Multinational States, Multicultural Nations: The Challenge of Liberal Multiculturalism in Nested Nations

Justin Gregory Lipton

Bates College, jlipton@bates.edu

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Multinational States, Multicultural Nations:
The Challenge of Liberal Multiculturalism in Nested Nations

An Honors Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Politics
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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts

by

Justin Gregory Lipton
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Abstract

This thesis questions the possibility of liberal multiculturalism, both normatively and in practice. In particular, it explores whether multicultural group rights may fail to achieve their liberal ends when distinct minority claims conflict. Though liberal multiculturalism presents a seemingly uniform justification of minority rights, national minorities and immigrant minorities are treated differently both in the literature and as a matter of policy. Often, national minorities – historically continuous and territorially bound – have demanded and received significant degrees of self-government within larger states. Is this culturally based self-government compatible with multicultural accommodation for nonmember immigrant minorities, or does it deny this possibility? I develop this question through an organized survey of the literature, and contextualize both types of minorities in relation to the nation-state. I conclude that universal and differentiated citizenship cannot be reconciled on principle alone. For this reason, I further explore this theoretical puzzle through case studies. I develop hypotheses about scenarios where the national minority self-government is most likely to be compatible with the integration and accommodation of immigrants, and test these hypotheses in two “most likely” cases, Quebec and Catalonia. Ultimately, I draw these findings together to consider whether and how an approach to minority rights can better account for competing claims.
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Introduction

Last summer, at a friend’s recommendation, I read Ian Buruma’s *Murder in Amsterdam*, a thought-provoking and journalistic study of the 2004 murder of the Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, by Dutch-born Islamist Mohammed Bouyeri. It is a story about not so much about the murder itself, but about Dutch society’s ambivalent and complex relationship with culture, religion, and diversity. Buruma investigates how a society built on progressivism and acceptance to the point of being “self-congratulatory,” has seen the rise of extremism, anti-immigrant right-wing parties, and an increasingly vocal rejection and distrust of the very model of multiculturalism upon which it was arguably founded. His book left me with far more questions than answers – questions about what it means to belong to a society or country, what practices should be supported, tolerated, or rejected, and the role of government and law in addressing diversity.

Though I did not make the connection then, I had already tackled many of these questions before. In my first senior-level Politics class at Bates, my seminar paper considered Sammy Smooha’s model of “Ethnic Democracy,” where he claims, using the case of Israel as a model, that *ethnos* (ethnic preference) and *demos* (rule of the people) can coexist as guiding principles in a democratic state. In reading Smooha and his critics, I wrestled with normative questions about legitimate and just governance – what are appropriate moral frameworks in which democratic governments can represent one or many culture(s), religion(s), language(s), or people(s)? But I also considered how these moral arguments informed and were influenced by political necessity and real-world
context. I have always been drawn to these two levels – the empirical and the normative – and sought to bridge the perceived gap between them.

Multiculturalism intrigues me because it ties these levels together, linking fascinating developments in political theory to current events and the evolving practice of modern liberal democracies. As I began to learn more, I was engrossed by the so-called backlash against multiculturalism, evidenced by the public denouncements of state multiculturalism by Angela Merkel and David Cameron, who viewed it a failed experiment which worsened the problems of difference it set out to solve. Was this, I wondered, a problem of failed application, flawed theory, or something else entirely?

At this stage in my thinking, I was deeply influenced by the European examples, and the challenge immigrants posed to traditional nation-states. However, I soon realized that multiculturalism was not only an issue of immigration, but also arguably the driving force behind minority self-government within states, as in Canada, Spain, the United Kingdom, or Belgium. I recalled researching, while studying abroad in Spain, the rise of nationalism and violent extremism in the Basque Country. I vividly remember the graffiti I saw scrawled, in English, on a church wall in the town of Guernica: “Basque Country is NOT Spain.”

I began to consider and question the relationship between these two fascinating issues – immigrant multiculturalism and minority nationalism. This paper seeks to understand these phenomena by viewing the interaction between them. Though both minority nationalism and immigrant multiculturalism embody the challenge of diversity in the liberal state, it is not clear how these two interact with one another when immigrants seek to settle and live the self-governing minority territory. This thesis asks
whether national minority self-government is compatible with, or denies the possibility of multicultural accommodation for immigrant minorities within its borders?

I develop this question through a guided analysis of the literature. Chapter 1 explains the philosophical bases and meaning of multiculturalism through a survey of the major justifications of multiculturalism, and the challenges that these group-differentiated approaches to politics raise. Narrowing in on liberal multiculturalism, I explore the academic debate between proponents of universal and differentiated citizenship. This rich normative conversation seems to work implicitly from an unsettled division between group rights (held by a collective) and group-differentiated rights (held by individuals by nature of their belonging to a group). As I suspect, the “type” of minority (either immigrant or national minority) affects normative evaluations of the strength of its members’ claims. I ask how separate claims for group or group-differentiated rights can be weighed against each other if and when these conflict. This leads me to develop my research question: Is immigration a challenge to, or compatible with, the aims of national minorities for cultural preservation through self-government?

Chapter 2 focuses more closely on each ‘type’: immigrant minorities and national minorities. I consider both minorities in the context of the nation state – each makes specific demands and poses unique challenges to nation building. In order to understand this relationship, I begin by examining the normative bases of nationalism and nation building, exploring normative justifications for homogeneity or unity within a state in the theory of liberal nationalism. This chapter then explores the challenge each type of minority poses to nation building – with the notable difference being that national minorities seek to engage in counter-nation building, supporting and institutionalizing a
nation within a larger, multinational state. I note that the self-government rights national minorities receive involve not just protections against the state, but also restrictions within their borders. Notably, these restrictions affect immigrants through the regulation of admission and integration. Do the policies necessary for national minority self-government have the ironic consequence of legitimizing illiberal treatment towards immigrants within their borders? This question cannot be answered without a clear understanding of the empirical terms of the relationship between national minority autonomy and immigrant integration and accommodation.

Chapter 3 pursues the same question through case studies and considers how we might assess immigrant-host relationship within the context of national minority self-government. I also consider the role that context plays in shaping the development of distinct models of immigrant management. Because of the complexity of these arrangements, I employ a configurational approach to assess compatibility. This approach considers how combinations of conditions relate to outcomes of interest. Chapter 3 identifies, explains, and justifies relevant conditions (independent variables), as well as the four outcomes (dependent variables) I consider – admission policy, integration policy, nationality policy, and multicultural accommodation.

Chapter 4 develops hypotheses to link the case conditions to these four outcomes. My core hypothesis is, paradoxically, that control over admission and integration policies is a necessary but limiting condition for allowing national minority openness to the inclusion and integration of immigrants. Following Blad and Couton, I speculate that this model of openness within a protected and promoted culture represents a third model of nationalism, “intercultural nationalism.” I develop hypotheses about when national
minorities are likely to seek and gain competency over these immigration policies, and how the presence or absence of said policies might impact the potential for compatibility between national minority self-governance and immigrant integration and accommodation.

I test these hypotheses in Chapters 5 and 6, through case studies of Quebec and Catalonia, drawing conclusions about the validity of the hypotheses I develop in explaining the findings in these two ‘most likely’ cases of immigrant-minority compatibility. Though Quebec, as the archetype of intercultural nationalism, seems to show that competencies over admission and integration policy are necessary, Catalonia challenges this hypothesis by demonstrating considerable openness even in the absence of these competencies.

In conclusion, I offer some thoughts about the relevance of these findings for liberal multiculturalism more broadly, and the difficulties of evaluating cases where moral and political dimensions influence one another.
Chapter 1: What is Multiculturalism? A Review of Culture, Rights, and Liberalism

Recent decades have been dominated by conversations about culture and difference. As a result of what Brubaker calls the “differentialist turn” of politics, identity has jumped to the forefront of public consciousness. Activists, politicians, and scholars across disciplines have all engaged with the questions this turn has raised, and produced a substantial and fascinatingly diverse body of literature and policies addressing difference. This effort, true to its philosophical roots, is global in scope. Yet as the sheen of novelty wears away in the 21st century, underlying inconsistencies and problems bubble to the surface. The political backlash we read about in the newspaper is just one of the signs of the difficulties multiculturalism faces, and the substantial challenges it poses to political philosophers and policy-makers alike. This chapter seeks to survey these foundations and tensions.

Before this review, it is important to clarify some terminology. Despite being the subject of much philosophical and political debate, the term multiculturalism remains poorly understood and often misused. Journalists may speak of the “multicultural” state, referring to the ‘fact’ of diversity; still others might take multiculturalism to refer to the celebration of difference. One reason for this confusion, as Melzer, Weinberger, and Zinman note, is that multiculturalism lacks a “recognized leader…fundamental text [or] official history.”¹ Helpfully, Augie Fleras parses the various uses of “multiculturalism” to

identify five levels of meanings: Multiculturalism as A) empirical fact, B) ideology, C) policy and program, D) practice, and E) counterhegemony.²

The first use, wherein multiculturalism is equated with demographic diversity, does not excite much interest here, and, as many scholars note, may do serious harm by confusing the terms of the debate. Similarly, although I acknowledge the counterhegemonic lens, I pay less attention to this dimension.³ I aim to link normative theory and political applications, specifically on the level of group-differentiated rights; for this reason, I focus on what Fleras refers to as ideology, policy and program, and practice, which I see as inherently interrelated.

Duncan Ivison’s conception of multiculturalism encompasses the fundamental aspects of multiculturalism in which I am most interested. He writes,

Multiculturalism refers to a broad array of theories, attitudes, beliefs, norms, practices, and policies that seek to provide public recognition of and support for accommodation of non-dominant ethno-cultural groups. [It is distinguished by] the aim to go beyond the protection of basic civil and political liberties associated with liberal citizenship to forms of differentiated citizenship that allow groups to express their distinct identities and practices.⁴

Ivison links multiculturalism as ideology with the practice of what is termed differentiated citizenship. His working definition provides a strong basis for understanding the normative basis of multiculturalism as ideology, and how it relates to practice. Ideologically, it points to the importance of culture and group affiliation, and shows that multiculturalism can be seen as a challenge to previous conceptions of

² Augie Fleras, The Politics of Multiculturalism (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 6
³ Fleras, 110
⁴ Duncan Ivison, “Introduction: Multiculturalism as a Public Ideal,” in Duncan Ivison ed. The Ashgate Research Companion to Multiculturalism (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 2
individual liberal rights. As a matter of policy and program, multiculturalism demands that the government acknowledge and work with cultural pluralism; multiculturalism challenges universal civil and political liberties and demands that the state be open to the possibility of legislating difference. Moreover, this shift is reflected in the actual policy-making of modern liberal states, many of which recognize cultural difference in law or policy, through special legislation and / or exemptions to laws. The third dimension, multiculturalism as practice, flows naturally from the first two, and scrutinizes implementation, circumstance, and outcome. I use the word multiculturalism intentionally to bridge these levels, connecting the conceptual level to state efforts to address diversity as a matter of policy.

I survey the sizable literature on multiculturalism by focusing on what I see as being two fundamental clusters of puzzles: First, in what ways are culture and identity important – not just to individuals, but at the level of governance? Second, can liberalism be reconciled with multiculturalism? This chapter is divided into two sections, each one focusing on one of these questions.

To better understand why individual attachment to culture might merit political action, I survey three justifications for multiculturalism: the politics of recognition, the politics of difference, and liberal multiculturalism. Next, I explore the criticism that these policies may encourage stereotyped, homogenized or reified interpretations of culture. To address the dilemma these critics pose, I turn to Anne Phillips, who maintains that despite

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5 Of course, one could argue that rights are a matter of policy as well. I agree. While it is useful to unpack the various parts here, one of the most fascinating and challenging aspects of multiculturalism is that ideology and policy are so closely linked.

6 Not surprisingly, the distinctions in the literature between these two puzzles are not as neat as one might hope; these questions are themselves parts of a whole and few scholars ask or answer just one. Nonetheless,
these challenges, we ought not give up on culture as an appropriate subject of analysis and policy.

The second half of the chapter narrows in on liberal multiculturalism as the most pertinent realm of normative debate. I begin by offering a spectrum-based approach to the contentious relationship between liberalism and multiculturalism. In the second and third sections, I focus on the terms of this debate, particularly over the values and meaning of liberalism. The challenge here is that multiculturalism may fail to achieve the liberal ends it sets for itself. I review two debates: one about freedom and autonomy, and another about equality and universality. From this debate, I develop the perspective that context plays a significant role in the moral balancing act these scholars attempt.

I. Considerations for Group-Differentiated Policymaking

A. Three Justifications for Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism can first and foremost be seen as an increased sensitivity, and response, to the dissimilar ways humans relate to their social and political environments. This general focus is not new; however, it has provoked tremendous interest in recent years because it brings with it the challenge of conceptualizing the way that diversity and difference matter in the public sphere. Ulf Morkenstam identifies three closely related justifications for multiculturalism: the politics of recognition, the politics of difference, and liberal multiculturalism. Although they stem from the same broad intention to take culture and pluralism seriously, each frames this intention in a different shade, which in turn shapes the policies they advocate. Below, I show how each author explains the

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I argue that these questions and the debates, both within and against multiculturalism, provide a useful lens for understanding a complex and multifaceted debate.
importance of culture and justifies multicultural policy-making. Although I include other scholars as necessary, I generally take Charles Taylor’s “The Politics of Recognition,” Iris Young’s “Ruling Norms and the Politics of Difference” and Will Kymlicka’s *Multicultural Citizenship* as representatives of each.

The politics of recognition seeks to show how human identity develops in relation to the community and context, and argues for a public role in supporting and affirming such identity: “Recognizing and treating members of some groups as equals now seems to require public institutions to acknowledge rather than ignore cultural particularities.”

Charles Taylor’s landmark essay “The Politics of Recognition” makes two points towards this claim: first, that society’s recognition of an individual or group’s worth affects the esteem and dignity of that person; second, that the state has an obligation to recognize such claims.

Morkenstam sees the “groundedness of the individual” as the heart of the politics of recognition: “Identities define what is important and what is not.” Taylor asserts that we are “only capable of understanding ourselves” in continuing interaction and dialogue with others. Taylor construes recognition – the feeling of being acknowledged, understood, and valued equally – as a basic human need. It is not merely that pre-existing identities require recognition, but that “recognition forges identity,” particularly for non-dominant groups. Moreover, lack of recognition, either as an individual or member of a

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9 Taylor, 32-3
10 Ibid. 66
group constitutes a serious harm. For Taylor, therefore, recognition is not a temporary alleviation of injustices, but a permanent investment in cultural survival.\footnote{He writes, “[the goal is to] maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever. After all, if we’re concerned with identity, then what is more legitimate than one’s aspiration that it never be lost?” Later, he adds that such measures may entail not just to protect the community’s survival, but also to “create members of the community, for instance, in assuring that futures generations [of Quebecois] continue to identify as French-speakers.” Ibid. 40, 57-8}{11}

Morkenstam identifies “the politics of difference” as a second, related defense of multiculturalism:

In a similar vein [to the politics of recognition], proponents of a ‘politics of difference’ focus on identities and dominant societal ideas and conceptions – but as institutional objects to self-development and autonomy…It is the systematic character of oppression in group-belonging, not the recognition of identities \emph{per se}, that makes groups the primary focus of analysis.\footnote{Morkenstam, 40}{12}

As Iris Marion Young explains, the politics of difference is broader than the politics of recognition, and focuses not only on culture, but also on other forms of socially produced group difference. Young sees the politics of difference as distinct in that “it is primarily critical, as opposed to self-assertive.”\footnote{Young (1999), 416}{13} Both Taylor and Young emphasize the relationship between identity and power; however, Young focuses primarily on the power of norms, whereas Taylor focuses more on the power of symbols and recognition.\footnote{I do not want to overemphasize the distinctiveness here, but instead view it as a matter of emphasis. It is plain to see that symbols are norm producing, and norms contain symbolic value as well.}{14} Young views majority institutions as propagators of “hegemonic discourses,” which doubly disadvantage individuals from non-dominant groups by embodying norms while simultaneously claiming neutrality.\footnote{Iris Young, "Ruling Norms and the Politics of Difference: A Comment on Seyla Benhabib," \textit{Yale Journal of Criticism} 12.2 (1999), 417}{15} Group affiliations like race, class, disability, and gender are important to Young because they positions individuals
and collectives in relation to these norms. Common to all defenses of multiculturalism, the politics of difference challenges the ideal of a “difference-blind” liberalism and the notion that equality is synonymous with equal treatment. For justice to be achieved against the force of dominant norms, Young argues for a differentiated (rather than universal) citizenship, which reflects and counterbalances the distinct ways that norms may disadvantage individuals by the nature of their group membership.

Liberal multiculturalism, the third account Morkenstam identifies, is now the dominant justification of multiculturalism. Will Kymlicka’s *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* exemplifies this position by framing a defense of multiculturalism as not only consistent with but also derived from a the liberal tradition. Kymlicka narrows the scope of his argument by focusing on what he defines as “societal cultures: a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities.” Such cultures have “not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions or practices.” This move is common in discussions of multiculturalism, where discussions of cultural rights often involve making judgments about what cultures ‘count’.

Kymlicka attempts to show that societal cultures are necessary for the fulfillment of the traditional liberal values of autonomy and equality. He argues that societal culture

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16 Elsewhere, Young distinguishes between aggregates and associations, where an aggregate is classifies by the presence or absence of a certain attribute, but an association connotes an intentional collectivity. Iris Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship,” *Ethics*, 99.2 (Jan, 1989)
17 While I delve deeper into the relationship between multiculturalism and liberalism in part two of this chapter, here I only examine how the argument that liberalism justifies multiculturalism.
19 Kymlicka, 76 In the context of Kymlicka’s well-known distinction discussed below between national minorities (historically situated and territorially bound) and ethnic groups (migration-produced), the label standard of societal culture would generally only apply to the former.
enhances individual autonomy because the latter provides a “context of choice.” Kymlicka sees cultural membership as a primary good, which simultaneously dictates the extents and limits of autonomy. He writes, “Freedom involves making choices amongst various options, and our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us.” Many scholars have developed similar arguments about the relationship between culture and choice. Kymlicka further attempts to show that multiculturalism produces greater equality, as well, particularly between groups within the same society. Kymlicka’s theory of liberal multiculturalism continues to shape the debate over multiculturalism today, as I review below.

Each of the opinions outlined above focuses on the importance of culture and membership in order to justify some form of group-differentiated policymaking. Clearly, there is much overlap, but together they serve to highlight the variegated foundations of differentiated citizenship. All three reach the conclusion that for minorities in society, the status quo propagates unequal treatment, and propose a new logic and practice of addressing pluralism. Differentiated citizenship may take many forms, but refers broadly to the notion that a universal citizenship – by which all citizens are equal and the same in the state’s eyes – can no longer succeed in accounting for diversity and difference. This is a major development in theories of citizen-state relations, In spite of the distinctions between them, the three justifications I identify above work as a whole to highlight different aspects of the importance of culture. The politics of recognition focuses on the importance of symbolic representation and recognition in the public sphere; the politics of difference focuses on the oppressive nature of norms for marginalized groups; liberal

20 Kymlicka, 1995, 82
21 Kymlicka, 1995, 83
multiculturalism grounds the importance of belonging in liberal values, and sees culture as a context of choice. Despite their distinctive foundations, all three authors propose multiculturalism and differentiated citizenship.

B. The Trouble with Groups

Still, defenders of group-differentiated rights face a significant challenge – both over how to define the groups they wish to recognize, and the consequences of such labels. One aspect of this challenge focuses on the difficulty of defining groups and their members, the other on potential consequences, such as stereotyping, reification, and lack of social unity.

Much of the literature concentrates on the problems of defining groups – questioning the utility of race, ethnicity, gender, and culture as meaningful social distinctions. Roger Brubaker calls this the “tendency to represent the social and cultural world as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic, racial, or cultural blocks.” Even when individuals may identify themselves in this language, it does not logically follow that these identities should be “uncritically adopted…as our categories of social analysis.”

Jack Eller points out the fear that politically and institutionally recognizing such categories, may reinforce “a specious cultural essentialism will reify differences and lead to a kind of cultural provincialism.” At its extreme, this attack criticizes cultural essentialism. As Chandran Kukathas writes, “The primary reason for rejecting the idea of group claims as the basis for moral and political settlements is that groups are not fixed

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22 Cited in Kymlicka 1995, 89
23 Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton Univ. Press, 2007), 40
24 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 8
25 Brubaker, Ethnicity, 10
and unchanging entities in the moral and political universe.”27 He extends this criticism on three points: first, that groups may change over time; second, that groups are not internally homogenous; and third, that the “interests” of the group are not easily known and may reflect those of cultural elites.28 This last point reveals his predilection for a conception of multiculturalism that opposes oppression, as Young’s does.

To be clear, few proponents of multiculturalism fall into this trap of viewing social groups or participants in a culture as a static, easily defined, internally homogenous ‘it’. Young, for example, goes to great lengths to define the permeability of cultural belonging, and Kymlicka dissociates the notion of a group from substantive content, arguing we should act to preserve the group itself but not its values or doctrines.29

Yet critics like Kukathas and Tebble are unsatisfied by these clarifications. Inevitably, they say, members of some groups have rights accorded to them and members of others will not. It is this step, labeling in order to ascribe legal status, not arguments about importance of belonging or collective identity per se, that they most often take issue with. James Tebble elaborates on Kukathas’s claim by showing that attempts by proponents of group rights to conceive of a group in an unessentialized way merely postpone the inevitable act of labeling: “However the unessentialized, collective identity is to be described at the ontological, social scientific level…that does nothing to rebut the charge that, at the level of politics and institutions, such groupings must by necessity be

27 Chandran Kukathas, Political Theory 20.1 (Feb., 1992), 110
28 Kukathas ultimately takes issue with the demand that group rights ought to be permanent, turning Taylor’s point of dialogical creation on its head by focusing on the relationship between the cultural community and the institution as a reason to deny permanent status. He writes, “It is not acceptable to evaluate or choose political institutions or to establish legal rights on the basis of the claims or interests of cultural community because those very institutions or rights will profoundly affect the kinds of cultural communities individuals decide to perpetuate or to reform.” Kukathas, 112
29 Young, “Polity…” 260, Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 101-5
essentialized so that they may be the fitting subject of politics [emphasis original].”30 He delivers a devastating critique: that proponents of politics of difference merely repeat the problem they seek to combat on the group, rather than individual, level:

Despite their criticism of liberal individualism as presupposing an untenable ontological atomism, the proponents of group rights such as Young are themselves group-level atomists who have to assert the ‘giveness’ of groups so that they may be clearly defined. But in doing so, they merely transpose the problems of atomism to a new, group-differentiated level.31

We are seemingly left with a puzzle: how to go about addressing problems suffered unequally by group members while simultaneously recognizing that those groups are themselves amorphous, changing, permeable, and undefined? This is not simply a philosophical diversion, but a practical challenge: even if a government were to seek to address the challenges of diversity among the populace, how could it do so without divvying up and labeling its citizens? How can a government work with difference in a way that doesn’t invite criticism of ethnic preference, discrimination, or resentment?

