless he's identified an enemy to attack. And that gets you nowhere. You may succeed, for example, on the seatbelt

issue, or you may succeed on an unsafe car, but if you're trying to persuade people to change industrial or municipal or personal practices, you have to recognize that there are a lot of interests involved, and you have to persuade them, sometimes with pressure, but the pressure has to be effective and result in the desired consequence.

An example, the early efforts in water pollution control were focused on enforcement and getting the bad guys, the guys who were breaking the law and dumping toxic materials into the public waters. And for the enforcement officers, the law had to be simple and very direct: You may not discharge anything, or, you may discharge only up to a certain point, and it has to be easily measured and easily prosecuted. That can lead to decisions that, in the long run, have unintended consequences and creation of other problems. If you don't say to the companies, this is what the goal is, and you could either get to it by changing your processes, or recovering materials, or by simply blocking and taking the waste elsewhere. You decide how, but you can't discharge more than this.

Whereas frequently, the early laws said not only, you may not discharge this, but, you have to do this, this and this, and requiring certain kinds of industrial actions. And you need to allow some flexibility for people to solve these problems. They're terribly complicated scientific process and engineering problems. You've got to give them some room to solve those problems, while you keep the heat on.

Q: Kind of pressure, pushing a little bit?

DN: You've got to push, you've got to use logic. I'm afraid I've got a conference right now.

Q: I was just about done, so, that sounds great. Thank you.

DN: You're welcome.

End of interview

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