In the following section, I detail a potential solution to this paradox: Anne Phillips’ multiculturalism, which acknowledges the challenges of dealing with culture, but without abandoning the pursuit of cultural justice altogether.

C. Potential Solutions

Anne Phillips offers an answer to this puzzle in her book Multiculturalism Without Culture. As the title suggests, Phillips questions the homogenizing tendency that comes with using “culture” as a political unit, and the cultural determinism that invariably follows. Her question is a good one: how can we take collective difference seriously without encountering the deterministic or homogenizing views of culture? She

31 Tebble, 270
argues only when we do away with reified, deterministic, or stereotyped interpretations of culture can society appropriately address the challenges it raises:

When I say I want a multiculturalism without culture, I mean I want a multiculturalism without particular notions of culture I have found unhelpful. But while I think that cultures have been reified and cultural conflict exaggerated, it is no part of my argument to deny that people are cultural beings.32

Despite her provocative title, Phillips is interested in using culture to understand the choices and disadvantages that individuals face as a result of their membership in cultural, gendered, or ethnic groups. Yet she attempts to understand and address these disadvantages while keeping the dangers of such an approach in mind. For Phillips, answering this question involves unpacking the complex relationship between culture and choice (or its opposite, coercion). Her goal in this endeavor is to “allow for the relevance of culture without making culture a determinant of action.”33 I believe that Phillips succeeds on this account, and provides scholars and policy-makers good reason not to abandon cultural justice altogether.

On a policy level, it is impossible to address the issues that multiculturalism raises without thinking about cultural belonging and “groups” of some type. However, following Phillips, such categories should be taken with a grain of salt. Critics of group-differentiated politics pose a significant normative and practical challenge to proponents of multiculturalism – the problem of defining groups. Though I continue to use the language of religion, culture, and minorities, it is important to consider the ways in which these broad analytical constructs obscure important difference at the individual level. Similarly, policies that are group-differentiated also encounter the challenge of who

32 Phillips, 52
33 Phillips, 131
belongs to the group. Nonetheless, dealing with and speaking of “groups” is a necessary evil for understanding conflicting claims for minority rights, as I seek to in this paper.

Multiculturalism paints a complex picture of the importance of group membership for individuals. Although liberal democracies have convincing reasons to consider differentiated citizenship rights, they can only do so with an eye to the dangers these projects encounter.

II. The Tensions, Limits, and Challenges of Liberal Multiculturalism

I show above three justifications for taking collective and individual difference seriously, and the first of the challenge these theories face – namely, that they must define and work with groups as units. Below, I explore the terms of the current debate about multiculturalism, focusing in on liberal multiculturalism, the dominant position today. First, I establish a spectrum approach to understand the relationship between liberalism and multiculturalism, and how liberal multiculturalism situates itself between the two. I then focus on disagreements about the liberal values of equality and autonomy. The rich debates surrounding each of these points frame the particular challenge I wish to highlight: how liberal states can negotiate competing demands by immigrants and national minorities when both of these claims are grounded in liberal values. This narrow question relates to my broader theoretical question of whether liberal multiculturalism can succeed on the liberal challenge it sets itself. Here, I situate the theoretical aspect of this question by seeking to understand the values of liberal multiculturalism.

A. From “Difference-Blind” Liberalism to Radical Multiculturalism: A Spectrum Approach
In 2001, Will Kymlicka notably declared that liberal multiculturalism had “won by default,” and further debates would focus on “how to develop and refine the liberal multiculturalist position, rather than whether to accept it in the first place.”\textsuperscript{35} He is partially right; much of the extensive literature on multiculturalism, with a few notable exceptions, works from a liberal perspective (as Kymlicka does in \textit{Multicultural Citizenship}), or applies primarily to liberal democracies. However, Kymlicka’s declaration of victory brushes aside significant debates from within and outside of the liberal tradition.

What does it mean for multiculturalism to be liberal? To address this question, I situate liberal multiculturalism on a spectrum of liberal and ‘multicultural’ beliefs, ranging from a “difference-blind,” egalitarian liberalism to a radical multiculturalism that rejects liberal norms altogether.\textsuperscript{36} Liberal multiculturalism occupies an intermediate position. I will review both extremes in order to show how liberal multiculturalism falls between them.

\textbf{Chart 1.1: From Difference-Blind Liberalism to Radical Multiculturalism}

\textsuperscript{34} Geoffrey Levey, “Liberal Multiculturalism” in Duncan Ivison ed. \textit{The Ashgate Research Companion to Multiculturalism} (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 19
\textsuperscript{36} This concept grew out of both Brahm Levey’s discussion and Patrick Loobuyck’s terminology in “Liberal Multiculturalism: A Defense of Liberal Multicultural Measures without Minority Rights,” \textit{Ethnicities} 5.1 (03//2005), although neither represents the debate as a spectrum in quite this way.
“Difference-blind” or egalitarian liberalism is the liberalism of the Enlightenment, linked to ideas of universal citizenship, equality, and impartial justice.\(^{37}\) The notion of equality as universal treatment and universal rights was long held as the ideal for the liberal state. Multiculturalism, of course, challenges the ideal that liberalism should be “difference-blind.” In recent years, anti-multicultural liberal scholars have defended egalitarian liberalism against its critics. They see the challenges multiculturalism levels against liberalism – the ‘atomized’ individual, insensitivity to difference – as misguided, and argue that multiculturalism may cause more significant problems than those it wishes to solve. Brian Barry, for example, offers a forceful defense of “egalitarian liberalism,” suggesting that what few problems encountered under a “uniform system of liberal laws” demonstrate incomplete application, rather than flawed ideals.\(^{38}\)

Chandran Kukathas, too, rejects liberal multiculturalism as inconsistent with the “core of common assumptions” in the liberal tradition, which he details:

First, liberal theory is *individualist* in asserting or assuming the moral primacy of the person against the claims of any social collectivity [as distinct from communitarianism]; second, it is *egalitarian* because it confers on all such individuals ‘the same moral status and denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth among human beings’; and third, it is *universalist* because it affirms the moral unity of the human species and accords “a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms.”\(^{39}\)

By this definition of liberalism, Kukathas has an easy case for asserting the incompatibility of multiculturalism and liberalism. But, as Loobuyck points out, multiculturalism and liberalism are only incompatible when multiculturalism is defined

\(^{38}\) Barry, 21  
\(^{39}\) Kukathas, 108
as “that which transcends liberalism to accommodate cultural and religious diversity.”

Nonetheless, some go to great lengths to show liberalism’s credentials in dealing with many types of group difference, and the extent of minority rights allowed by universal rights and freedoms. As Loobuyck writes, “egalitarian liberalism is not the enemy of diversity; rather it is the foundation upon which pluralism in the areas of culture, religion, and lifestyle can be fairly implemented in a single society.”

On the other end of the spectrum, anti-liberal multiculturalism sees liberalism as insufficient to accommodate the importance of cultural difference. Melzer, Weinberger, and Zinman assert that liberal multiculturalists do not take the radicalism of multiculturalism seriously enough because they do not acknowledge the “serious challenge it means to pose to traditional liberalism.” As a whole, they seem to view multiculturalism as what Fleras terms “multiculturalism as counter-hegemony.” They write,

[Multiculturalism] is a movement that radicalizes and Nietzscheanizes the liberal idea of tolerance – thus turning that ideal against liberalism – by tending to deny the possibility of universal truth as well as of non-oppressive power and by seeking, through this very denial, a comprehensive redistribution, not so much of wealth as of self-esteem, and not so much to individuals as to various marginalized groups.

To be sure, they develop an extreme position, and one fitting with the radicalism they wish to convey. By these anti-liberal multicultural standards, the state would have little claim to enforce any standards of justice on peoples within it, as any law or policy

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40 Of course, this assertion, which Loobuyck rejects, is tautological. However, within egalitarian liberalism, it is important to distinguish “multicultural” measures beyond what liberalism permits, from the already substantial accommodation available within liberalism. Loobuyck, 109-110
41 Barry, 63-8, Kukathas 115-8, As I show below, they may even permit that the groups be illiberal, so long as they are not given special treatment (i.e. Kukathas 117).
42 Loobuyck, pg. 110
43 Melzer et al., 2
44 Melzer et al., 4
act would merely propagate a hegemonic and dominant ideology. Their language – particularly the ‘impossibility of universal truth’ – is in fact more typical of critics who fear “endless turmoil, ethical relativism, and ultimately nihilism.” However, many scholars do accept, to varying degrees, the limitations liberalism imposes on multiculturalism, precisely because it “absolutizes liberalism” and seeks to impose liberal values on others. This ongoing debate in the realm of radical multiculturalism is engaging and necessary, though mostly outside of the scope of this paper.

Liberal multiculturalism seeks to carve out a middle ground between these two philosophies. As I detail, Kymlicka grounds his defense in much of the same language as Kukathas, and both appeal to the liberal tradition to make their claims. That leads us to a second paradox: it would seem that both egalitarian liberalism and liberal multiculturalism could be supported or contested in the language of liberalism. That the two reach such different conclusions from the same principles is puzzling, unless we appreciate how values are interpreted, applied, and even weighed against each other. The following two sections explore this paradox by highlighting the terms upon which these liberal principles are debated: the first focuses on the distinction between autonomy and freedom (freedom to vs. freedom from), the latter on defining equality.

Still, one alternative narrative we must first consider is that egalitarian liberals and liberal multiculturalists disagree primarily about what values matter (not, as I suggest, the meaning of the values themselves. For example, Barry’s rejection of multiculturalism may stem from the view that equality (and not autonomy) is the heart of

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45 Eller, 251
46 See, for example, Parekh, 109-113
liberalism. Furthermore, though many liberal multiculturalists support the liberal values Kukathas names, autonomy is notably and intentionally absent from the list. We might conclude that the point of distinction between liberals and liberal-multiculturalists stems from a disagreement over the age-old tension between freedom and equality, with each side choosing a favorite. Although there is some truth to this interpretation, I believe the substantial disagreement involves both more subtle and complex understandings, not only of relative worth, but also of the values themselves. I note here a significant difference in interpretation: competing definitions of autonomy, and competing understandings of equality. For this reason, I take each of these in turn, showing the role they play in defenses of multiculturalism, and the challenges these commitments raise.

B. Autonomy and Tolerance: Freedom to or Freedom From?

As I show above, Kymlicka grounds his theory of liberal multiculturalism in both equality between groups and freedom within groups. In Chapter 5 of Multicultural Citizenship, he focuses on autonomy, writing “Liberals can only endorse minority rights in so far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom or autonomy of individuals...[minority rights] are not only consistent with individual freedom, but can actually promote it.” I will not rehash his “context of choice” argument, but he explicitly echoes the language of Rawls and Dworkin in defining autonomy in terms of individual choice and the ability to reflect on and revise these choices; it “allows people to choose a conception of the good life, and then allows them to reconsider that

47 Mitnick writes, “Suffice it to say that, contrary to Barry, many liberal theorists see liberalism as committed, in some sense, foremost to individual autonomy” Eric J Mitnick, “Differentiated Citizenship and Contextualized Morality,” Ethnical Theory and Moral Practice, 7.2 (Apr. 2004), 167
48 This analysis would not suggest that liberal multiculturalists only care about autonomy, nor that ‘egalitarian’ liberals only care about equality, but rather that they differ over the question of which rules out when the two conflict.
decision.” In this way, he makes a case for the importance of culture in providing the individual with the capacity to decide, without relying on reified notions of culture or determinism.

The first important consideration questions whether culture supplements or limits autonomy. Anne Phillips identifies the tendency to view culture as either an enabler, or as a constraint. For those who see culture as enabling, culture provides a range of options; one can make, understand, and revise choices only within these options. By this “enabling” view culture, “we need our cultures in order to be become autonomous beings.” The politics of group-differentiated rights are more easily justified from this conception. On the other hand, some view culture as a constraint on autonomy. Interestingly, those who view culture as a constraint may employ this view either in favor of or in opposition to multiculturalism. A culture-as-constraint argument in favor of multiculturalism would emphasize how cultural belonging produces unequal choices: “it represents (at least some) cultural conventions or values as so much bound up in one’s identity as to become beyond one’s control.” The constraint, though a product of culture, acts from within an individual. By this assessment, cultural rules or practices may make conforming to certain laws or job requirements more difficult, thereby justifying exemptions or special treatment.

49 See also Phillips 38-41
50 Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 75
51 Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 80-1
52 While she identifies the two positions (as arguments for multiculturalism) with Kymlicka and Parekh, I don’t think this opposition necessarily works, as Phillips herself notes, n.16
53 Phillips, 105
54 Phillips continues, “If this [analysis of individual choice] is so, then the very value that liberals attach to autonomy requires them to support policies aimed at protecting and sustaining cultures that might otherwise fall apart,” Phillips 105
55 Phillips, 108
A more meaningful challenge from those who view culture as a constraint emphasizes the ways in which membership in a group may coercively limit individual autonomy. This is a significant challenge to multiculturalism; it suggests that multicultural measures intended to secure the autonomy of individuals could ironically limit it. This line of thinking focuses more on how cultural membership may constrain individuals if cultural practices or even membership without the possibility of exit are forced on an individual by other members of the culture, particularly cultural elites.

This leads to what I see as the most significant debate surrounding autonomy, which pits autonomy against tolerance. This is a tug-of-war between two competing types of freedom: one, a freedom to, the other a freedom from. The question posed is as follows: if we take freedom of choice to be fundamental, how can the state adequately deal with groups who either do not value autonomy, or restrict the autonomy of their own members? This question problematizes autonomy in two ways: first, it asks if liberal autonomy is concerned with the process of decision-making or with its result. Second, and more pressingly, it puts two competing conceptions of freedom in conflict – the freedom to make and pursue ones conception of the good life, and the freedom from government interference, commonly referred to as tolerance. As Gaus shows in his article, “The Place of Autonomy within Liberalism,” the liberal tradition supports liberty as a norm “until some justification is offered for limiting [said] liberty.” Can multiculturalism address this challenge?

Kukathas’s and Kymlicka’s debate in the pages of Political Theory shows the competing degrees of freedom at work here. Their competing perspectives represent two
distinct categories of liberalism. Kukathas initially raises the question of how to address a group that does not value liberalism. He argues that by placing autonomy at the core of liberal multiculturalism, as Kymlicka does, scholars will be drawn to challenge minorities to uphold liberal values via “cultural interference rather than cultural protection.”

Kukathas flatly rejects the importance of autonomy for many groups, writing “critical reflection need play no part in their conception of the good life.” He seeks to turn the tables on Kymlicka, showing that his own logic takes him “down the path of interference,” undermining, rather than promoting, liberty.

Kukathas advocates a “liberal individualist standpoint [that] seeks…balance between the claims of the individual and the interests of the community.” The numerous freedoms (individual rights) they are accorded even permit that these groups be “quite illiberal.” Bhikhu Parekh makes a similar claim, albeit as a criticism of liberal rigidity, not an affirmation of liberal tolerance. He writes, “Paradoxical as it may seem, it is the glory of liberal (that is, tolerant, open and free) society that it is not, and does not need or even seek to become, exclusively or entirely liberal (that is committed to a strong sense of autonomy, individualism, self-creation, and so on). Liberal writers misunderstand its inner logic and strength when they seek to turn it into one.”

Both Parekh and Kukathas see autonomy and tolerance as inherently at odds, criticizing what they see as the logical conclusion a liberal affirmation of individual autonomy – interference and intolerance.

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57 George Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism,” Political Theory 35.2 (Apr., 2007)
58 Kukathas, 122
59 Kukathas, 120
60 Kukathas, 120-121
61 He writes, “If members of a cultural community wish to continue to live by their beliefs, the outside community has no right to intervene to prevent those members acting within their rights” Kukathas, 117
These scholars are more concerned with shielding religious and cultural groups from the state interference than they are with ensuring that these groups foster the capacity for individual choice among their members.

Kymlicka’s response to these critics affirms much of what has already been covered here in terms of his values, but makes an important qualification on this charge. He writes that the charge of the inevitable “path of interference…conflates two distinct questions,” one of “identifying a defensible theory” and another question of “imposing.” Articulating a set of values and coercively enforcing them are separate enterprises. He claims that while we would encourage all groups to respect and foster the autonomy of their members, we would not permit ‘interference’ except in extreme scenarios. Joseph Raz, in his article “Multiculturalism,” articulates a similar balance: while we may seek to “fight superstition, repression, and error wherever we find them…when we do so we are of course constrained by principles of toleration and of respect for people.” Still, the challenge remains: Can multiculturalism promote individual autonomy through groups without diminishing other types of freedom? Although it is possible to find some balance between autonomy and tolerance, I leave open the challenge of whether multiculturalism supplements autonomy as it claims to.

C. Equality, Universality, and Neutrality

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62 Parekh here responds to Rawls, Raz, and Kymlicka. Parekh, 113
64 He writes, “Liberals have no right to impose their views on others. But they do have the right, and indeed the responsibility, to identify what those views actually are” Kymlicka, “The Rights…” 145
65 Joseph Raz “Multiculturalism” Ratio Juris 11.3 (Sept.1998), 205
A second significant set of debates centers on the application and interpretation of equality. Defenders of liberal multiculturalism, like liberal egalitarians, appeal to the language of universality and equality as justifications for minority rights. As above, this defense places a significant burden on the liberal multiculturalists to prove that the measures they propose meet these standards. I build on the three justifications presented at the outset, but work to highlight the tensions among liberals about the meaning and application of equality: How can different treatment be justified in the language of universalism? To what extent is it possible or desirable for the liberal state to claim cultural neutrality? Finally, do group-differentiated rights lead inevitably to inequality either between or within groups?

The meaning of equality has been hotly contested in recent normative debates. As Amartya Sen writes, much of this debate revolves around the question: “equality of what?” Chris Armstrong, in *Rethinking Equality* points to a number of schools of answers, showing how much of the debate stems from disparate ideas of what individuals ought to have the equal opportunity to obtain.

Interestingly, defenders of group-differentiated rights often appeal to the language of equality and even universalism, but reject that either implies uniform treatment. Iris Young, for example, shows how different meanings of universality may conflict: “I argue that far from implying one another, the universality of citizenship, in the sense of the inclusion and participation of everyone, stands in tension with the other two meanings of

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66 Whereas some scholars (Kukathas, for example) deny that individual autonomy need hold a central place in liberalism, liberal scholars are nearly unanimous on the importance of equality, although they differ markedly over both what type of equality matters and over its application. Patrick Neal points out two questions faced by a defender of liberalism: “Why is it right to treat people as equals?” and “What does it mean to treat people as equals?” (679). The debates I trace here focus on the latter question.

universality embedded in modern political ideas: universality as generality, and universality as equal treatment.” She argues that the latter two outweigh the former, and that seeking equality requires recognizing the particular disadvantages individuals face. As Young writes, “the inclusion and participation of everyone in social and political institutions therefore sometimes requires the articulation of special rights that attend to group differences in order to undermine oppression and disadvantage” [emphasis mine].

Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka both ground their theories in the language of universalism as well.

The first step in many of these arguments is to show that the state cannot provide the neutral treatment that ‘difference-blind’ liberals suppose it can. Liberal neutrality would hold that the state acts as an impartial mediator or realm wherein disparate groups can meet and coexist. This norm of a “morally and culturally neutral state,” Bhikhu Parekh argues, “is logically impossible.” All state actions, even the failure to legislate on substantive questions, “have an inescapable moral dimension.” Furthermore, the ‘public’ sphere, though portrayed a neutral grounds, in fact reflects the dominant culture. As Charles Taylor writes,

The claim is that the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of the politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture. Consequently, the supposedly fair and difference-blind society is not only inhumane…but also, in a subtle and unconscious way, itself highly discriminatory.

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69 Young, “Polity”
70 Young, “Polity,” 251
71 Here, the idea of state neutrality and liberal neutrality are inevitably bound together. The claim is that liberalism, embodied by a state, cannot be neutral. Neither can “liberalism” independently be neutral, because it is in itself one of many prioritizations of value.
72 Parekh, 201-2
73 Taylor, 43
The dominant, often majority, culture enjoys a preference and recognition (often unnoticed) in language, holidays, curriculum, norms, and dress. I see two related dimensions of non-neutrality. The first is a passive inequality, as state laws and institutions inevitably and unavoidably capture the traditions, values, and morals of the majority; Young’s defense of “the politics of difference” captures this argument perfectly. Secondly, as I discuss in Chapter 2, the state actively pursues a partial strategy by pursuing a nation-building policy, particularly through language and education. That is, the state seeks to create new members and foster some sort of social cohesion. For Kymlicka, contextualizing multiculturalism policies as a response to nation building involves rethinking the necessary justificatory language; rather than as a demand to “depart from the norm of ethnocultural neutrality,” it is seen as a response to and protection against nation-building. If the premise of neutrality, even in civic nations, is shown to be “manifestly false,” then the burden of proof shifts away from those advocating differential treatment. As Joseph Raz sees it, multiculturalism at its core aspires to “undo some of the harms done by nationalism.” The nation-state, as I show in the next chapter, relies on this process of unification, and therefore stands in explicit tension with multiculturalism.

The measures multiculturalists seek require that the state counterbalance its own passive and active propagation of a dominant culture by either seeking fairer treatment for immigrants against these pressures, or by allowing national minorities to pursue their own nation-building policies to counter those of the dominant majority. However, as with

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75 Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 24
76 Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 24-9
autonomy, multiculturalism faces a critique on its own values: critics affirm that multiculturalism actually creates greater inequality than liberal egalitarianism.

First, defenders of liberal egalitarianism argue that equality does, in fact, require universal rules. For Eric Mitnick, the egalitarian challenge [particularly Barry’s] to multiculturalism is based on the “obvious moral difficulty [of a policy whereby…] social benefits and obligations are distributed in a formally unequal way.” 78 Take Barry’s defense of a uniform legal system: “From an egalitarian liberal standpoint, what matters are equal opportunities. If uniform rules create identical choice sets, then opportunities are equal.” 79 In response to the “same law…different impact” argument, Barry retorts that all laws affect some people more than others, and may even give preference to certain individuals over others (he includes rape law, drunk driving laws, and gun laws as examples). Although “unequal impact of a law may in some cases be an indication of unfairness,” claimants must prove inequality on a case-by-case basis. 80 He rejects the notion that cultural belonging or preference ought to hold any more weight than individual preference, which lawmakers should already consider when deciding whether to ban or allow a particular behavior for the general population. Again, what matters are equal options. These arguments challenge that by departing from a standard of formal, universal equality, multiculturalism abandons what matters most about equality itself.

Liberal multiculturalism must prove that it actually achieves equality in the way it seeks to for society as a whole. This literature asks both “Are the various groups the state

77 Raz, 195
78 Mitnick, 169
79 He continues: “We may expect that people will make different choices from these identical choice sets, depending on their preference for outcomes and their beliefs…But this has no significance: either way it is irrelevant to any claims based on justice, since justice is guaranteed by equal opportunities” Barry, 32
recognizes equal with one another?” and also “Are all members of or within a given group equal?”

At the level of policy, these seemingly theoretical debates are continuing evidence of the difficult challenge faced by governments in recent years. On the one hand, we see continuing pressure towards increasing egalitarianism and universalism that spawned from the French Revolution; on the other, modern scholars’ emphasis on pluralism and difference is gaining traction and importance, as the various proponents of multiculturalism show. The values of liberalism, supposed to be the guiding principles of most modern democracies, are caught in tension between these seemingly contradictory trends. This chapter details how the values are balanced, their meanings debated, and the inconsistencies and contradictions this debate produces. Despite the difficulties, I believe that states face the imperative to address pluralism, as liberal multiculturalism suggests, by moving past universal citizenship, but it must do so while succeeding on its liberal terms.

III. Why Principles Alone Are not Sufficient

Stepping back from the literature, we can see multiculturalism as a balancing act of competing ideals, one that requires a thorough and thoughtful analysis and cannot be solved conclusively. The questions that engage me most ask whether multiculturalism achieves what it seeks to, and whether a liberal multiculturalism is constrained or enhanced by its liberalism. However, I note that the substance of these moral questions seems to be highly shaped by the type and situation of the group in question. Many times,

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80 Barry, 34. A related criticism by Barry and Levey shows that inequality is not an overly broad and therefore insufficient criterion for according special treatment
this distinction is implicit and subtle, but it has a profound impact on the discussion at hand.

In particular, the distinction between national minorities and immigrants appears critical. For example, arguments for increased tolerance gain more traction when the groups in question are considered national minorities: historically or territorially bound nations within states. Immigrants, on the other hand, are more often encouraged to integrate and participate within the larger society; their cultural affiliation is weighed as less valuable. Even more importantly, national minorities are often the bearers of group rights in the form of political autonomy or language rights. Immigrants, on the other hand, are at best granted group-differentiated rights (rights that individuals may exercise by nature of their membership in groups). Disagreements over liberal values alone cannot explain why a rights-based perspective would produce these different outcomes.

For this reason, the distinction between immigrant minorities and national minorities excites me. Though many scholars treat multiculturalism for these two categories of minorities as compatible, distinct projects with the same philosophical foundations, I question whether this division is so neat. In particular, I ask how separate claims for group and group-differentiated rights can be weighed against each other if and when they conflict, as when immigrants seek to settle in national minority territories.

As I explore in the next chapter, both of these forms of multiculturalism frame themselves in liberal language as a response to nation building; but how do they respond to each other? Does self-government for national minorities legitimize illiberal treatment towards immigrant minorities within their borders, denying the possibility of multicultural accommodation? Is immigration a challenge to, or compatible with, the
aims of national minorities for cultural preservation or self-government? Before we can develop hypotheses for each of these questions, we need to better understand the distinct relationship of each type of multiculturalism (national and ethnic) in the context of the nation-state.
Chapter 2: Competing Needs – Nationalism and Minorities

To fully understand multiculturalism, one must first understand nationalism and nation building. Nationalism not only sets the backdrop and context of multiculturalism, but is the force against which multiculturalism acts, as the state pursues policies aimed at creating social unity through shared ways and means of belonging. This chapter explores this tension in order to assess the scope and limits of multiculturalism, and furthermore, to understand how the demands of national minorities and immigrant minorities engage with nation building in distinct ways. This tension is inescapably infused with the language of culture, rights, autonomy and equality I review above.

I begin by focusing on the state itself, the potential benefits of homogeneity and social cohesion, and, more specifically, the normative justification of the nation-state proposed by a liberal nationalism. “Liberal nationalism” appeals to me here because it argues that social cohesion (with the nation as the standard political unit) is necessary for the realization of liberal values. After understanding the political and moral justifications of state-led nation building, I revisit the demands of multiculturalism. Immigrant minorities and national minorities raise discrete challenges that highlight different aspects of the tensions between multiculturalism and nationalism. I address each of these tensions separately. Finally, I ask whether, and how national minorities, which themselves engage in nation building, can reconcile the need for cultural preservation with the challenge of internal diversity raised when immigrants seek to settle within and join the national minority.
I. In Defense of the Nation

A. The Utility Argument for Nationalism

Before turning to the ways that national and immigrant minorities interact with the state, it is important to understand the state itself, and the case for nationalism. After reviewing some terminology, I examine the functional origins of nationalism, showing how nation-states became the norm because of the efficiency and advantage this model of cohesion allowed. Next, I turn to a more recent defense of the nation, developed from a liberal perspective in Yael Tamir’s *Liberal Nationalism*. Together, these arguments help set a framework and move towards social cohesion and sameness that multiculturalism challenges.

First, it is important to clarify the terminology of states, nations, and nationalism. By “state,” I mean a society united under a sovereign government with common institutions on a defined territory.\(^81\) Although I do not attempt to solve the much-discussed question of how to comprehensively define a nation, I follow Yael Tamir and others in asserting it must be marked by some combination of subjective (experienced, or identity) and objective criteria.\(^82\) Take David Miller’s comprehensive definition, for example. He writes, “[A nation is] a community constituted by mutual belief, extended in history, active in character, connected to a particular territory, and thought to be marked off from other communities by its members’ distinct traits”\(^83\) Though scholars may object

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to some of these markers, I define a nation as a group or community with a mixture of both imagined and ‘real’ ties to one another.

Regardless of the specific criteria for nationhood one chooses, Tilly points out two distinct historical meanings of nationalism: “state led nationalism on one side, state-seeking nationalism on the other.”84 State-led nationalism is the belief that it is desirable or necessary for states to engage in nation building by attempting to create the aforementioned subjective and objective aspects of community. State-seeking nationalism, on the other hand, is marked by the claim to “autonomous political status,” the belief that every ‘nation’ should have recognition and institutionalization as a state.85 Both, Tilly writes, “shared the principle of national self-determination: that states should correspond to homogenous peoples, that homogenous peoples had distinctive political interests, that members of homogenous peoples owed strong loyalties to the state that embodied the heritage, that the world should therefore consist of nation-states…”86 Thus, the ideal of the nation-state demonstrates a belief in universal self-determination: that national and state borders should perfectly coincide.

Nationalism, in both cases, is the belief that the nation-state (that is, a state that corresponds to and creates a homogenous people) serves a functional purpose. Though typically measures of inclusion appeal to a shared, almost timeless history as a nation, such primordialist narratives are unrealistic. As Hobswam, Ranger, and Weber note, cultural or national elites often create this common identity as a means of achieving

85 Tilly, 133
86 Tilly, 133
social cohesion.\textsuperscript{87} The functional logic of ‘national’ identity and unity, as histories of nationalism show, preceded the modern era of the nation-state. The ruling or governing class understood this efficiency. As Linz discusses, “the process of unification” of language and law served initially to increase cohesiveness in early republics.\textsuperscript{88} Often, the elite or ruling class led this process, as new governmental and economic cohesion benefited them most directly. The state defines itself by exclusion and finds cohesion in “demarcating by specific categories who is included and who is excluded.”\textsuperscript{89} Although typically the border of inclusion distinguishes members from foreigners (potential or actual members of other nations), Marx notes that the state may even exclude potential members, “to serve the explicit requirements for solidifying core loyalty to the nation.”\textsuperscript{90} This shows that the ideal of homogeneity has both subjective and objective elements.

Therefore, scholars, rulers, and national elites have long acknowledged the benefits to states that actively seek homogeneity both through a process of exclusion and through the dissemination of a national identity, uniform language, and common institutions. Still, these arguments often rely on the language of efficiency and advantage, not on moral justifications.

However, recent scholarship has brought renewed interest in the normative justifications of nationalism, and a new emphasis on a ‘civic’ (open to all, inclusive) rather than ‘ethnic’ nation (“conceived as inherently exclusionary and illiberal”).\textsuperscript{91} To

\textsuperscript{87} As summarized by Marx, 105
\textsuperscript{88} Juan Linz, “State Building and Nation Building,” \textit{European Review} 1.4 (1993) He writes of “a slow and largely unplanned process of nation building took place in those Western European states,” 361
\textsuperscript{89} Anthony Marx, “The Nation-State and Its Exclusions,” \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 117.1 (Spring, 2002) 103
\textsuperscript{90} Marx, 107
\textsuperscript{91} Rainer Baubock, “Beyond Culturalism and Statism,” \textit{Eurosphere Working Paper No.} 6 (2008), 10
better understand the tension between nationalism and multiculturalism, therefore, these scholars ask: “On what grounds is nationalism normatively justified?”

For some scholars, like Yael Tamir, this involves “translat[ing] nationalist arguments into liberal language.” Tamir and others claim that liberals ought not shy away from nationalism as anachronistic and anti-modern, but instead see the ways in which national identity and, crucially, national unity are inherent in the pursuit of liberal values. Liberal nationalism therefore provides a counterpoint to liberal multiculturalism.

B. The Foundations of Liberal Nationalism

Yael Tamir’s *Liberal Nationalism* introduces and develops what she terms liberal nationalism, bringing together two concepts that are seemingly at odds. As she puts it,

Liberal nationalism attempts to capture what is essential to both schools of thought, drawing from liberalism a commitment to personal autonomy and individual rights, and from nationalism an appreciation of the importance of membership in human communities in general, and in national communities in particular.

Her undertaking is engaging and relevant for scholars of multiculturalism not only because she builds upon liberal values, but also because most real-world models of multiculturalism often develop within liberal states. Furthermore, as I show in the preceding chapter, many proponents of multiculturalism challenge nation building as oppressive and inherently biased. Therefore, it is interesting to step back and detail the justifications underlying these contested status and action of the state.

Tamir frames her argument for nation building by first establishing a framework for understanding individuals and nations. She introduces the concept of the “duality” of

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92 Tamir, 14
93 Tamir, 35
the modern individual, who experiences simultaneously “the need to live one’s life from the inside and the need to be rooted.”

She also uses a “cultural rather than a political definition of nationalism,” and defines a nation as possessing “both a sufficient number of shared, objective characteristics – such as language, history, or territory – and self-awareness of its distinctiveness.”

In Chapter 2 of *Liberal Nationalism*, Tamir focuses on the importance of belonging to a national culture. She claims that national membership is “an important and constitutive element of personal identity.” She sees access to national culture as important both as a context for and a subject of choice. That is, national culture matters both in that it enhances individual autonomy (as Kymlicka argues), and also matters because people choose to belong to national cultures. For Tamir, culture matters as a “constitutive choice.” By Tamir’s definition of national culture, these claims also add moral substance to the ideal of the nation-state as a body of political organization that maximally benefits its members.

Tamir next contends that the right to culture, despite its appearances, is an individual rather than a communal right. Once again, she sees this step as crucial in establishing a liberal, as opposed to communitarian, justification for nationalism. She refutes typical rationalizations of national culture as a collective right, concluding, “The right to culture ought to be justified only in reference to its value to members, even if this

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94 I do not mean to suggest that liberal nationalism is inherently against multiculturalism, but I am interested in A) determining the justifications for nation building in liberal nationalism, and B) highlighting the tensions between these nation building policies and multiculturalism.
95 Tamir, 30
96 Tamir, 57
97 Tamir, 66
98 “It is only when we choose to accept our cultural affiliations as well as the values suggested by them, that culture can indeed assume its instrumental value.” Tamir, 36
99 Tamir, 41.
value fails to capture the full worth of preserving a culture.” On this point, she adds a fundamental caveat, and one that is useful to keep in mind throughout this chapter, as well as this thesis as a whole. She distinguishes, “matters of principle” and “matters of policy.” For example, if State Y has 10 rather than 10,000 members of community X, the policies enacted (state funding for churches or schools, exemption laws or self-government rights) may differ drastically, although the right to culture as a moral claim remains unchanged. This example shows, not so much that we should keep moral and political questions completely separate, but how they interact and that we must consider each as it influences the other. Rainer Baubock and David Miller articulate a similar caveat when they argue that political decisions do not flow naturally from moral arguments, and that there is some danger in conflating the two. Particularly in the context of multiculturalism, which bridges ideology and practice, it is important to distinguish between political and moral decisions, even where they intersect.

Tamir must then show how these individual rights are best served by an organization through nations. She does so by arguing that morality is tied to communal life. That is, people will inevitably and justifiably feel a more significant moral

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100 Tamir, 42-5
101 Tamir, 47
102 Tamir, 45
103 Tamir, 53-56, This realization leads Tamir towards a “multiculturalist” conclusion, though she does not label or emphasize it as such. She writes that a smaller community (X) “will get the same number of cultural vouchers per capita, but can do much less with them than members of the Y community…If we wish to ensure that all cultures enjoy an equal chance, we may wish to supplement the funds granted [on a per-capita basis] to members of the X community” Tamir, 55.
104 Baubock writes, “The flaw is that normative culturalism conflates moral reasons for valuing cultural community and diversity with political justifications from institutional arrangements in multicultural democracies… There are no cultural reasons that can tell us, which language deserves protection at which costs to its members and to outsiders, which nation-building project has a claim to a contested homeland, which religious restrictions of liberties for members should be tolerated and which shouldn’t.” 15-6. See also Miller, David “Immigration: the Case for Limits” 2005
105 Tamir, 96-117
obligation to those with whom they associate.\textsuperscript{106} Though individuals have greater obligations to community members,\textsuperscript{107} this does not imply that they have no obligation to non-members,\textsuperscript{108} nor that associative obligations “hide a chauvinistic agenda…[or] imply an objective hierarchy among different forms of life.”\textsuperscript{109} Rather, she asserts that individuals will experience preferential concern for those with whom they most closely associate.

C. The Liberal Case for Nation-Building

With this framework, it is possible to re-visit the advantages of social unity, as Tamir and others have done, from a liberal perspective. Before reviewing these arguments, it is important to maintain the aforementioned distinctions in mind. First, some arguments speak of the importance of perceived unity, whereas others note the benefits of shared objective characteristics, particularly language.\textsuperscript{110} Second, though political and moral justifications are closely related (particularly so when liberal nationalists re-work ‘efficiency’ arguments), these two concepts are and should be maintained as conceptually distinct. Thirdly, although liberal nationalism emphasizes commonality, it also emphasizes openness and inclusion. Unity, therefore, requires that people identify themselves as members of the nation and share formal aspects, like language, of the national culture, but \textit{not} that the state be internally homogenous along

\textsuperscript{106} She captures the complex relationship between the political (inevitable) and moral (justly) levels in the title of her concluding chapter “Making a Virtue out of Necessity”
\textsuperscript{107} Of the basis for these ties, she writes, “It is neither love nor sympathy but connectedness, the belief that we all belong to a group whose existence we consider valuable. Feelings of shame or anger reflect this connectedness as much as feelings of pride or love.” Tamir, 98
\textsuperscript{108} Tamir, 112-114 “Caring for Non-members”
\textsuperscript{109} Tamir, 101
\textsuperscript{110} Of course, characteristics like shared history, to the extent that it reflects both historical events and some degree of interpretation, may fall somewhere between the two.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind the two forms of nationalism mentioned above: state-led nation building, and nation-led state building. Below, I survey justifications for subjective and objective forms of national belonging within a liberal nationalist framework; these arguments provide a counterpoint to multiculturalism by showing the benefits of national unity from a liberal perspective.

One set of liberal nationalist arguments focuses on perceived unity and the types of associative obligations that Tamir discusses. Andrew Mason, surveying the liberal nationalist literature, notes four such arguments for why “a sense of belonging together is a necessary precondition for the realization of liberal values.” Shared identity fosters identification with state institutions, improves stability, increases public trust and compromise, and is necessary for distributive justice associated with the liberal welfare state.\footnote{Mason, 263-5. He draws these arguments from a number of theorists, including J.S. Mill, David Miller, Yael Tamir, Brian Barry, and Roger Scuton}

Liberal nationalists claim that redistributive justice, belonging, stability, and identification are all predicated on the nation as a unit of political organization. As David Miller writes, solidarity not only enables distributive justice, but also fosters the feelings of membership necessary for individuals to act towards the common good, another necessity for democratic politics. “Nationality,” he writes, “is the de facto source of such solidarity.”\footnote{One crucial question, which I address below in discussing the challenge of immigration, is the extent to which non-members can be expected to adopt the national culture as their own.} Thus, even within a ‘civic’ nation, a shared identity at minimum significantly facilitates cohesion and its many benefits, and may even be necessary for their realization.
The liberal nationalist thesis also argues that nation building is legitimate not only as a means of fostering national identity (subjective belonging), but also to impose certain types of objective uniformity, particularly language. Common language facilitates participation and is a prerequisite for democratic politics. As Brian Barry writes, “For democratic politics to work, the citizens must be able to communicate with one another, and have access to the same forums of political debate.” Will Kymlicka makes a similar argument: “Put simply, democratic politics is politics in the vernacular. The average citizen only feels comfortable debating political issues in their own tongue…[W]e can expect – as a general rule – that the more political debate is conducted in the vernacular, the more participatory it will be.” He adds that effective political participation also involves elements of a shared national culture, and politics has a large “ritualistic component.”

Nation building, particularly through universal education, helps to instill common values, build common identity, and also provide tangible linguistic and economic abilities that link the nation together. For example, Ernest Gellner argues that “cultural homogeneity’s efficient gains for communicational transparency are indispensable to modern industrial liberal democracies.” Only a national education system can instill the high level of standardized skills necessary for equal access to the labor market. Though Gellner focuses on this as an element of interchangeability of the workforce, nation

113 Miller, “In Defense of Nationality,” 308
115 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 213.
116 Kymlicka, Vernacular, 213
117 Quoted in Abizadeh, 504
building through standardized education can also be justified from a liberal, equality of opportunity standpoint.

The liberal nationalist position affirms the importance of a sense of social cohesion, and therefore validates and even encourages state efforts to build a national culture through national education, curricula, and shared history. These scholars make compelling arguments for a common language and culture as unifying, rather than divisive forces; liberal nationalism, in contrast to multiculturalism, uses liberalism to justify national unity and homogeneity. Nation building, therefore, has both benefits and costs. Despite its inclusivity, liberal nationalism encourages minorities to join, participate, and engage largely on the dominant culture’s terms. Furthermore, liberal nationalism faces the challenge of how to manage those who are outside or in transition, and even those who reject the dominant culture – precisely the challenge raised by multiculturalism.

Below, I discuss how immigrant minorities and national minorities pose distinct challenges to the nation-state. In the following section, I examine the case of cultural or ethnic diversity in the state caused by migration. Newcomers highlight the challenges and limits of the state’s treatment of difference. In the third part of this chapter, I look at the case of national minority groups, and their demand for political autonomy through self-government. Though there are key differences among them, both respond uniquely to nation building, and help to expose the challenging balance of ideals multiculturalism sets out to achieve.
II. Immigration and Integration: Immigrant Minorities and the Nation-State

The arguments above show the benefits of homogeneity among the citizens of a state, both as a matter of identity (subjective association), and through the practice of actual shared traits. Cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity, increasingly a reality for modern states, raise both theoretical and concrete challenges to the nation-state, which I explore here. In broad terms, immigration policy comprises two parts: one which regulates the movement of persons, and another which determines the conditions, contracts, terms of membership, and rights of those who arrive. Ricard Zapata-Barrero terms the first the “level of accesses to territory” and the latter “the level of coexistence.”118

A. The Level of Access: Inclusion and Exclusion

The question of inclusion and exclusion is marked on either extreme by either a policy of unrestricted “open borders” or a policy of complete exclusion. These correspond to two distinct principles: the “ideal of free immigration,” on the one hand, and the “ideal of self-determination” on the other.119 Immigration policy, particularly as it deals with admission into a given territory, often balances aspects of each of these ideals, however it is worth examining each briefly.

Advocates of free immigration and open borders generally argue that freedom of movement is a basic and universal freedom. The case for free immigration, as articulated by Chandran Kukathas, starts from the assumption of full and equal freedoms and sees closed borders as a restriction on that freedom; such a restriction he argues, must be

119 Tamir, 158
justified. It denies freedom of movement (and potential freedom gained by entering more just societies), free access to the market, and finally, freedom of association.\textsuperscript{120} One’s place of birth, citizenship status, and even the borders of the international system are arbitrary, and have no moral weight to limit freedom. The injustice of such a limitation is compounded by the economic disparity between the global north and south, which places many in a situation of disadvantage arbitrarily determined by their place of birth, and arbitrarily limited by political borders.

Chaim Gans, likewise, speaks of a ‘globalist’ moral framework, whereby “human beings as such…are the primary beneficiaries of justice, and not human beings as inhabitants of a particular part of the world.”\textsuperscript{121} Rejecting “pure nationality-based immigration policies…presuppose[s] that states do have obligations to assist in implementing certain values (such as freedom of movement, distributive justice and pluralism) not only within their own jurisdiction.”\textsuperscript{122} Although fully open borders are not a practicable reality, as even Kukathas admits, there is a strong case to be made for the type of globalist, humanist position to encourage states to accept migrants. States cannot claim responsibility exclusively to their own citizens.

What is open for debate, therefore, is how the state can balance its own need for cohesion with the competing demand for global justice. David Miller, in “Immigration: The Case for Limits,” disputes claims for open migration from a liberal nationalist standpoint, arguing that unrestricted migration should not be considered a basic right. He argues that rather than unrestricted movement, individuals have a right only to “sufficient

\textsuperscript{120} Kukathas, “Immigration,” 210
\textsuperscript{121} Gans does not argue for fully open immigration policies. Chaim Gans, “Nationalism and Immigration,” \textit{Ethical Theory and Moral Practice} 1.2 (1999), 162
\textsuperscript{122} Gans “Nationalism and Immigration,”171
freedom of movement...even though the extent of free movement is very far from absolute.”

Except for the case of refugees, home countries generally provide an “adequate range of options” of internal movement, even if an individual cannot have his or her ideal. Miller also argues that an immigrant’s right to enter other societies does not follow as a consequence of the right to exit one’s own. If a citizen leaves society A, “it seems that [choice] can be exercised provided that at least one other society, society B say, is willing to take him.” As Miller notes, many rights (like marriage) cannot be exercised without a willing partner. Thus, an individual state has no obligation to accept a migrant simply because it may be that person’s first choice. It is the migrant’s prerogative to find a willing receiving state. Furthermore, Miller distinguishes between moral and political justifications with respect to universal human rights: “accepting that every human being is equally an object of moral concern – does not yet tell us what we are required to do for them as a result of that equality.” He proposes that we might accept the impossibility of ensuring exactly equal opportunities, but strive to ensure that “[individuals’] basic rights are respected...to a certain minimum level.”

Miller’s primary defense for restrictive immigration policy builds on the justification that “a common public culture...serves valuable functions in supporting democracy and other social goals,” as explained above. He makes three assumptions about immigration and the bidirectional transformation it produces:

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124 He writes, “So although people certainly have an interest in being able to migrate internationally, they do not have a basic interest of the kind that would be required to ground a human right. It is more like my interest in having an Aston Martin [an ideal choice] than my interest in having access to some means of physical mobility.” Miller, “Limits,” 196
125 Miller, “Limits,” 198
126 Miller, “Limits,” 199

Linton 51
(a) that immigrants will enter with cultural value, including political values, that are more or less different from the public culture of the community they enter; (b) that as a result of living in that community, they will absorb some part of the existing public culture, modifying their own values in the process; and (c) that their presence will also change the public culture in various ways.\textsuperscript{127}

These assertions are valid, and appear to be shared by most scholars of immigration. With these claims, Miller notes two processes provoked by immigration. The first process (point b, above) notes the fluid nature of immigrant culture. As Tamir explains, “Choice does not necessarily mean selecting between two well-structured alternatives, but can also involve creating a series of variations combining the old and new, which may result in a proliferation of cultural alternatives.”\textsuperscript{128} This notion of cultural fluidity is consistent with Anne Phillips’ discussion of culture above. The second process explains that diversity necessarily affects pre-existing members of the community, including the very identity of the community itself. As Miller aptly notes, this change is inevitable.

More controversially, Miller defends limiting migration as a means of protecting “cultural continuity.” Current members do not care about just any public culture, but their own: “they want to be able to shape the way that their nation develops, including the values that are contained in the public culture [emphasis mine].”\textsuperscript{129} He concludes, “So a political judgment needs to be made about the scale and type of immigration that will enrich rather than dislocate the existing public culture.”\textsuperscript{130} As a matter of principle, Miller contends that, barring explicit racism or sexism\textsuperscript{131}, “receiving states are entitled to consider the benefit they would receive from admitting a would-be migrant as well as the

\textsuperscript{127} Miller, “Limits,” 199-200.
\textsuperscript{128} Tamir, 49-50
\textsuperscript{129} Miller, “Limits,” 200
\textsuperscript{130} Miller, “Immigration: The Case for Limits” pg. 201
\textsuperscript{131} Again, these arguments do not apply to refugees
strength of the migrant’s own claim.” While this makes logical sense, it remains open to the criticism that nation-states will seek to minimize the change to their national culture through *de facto* or *de jure* discrimination among would-be candidates. Why would nations not choose to admit only affluent, educated workers liable to contribute most or create an easier “symbiosis” with the current national culture?

Questions pertaining to selection and admission criteria for immigrants reappear in later chapters in the context of national minorities’ desire to control immigrant flows. In these contexts, many of the same questions about the right to movement and selection criteria gain the added element of cultural preservation within a larger state. The arguments for inclusion and exclusion at the “level of access to territory,” which I discuss here, provide a basic context for understanding my assessment of national minority admission policy below.

B. The Level of Coexistence: Immigrant Integration and Accommodation

The second interaction between state nationalism and immigrants occurs at the “level of coexistence,” which questions what sort of treatment immigrants or non-members ought to receive and can fairly demand once they have entered. Internal diversity, particularly when caused by migration, challenges both subjective and objective aspects of national cohesion. The language scholars use to describe policies of incorporating immigrants shows how language (e.g. integration vs. assimilation) and assessments about the legitimacy of integration practices often conflate with one another. The level of co-existence indicates the openness of the state to immigrant diversity,

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132 Miller, “Limits,” 204
prompting scholars to attempt to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate practices of integration.

From a liberal nationalist perspective, if what matters is national culture, diversity will not pose a problem in so far as non-members can be incorporated into that national culture. As Yael Tamir writes,

Once individuals have formally joined a political community they should be treated as equals… The political culture should be open to all and members of national minorities ought to be encouraged to participate and integrate into the political sphere.\textsuperscript{133}

Tamir tries to balance the state’s need for unity with a liberal commitment to the individual, even as the two are at odds, by advocating openness. From a liberal nationalist perspective, it is justifiable and even necessary for the state to pursue a policy of integration to minimize the threat cultural diversity may pose to social cohesion. However, there is a high degree of inconsistency from one author to another in terms of how the process of immigrant adaptation is described. In particular, scholars often make distinctions between proper and improper expectations for how immigrants are incorporated or encouraged to adjust to the cultural, linguistic, political, and economic life of a new society. Tamir and others follow a common distinction between the acceptable ‘integration’ and the undesirable alternative, ‘assimilation’, which connotes insensitivity and obligation.

Rogers Brubaker builds on this distinction between just and unjust forms of integration, although he uses the language of ‘assimilation’ differently. One extreme of accommodation policies he refers to as “Anglo-conformity.” He refers to historical examples of “harshly homogenizing state projects” which derided or shamed outsiders or
imposed imperialist expectations, policies, and practices in order to achieve homogeneity. As Brubaker writes, this model was cast aside in the “differentialist turn” of the 1980s and 1990s, which focused on various types of difference (Black Power, gay rights, recognition of indigenous people) including immigration.

For Brubaker, assimilation is an umbrella term encompassing a range of particular adaptation policies. Assimilation can be “general and abstract,” or “specific and organic.” The difference between the general and specific sense of the word is that the former allows for a process and spectrum of change, whereas the latter “implies complete absorption.” He writes,

In the general, abstract sense, the accent is on the process, not on some final state, and assimilation is a matter of degree. Assimilation designates a direction of change, not a particular degree of similarity. In the specific, organic sense, by contrast, the accent is on the end state and assimilation is a matter of either/or, not of degree.

He furthermore describes an intransitive and a transitive use (to become vs. to make similar), and argues that the only respectable form of assimilation must be both intransitive and general. This intransitive form of assimilation, which focuses on the process of becoming more similar, closely resembles mainstream use of the terms “integration, adaptation, or incorporation.” States have shifted in recent years towards

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133 Tamir, 161
134 Rogers Brubaker, “The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24.4 (2001), 533. By this model of integration, according to Kymlicka, “Immigrants were expected to assimilate to existing cultural norms, and, over time, become indistinguishable from native born citizens in their speech, dress, leisure activities, cuisine, family size, identities, and so on.” Will Kymlicka, Vernacular, 153
135 Brubaker, 532
136 He continues, “The two meanings are related, but they differ sharply in their affective overtones, moral and political connotations, and intellectual respectability.” Brubaker, 534
137 Brubaker, 534
138 Brubaker, 534
using these terms to replaced “assimilation,” though Brubaker contends this reflects mostly a change in discourse, not policy.

Andrew Mason, too, has sought to define the limits of what is acceptable or unacceptable for the state to pursue in terms of encouraging social unity.\(^{139}\) He distinguishes radical and moderate assimilationists, as well as coercive and non-coercive means. Moderate assimilation will not require that members of the non-dominant culture will “abandon all their distinctive customs [but instead] abandon only those customs and practices which are either unjust or in conflict\(^ {140}\) with some of the central public customs and practices of the non-dominant group.\(^ {141}\) Furthermore, assimilation policy must be judged by its means of enforcement. He writes,

Coercive measures might include laws which prohibit members of a cultural community from engaging in their customs and practices. In their most extreme form, this could involve laws against practicing a particular religion, or against wearing certain kinds of dress, or using certain languages in public places. Noncoercive measures, in contrast, might include giving the customs and symbols of the dominant culture public status and respect…employing the language of the dominant culture in public affairs; requiring that state schools teach in that language and educate children in the history, geography, and literature of the dominant culture; subsidizing the dominant culture in various ways…

Although coercive measures are almost always oppressive (except in the case of unjust cultural practices), Mason suggests that a moderate, non-coercive assimilation policy could fulfill the nationalist criteria to foster a sense of belonging together, while

\(^{139}\) In his article, “Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism, and the Ethics of Assimilation,” Mason details the liberal-nationalist position, offers a reading of assimilation policies, and finally argues that a “sense of belonging” may be sufficient grounds for national cohesion, rather than the thicker “sense of belonging together.”

\(^{140}\) To some, the idea that we might allow those behaviors that do not “conflict” reads as hegemonic. See Slavov Zizek’s reproach: “This is liberal-tolerant racism at its purest: this kind of ‘respect’ for the other is the very form of appearance of its opposite, of patronizing disrespect. The very term ‘tolerance’ is here indicative: one ‘tolerates’ something one doesn’t approve of, but cannot abolish, either because one is not strong enough to do it or because one is benevolent enough to allow the Other to stick to its illusion.”

Appendix: Multiculturalism, the Reality of an Illusion, “http://www.lacan.com/essays/?page_id=454

\(^{141}\) Mason, 267
avoiding the oppression that generally goes along with it.142 Clearly, the terminology for integration practices differs from scholar to scholar, but each author nonetheless details limits for fair adaptation. As with questions of admission, the question of integration resurfaces in the context of immigrant integration into national minorities. In this context, it is useful to think about the integration policies enacted by the minority as they relate to the language above. Do national minorities pursue radical, coercive policies, or are they able to treat integration as a matter of degree, chosen by the immigrant herself. Though I do not use the terminological distinction between just integration and unjust assimilation, it is important to consider the intentions and means of integration policy, as I do with respect to national minorities below.

Multiculturalism poses a distinct challenge in the realm of integration: that states must proactively recognize and accommodate difference. However, it is not clear whether we should consider multiculturalism as an extension of fair integration policy, or a separate demand entirely. Is assimilation a precondition for multiculturalism, or are the two perhaps opposed? Many critics of multiculturalism – scholars, social commentators, and politicians alike – see multicultural policies as a driving force of separatism that undermines a necessary social unity. British Prime Minister David Cameron, for example, claimed, “Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream.”143 This interpretation sees multiculturalism as a force that counters the process of adaptation

142 Mason, 271
and incorporation of immigrants by undercutting the social fabric and national cohesion of the nation-state.

However, supporters of multiculturalism see a response to and improvement upon previous policies of integration. Multiculturalism demands that the state be accommodating of difference in order to be more inclusive. Kymlicka, for example, dismisses critics who “view multiculturalism in isolation,” and do not account for the other government policies that encourage integration.\footnote{He writes, “For example, it is still the case that immigrants must speak English to gain citizenship, or to graduate from high-school, or to get government employment, or to gain professional accreditation… These are the basic pillars of government-supported integration within liberal democracies.” Kymlicka, Vernacular, 155.} Even the non-coercive, moderate means introduced above affect immigrant’s education, financing, health, professional life etc.: “[They] encourage, pressure, even legally force immigrants to take steps towards integrating into society.”\footnote{Kymlicka, Vernacular, 155} This does not mean, for Kymlicka, that nation building is illegitimate or ought to be discontinued. However, it does require that we rethink multiculturalism as a legitimate response to nation building that seeks participation on “fairer terms,” not isolation. For Kymlicka, recognizing immigrant multiculturalism on these grounds requires both understanding that integration occurs slowly over generations, and ensuring that public institutions provide the equally respectful and accommodating treatment to minorities as they do the dominant group.\footnote{Kymlicka, Vernacular, 162}

Kymlicka includes a list of twelve common ‘multicultural reforms’ advanced by immigrants. These include affirmative action policies in “major educational and economic institutions”, quotas in legislative bodies, culture-specific curricula revision, accommodation and recognition of holidays (or exemptions from Sunday-closing...}
legislation), dress code exemptions, “anti-racism educational programs,” anti-harassment rules, “cultural diversity training for the police or health care professionals,” “guidelines about ethnic stereotypes in the media,” public funding for ethnic or cultural scholarship or festivals, mother-tongue services for immigrants, and “bilingual education programs for children of immigrants.”

He argues that the diverse policies sought under immigrant multiculturalism show the importance of participation and inclusion – the very things assimilation policies aim for. The first three policies he lists, focused on affirmative action and group representation, “are intended to help immigrants enter into mainstream societal institutions.” All the others, except for the last two, “are intended to make immigrants feel more comfortable within these institutions once they are there.” For Kymlicka, the fact that these policies focus on inclusion and participation in common institutions readily disputes the fear of social cleavages. What these policies seek to challenge are the terms of integration. He writes, “They are rejecting Anglo-conformity, but not integration.” Kymlicka’s narrative of these policies may even downplay the gravity of what he lays out: exemptions from laws and affirmative action policies, for example, are significant, long-term changes.

The last two forms of accommodation, mother-tongue services and bilingual education, are notably harder for Kymlicka to defend. He classifies both as “temporary,”

148 Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 164
149 He writes, “None of these [first ten] policies involve encouraging immigrant groups to view themselves as separate…On the contrary, they are intended precisely to make it easier…to participate within the mainstream institutions of the existing society.” Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 165
150 Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 165
and works to portray them as “short-term forms of institutional separateness [which] promote long-term institutional integration.”

Kymlicka and others offer multicultural rights as a counter-balance to, not in place of, nation building. This narrative correctly refutes the often nativist undertones of the belief that immigrants reject the dominant culture and tear apart the social fabric, but it may understate the gravity of immigrant demands, and the significant pull these demands place on the state. Once again, I consider whether these same concerns immigrants provoke (and the difficulties of multicultural accommodation) might be amplified in the context of national minority, which seeks cultural preservation in the already unstable context of a larger sovereign state.

As we can see, diversity and the demands that accompany it provoke serious challenges to the nation-building model of social cohesion. Still, I do not think that all integration is inevitably oppressive, particularly if the nation is able to take the rights and interests of non- or new members seriously. What policies best suit these interests is not something that we can judge in advance, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. As Brubaker concludes, we must transition from seeing immigrants as “objects” to seeing them as “subjects,” members of heterogeneous, multi-generational and fluid groups.

This framework reinforces the idea that integration is not an A-to-B transition, but a process of reflection, hybridization, and choice. Still, fairness requires a careful balance between the needs and demands of non-members and the needs of the state.

Both of the pertinent questions about immigration and nationalism are ultimately questions of degree: How much (and how quickly) can immigrants be expected to

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152 Brubaker, 542-3
integrate? How much can the state accommodate diversity without losing or dramatically altering its foundations? What matters most, I believe, is that these questions are asked, and options are weighed, in every case. But most importantly, the interests of the state must not automatically outweigh those of the immigrants. Below, I detail the demands of national minorities. Interestingly, the national minority-state relationship, like the immigrant minority-state relationship, also raises questions of inclusion and exclusion, and the limits of integration.

III. National Minorities, Self-Determination, and Multinational States:

In this section, I show how national minority demands challenge liberal nationalism. I engage with two questions here; first, how should states respond to minorities within their borders who see themselves as a distinct nation. Liberal nationalism advocates self-determination, yet empirically nation and state borders do not always overlap. Next, I focus on the major multicultural accommodation sought by national minorities: self-government. This right raises difficult questions, particularly in the context of the right to cultural survival, which many see as inherently connected to minority self-government. I detail these challenges with a critical eye to how the arrangements might affect immigrants within nested nations.

A. Nations within Nations

Our discussion of immigration and the challenges of diversity presupposed the existence of states; however, these units are themselves products of complex political processes of state formation, self-determination, or secession. Although we tend to conceive of the world as organized by nation states, there are many examples of stateless nations. Frequently, minorities within states see themselves as national minorities,
possessing what Tamir calls a “national culture,” but lacking an institutional framework of self-government. As with immigrants, the existence of national minorities creates two points of tension for the nation state. The first, often discussed under the rubric of self-determination or secession, questions how states ought to respond to demands for self-government (either autonomy within, or secession from, preexisting states). The latter questions the dimensions and limits of this self-government: cultural survival, and the policies it supports, is a crucial but controversial dimension of self-government.

As liberal nationalists argue, individuals who see themselves as members of a national culture have a strong interest in living within that culture. Recall from above that the “ideal” of the nation-state is legitimated on the premise of its universal application: to every state a nation, and to every nation a state. However, as Michael Keating and others write, there are many more nations than there are viable states. Looking out over the global landscape, the reality is, not surprisingly, far messier than this ideal would suggest. Even if one could easily define and classify all nations, the “borders” of these groups would not fit neatly with geopolitical borders. On this point, Keating speaks of a “blurring of sovereignty” noting examples both of diversity within states (Scotland and Wales, for example) as well as supranational organizations of states, like the EU. As Tamir writes, even as globalization pulls states to realize the “advantages of transnational cooperation, [this stands in tension with an] increasing concern with the preservation of national and cultural uniqueness.” For divided states, national differences are a significant challenge to social cohesion. Self-determination through secession would seem an ideal remedy to these conflicts. A significant body of literature has addressed

153 Keating, “So many nations…” 39-64. See also Linz, 356
154 Keating, pg. 58
this question by focusing on justifying the moral and legal right to self-determination (often through secession or division) and working to define the groups to whom this right belongs.\textsuperscript{156}

However, for a variety of reasons, secession alone is incapable of solving the “problem” of multi-national states. The reality of cohabitating or competing nations produces more complex models of belonging and political power distribution than those addressed above with respect to ethnic diversity. David Miller addresses this problem directly in his chapter, “Nationality in Divided Societies.” He provides three models of divided societies: “ethnic cleavages [not considered multinational],” “rival national groups”\textsuperscript{157} and “nested nationalism.”\textsuperscript{158} I am most interested in the last one, which examines the reality of “two or more territorially based communities…within the framework of a single nation, so that members of each community typically have a split identity.”\textsuperscript{159} Miller’s descriptive language of “communities” within a “nation” (rather than “nations” within a state) betrays his position; he does not view Spain or Canada as “multi-national states” (a term he instead associates with rival nations within a state) because, he says, they are defined more by an “over-arching nation-state” and “split-level identities” for national minorities within.\textsuperscript{160} Still, his language is useful in helping to conceptualize the presence of national minorities within larger states. Furthermore, his

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\textsuperscript{155} Tamir, pg. 58
\textsuperscript{156} Avashai Margalit and Joseph Raz “National Self-Determination,” Journal of Philosophy 87.9 (1990). Tamir, Ch. 3. The question of self-government is widely discussed among scholars of nationalism.\textsuperscript{157} Rival National groups have “mutually exclusive national identities” and often “rival territorial claims.” Therefore, the possibility of coexistence or a shared state is slim. Miller, “Nationality in Divided Societies,” in Alain Gagnon and James Tully eds. Multinational Democracies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 303
\textsuperscript{158} Miller, “Nationality in Divided Societies,” 301
\textsuperscript{159} Miller, “Nationality in Divided Societies” 304
idea of split identity (that one can feel Basque and Spanish, for example) is helpful in explaining why these groups may choose not to secede despite their national identity.

National minorities (interchangeably, nested nations) face a difficult situation: they are subject to the political power and pressure to assimilate from the state, yet many important aspects of their lives, as Margalit, Raz, Kymlicka, and Tamir show, are bound up in their ability to live within and have control over their national / societal culture. In order to achieve this, these groups demand self-government; this demand creates both practical and theoretical challenges. Much of the justification behind this demand has already covered, both in the importance of societal cultures for individual choice and wellbeing, and in the liberal nationalist extension of this argument to the nation as a meaningful unit of political organization. Furthermore, national minority multiculturalism, like immigrant multiculturalism, situates itself in opposition to, and as a reaction against state-led nation building. In the following section, I focus on the most important aspect of national minority multiculturalism: self-government.

B. Group Rights, Self-Government, and Cultural Survival

The critical aspect of national minority self-government is that it counters nation building with nation building. That is, the minority government, too, tries to establish the subjective and objective aspects of a nation within its territory. There are two aspects of minority nation building that I examine in further detail, as both highlight the challenge of a liberal multiculturalism for national minorities: First that it is a right held by groups; second, that it implies or justifies the right to cultural survival. These two claims seem to be mutually reinforcing.

160 Miller, “Nationality in Divided Societies,” 318. Still, I follow the rest of the contributions in Multinational Democracies in classifying states with nested nations as “multinational,” and will continue to
The question of whether multiculturalism supports (or should support) group or individual rights produces no clear answer and much controversy. In the discussion of tolerance and autonomy introduced in the first chapter, some liberals focused on individuals as the bearers of multicultural rights to emphasize the importance of protecting these individuals from coercion by cultural elites. Still, the distinction between group and group-differentiated rights is not so neat. Anne Phillips, for example, specifies:

I am not objecting to either the funding of ethnocultural associations or measures to raise the political representation of people from minority groups [either of which might be considered group rights]. My objection, instead, is to measures that enhance the regulatory authority of a group over its members.  

Similarly, Will Kymlicka offers a nuanced defense of certain group rights, writing that what matters more than whether rights are individual or collective is that they must supplement, not restrict individual rights. Group rights might take the form of either “internal restrictions…the right of a group against its own members” or “external protections…the right of a group against the larger society, designed to protect the group…” As Kymlicka writes, “given the commitment to liberal autonomy, I argue that liberals should be skeptical of claims to internal restrictions.” The most significant rights demanded by national minorities are group rights surrounding self-government and the importance of cultural protection. As such, they are open to the criticism of failing to live up to their liberal values.

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use the terminology “national minority” to refer to Catalonia and Quebec.

161 Phillips, 169
162 Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 22. For another interesting take, see Baubock, who argues that all rights can be justified in liberal individualist terms, although they may require “institutional arrangements [that are] particularistic and collective as we move from liberty via equality to self-government.”
163 I would add here that caution with internal restrictions ought to matter equally, if not more, when those restricted are not members of the group, but would be nonetheless subject to its dictates.
164 Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 22
165 Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 22
To test this claim, I use Kymlicka’s “Human Rights and Ethnocultural Justice” in *Politics in the Vernacular*, in which he explains and defends the collective nature of national minority rights. He argues that human rights are “insufficient” for protection of national minorities, and may require supplementation with minority (group) rights in three ways: migration and settlement policies, boundary and territory rights, and language rights. Though Kymlicka frames all three of these rights as external protections, I read these critically with an eye towards how the exercise of these rights affects members of the group, and non-members within or wishing to enter.

Kymlicka first discusses policies of migration or settlement restrictions, opening with the idea that states may use resettlement policy to threaten the national minority “both to break open access to their territory’s natural resources, and to disempower them politically by turning them into a minority even within their own traditional territory.” Protection against the state justifies land rights, and national minority control over immigration policy. Because they must offset the threat of state incursion, a self-governing minority might demand “lengthy residency requirements” for immigrants before they were given voting rights, or mandate its own language in public schools, courts, or institutions. By focusing on these restrictions as means of *protection* against the nationalist, assimilationist desires of the “dominant” culture, Kymlicka moves quickly to self-government rights that limit the very protections he advocates elsewhere for immigrants. Moreover, addressing the fear that these restrictions are unjust, he merely

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166 Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 73
167 Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 74
draws parallels to the state’s integrationist policy, rather than offering a justification for why the national minority’s rights trump those of ethnic or immigrant minorities.\textsuperscript{168}

Kymlicka has more success portraying the subsequent group right, control of “boundaries and powers of internal political subunits,” as an external protection. He argues that states may draw borders “so as to disempower national minorities” by dividing the nation or allowing the “minority’s territory [to be] absorbed into a larger political subunit.”\textsuperscript{169} However, in the third right, “official language policy,” he again transitions from the need for external protections to limiting the autonomy of individuals within the society. Defending against claims of illiberalism, Kymlicka parallels the efforts of the national minority to ensure language survival with the ‘official’ language of the majority’s “government bureaucracy, courts, schools” etc.

One potential remedy to the language dominance of the ‘majority’ would be to legally guarantee the minority’s ability to use its language. Kymlicka sees this as insufficient: “But it is difficult to sustain such a predominant status for a minority language, particularly if newcomers to the minority’s territory are able to become education and employed in the majority language.”\textsuperscript{170} Therefore, national minority protection may involve illiberal restrictions on immigrants, and rule out the possibility of multiculturalism \textit{within} the nested nation. I believe he finds strong justifications for minority national multiculturalism, but does not provide us with a good reason for summarily overruling the demands of immigrants.\textsuperscript{171}

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Elsewhere, Kymlicka considers the relationship between immigrant integration and national minority autonomy, as I discuss below. I do not mean to misrepresent his argument, but to show how, by his own argument, external protections may require internal restrictions.
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This defense of national minority self-government as a group right points to a related and challenge question: is there a right to cultural survival? Recall Charles Taylor’s move to link the politics of recognition with the right to cultural survival: “[the goal is to] maintain and cherish distinctness, not just now but forever. After all, if we’re concerned with identity, then what is more legitimate than one’s aspiration that it never be lost?” Yet the legitimacy of this right divides scholars. On a practical level, the self-government rights, particularly those that help secure the national culture through language policy and membership restrictions, are fundamental to cultural survival. As Dominique Arel writes, in “Political Stability in Multinational Democracies,” the “fear of minorization” is a fundamental driving force for nationalism. This fear is even more acute for national minorities “Nationalism thrives on the perception that the culturally defined nation is in danger of becoming a minority on its ‘own’ territory (the homeland) due to birth rate differentials, immigration flows, or assimilation.” National minorities face a double fear, one from internal minorization, and the other from external cultural dominance or assimilation into the supra-national or state culture. The policies they institute in self-government and nation building seek to protect against both of these fears.

But is there a moral reason to secure a nation against minorization? One potential response, introduced above, is that individuals benefit from access to their national cultures and nation-states help to guarantee this access. Yet Tamir, for example, who agrees with this premise, argues that although national cultures are necessary for states,

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172 Taylor, 57
174 Arel, 77
there is no strong reason to suggest that a particular national culture’s survival is worthy of protection. As she writes, “Defining a political entity as a national community is only justified if a substantial majority of its citizens has consented to this definition. This implies that the national character of a political entity is to be determined de facto and not de jure.” Still others argue against this “freedom-based” conception of the nation specifically because it cannot account for the importance of cultural survival. This fascinating debate is all the more complex as we consider that any national culture is heterogeneous, and inevitably prone to change over time. The scholarship remains divided on this crucial question, particularly because of the seemingly illiberal costs ensuring cultural protection incurs, even if survival is seen as a liberal right. The possibility of a right to cultural survival is fundamental to the case studies I review.

Nested nations engage in nation building, but do so in opposition to the nation building of the dominant state. This framing of minority nation building as protection significantly alters the scope of the projects that the national minority may seek, as well as the normative considerations surrounding these efforts. The added element of cultural survival, or even a fixed cultural identity, invariably shapes policies. Furthermore, self-government can only be achieved by group rights, and must accept the difficulties that accompany these rights.

IV. Minorities within Minorities: Immigration in Nested Nations

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175 She continues, “Hence, attempts such as that of Israeli law to bar parties that deny the Jewish character of the state from standing for election is unjustified.” Tamir,158.

176 Gans writes, “The freedom-based argument …cannot explain the historical and inter-generational dimension characteristic of nationalist demands and aspirations…the demand to survive through historical time is an essential component of nationalism” Gans, “Immigration,” 164-5.
Above, I ask whether self-government for nested nations necessarily legitimates illiberal treatment towards minorities by denying the possibility of multicultural accommodation. Whereas often these two types of multiculturalism are treated as distinct projects, from what we can see in this chapter, they are closely related, and perhaps even in tension. However, in the context of nationalism, we see an interesting dynamic. Whereas both immigrant and national minority multiculturalism are justified by recognizing the importance of culture as it stands in opposition to the homogenizing pull of the nation-state, nested nations respond by engaging in their own nation-building project. They assume many of the roles of government, ostensibly to protect themselves against the assimilation into the state. But they, too, encounter internal diversity in the form of immigration to their ‘own’ territory. These immigrants, not surprisingly, bring with them demands for recognition, fair terms of integration, and even multicultural accommodation. Paradoxically, the very rights national minorities demand as cultural protection and recognition may stand in opposition with the challenges of internal diversity. What remains to be seen is the extent to which the nested nation is capable of balancing its desire to maintain a distinct society with these challenges.

This question has both political and moral dimensions. First, can national minorities create means of integration and belonging that will be open and accessible to new members and the demands for accommodation that they make? Second, are these responses morally legitimate on liberal grounds? Although I have developed an extensive framework for answering this latter question, I cannot proceed without the former. Therefore, we must turn to cases of nested nations.
In the following chapters, I address the tension between national minority self-governance and immigrant integration and accommodation through case studies. I am interested in developing a case-oriented framework for understanding the various dimensions of the immigrant-host relationship in nested nations, and thinking about the ways in which these projects might be compatible or incompatible. The normative literature I survey in Chapters 1 and 2 sets the backdrop for this relationship by establishing a framework for understanding liberalism and multiculturalism, and positioning two distinct minorities in relation to the nation-state. The following chapters build from this framework to understand how national minorities and immigrant minorities interact under national minority self-governance.
Chapter 3: Case Methodology

I. Introduction: Why Use Case Studies?

In the preceding chapters, I introduce a normative framework for understanding the complexities and contradictions of liberal multiculturalism, and also position both national minorities and immigrant minorities in tension with the nation-state. However, though each minority interacts with the nation-state in distinct ways, it is still unclear how they interact with each other when immigrants seek to settle in the territory of the nested nation. Are self-governing national minorities capable of fairly managing new internal diversity introduced by immigration, or is immigration inherently a challenge to the nationalist project and self-preservation? Can nested nations adopt ‘civic’ means of belonging, open to all would-be members, or would doing so contradict their fundamental purpose? Moreover, can new members be integrated only on the terms of the majority, or is the nation capable of multicultural accommodation for immigrant minorities? Might they even be more likely to respect and accommodate internal pluralism? In short – is national minority autonomy compatible with immigrant multiculturalism?

As we begin to think about real-world application of this theoretical puzzle, modeling these potential scenarios becomes considerably more complex. As I show, political theory does not do enough to explicate the nuances of this relationship. It is difficult to try to ascertain the justice of various responses to these two competing claims without a clear understanding of the empirical and political dimensions of the relationship. How do they seek to manage this ‘new’ diversity? Is the national identity
open to would-be members? Is the nested nation capable of accommodation, and on what terms?

These questions merit further exploration through case studies. For this reason, Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 attempt to answer the above questions by focusing on the overlooked “triadic relationship...between nation-states, minority nations, and immigrants.” Only once this relationship is better understood can we readdress the normative question, which asks how to judge the justice of various responses to competing claims, and what arrangements best achieve liberal values.

Although case-based research has both clear advantages as well as some disadvantages, this approach is particularly suited to this thesis for a number of reasons. Real-world examples of self-government have the potential to confirm or challenge the assumptions of political theory. Nested nations sit at the intersection of some of the most discussed and debated issues of the early 21st century, including multiculturalism, citizenship theory, nationalism, and migration. By testing these concepts and events in practice, we have a unique opportunity both to advance our understanding of real-world experience and to critically test theoretical assumptions. The relationship between theory and cases can work in the opposite direction, as well. In addition to providing a means of ‘testing’ existing theories, there is a strong case for “using actual moral and political discourse as the starting point for political theory.” That is, cases can highlight limitations in existing theories, and shed light on the need for new ones. Furthermore,

though I focus on a specific type of interaction, these results should shed light on the enduring challenges liberal democracies continue to struggle with in the face of immigration and diversity.

Case studies provide a context for, and enrich our understanding of the moral and political questions scholars grapple with. They may also suggest new directions, or new questions that need answers. This thesis attempts to take advantage of both sides of this logic, testing theories against the reality, and, ultimately utilizing case-based observations to develop and enhance political theory. This chapter provides a framework for case-based research, explaining case selection, identifying dependent variable ‘outcomes’ with which we can assess the compatibility of national minorities and immigrants, and considering variables that are likely to impact this relationship. I also develop independent variable ‘conditions’ which I seek to link to these outcomes through hypotheses in Chapter 4.

II. Case Selection and Overview

Though there are only a limited number of cases of national minority self-government, one of the most important questions we can ask is, “Where should we look?” Given the scope of this project, it is impossible to examine all potential cases; this makes choosing cases correctly all the more crucial. The “Multiculturalism Policy Index,” run by Queens University, scores only eleven countries (what they term ‘multinational’ or ‘plurinational’ states) in their index of multiculturalism policies directed to national minorities in modern democracies.¹⁷⁹ Of these countries, all but Japan

¹⁷⁹ Multiculturalism Policy Index, http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/, (February 21st, 2012). This project scores countries on a set list of policy requirements, and provides separate scores for “Immigrant Minorities,” “Indigenous Peoples,” and “National Minorities.”
are located in North America or Europe. Moreover, in the most recent date in which they were scored (2010) two countries received flat 0s and another received a 2 on a scale of 6. Therefore, there are only a limited number of cases to examine, which have in common certain conditions (liberal democracies, first world economic powers, etc.) that are relevant to the inquiry at hand. This is not a coincidence, nor is it a bad thing. This natural limitation shows that national minorities are more likely to gain state recognition and self-government in liberal states – precisely where we would expect to see similar recognition and multicultural accommodation for immigrant minorities.

Nonetheless, even among liberal democracies, where we look determines to a significant degree what we should expect to find. Imagine that we discover a case of a nested nation whose view and treatment of immigrants is marked by xenophobia, racism, and exclusionary policies. What would such a case demonstrate? History is replete with examples of protectionism, discrimination, or violence in nation-states, where immigrant-host conflict is arguably less likely than it would be in nested nations. The presence of ethnic or cultural conflict, therefore, would not substantiate more generally the incompatibility of multiculturalism and minority self-government. However, a case that demonstrated the absence of serious conflict, and even positive steps towards accommodation, would show that the two projects could, in fact, be reconciled. Furthermore, if we find incompatibility even in the cases where conditions should be most favorable to compatibility, this finding would also be more noteworthy than in a case where compatibility is less likely. With this in mind, I believe it is important to look for the cases where the compatibility of nested nation self-government and immigrant multiculturalism is most likely. On a practical level, given the narrowness of my focus

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180 The implications of this finding are explored below in the methodology section.
(minority immigrants within a minority nation within a state), it is also useful to find nationalist projects that have been well documented and explored in the literature. Catalonia in Spain and Quebec in Canada both match these criteria.\textsuperscript{181} I will briefly introduce each case before detailing a methodological approach to study these cases.

Quebec is a fascinating case for exploring the relationship between immigration and self-government because immigration has held such an important place in public discourse and academic discussions of Quebec historically, and particularly over the past 50 years. Quebec gained autonomy by the British Parliament’s Quebec Act of 1774 and has long viewed itself as a “founding member” of Canada. Quebec’s distinct status was reaffirmed in the creation of Canada through confederation in 1867, which established power sharing and “dualism” between English and French Canadians, particularly in the eyes of Quebec nationalists.\textsuperscript{182} Following the Quiet Revolution, a period of rapid modernization and industrialization during the 1960s, Quebec underwent significant changes both economically and politically. After the 1976 election of the secessionist Parti Quebecois, Quebec instituted its now-famous language legislation, Law 101, which made French the official language of Quebec as well as the language of common life. The PQ also initiated two failed referenda on secession, first in 1980 and again in 1995.\textsuperscript{183} Canada, the state within which Quebec is embedded, has historically been a country with high levels of immigration\textsuperscript{184} and is generally taken as the pioneer of state

\textsuperscript{181} Of course, there are a number of other examples I would have liked to explore with more time to devote to this project. Both \textit{Multinational Democracies} and \textit{Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations}, anthologies that explore multinational democracies, include Flanders in Belgium in addition to these two cases. Other notable multinational democracies are the U.K. and Switzerland.


\textsuperscript{183} These two referenda were separated by a period of rule by the labor party, which won election in 1985.

\textsuperscript{184} Peter Li, \textit{Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{185} Quebec, which has a significant amount of control over immigration and integration policy, rejects the federal multiculturalism policy in favor of its own model of Interculturalism. This model more explicitly states expectations of immigrants and clearly defines common values in a way traditional multiculturalism does not, although scholars debate the significance of this distinction. The first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century has seen a renewed emphasis on the limits of “reasonable accommodation” and a fascinating public conversation on the meaning of Quebec nationalism, citizenship, and identity. Quebec therefore exemplifies the difficult endeavor of reconciling a commitment to the preservation of a unique minority culture with the liberal goal of openness to cultural diversity and the integration and accommodation of new members.

Catalonia is one of 17 autonomous communities in Spain, and along with Basque Country and Galicia, one of three regions to have been recognized as a “historic nationality” by the 1978 Constitution. Catalan autonomy has followed a rocky trajectory alternating between periods of self-government and extreme cultural oppression from the center, under the dictatorships of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) and Francisco Franco (1939-1975). Catalonia played a key role in the transition to democracy following Franco’s death, and the Spanish Constitution of 1978 establishes Spanish Federalism with the creation of the autonomous communities. While the Autonomous Communities assume competency over matters such as the institutions of self-government, public works, internal boundaries, city planning, and the promotion of culture (Article 148), the State retained a significant degree of control. Though Catalonia has had control over linguistic policy, the state retained control over immigration among its 31 exclusive

\textsuperscript{185}Augie Fleras, \textit{The Politics of Multiculturalism: Multicultural Governance in a Comparative Perspective} (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),
rights. Spain, historically a net emigrant country, has in the past one or two decades begun to receive exponentially higher inflows of migrants, many from North Africa; this has fundamentally altered the power dynamic and conversation about immigration in Spain and Catalonia. Catalonia’s approved 2006 Statue of Autonomy sought greater control over immigrants, but was declared unconstitutional by Spanish courts in 2010. In most studies of nested nations, Catalonia is taken as the ideal national minority Spain, and is often contrasted with the ‘ethnic’ nationalism of the Basque Country. While Catalonia has only in recent years sought further control over immigration policies, it has historically demonstrated a high degree of openness and willingness to incorporate new members into society, despite high rates of both internal and external immigration. This makes Catalonia the most likely case within Spain, and an ideal case for examining how national minorities address the challenges caused by internal diversity.

III. Assessing the Compatibility of National Minorities and Immigrants

Before turning to the specifics of these cases, we must delve further into the question of explicitly what we are trying to assess. This requires, not fundamentally changing, but re-articulating the central question of this thesis. The research question that I develop through the literature asks: “is culturally based self-government compatible with multicultural accommodation for non-member immigrant minorities, or does it deny this possibility?” Though this question neatly highlights the theoretical tension between two seemingly distinct projects for differentiated citizenship, it seems to suggest that the question of compatibility might be answered with either a simple ‘yes’ or a ‘no’.

186 See, for example, Multinational Democracies or Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations.
This framing of the question does not provide room to consider that minority self-governance and immigrant multiculturalism may be compatible in some cases or ways but not others, nor does it provide us with a good indication of what ‘compatibility’ really means. Furthermore, in turning to the cases, I am interested in linking specific conditions of the case to the outcomes I assess. Taking into account this nuanced and variable-based approach requires re-articulating, but not fundamentally changing, the central research question of this thesis. Adapted to the case-based approach, therefore, I ask: *Under what conditions, and with what (if any) limitations, is national minority self-governance compatible with the integration and accommodation of new members?* Reframing the question this way allows a more contextual and deeper understanding of the concept of compatibility, as it encourages us to think about the many aspects of host-immigrant interaction, as well as the factors and conditions that surround and influence these interfaces. Note also that I move away from the one-dimensional outcome “multiculturalism,” instead speaking of ‘integration and accommodation’. This change reflects the need to consider a multiple aspects of compatibility, which I lay out in four dependent variables below. It also leaves open the possibility that national minorities may engage in a unique form of accommodation, distinct from traditional multiculturalism. Though I am especially engaged by the question of whether national minorities are capable of multicultural accommodation, we must also consider who enters and on what terms they are incorporated or adapted into the nation, before we can fully understanding multiculturalism. Furthermore, though this re-stated question is geared towards case analysis, I should emphasize that I am still driven by the theoretical puzzle of whether liberal multiculturalism can succeed on the liberal standards it sets for itself.
Answering this re-articulated research question first requires a clear understanding of what it would mean for the two minorities to be ‘compatible’. By compatibility, I refer to the reciprocal relationship between national minorities and immigrant minorities, and view the two as compatible to the extent that the advancement of rights for one minority does not infringe upon or unjustifiably undermine the rights of the other. This definition focuses on both minorities as they relate to one another—weighing them as equally as possible.

My definition builds on Zapata-Barrero’s assertion that the presence of one minority should not harm the situation of another. Though both minorities already find themselves in (unconnected) situations of disadvantage¹⁸⁷, he asks if, when these two are “linked,” the situation for either worsens: “For it to improve the lot of both groups would be ideal, but I think it is reasonable to maintain as a standard that it does not worsen it for either.”¹⁸⁸ Zapata-Barrero rightly emphasizes the need to take into account both parties—the national minorities and immigrants. This dual perspective forces us to consider the terms of integration and membership from the immigrants’ perspective while simultaneously acknowledging how internal diversity threatens the status of the national minority within its own region and within the state.

While I like that he emphasizes the dialectic nature of this relationship (national minorities can be a threat to immigrants, just as immigrants can be a threat to national minorities)

¹⁸⁷ See Chapter 2 sections II and III, in this work, for a comparison of immigrant and national minorities with respect to the nation-state.
minorities), his assessment still does not explain compatibility. It seems to suggest a clear definition of incompatibility (when the situation of either one worsens that of another), but does not articulate clearly enough what it would mean to “worsen” the other’s situation, nor relative to what this situation would be deemed ‘worse’. My definition, whereby national minority self-government is compatible with immigrant integration and accommodation to the extent that the advancement of rights of one minority does not infringe upon or unjustifiably undermine the rights of the other, attempts to clarify these doubts. It imposes a liberal standard for compatibility (the rights of one do preclude or infringe on the rights of the other), rather than simply defining compatibility as the absence of some undefined harm. This standard is broad enough to encompass the various policies I discuss below, but also attempts to take into account how the demands being weighted may differ by situation, even within the same case. I also include in this definition some flexibility, by speaking of “unjustifiably undermining.” This intentionally imprecise word choice allows for contextual assessments of compatibility across different dependent variables, and also leaves open normative questions about the justice and fairness until after I have examined the cases.

Below, I offer four dependent variables (outcomes) which together help to assess the relationship between national minorities and immigrants. Together, these provide alternate means of assessing the compatibility of national minority self-governance with immigrant multiculturalism.

189 Note: Zapata-Barrero is not making an argument specifically about compatibility and does not use this word. However, because his essay focuses on the interaction between the cultural demands of immigrants and national minorities, I find his assessment here useful.
IV. Dependent Variables: Admission Policy, Integration Policy, Nationality Policy, and Multicultural Accommodation.

In determining what variables to consider in assessing the compatibility of national minority self-governance with immigrant multiculturalism, it is important to think broadly about the distinct areas of interaction. A comprehensive approach to understanding immigration in nested nations must address the institutional framework of the national minority within the state, as well as the policies it enacts. Where does the national minority, rather than the state, seek to exercise competency related to the management and incorporation of immigrants? Who enters the state and on what terms? What role do culture and language play in determining entrance or membership, and how does the national minority seek to regulate or normalize language? How is the national project defined, and is it open to non-members? Building on these questions, I select four dependent variables necessary for evaluating distinct elements of national minority self-government as it relates to immigration: Admission Policy, Language Policy, Nationality Policy, and Multicultural Accommodation.

A. Admission Policy

The first dependent variable I consider is Admission Policy. Admission policy concerns which (and how many) immigrants are admitted, what criteria are used to determine who enters, and what (if any) provisions or expectations act as terms of entrance. Specifically, I examine how nested nations treat and think about the question of population flow and demographic change. Immigration produces conflicting pulls, as the national minority must juggle economic needs, political sustainability, and its cultural

190 As Li notes, it is important to consider both “admission” and “selection” of immigrants.
distinctiveness amidst the tumultuous pull of globalization.\textsuperscript{191} Though not all nested nations exercise control over immigration, and at times may not even seek to, these cases are still stimulating areas for exploration; we must ask when and why the national minority seeks competency to control immigration policy.

Admission policy can also be used as a lens for examining the nation’s position and power within the larger state, as well as the developing self-conception of the minority. In each case, therefore, history and context play an important role in contextualizing the findings. Exploring both how and when the national minority perceives, seeks to control, and actually regulates admission, will provide a clear picture of the defensiveness or openness of the nationalism to immigration at the broadest level. As Joseph Carens writes,

The degree of openness to immigrants, the criteria of selection and exclusion, the kinds of adaptation, and the degree of conformity to the dominant population expect of new arrivals and their descendants – all of these factors indicate something about who belongs, what is valued, and what membership and citizenship mean.\textsuperscript{192}

Carens rightly points out that all polities must make decisions about inclusion and exclusion. These decisions reflect matters of identity, as I explore below, but are deeply shaped by literal boundaries of inclusion and exclusion and the flows of people through them. Therefore, addressing the question, “Who gets in?” is a necessary first step to understanding the relationship between immigration and national minorities.

\textbf{B. Integration Policy (Language)}

\textsuperscript{191} Steven C. Roach, \textit{Cultural Autonomy, Minority Rights and Globalization} (Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005)
The second dependent variable I consider, integration policy, refers to the terms of ‘assimilation’ of immigrants. In the cases I review, language policy plays such an important role as an assimilationist policy that I seriously considered treating it as a separate variable. I chose to use the broader category, integration policy, instead, because it speaks more generally to the model of immigrant adaptation and incorporation into society; language, to the extent that language policy enhances linguistic assimilation or normalization, can therefore be treated as a subset or example of integration policy.193

Largely, scholars have approached linguistic integration in terms of public recognition at the level of government, and from the perspective of individual linguistic autonomy. The state must determine which languages to recognize in what spheres of public life, and what such recognition entails.194 Though language policies can take different forms, nested nations often seek to “normalize the use of their language in the public sphere” through what Alan Patten terms the “language maintenance model.”195 As Kymlicka explains above in his discussion of language rights, even official multilingualism (two or more equal-status languages, with free choice between them) is insufficient to ensure language survival. Language normalization policies in the “maintenance” model take positive steps to ensure the viability of a given language, generally within a set territory.196 Where do we see national minorities pursuing policies of language normalization and protection? What restrictions or policies does this model entail?

193 This also allows me to consider how language policy works as a term of admission or a feature of nationality policy – its importance spans across the dependent variables.
194 Alan Patten, “Political Theory and Language Policy,” Political Theory 29.5 (2001), 692
196 Patten, 705-6
Appraisals of the ‘liberal’ or ‘illiberal’ nature of language policies mostly focus on the rights of the national (linguistic) minority within the state, or alternately the concern that language policies they enact do not negatively affect ‘majority’ members within the minority territory (e.g. Anglophones in Quebec). However, it is also interesting to consider the impact of language policies (where present) on immigrants. Language may be used as a condition for admission (here considered under ‘admission policy’), but it may also be treated as a term of entrance and a significant form of integration. Of particular interest are the ways that language may be used as a proxy for culture in nested nations, and what policies this substitution produces at the level of integration and language normalization.

More broadly, integration policy applies to the way that the national minority government approaches the question of integration – and where it has control of doing so. Though there are many bureaucratic aspects of integration that the national minority might control (e.g. residence permits, work authorization, initial reception etc.), I am more interested in the philosophy of integration advanced by the nation. What areas of assimilation seem to matter most, and how radical or moderate are the assimilation policies they enact? Though I pay particular attention to language policy, I also consider the other ways that the national minority integrates immigrants, and especially its philosophy for doing so.

C. Nationality Policy (National Identity)

Third, I focus what Ángel Castiñeira terms nationality policy, which deals with how membership is defined in the nested nation. As he explains, nationality policy deals with the questions, “Who belongs to the demos? Who can definitely become a
Though I am interested in the question of official processes of membership (national minorities do not often exercise an officially recognized citizenship policy), I pay particular attention to how the national identity is defined at various levels of society. Nationality policy also indicates something about the integration policy of the national minority, to the extent that definition of the nation determines who can be a member or not.

The key issue of nationality policy, as it relates to my research question, is whether the nation defines itself, or is capable of redefining itself in a way that both maintains the critical elements of distinction and is open to new members. Is it possible to define nationalism in a way that is both cultural and “civic,” or are these contradictory? Though these elements seem incongruous, no modern immigrant society can “survive” without fostering membership among new arrivals. While Castiñeira, who is Catalan, focuses primarily on the nationality policy from the perspective of the national minority (asking, “Who should form a part of *our demos,*”), I see membership as a matter of both perception and status. A second test of the successful integration of immigration is whether immigrants believe they are, or are capable of becoming, members of the nation. Recall that, by my definition of compatibility, it is important to consider any arrangement or policy as it affects both immigrants and the national minority, to see how each affects the other. Therefore, I am interested in exploring how the national government and elite define membership, and how it is perceived and experienced by both ‘members’ and immigrants.

D. Multicultural Accommodation:

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Lastly, I consider the possibility of multicultural accommodation. Multiculturalism, as I discuss in Chapter 2, challenges traditional models of integration, although scholars continue to debate whether this challenge weakens assimilationist policies or builds on them.\textsuperscript{198} For this reason, it is important to consider both integration and multiculturalism. In isolation, the presence or absence of multiculturalism (as ideology, policy, and practice) does not give us sufficient evidence to determine the openness of the nested nation. However, when coupled with the measures of integration above (particularly language policy and nationality policy), the presence or absence of multiculturalism provides a missing dimension to the interface of immigration, national minorities, and cultural politics. The tantalizing question I ask is whether nested nations can themselves recognize internal diversity and pluralism. I term this variable \textit{Multicultural Accommodation}, and assess both policy elements as well as the public discourse. Though the term “accommodation” may have a narrow connotation, I use it to refer to all policies or ideologies that respond to and recognize difference and internal pluralism. The extent of multicultural accommodation, both at the level of discourse and in practice, is the ultimate test for determining the openness of national minority. If the national minority cannot or will not accommodate the demands of internal pluralism, then it follows that the cultural accommodation of one group (in the form of national minority self-government) precludes the possibility of similar accommodation for another. This may be the case even where the national project is ‘open’ in its admission, integration, and nationality policy.

E. The Role of Competency

\footnote{198 See Chapter 2, Section IIB in this work.}
A thorough examination of the potential conflict or compatibility between national minorities and immigrants must take into account four variables: admission policy, integration policy, nationality policy, and multicultural accommodation. Each of these outcomes highlights an important dimension of the question of whether national minorities are capable of fairly managing new internal diversity introduced by immigration. Distinguishing the various dependent variables of each case, as I do, allows for a nuanced approach that considers the possibility of a wide range of outcomes present in a single case, which may sometimes conflict with one another, but as a whole provide a clear and multifaceted depiction of the cases.

Still, not all of these variables are of the same type; I consider admission policy and integration policy distinct in that the institutional framework of the state significantly affects the degree of control that the national minority exercises over these policies. I therefore group admission and integration policy as “competency-conditional” variables, as opposed to nationality policy and multicultural accommodation, which I term “competency-neutral.” This differentiation is significant because control may be as important if not more so than the specifics of the policies themselves. Competency is determined by the constitutional right to manage a given area of governance, as well as the structural and institutional mechanisms that make exercising this power possible. Whereas admission and integration policy in nation-states are questions of policy alone, in nested nations we must also consider the institutional framework of the state, and what competencies the nested nation enjoys within that framework. Though they are related, competency should be treated as analytically distinct from policy, which refers to how the nested nation actually exercises control through its activities, values, and actions.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that competency in federal states is not an either/or proposition but rather a matter of degree. Federal states are defined by the existence of mixed, and even overlapping, jurisdictions: the presence of “two spheres of government that combine the principles of self-rule plus shared rule, in other words, the principles of self-government and shared government.” 199 A given capacity of governance might be held exclusively by the state, exclusively by the minority, or be subject to joint sovereignty. This complexity is important to keep in mind, particularly as it relates to admission policy and integration policy, two dependent variables for which competency and policy play equally vital roles.

Therefore, in multinational states, the institutional and legal framework of the state structure matters a great deal in determining the basic structural competencies of the nested nation. Though I do not treat the general institutional framework as a separate dependent variable, I am interested in the role that competencies play in moderating the relationship between independent and dependent variables. Though any policies at the national minority level are to a certain extent contingent on the national minority’s competency in these areas, control over immigration and integration are typically the domain of sovereign states. Therefore, there is considerably more variance in how much control the national minority can exercise over these two policies relative to nationality policy and multicultural accommodation.

I turn now to independent variables in each case that I believe will be likely to be associated with the dependent variables I lay out here. My intention is to consider which variables will be most likely to be associated or impact the four dependent

variables that I develop above: Admission Policy, Integration Policy, Nationality Policy, and Multicultural Accommodation.

V. Independent Variables

Above, I develop four dependent variables to assess the compatibility of national minority self-governance with immigrant integration and accommodation. I now seek to develop a conditional understanding for these outcomes by drawing out what I consider to be the most relevant aspects of each case. It is important to consider conditions (independent variables) in addition to outcomes (dependent variables), for a number of reasons. Principally, we must understand the conditions of each case so as not to consider in isolation an immigrant-host interaction that is unquestionably contextual. The state structure matters, as does the national minority’s history, status, and power within it. Similarly, ‘immigration’ differs drastically from case to case, and within the same case over time. We must take into account the rate of flow, the origin of the migrants, and the demographic, economic, linguistic etc. qualities of the receiving society as well. Considering these variables allows us to better understand (or, at least hypothesize), about the relationship between the real world and these four outcomes.

I am interested not only in measuring these outcomes, but also in linking them to conditions present in the case. To do this, I follow Charles Ragin’s configurational approach to casework.\(^{200}\) This method differs from conventional variable-oriented methods in that it treats variables as contextual: the significance of a single variable

changes depending on other aspects of the case.\textsuperscript{201} Furthermore, this approach treats each case as a configuration of multiple interrelated variables.\textsuperscript{202} Rather than consider the impact of a single condition (e.g. high rates of immigration) the configurational approach might explore whether a configuration of high rates of immigration, low birth rates, and a relatively robust economy will interact to associate with certain outcomes (DV$s$). This approach, as Ragin argues, allows the researcher to see how various parts of the case interconnect with one another, and allows the possibility of drawing conclusions from a single case by using case-specific knowledge more effectively, in perspective. This allows the researcher to classify cases as “types” created from a specific combination of variables. When developing hypotheses for the relationship of conditions to cases, as I do in Chapter 4, therefore, I consider many of these variables simultaneously.

The challenge of Ragin’s configurational approach is that it requires the researcher to identify and determine the relevant variables in order to create these configurations. Moreover, as Gerring demonstrates, we must not only define the key concepts clearly, but also determine a reliable measure that reflects real-world occurrences.\textsuperscript{203} This chapter attempts to clearly define and, wherever possible, operationalize key variables in each case.

One limitation of this inquiry is that I examine only two examples of nested nations, each of which displays considerable variability across time. Furthermore, there are a number of important conditions built into the selection of cases, whether

\textsuperscript{201} By contrast, traditional statistical models treat each variable as an independent element with self-contained meaning.

\textsuperscript{202} As Ragin writes, “The principle that ‘context matters’ is central to the configurational approach to cases…To view each case as a configuration, it is necessary to examine relevant aspects of a case all at once, as an interpretable combination of elements,” 66

intentionally or not. There is no suitable way to measure the impact of these variables, as they are built into the natural selection of cases, including those not examined here. Moreover, though selecting “most likely” cases maximizes the possibility of compatibility, it may also weaken the empirical validity of hypothesis testing, because outcomes are seemingly restricted.

I take these limitations very seriously, but believe that the two-case comparative approach selected here represents a trade-off rather than an outright failure. I have already explained why choosing ‘most-likely’ cases will yield more significant findings: if it is unclear whether A and B can ever co-exist, it is important to look for cases where the two are most likely. In these instances, either a positive finding (A and B are both present) or a negative one (B cannot occur where A does) is more significant than either of these findings would be in other scenarios. Furthermore, one advantage of the small-N case-study approach is that it allows specificity and attention to detail in a way that large-N studies do not. While I attempt to distinguish and clearly define both dependent and independent variables, focusing narrowly on one or two cases allows for a nuance examination of these. Moreover, it allows for the possibility of detecting and categorizing changes within each case. For this reason, I am not content to focus only on how each case exists now, but how the conditions and outcomes have evolved over time.

The remainder of this chapter enumerates a list of variables that I believe will be relevant to outcomes in question. Wherever necessary, these definitions attempt to clearly define the concept that they are trying to convey, as well as specific measures we would see in the real world.
### Table 3.1: Overview of Relevant Independent Variables

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### A. Demographic Variables: Size, Growth, and Source of Change

Demography is an important variable for understanding the position of the national minority within the state, and within its own territory. The population size and growth of the nation can be seen as a measure of strength, stability, influence, and even power. As Sigler explains, “Historical demography is a powerful explanatory tool for interpreting minority situations.”\(^{204}\) He argues that changes in population size are a key determinant in shifting power relations between the minority and the state. As Danielle Conversi notes, “the more numerous the population, the more strength the nation has…”\(^{205}\)

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\(^{205}\) Conversi, 191
In addition to absolute and relative size, growth and change in population also seems significant. Consider Conversi’s prediction that “a declining nation is a bad omen for every sincere nationalist.”\textsuperscript{206} This relates to the forward-looking element of demography. Not only do population growth rates foreshadow the long-term viability of the nation (what Quebeckers call “\textit{la survivance}”), but they also indicate the future demographic relationship between the minority and the state. The minority may fear that a shrinking or negative growth rate will forebode diminished political power, or see growth as an opportunity to re-open negotiations with the state. From the state perspective, as with absolute / relative population size, growth rates may inspire efforts to integrate the national minority or provoke the fear that the minority’s power is growing out of proportion. These hopes and fears will inevitably effect the minority’s status within the state, as well as their self-conception. I consider growth rates of the minority both in absolute terms, and relative to the state. I also look for the primary source of any change. This last question considers birth and death rates, and immigration and emigration. It is important to understand what factors most account for any change we see in the population size of the national minority.

B. Migration Variables

At the level of the nested nation, trends in migration matter significantly. While this is partially accounted for by population growth, rates of migration are a significant variable in their own right. There are three major aspects of immigration: migration rate, total proportion of the population, and type.

1. Rate of Migration

\textsuperscript{206} Daniele Conversi, \textit{The Basques, the Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization} (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997), 191
One of the most common ways of measuring migration is to consider the rate of migration. This provides a number that indicates the net flow of migrants (either inwards or outwards) per 1,000 people. To the extent that immigration is a threat (even if it is a manageable one) to the culture of the nested nation, greater quantities may magnify the challenge. However, at the same time, the nested nation may have economic or social reasons for desiring immigrants. For example, immigrants may fill vital roles in the economy and add (to the extent that they become members of the nation) add to the demographic strength of the nested nation relative to the state. This leaves open the possibility of contradictory needs for the nation to juggle – regardless, it is clear that the actual flows of people relative to the size of the nested nation will certainly be important.

2. Immigrants as a Percentage of the Population

Similarly, we can measure the total percentage of the population that was born outside of the territory of the nation.207 This gives us a more longitudinal sense of the population make-up, and also helps contextualize changing responses to migration over time by highlighting the indistinct line between immigrant and ‘member’. Schiffauer even argues that perhaps this process of transition (from immigrant to member), which blurs ‘us / them’ divisions, may be more disquieting for the “host” society than the mere presence of immigrants.208 This is a useful reminder of what common knowledge and current events readily demonstrate: perception matters in immigration politics as much as (if not more than) reality does. Therefore, though both rates of migration and the number

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207 Unavoidably, measuring population size or proportions involves making judgments about who is included and who is not. Ironically, this is precisely the question that I consider, but it is impossible to avoid drawing the line somewhere if we wish to be able to use and understand the data.

of immigrants as a percentage of total population provide quantifiable measures of the presence of immigrants in the nested nation, we should also consider how members of the nation view immigrants.

3. Internal or External Migration

Thirdly, it is important to consider the origin of these migrants and the traits they bring with them. While all we would expect all immigrant receiving societies to care about the language, culture, race, religion, and economic status of immigrants, the most pressing condition in the case of nested nations seems to be whether the immigrants enter from a foreign country, or are internal migrants who relocate within the same state. For nested nations, given the triadic relationship with the state, the major question is whether immigration comes from internal migration (other regions of the same country) or from foreign countries. While we might pursue a far more complex classification system, the major concern for the nested nation is its status and security within the state. For this reason, internal migrants represent a distinct challenge from external migrants. Those who migrate from within the state not only decrease the territorial concentration of self-defined members of the nested nation, but also may prefer to speak, work, and live in accordance with the dominant language and culture. However, foreign migrants are more likely to demonstrate a higher degree of distinctiveness from the national minority in terms of race, religion, and culture. It is not clear which type, then, poses a bigger challenge to the national minority. While I include data related to countries of origin, mother tongue, religion, economic status, skill (and others) in my findings, I focus on

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internal-external migration as the major variable of migrant ‘type’ because this seems to be the most relevant, easily identifiable, broad distinction.

4. Historic Migration

We should also consider, as context, the history of immigration in the state and nested nation. Whether the state historically sent or received migrants affects the importance of immigration in the collective conscience. Where the state has always received high rates of immigrants, this fact may profoundly shape the way that individuals and the government view current migratory trends and management thereof. In countries of net emigration, or very low levels of immigration, the policy questions of immigrant management may not retain the same degree of salience. For example, though Spain retained control of immigration in the 1978 Constitution, the issue of whether the state or autonomous communities would regulate immigration was hardly debated. Ángel Castiñeira claims that Spain’s history as an emigrant country led to a lack of debate over immigration-related powers with respect to the Autonomous Communities. This power was centralized, he shows, almost by default. Historic levels of migration may also influence the way that the national minority government perceives new migrants, either as a continuation of historical patterns, or a distinct break and novel challenge.

C. Linguistic Variables

As I show above, language is generally an important demand for national minorities, though the way that they exercise control over language policies changes over time. In order to clearly distinguish between conditions (independent variables) and language policy, which I treat as part of the dependent variable integration policy, I

attempt to distinguish between variables of the national minority’s linguistic situation and policy, which I treat as a dependent variable [see footnote].\textsuperscript{211}

1. Fluency

Rates of fluency are likely to determine the perceived need for language policies, as well as the place of language in the national project. While language policies intend to increase rates of fluency, it is also likely that how widely spoken and understood the language is within the territory impacts the perceived need for and application of language policy, and perhaps also how centrally language figures into nationality policy. Interestingly, we must consider, for both of these outcomes, whether relatively high or low levels of language ability – measured through comprehension, spoken, and written ability – are most associated with an emphasis on language politics. Any assessment here must also take into account what languages are actually spoken: while the minority speaks a distinct language in both of these cases, it is important to determine as well whether members of the national minority are also bilingual in the dominant language of the state (if one exists).\textsuperscript{212} Along the same lines, we should also consider the state language policy. Is it officially monolingual or bilingual? Where it recognizes minority languages, does this recognition extend across all state institutions, or is it territorially restricted? Though these latter questions may overlap with what I term competency over language policy (included as a subset of integration policy), it is important to consider the state treatment of language as an important factor.

\textsuperscript{211} Later, I discuss the possibility for ‘feedback’ whereby so-called dependent variables may influence ‘independent’ variables over time. This is true for language policy, where the presence and strength of normalization or a language maintenance model will influence the levels of fluency once implemented. Similarly, admission policies, if implemented, will determine the rates of entrance as well as the ‘type’ of migration.

\textsuperscript{212} “Minorities at Risk Project” (2009)
2. Potential for Recruitment

One condition that seems to precede and influence control over immigration and integration policy is whether or not the language of the national minority is widely spoken outside of the national minority territory. Put another way: are there potential immigrants who are linguistically compatible with the nested nation? Though this might seem to be a narrow consideration, it stems from a much broader question of the recruitment potential of the minority. Population flows and linguistic assimilation are critical to the strength and security of the nested nation, particularly when language is taken as a key marker of the national culture.\(^\text{213}\)

As discuss in the context of admission policy above, who enters the territory and by what criteria are important criteria for determining the openness and content of the nationalism. As Christian Joppke shows, nation-states are interested in managing immigrant flows in their own self-interest. It is likely that migrants who are linguistically compatible with a minority-language nested nation will be appealing candidates for migration, as would diaspora ‘members’ of the nation, if any such exist. This latter category, termed “coethnics,” is perceived as lastingly stranded or separated members of the nation; they have been the subjects of controversial positive recruitment policies (like the Israeli “Law or Return”), as it is hotly debated whether ethnicity, race, or religion are justifiable determinants of admission policy.\(^\text{214}\)

Of course, the calculations of the minority in terms of its aspirations for migration are multifaceted, and may take into account the country of origin, race, culture, economic


skill, family relations, or any number of features. These are by no means trivial considerations, but they do not seriously distinguish the migrant pool of one country (or nested nation) from that of another to the same extent that language or coethnic roots would. I focus on ethnically or linguistically compatible potential migrants specifically in order to ascertain how their presence or absence might affect the immigration policy or integration policy of the minority. What I term ‘potential for recruitment’ does not include the dependent variable – admission policy – but whether there are linguistically or ethnically compatible potential immigrants outside of the state.

D. Historic Context and Political Structure

Thus far, the independent variables above touch on the demographic, linguistic, and migratory factors of the nested nation – all critical variables in determining the position of the nested nation within the state and in gauging what particular features of the nested nation and flows of immigration are likely to be associated with influencing the openness of this interaction. This final grouping brings together a number of distinct variables that generally reflect the historic context and political structure of the state, or do not fit neatly into the categories I detail above. They help to add context to how the national minority fits into the state and what historic features of the state-minority relationship are most likely to be important.

1. Type of Federation / Structure of Government:

Structure of Government refers particularly to the form of federalism present in the state. While we might assume that all of the cases should necessarily be of the same type (democracies with self-governing nested nations), there are number of systems of classification in the literature that help us conceptualize the similarities and differences
between these cases. Lijphart differentiates between ‘congruent’ and ‘incongruent’ federations: in incongruent, federations political borders coincide with ethnic or cultural borders. But as Baubock writes, “all multinational federations are by definition incongruent.” He suggests that the formation of the multinational federation, whether the confederation of previous independent states, or the decentralization of a single state, should be more important.

Ferran Requejo builds on this distinction in *Multinational Federalism and Value Pluralism*. Requejo introduces four basic types of federal states: regional states, symmetrical federations, asymmetrical federal agreements, and confederations. Regional states, like the UK, are defined by a federalism that develops out of the legislative and executive (not judicial) decentralization of a single state. Symmetrical federalism, as in the case of the United States, is defined by the fact that all federated units related more or less equally to the central government. In asymmetrical federalism, however, each federated unit negotiates its own areas of competency with respect to the state, and there is a fair degree of heterogeneity between the various agreements. The fourth type, confederations develop through “an international accord between previously independent states that decide to join together” for economic or military integration. The confederation, dependent on its constituent parts, has only limited effect on the citizens of each country. By this approach, there are four types of federalism (though centralization should also be considered as a fifth, non-federal, structure of government). This approach re-states much of the same ground covered by Lijphart and Baubock, but adds

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216 Rainer Baubock, “Why Stay Together,” 368

217 Requejo, 55-60
that the presence and status of other nations within the state is likely to impact the relationship between any one national minority in the state.

2. Historic Status

In addition to classifying the federal structure as a whole, it is also important to consider how ‘bound up’ the particular nation is within the state; a variable I call historic status. By historic status I refer to the status of the minority as a distinct but built-in unit in the process of state creation and constitution drafting, and its continuous role in state history. I operationalize ‘Historic Status’ in the following three questions, which I address below.

   a. Was the nation a founding member of the state?
   b. Did the Minority Play a Role in the Negotiation and Drafting of the Constitution?
   c. Has the Minority’s Self-Government been Continuous since it Gained Autonomy?

Founding membership is defined as the presence of the national minority as a pre-existing entity both incorporated and distinguished in the original formation of the state. This variable firmly situates the nationalism of the minority in relation to the process of state-creation. It also re-articulates the issue of how the multinational federation came to be: whether through confederation or decentralization. Where the state was created through federation, I predict that national minorities will have more significant historic status, but may also be more likely to see themselves as deserving of a high degree of self-government or even secession.

The role of the minority in the drafting of the Constitution similarly underscores the historic situatedness of the nested nation, and adds a closely related dimension to founding membership. These variables are significant for a number of reasons. First, their
presence or absence allows us to pinpoint not only the roots of minority nationalism (when the nation became a nation), but also to situate the minority nationalist project firmly within state development and see how closely the two are related.

The presence or absence of a founding role likely affects the self-definition of the nation, particularly in how it views with relation to the state structure. For Quebec, for example, the Confederation of 1867 established “power-sharing formula” that laid a framework for subsequent events and negotiations of its status within Canada. Similarly, Catalonia’s pre-existing Statue of Autonomy (along with those of Basque Country and Galicia) became the foundation for the creation of the Autonomous Communities in 1978.

As, Gagnon and Iacovino explain, when national minorities co-founded the state and are party to the creation of the Constitution, their role and status as a community is fundamentally altered. Whereas other social groups exercise political power through state institutions, founding nations do not merely seek distribution, but create and dictate the parameters of the state itself. When a national minority cooperates to determine the content of the constitution and the structure of the state itself, it acts as “a historically self-determining entity, already constituted, and the constitution would be the result of an evolving set of agreements that are acceptable to all parties.”

Continuity, as James Tully shows, is one of the key foundations of nation-to-nation relations in multinational states. I am interested in whether the national minority has exercised continuous self-government within the state from the time of the national minority’s first self-rule. While the elected party or competencies of the government may change, I am measuring the uninterrupted existence of a governing body from the time of
creation until the present. As a single variable, **Historic Status** can help to contextualize the permanence of the nested nation with respect to the larger state.

The exact impact of historic status (to the extent that the questions I ask measure this concept) is difficult to know. In most nested nations we see secessionist movements (although with varying degrees of public support). It is not clear whether historic status makes secessionism more likely or less likely – do the questions I ask reflect the likelihood of the national minority to see itself as a nation, to see itself as part of the state, or both?

3. Cultural or National Repression

The concept of cultural repression reveals the negative side of historic status. I am interested in measuring, particularly in a historical perspective, if and to what extent the national minority culture has undergone repression. While I call this ‘cultural’ repression, I consider broadly if there have been either political or military limitations on the expression and practice of the minority culture / religion / practice / language. Examining historical and present repression capture the tensions of the relationship between the minority and majority in a way that simply examining political competencies or structures cannot. As Scott suggests, cultural repression may consolidate ethnic identity.\(^{219}\) This may affect language as well, where the importance of language will strengthen as a result of repression.

4. Level of Distinctiveness:

I believe it also important to consider how distinct the national minority is from the larger state. As the literature review in Chapter 1 shows, this exercise requires

\(^{218}\) Gagnon and Iacovino, *Federalism*, 27. See also James Tully, *Strange Multiplicity*.  
\(^{219}\)
imposing fixed categories (e.g. race, custom) over what we know to be blurry lines. With any such measures, of course, subjective (perceived) difference is likely as meaningful as “actual” difference, even if we assume that such difference could conceivably be measured. However, it is far more elusive to try to label perception. For this reason, I follow the measures used by the Minorities at Risk project, which classifies the distinctiveness of the minority culture based on four variables: Language, Belief, Race, and Custom.\textsuperscript{220} I rely on the Minorities at Risk data-set, from which I borrow four “markers of difference”. This dataset “monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups in all countries with a population of at least 500,000.”\textsuperscript{221} This project usefully standardizes all markers in order to allow for comparison, which I use to consider how distinctive the national minority is.

5. Economic Strength:

Like population size, the economic strength of the nested nation provides a concrete measure of the economic strength of the minority in the nation state. Historically, when the nested nation is an industrial power, this heightens the political tension on both sides. Most importantly, the greater the economic strength of the minority, the greater their political clout becomes. This likely increases the pull for secession (as the minority views itself as more self-sufficient, and perhaps even burdened by federal taxes), while simultaneously increasing the central power’s interest in maintaining the minority as a member of the state. Moreover, economic strength will


\textsuperscript{221} Minorities at Risk, “The MAR Project,” http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/
likely determine how attractive settling in the nested nation’s territory will be both to new immigrants and internal migrants. The economic strength of the national minority, as well as the presence of unique industries or advanced development are critical for understanding the position of the national minority within the state. As Shafir speculates, economically advanced minorities are more likely to be open to immigration, which is inevitably a force of modernization.

VI. Conclusion:

Table 3.1 [Duplicate]: Overview of Relevant Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. Demographic Variables</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Population Size</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Population Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Source of Change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B. Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Percentage of Total Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mix (Internal vs. External)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Historic Sending or Receiving State?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C. Linguistic Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Level of fluency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Recruitment Potential</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D. Historic and Political Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Type of Federation / Structure of Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Historic Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Level of Distinctiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Contestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Economic strength / size</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chapter introduces a list of independent variables – aspects of the case most likely to be associated with the outcomes I measure. Together, these variables highlight various aspects of the state, the nested nation, and the migrants themselves that should be most closely associated with the outcomes I measure. In the following chapter, I bring the
independent and dependent variables together to formulate hypotheses about the interaction between national minorities and immigrants.
Chapter 4: Hypotheses and Hypothesis Testing

I. Introduction to Hypothesis Formation

Having fully mapped both the pertinent dependent and independent variables, it is possible to begin developing hypotheses that link the two. I test the theory that nested national minority autonomy will be *maximally* capable of openness, integration, and accommodation through a unique model of “intercultural nationalism.” By this model, national minority control over competency-conditional policies is necessary for establishing the openness of the national minority to new diversity. These same policies, however, also clearly define some limits to accommodation.

I begin by exploring the classic models of nationalism, defensive / ethnic and open / civic, and examining how the four dependent variable outcomes might differ in each case. However, these models do not seem capable of capturing an approach to immigrant integration which balances the distinct needs of the host society / culture with internal diversity\(^{222}\), or the role of what I term “competency-conditional” policies in shaping this relationship. Following Couton and Blad, I classify a third model, “intercultural nationalism,” which I believe will represent “most likely” cases of compatibility in nested nations. I then hypothesize about the conditions under which we would expect to see intercultural nationalism arise, and what this model might entail for the outcomes I consider.

A. Defensive and Open Models of Immigrant-Host Interaction

Before developing specific hypotheses about the cases themselves, it is helpful to imagine what types of scenarios, or models, of immigrant-host interaction are possible.

\(^{222}\) We would expect to see this type of balancing in “most likely” cases.
Here, we could imagine both a maximally open and a maximally closed national model of immigrant management. As Gershon Shafir speculates, a defensive nationalism “favors excluding immigrants or viewing them as a separate ethnic minority.” This model is contrasted with modernizing nationalisms, which he says, “tends towards assimilation of immigrants or is ready to tolerate multiple cultures.” For Shafir, therefore, assimilation and multiculturalism necessarily move together, and stand in opposition with exclusion and preservation. Below, I plot each of these models, using Shafir’s general distinction between defensive and modernizing (here labeled ‘open’) models, and my own dependent variables.

**Table 4.1: Two Basic National Models of Immigrant Management**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Defensive Model (“Ethnic”)</th>
<th>Open<strong>225</strong> Model (“Civic”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Admission Policy</td>
<td>Exclusionary</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Integration Policy</td>
<td>Radical, Coercive or Separatist</td>
<td>Moderate, Noncoercive<strong>226</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nationality Policy</td>
<td>Closed to non-members (“ethnic”)</td>
<td>Open to new members (“civic”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Multicultural Accommodation</td>
<td>Impossible</td>
<td>Likely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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224 Shafir, 5 We should consider, of course, that all nations have elements that are both “ethnic” and “civic.” I plot these as ideal cases.
225 Shafir focuses on the economic development of national minorities as it relates to immigration. He sees ‘modernizing’ nations as embracing the economic benefits of modernity, embodied in immigration. Cultural adaptation and assimilation are consequences of this economic perspective. As he says, “immigrants usually arrive as a direct result of the regions’ industrialization, and therefore, become emblematic of modernity.” While I agree with this thesis, I choose to call the latter model ‘open’ to focus on national / cultural aspects of immigration, rather than economic modernization, although I recognize that the two are linked.
Table 4.1 presents two models of immigrant management in nested nations. The first model is defensive, and expresses “permanent opposition” to immigration, consistent with the view that immigration is always and inherently a threat.\(^{227}\) This model would be marked by exclusionary policies that seek to preclude or limit the entrance or status of non-members. With respect to language policy and integration in general, Shafir argues that the concept of ‘integrating’ new members contradicts the exclusionary, closed-off nature of ethnic nationalism. That is, any policies that aim to incorporate difference are inherently inconsistent with a defensive model. For the most part, this assessment seems accurate, at least in an archetype of ethnic nationalism. However, I speculate that when faced with diversity, the defensive national model of immigrant management may sometimes adopt aggressive assimilation policy, in addition to, or in lieu of, exclusion. Where necessary, they may use what Mason refers to as ‘radical’ and ‘coercive’ assimilation measures, which could prohibit or outlaw minority culture, religion, and / or language.\(^{228}\) Therefore, though we would generally not expect an ethnic nation to take steps or commit funding to facilitate integration, it is possible to classify either a policy of separatism or radical assimilation as consistent with this model. This radical assimilation model necessarily denies the possibility of multicultural accommodation. Similarly, we would expect that the nationality policy would be closed, based in conditions of blood or birth.

\(^{227}\) Shafir, 19  
\(^{228}\) Mason, 267
An ‘open’ national model of immigrant management, in contrast, would be marked by an attitude of integration and incorporation to immigrants, who themselves become members who define and change the national project. Admission policy in the open model would be consistent with the policies enacted in liberal democracies – though the criteria and application of admission policy differs widely from state to state, these models are typically marked by non-discriminatory entrance criteria, acceptance of refugees consistent with international norms, and, of course, a consideration of the economic skills of the migrant as they relates to the demographic and economic needs of the state. This model does not imply the nation is laissez-faire with respect to culture and language (recall that all nation-states engage in nation-building to some degree). However, it does reflect a maximal degree of openness to cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity, at least to that citizens are not discouraged or prevented from participating in their “own” practices. Most of all, we would expect decisions about language and culture to be open to continual revision and consistent with the changing demographic and linguistic landscape. We would also expect to see accommodation where it was needed or demanded by a sizeable minority. In the open model, the nation is defined in a way that is accessible and open to revision – it employs clearly civic definitions of belonging. Lastly, the open model allows for the possibility of multicultural accommodation, though it does not require it.

The defensive and open models provide, across dependent variables, a best- and worst- case scenario for the compatibility of national minority self-government with integration and accommodation for immigrants. However, neither model offers a possibility that balances between the cultural demands of the national minority and those
of the state, as we would expect in cases that are most likely to be compatible. Furthermore, neither model accounts for the fact that admission policy and integration policy are both contingent on the institutional framework of the state. So while we could test nation-states according to these models of immigration, (nation-states have sovereignty over all of these areas), these models are not sufficient, because they assume competency and ask how this competency is exercised. Below, I explain how I account for these hitches, by treating immigration and integration policy as competency-conditional variables as part of Cory Blad and Philippe Couton’s third model of immigrant management, “intercultural nationalism.”

Cory Blad and Philippe Couton develop the model of intercultural nationalism, which combines “relative openness to globalizing social forces, particularly international migration, with a commitment to the maintenance of a coherent national community.”229 This model combines cultural and civic nationalism in a way that neither the defensive / ethnic nor open / civic model can account for. In this model, the society offers intercultural accommodation, by which new arrivals are “integrated into an existing cultural, economic and political context. They are encouraged to retain their traditional beliefs and values; however the pre-existing dominant public milieu is institutionally protected.”230

Moreover, if these scholars are correct, the openness of the nation to integration and accommodation is dependent on the national minority’s ability to exercise competency over immigration. In the context of the national minority / state relationship I describe in Chapter 2, Section III, it is clear that the national minority takes the matter of

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230 Blad and Couton, 652
competencies very seriously. I expect that the exercise of these competencies shapes the model of immigrant management the national minority follows. I am interested in exploring the proposition that the conflicting goals of preservation and openness can only be balanced – without the so-called ‘clash of cultures’ – to the extent that a national minority feels secure in its place within the state, and able to dictate the terms of admission and integration. The more institutional and policy control the nested nation has, the more capable it is of incorporating or integrating new members. However, national minorities seek these powers in order to manage migratory flows with the goal of institutionalizing, and often preserving, a national culture (and often language). This suggests that, ironically, the very structures that allow the national minority to be open to immigration and integration (by increasing a sense of security and control) also by necessity limit the possibility of accommodation.

In “Minority Nationalism and Immigration,” Will Kymlicka articulates precisely paradoxical proposition.231 He refutes the claim that minority nationalism is inherently incompatible with modernity (see “Defensive” model above), briefly enumerating the liberal and modernizing tendencies in Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, and others.232 He contrasts the ‘ethnic’ view of minority nationalism with post-ethnic / civic nationalism, arguing that the “clear trend in most Western democracies is towards a more open and non-racial definition of minority nationalism.”233 Still, he claims, “it may be that special circumstances must be in place for such a post-ethnic multicultural form of minority nationalism to arise;” he lists control over admission policy, integration, and language

232 Ibid, 280-283
233 Ibid
policy as essential circumstances. Neither the open nor the defensive model accounts for
the post-ethnic nationalism Kymlicka describes: what Blad and Couton call “intercultural
nationalism.”

This third model, intercultural nationalism, combines elements of cultural
nationalism in a civic framework. The intercultural model differs both in that it accounts
for a balancing of interests, and speculates that national minority competencies play an
integral part in this facilitating and defining how the needs of the national minority can be
balanced with those of immigrants into their territory. In this sense, it provides a “most
likely” case for compatibility.

However, it is not clear what we should expect to see in this model. Below, I
develop two hypotheses: one about the conditions most likely to produce a model of
intercultural nationalism, and another about how this model relates to the four outcomes I
develop. First, however, I explain how admission policy and integration policy function
as both dependent and moderating variables in these hypotheses.

B. Competency-Conditional Policies as both Dependent and Moderating Variables

My hypotheses stem from the distinction I introduce in Chapter 3 between
competency-conditional and competency-neutral dependent variables. Admission policy
and integration policy, I claim, are fundamentally different from nationality policy and
multicultural accommodation in that the institutional framework of the state qualifies the
former two. For this reason, a national minority may have varying degrees of control of
these policies relative to the state, quite separate from the question of how the policies
themselves are or would be exercised.
I believe that these competency-conditional policies can be seen both as *dependent* variables, and as *moderating* variables. As dependent variables, admission policy and integration policy can be clearly connected to the conditions of the case; to understand this relationship, I simply ask, “under what conditions would we expect to see the national minority gain and exercise competency over admission policy and integration policy?”

As *moderating* variables, however, these competency-conditional policies alter the association between conditions in the case, on the one hand, and nationality policy and multicultural accommodation on the other. To understand these variables as moderating, or intermediate variables, we take as given the presence or absence of national minority control over admission and / or integration policy (as it exists empirically), and ask how the exercise (or lack thereof) of these competency-conditional variables moderates the conditions of the case, the other dependent variables (nationality policy and accommodation), and most importantly the relationship between the two.

Treating admission policy and integration policy *only* as dependent variables would prevent any hypotheses from reflecting the role these policies play in shaping the so-called ‘independent’ case conditions, particularly as it concerns levels of fluency, migration rates, and population size. After all, the nested nation has a strong interest in exercising control over immigration and language precisely in order to shape demographic and linguistic circumstances. Qualitative case analysis is particularly useful for understanding variables in this way.

When dealing with only a few variables, the ideal approach would be to map all possible combinations and see how they relate to a single outcome. However, I have
identified a significant number of independent variables and focus on four distinct outcomes. This chapter, therefore, lays out a broad-strokes hypothesis of the relationship between case conditions and the four dependent variables I assess, and then addresses this hypothesis in two parts.

These more narrow hypotheses build configurations of only the most relevant variables for the outcome in question. This is not to discount other aspects of the case, but to identify the most salient features related to given outcomes and speculates about how they relate. A single hypothesis will select a number of variables to consider in combination.

To further streamline, it is also possible to build a single larger concept that incorporates or any number of distinct variables. For example, in asking what variables are most likely to increase demands for competency over admission policy, I hypothesize that the fear of minorization precedes such a demand. High rates of migration, low birth rates, high rates of emigration, and/or slow relative growth (to name just a few) could produce this fear. Therefore, I group multiple variables into broader categories that can highlight many dimensions of a similar, clearly defined concept (in this case, “fear of minorization”). The advantage of the configurational approach is that it allows for hypothesis testing that incorporates the complexity of real-life scenarios in this way.

Nevertheless, not all of the independent variables are alike in kind; they mix quantifiable measures, historical fact, and broad concepts. This range of measurement contributes to the richness of the cases, but also is open to the critique of inconsistency, particularly when these variables are mixed and matched in a single hypothesis. Though I distinguish in these explanations between concepts and their measures, I see no reason
why various conditions of a case should not be drawn into a single hypothesis. Reality is complex, and this complexity is best accounted for in an approach that works with history, policy, data, and concepts together.

Once again, the question I ask is: under what conditions, and with what (if any) limitations, can self-governing nested nations integrate and accommodate new members? This question probes the openness of the national minority to assimilate immigrants, and moreover, whether it is capable of becoming internally pluralist by accommodating difference. I expect that compatibility is most likely in the model of interculturalism – where integration and accommodation occur within a clearly defined and institutionally protected public culture. I test the broad hypothesis that national minority control over the terms of admission and integration is both a necessary and limiting factor for the integration and accommodation of immigrants within the national minority – consistent with a third model of immigrant management, intercultural nationalism.

I begin by developing a hypothesis about the conditions that are most likely be associated with the national minority gaining or increasing its competency over admission and integration policy. Hypothesis 1 posits a configurational approach likely to be associated with national minority competency over immigration and integration policies. This hypothesis concretely links conditions of the case to the degree of national minority legislative, political, and structural control over immigration and integration.

Next, I consider the impact of these policies in influencing competency-neutral variables. Hypothesis 2 address two related questions: first, how do immigration and integration policies affect the conditions (demographic, economic, linguistic etc.) present in the case; second: how do these policies moderate the relationship between these case
conditions and the outcomes I measure in terms of national identity and multicultural accommodation? How do national minorities exercise control over immigration and integration, and how does the presence or absence of these policies influence the likelihood of the three models of incorporation? Overall, I test the hypothesis that competency over immigration and integration policies will maximize the openness of the national minority, but within the limits of intercultural nationalism. In the remainder of this chapter, I build two hypotheses, which I then address through case studies in Chapter 5.

II. Hypothesis 1: Conditions Associated with Competency over Admission and Integration policies.

The first hypothesis I develop treats competency over admission policy and integration policy as dependent variables. I ask, “under what conditions would we expect to see the national minority gain and exercise competency over admission policy and integration policy?” Though admission policy and integration policy are distinct from one another, and may occur separately, they highlight core aspects of the larger concept of immigration management – in keeping with the broad hypothesis that certain competencies and policies are necessary for national minorities to become open and ‘post-ethnic’. The configurations for each are similar enough that it is worth considering them together. Finally, viewing them together shows how they interact. In examining the variables most likely to lead to control over admission and integration policy, I consider separately factors likely to increase demand by the national minority, and factors likely to increase the state’s openness to these demands. I address each of these aspects of these topics separately.
A. Demand for Competency over Immigration Policies

**Hypothesis 1a:** Nested Nations are likely to demand competency to control admission and integration policy when they experience linguistic and demographic instability, have the potential to recruit immigrants compatible with the national project, and where they generally seek or expect a high degree of self-governance.

**Graph 4.1a: Conditions Likely to Increase Demand for Competency over Immigration Policies**

We would expect nested nations, as a general rule, to demand control over immigration to the extent that they view uncontrolled or state-controlled migration as a threat, and believe that gaining competency over migration will allow them to minimize the harms, or even benefit from migration. I also consider the possibility that national minorities generally seek to increase sovereignty over issues of governance (apart from some exceptions, like the military and defense). This hypothesis, therefore, connects three key concepts: demographic and linguistic instability, a general demand for
increased self-governance, and the potential to recruit immigrants consistent with the national project.

The first condition likely to produce a strong demand for increased competency is demographic and linguistic instability. Low birth rates, low growth, or high rates of immigration all provoke fears among the national minority about the survival of the nation. This fear has both an absolute and a relative dimension. In absolute terms, low birth rates and high levels of immigration contribute to a fear of minorization – of being made a ‘minority’ even in the designated territory. Low birth rates intimate the decline of the nation, and the fear that over time the nation will cease to exist if there are not enough members of future generations to carry on the national identity. High rates of immigration may heighten these fears.

In relative terms, demographic strength and stability are also indicators of the status of the nested nation within the state. Declining population size or slowing growth forebodes a lack of importance within the state, and the worry that the national minority will lose political power or perhaps the power of self-government altogether. In cases where a national language is taken to be a key marker of national identity (true in all cases I consider here), linguistic instability also becomes a threat to the minority. The nested nation may seek to minimize and counteract linguistic instability by selecting linguistically compatible migrants, wherever possible, or by making language acquisition a clear term of integration.

The nation’s position within the state, both in terms of its historic importance and its structure of self-government, will also play a role in determining what competencies it demands. This connection seems reasonable – presumably nations with a high degree of
historic importance within the state may see themselves as more deserving of increased
competencies, and may also feel that they are more likely to be accommodated.
Furthermore, nations who are racially, culturally, or linguistically distinct from the
majority may be more likely to feel they have a truly “distinctive” society to protect,
though the source of migration certainly influences this fear.\textsuperscript{234} I speculate that these
features, Historic Status and Level of Distinctiveness, connect to a general demand for
increased sovereignty.\textsuperscript{235}

Thirdly, the nation must feel that it will benefit by gaining competency over
immigration. As a general rule, when a national minority (or any state, for that matter)
controls admission and selection, it is able to balance and maximally fulfill its own needs
(demographic, economic etc.). While national minorities will always (perceive
themselves to) benefit from controlling migration, this benefit is especially clear when
the national minority has the potential to recruit migrants who are compatible (usually
linguistically) with the nation. These could either be diaspora members of the nation,
potential migrants who already speak the language of the region, or those who are
deemed more likely to acculturate. Interestingly, the very idea of ‘suitable’ potential
immigrants is determined by how the nation defines itself, but typically, same-language
migrants seem to have a particular appeal to the national minority. Particularly in the
presence of same-language potential migrants, control over immigration appears to be a
solution to fears of minorization, not simply a way of minimizing it. Still, it should be
added that immigration in general is a complex balancing act: the nested nation must

\textsuperscript{234} Of course, fear of minorization is a perceived, rather than explicitly quantified phenomenon.
Furthermore, though I do not have space to address this hypothesis here, it may also be true that nations
with a high degree of distinctiveness will in general be more likely to enjoy greater powers of self-
government.
\textsuperscript{235} The presence and strength of a secessionist movement also may be important in this regard.
consider its demographic, political, and economic needs in addition to the potential ethnic, linguistic, and/or cultural needs of the national project. These needs and the relative importance of each are fluid and change over time.

Finally, the demands of national minorities will be influenced by their perceptions of how likely they are to actually achieve their demands. Though ‘demand’ and ‘responsiveness’ are treated as distinct variables, they clearly interrelate. Perceived likelihood of concessions increase the likelihood of demands, just as demands are instrumental in shaping the receptiveness of the state.

B. State Receptivity to Demand for Competency Immigration Policies

With this demand-centered hypothesis fleshed out, we must turn to the question of what circumstances are most likely to lead to openness to conceding to national minority demands.

**Hypothesis 1b:** *The state is most likely to be receptive to national demands for increased competency over immigration policies when the nested nation has significant bargaining power (measured in demographic and economic strength, political representation at the state level, and strong asymmetrical self-governance), coupled with a historic status likely to make the state more responsive to the minority’s demands.*
Hypothesis 1b distinguishes a number of elements that affect how receptive the state will be to minority demands. I broadly distinguish between conditions that increase the national minority’s bargaining power relative to the state (the ability to make the state do something it would not otherwise do), and conditions that make the institutions of the state more prone or more likely to concede to the nested nation’s demands.

I present this hypothesis broadly following the assumption that as the nested nation’s ‘power’ increases, so does its ability to influence the processes of the state. It’s also worth considering that the opposite might be true: if the national minority and state engage in control for power, the state may feel threatened if the national minority
becomes too big or too powerful. Despite these competing hypotheses, I hypothesize that national minority with large populations and economies, state-level representation,\textsuperscript{236} and asymmetrical status will be more likely to achieve their demands for competencies. I view all of these as indicators of bargaining power.

In addition to bargaining power, I consider the historic conditions of the nation within the state. Distinctiveness, historic status, and contested development position the nation within the state in a way that will render the state and its institutions more responsive to minority demands. I hypothesize that states are more likely to be responsive to demands for preservation of a ‘distinct’ society when that society is demonstrably distinct from the larger state. Second, I consider the historic place of the nation within the state. In many cases, the histories of the national minority and the state are intimately connected for centuries, sometimes pre-dating the foundation of the state itself. Where nations are firmly rooted in the structure and history of the state could be more likely to be seen as instrumental, indissoluble members of the union. However, here we encounter a competing dilemma: national minorities with significant historical status (for example, in multinational states created through confederation) may also be more likely to view themselves as sovereign. In the case of strong secessionist movements, it is not clear whether we would expect the state to be more or less likely to relinquish competency. However, I hypothesize that where nations enjoy significant historical status, this status will influence the sympathy of the state to minority demands.

\textsuperscript{236} Multinational Federalisms often provide national minorities with the political powers to influence and shape federal policies, including guaranteed seats in federal legislative bodies and veto powers. I do not consider veto power here, although it is an indicator of political power, because it does not influence the devolution of powers so much as prevents legislation that the national minority would find oppressive.
I also suggest that a history of contestation may influence the responsiveness of the state to national demands. Once again, there are competing hypotheses for how a cultural oppression might relate to the responsiveness of the state. It is not clear whether such contestation would make increased devolution of power more or less likely. We might assume that in states with historic or current contestation, the national minority has less status or continues to be perceived as a threat to state-wide unity. However, it is also possible that states with histories of violence or repression are more likely to compromise and agree to minority demands as a result of the historical contestation. I consider both of these hypotheses. As all three of these variables suggest, the historic position of the national minority within the state clearly influences its ability to achieve its demands for competency. While the causal relationship is complex in all cases, I assert that the state is more likely to be responsive to the demands of highly distinct national minority with significant historic status within the state, although it is not clear how cultural repression affects this relationship.

Below, I bring together Hypotheses 1a and 1b to develop a broader hypothesis for when the nested nation is most likely to gain structural competency over immigration policy. Recall that each structural outcome is not clearly a yes-or-no but a degree of control.

**Hypothesis 1a:** Nested nations are likely to demand competency to control admission and integration policy when they experience linguistic and demographic instability, have the potential to recruit immigrants compatible with the national project, and where they generally seek or expect a high degree of self-governance.

**Hypothesis 1b:** The state is most likely to be receptive to national demands for increased competency over immigration policies when the nested nation has a significant bargaining power (measured in demographic and economic strength, political representation at the state level, and strong asymmetrical self-governance), coupled with a historic status likely to make the state responsive to the minority’s demands.
Hypothesis 1 (Combined): The nested nation is likely to gain structural competency over immigration policy where it exercises a strong demand for control (likely where it experiences linguistic and demographic instability, the potential to recruit ‘compatible’ migrants, and a general demand for increased competency) and the state is receptive to these demands (based on a combination of bargaining power and responsiveness).

Graph 1 (Combined): Conditions Likely to Increase the Likelihood that the Nested Nation will have Structural Competency over Immigration Policies

Hypothesis 1 develops a configuration most likely to increase the nested nation’s control over immigration policies – admission policy and integration policy. Here, I treat these outcomes as dependent variables. Recall however, that structure is distinct from policy – the manner in which that competencies are exercised. Similarly, it is important to keep in mind that competency is a matter of degree in nested nations – therefore the first ‘measure’ of this outcome involves determining the relative control of the nested nation and state over both admission and integration policy.
III. Hypothesis 2: Competency-Conditional Policies and Intercultural Nationalism

Above, I treat admission and integration policy as dependent variables in order to understand how they evolve in relation to the conditions of the cases. Now, I turn to the question of how the presence or absence of these competencies affects the openness of the national minority across all four variables – including the exercise of admission and integration policy. I hypothesize that a model of intercultural nationalism can only arise when national minorities have competency over admission and integration policy. Hypothesis 2a articulates that the exercise of these competency-conditional policies is necessary for an inclusive and accommodating model of immigrant management. Hypothesis 2b shows the way that the exercise of these policies also limits, perhaps illiberally, the extent of integration and accommodation possible within the nested nation.

**Hypothesis 2a:** National minorities are most likely to demonstrate openness to incorporating and accommodating immigrants under circumstances where they exercise meaningful control over admission and / or integration policy. The exercise of these policies shapes the demographic, cultural, and linguistic conditions of the case, helping to secure the national minority’s viability. Competency over these policies, and the exercise thereof, is a necessary precondition for the inclusion (via a civic nationality policy) and accommodation of immigrants.

**Hypothesis 2b:** Competency over admission and integration policy helps establish an institutional framework that protects and promotes a common national culture. Admission policies will favor nationally ‘compatible’ migrants and impose some cultural terms of entrance and a significant degree of integration on migrants who wish to enter. These policies will give shape to a nationality policy that emphasizes culturally ‘civic’ means of belonging and accommodation within a pre-determined culture.

Hypotheses 2a shows how competency over, and the exercise of admission and integration policies allow the national minority to affect the case conditions in a way that
ensures the stability and security of the national minority within the state. I hypothesize that the exercise of one or both of these policies is a necessary precondition for the national minority to move away from a “defensive” national model of immigrant management towards a more open one. Without substantial control in at least one of these areas, I predict that national minorities will be most likely to be marked by defensive and ethnic nationalism. In the absence of competency, high rates of immigration and demolinguistic insecurity are likely to lead to ethnic entrenchment.

Hypothesis 2b links the exercise of admission and integration policies to the model of intercultural nationalism. Intercultural nationalism is a public philosophy that emphasizes integration and accommodation “into an existing cultural, economic and political context.” This context, according to Blad and Couton, is “institutionally protected” even as the preservation of other cultures is promoted. I postulate that, across all four variables, openness towards immigrants occurs with some fixed limitations. The model of intercultural nationalism is most likely to make the demands of the national minority compatible with those of immigrants into that territory. This model is most likely to demonstrate openness to the integration and accommodation of immigrant minorities. However, it is able to do so precisely because the national minority regulates immigration, enforces clear terms of integration, and defines a nationality policy that, while civic, clearly promotes a form of cultural nationalism. Furthermore, by promoting a common public culture, it allows for accommodation, but with clearly demarcated limits.
Table 4.2: Intercultural Nationalism: A Third Model of Immigrant Management?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model:</th>
<th>Defensive / Ethnic Model</th>
<th>Open / Civic Model</th>
<th>“Intercultural Nationalism”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Admission Policy</td>
<td>Exclusionary</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>*Management of admission and selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Integration Policy</td>
<td>Radical, Coercive</td>
<td>Moderate, Non-coercive</td>
<td>*Integration into an existing context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nationality Policy</td>
<td>Closed to non-members (“ethnic”)</td>
<td>Open to new members (“civic”)</td>
<td>Culturally civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Multicultural Accommodation</td>
<td>Impossible</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Accommodation within a protected common culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Indicates that the national minority exercises some or total control over this competency-conditional variable. The words in the table indicate how we would expect such policies to be exercised.

Table 4.2 plots this hypothesis as it fits into Blad and Couture’s model of “intercultural nationalism,” with my own variables. In the following chapter, I test both of my hypotheses through case studies of Quebec and Catalonia. I summarize my general hypothesis below:

**General Hypothesis:** National minority control over the terms of admission and integration, which should arise under the conditions presented in Hypothesis 1, is both a necessary and limiting factor for the inclusion and accommodation of immigrants in the national project and multicultural accommodation – consistent with a third model of immigrant management, intercultural nationalism.

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237 Shafir focuses on the economic development of national minorities as it relates to immigration. He sees ‘modernizing’ nations as embracing the economic benefits of modernity, embodied in immigration. Cultural adaptation and assimilation are consequences of this economic perspective. As he says, “immigrants usually arrive as a direct result of the regions’ industrialization, and therefore, become emblematic of modernity.” While I agree with this thesis, I choose to call the latter model ‘open’ to focus on national / cultural aspects of immigration, rather than economic modernization, although I recognize that the two are linked.

238 Blad and Couton
Chapter 5: Quebec: The Archetype of an Intercultural Nationalism?

I. Francophone Ethnic Nationalism: Confederation Through the Quiet Revolution
II. Devolution of Powers: Quebec’s Evolving Competencies
III. Intercultural Nationalism: Preservation and Pluralism
IV. Enduring Challenges: Belonging and the Crisis of Reasonable Accommodation

As Chapter 4 reviews, I am interested in testing the compatibility of national minority self-governance with immigrant integration and accommodation. I approach this relationship through two specific questions: First, when are national minorities likely to gain competency? Second, how does the exercise of competency affect the conditions of the case and moderate their impact on national identity and multicultural accommodation? Chapters 5 and 6 test the hypothesis that immigrant-host interactions are most likely to be compatible under a model of intercultural nationalism.

Though I “tell the story” of each case, (and do not systematically map each case out by variables), I do so with my hypotheses and viewing the interactions between them. Wherever possible, I consider both the empirical elements of the case, and how they correspond to the variables and broader concepts I develop in hypothesis formation.

Organizationally, I elect to examine each case as a whole, testing hypotheses 1 and 2 across time. This organization works best because it allows me to show how the hypotheses interrelate. Hypothesis 1 concerns circumstances that are likely to be associated with devolution of power, whether initially or to a greater degree. Not surprisingly, these competencies and the specific policies change considerably over time. Furthermore, because Hypothesis 2 asks about the impact of these policies, considering them separately would involve hopping back and forth over time, treating each “case” as novel every time there was a change in the institutional framework or application of
immigration / integration policy. This back-and-forth approach would not only require a significant amount of repetition, but it would also detract from the over-arching hypothesis that I am interested in testing: that national minority control over the terms of admission and integration is both a necessary and limiting factor for full integration into the national project and multicultural accommodation – consistent with a third model of immigrant management, intercultural nationalism. Testing this hypothesis, as I show, requires considering competency over immigration and integration both as dependent and moderating variables. Still, when applied to real case studies it becomes clear that these policies function as both dependent and moderating variables simultaneously; control over immigration and integration can be viewed as outcomes even as they influence the conditions of the case moderate the impact thereof on the competency-neutral outcomes: nationality policy and multicultural accommodation.

In this chapter, I examine the case of Quebec, which Blad and Couton consider the archetype for their model of intercultural nationalism. Quebec is widely regarded as a liberal national minority, known both for its embrace of interculturalism as a public philosophy and for its controversial language laws. Here, I consider the development of Quebec nationalism, from the defensive, exclusionary model it exhibited from its foundations into the early 20th century, to the Quebec’s pioneering model of interculturalism, beginning during the of the Quiet Revolution. The case of Quebec shows the co-occurrence of dramatically increased competencies with a significant transition away from intercultural nationalism.
I. Francophone Ethnic Nationalism: Confederation through the Quiet Revolution

Since before Canada’s foundations, Quebec nationalists have emphasized the Francophone community’s unique status in North America, and sought to preserve and protect the so-called “French fact.” However, it is worth noting that this ‘fact’ itself is somewhat of a re-imagination of reality. Demographically, Quebec has always been marked by social, linguistic, and national diversity. Montreal, for example, has been characterized by its cultural diversity and French-English bilingualism from the time of its conquest by the British in 1760, until the Quiet Revolution nearly two centuries later. In addition to native Canadians, the French, British, Irish, Scotts, and even fleeing Loyalists first settled Quebec and Canada.

Still, as a matter of governance and history, nationalists find evidence of their important historic status. As far back as 1774, the Quebec Act established partial autonomy for French Canada with protection of Catholicism, French, and historic civil laws. In 1791, the province of Canada was divided into majority-Anglophone Upper Canada and majority-Francophone Lower Canada. Nearly a century later, the British North America Act of 1867 (BNA) established Quebec as one of four provinces, dividing the Province of Canada into Ontario and Quebec. Therefore, though Canada was created through confederation, this act required dividing “two very different cultural, linguistic and religious communities.”

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over education, health, and the justice system, among other competencies. Provincial autonomy from the start acknowledged the special status of Quebec and recognized the equal status of French and English in the Federal parliament, and court. While today Canada has 10 provinces and three territories, Quebec nationalists have widely rejected the idea of provincialism, instead insisting on Quebec’s status as a “distinct society” as one of two territorial majorities in Canada. For Quebec nationalists, these early documents emphasize the distinct status of the Francophone Canadians as one of two founding peoples. With respect to historic status of Quebec in Canada, its founding role and participation in constitutionalism seem critical; it seems this founding status, as well as Quebec’s high level of distinctiveness (cultural, linguistic, religious, and arguably racial) have solidified, in the minds of Quebecois nationalists, Quebec’s strong claim to autonomy.

Demographically, Quebec was and continues to be a significant minority within Canada. The 1901 census recorded Quebec’s population at 1,648,898: approximately 1/3 of Canada’s 5,371,315 total. This placed Quebec as Canada’s second most populous province, where it remains today. The population was divided between urban centers and rural areas, and the economy combined agriculture, trade, and small-scale production.

Quebec’s early demographics indicate that the ‘problem’ of immigration present throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, despite the fact that Quebec remained

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243 One interesting point here is that the descriptive words scholars use to describe Quebec’s status indicate frames of reference for viewing the nation’s position within the state. Viewed as a founding member, Quebec’s demographic position seems insecure – at just 1/3 of the total population. However, when viewed as one of many provinces, Quebec’s position appears strong. This semantic difference belies deeper issues of framing.

244 Statistics Canada, “Population of Canada, by province, census dates, 1851 to 1976,”
linguistically stable (at approximately 80% francophone\textsuperscript{245} and declined only slightly in relative population size. In the early 1800s, the arrival of Irish, Scotts, Americans, and English tested nationalists’ vision of two distinct, homogenous peoples. During this period, continuing immigration fueled the already existing separatist, ethnically defined nationalism, which combined traits of language, ethnicity, and territorial belonging.\textsuperscript{246,247} As McAndrew writes, Anglophones and Allophones (speakers of neither French nor English) were viewed as a distinct element – functioning almost as a separate community within Quebec, and particularly in Montreal.\textsuperscript{248} Religion, language, and origin were treated as the major demarcations of identity. In this way, the French-Canadian national identity, imparted at birth, created “fixed, narrow, and impermeable [boundaries].”\textsuperscript{249}

It seems likely that this ethnic nationalism rose in order to distinguish and defend a “homogenous” nation from the perceived threat of immigration, and the fear that the Francophone Canadians would be unwillingly integrated into the larger Anglo-American community. From the time of Confederation through the mid-1900s, the concerns of internal diversity and assimilation into Anglophone Canada were closely linked. As Hypothesis 2 predicts, early Quebec separatist nationalism grew in response to the uncontrolled growth of an Anglophone minority within Quebec, leading to some incidents of racism and violence and a high degree of ethnic tension in the mid 1800s.\textsuperscript{250}

Moreover, English-Canadians exerted a high degree of influence over development

\textsuperscript{245} John Alexander Dickinson, \textit{A Short History of Quebec} (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 202
\textsuperscript{248} McAndrew, 2
\textsuperscript{250} Dickinson, 159
projects, finances, and political power in Quebec and Canada as whole. The new waves of immigrants in the early 1800s were mainly American or English, and therefore by necessity strengthened, from a Quebecois nationalist perspective, the power of the Anglophone majority. Moreover, industrialization in other parts of Canada and the U.S led to the emigration of approximately 400,000 French Canadians between 1860 and 1900.\textsuperscript{251} Despite this demographic insecurity, the francophone population remained stable for much of the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century through to the Great Depression.

The turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century saw a significant increase in rates of immigration in Canada as a percentage of Canada’s population, from around .5\% (immigrants admitted / Canada’s population) in the 1890s to a peak of 5.3\% in 1913.\textsuperscript{252} This was spurred by the growth of Industrial Capitalism, starting in the 1890s up until the 1930s. Quebec, at this point subject to Federal immigration policy under article 91 of the BNA, diversified alongside Canada.\textsuperscript{253} The BNA in theory established shared jurisdiction between the Federal and Provincial governments with respect to immigration, though in practice the Federal government exercised this competency.\textsuperscript{254} Though French was recognized, it was co-official along with English, and the education system was dual-confessional.

Not surprisingly, Quebec underwent a demographic and ethnic transformation as a result of the broader trend of foreign immigration to Canada: between 1896 and 1914, Quebec received over 700,000 new immigrants. During this same period, an additional 800,000 Quebecois left. Once again, the Quebecois nation (defined by ancestry) was

\textsuperscript{251} Behiels, 3, Statistics Canada
\textsuperscript{252} Peter S. Li, Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues, 20-1. Appendix A1 “Immigrants Admitted Annually to Canada 1867-2000,” 184-5
\textsuperscript{253} The British North America Act
\textsuperscript{254} Chris Kostov, “Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreements (1971-1991) and Their Impact on Federalism,” \textit{American Review of Canadian Studies} 38.1, (Spring 2008) [no pages]
doubly undermined. This process of social and linguistic diversification elicited, as we would expect, “hostile reaction of Quebec’s francophone élites to the immigration policies of the national government” across various nationalist organizations.\textsuperscript{255} The response to immigration was almost always critical and defensive, with the exception of the Liberal party (federal and provincial), who linked immigration with the necessity of modernization and the industrialization of the economy.

In sum, Quebec arose as a distinct society with a foundational role in the confederation and constitution drafting of Canada. Since Confederation, it has enjoyed uninterrupted governance, although more radical iterations of Quebecois nationalism were frustrated by the provincial structure of the state and Anglophone dominance within it. Quebec’s economy, centered on agriculture and artisanship until the advent of industrial capitalism in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, was generally less industrialized than Ontario. Moreover, what financial or development projects existed were controlled primarily by Anglophones. During this period, it experienced dramatic demographic instability, although linguistic separatism, particularly in schools and churches, between the Anglophone and Francophone community lessened the impact of linguistic change.

Up to and including WWII, “the prevalent attitude towards immigration among French-Canadian leaders remained that of open hostility.”\textsuperscript{256} Quebec’s ‘ethnic’ self-conception, for nationalists, was all the more necessary in the face of British and European immigration, as embodied in divided spheres of religion, education, business, and even settlement. The closed national identity and attitude of fear and hostility indicate clearly the absence of compatibility of immigrant integration or accommodation

\textsuperscript{255} Behiels, 5
\textsuperscript{256} Behiels, 11
and national minority self-government in this period. As Juteau summarizes, “French
Canada was thus constructed as a nation, as an ethnically defined national community
that was economically and politically subordinated to English Canada, and that strived
for greater autonomy.”257 This relationship, as well as the ethnic nationalism associated
with it, remained true until the mid-20th century.

From the time of its foundation, Quebec fits the defensive, ethnic model of
nationalism. Although it did not exercise control of admission, at the institutional level
(e.g. schools) and in public discourse, it practiced a policy of exclusion and separatism.
Quebec’s primary response to immigration was to prevent integration by allowing almost
all immigrants, Anglophone and Allophone, to integrated into the Anglophone context.
Moreover, with the exception of some economic arguments, immigrants were widely
viewed as a demographic, socio-cultural, and political threat. This view of hostility, I
believe, confirms what we would expect to see with high rates of immigration and
demographic instability in a country with significant historic status. Many of the
conditions that I hypothesize will lead to an increased demand for competency also
associate with a mostly closed and defensive ethnolinguisitic nationalism. For many
scholars, the Quiet Revolution is the (re)defining moment in Quebec’s history, for
reasons that I discuss below.

II. Devolution of Powers: Quebec’s Evolving Competencies

The Quiet Revolution marks a critical turning point in the history of Quebec,
where simultaneous social, political, and ideological change fused to fundamentally
redefine Quebecois society. Rapid industrialization, government expansion, and

257 Juteau, 443
demographic concerns led to a significant increase in demand for control over immigration policy – particularly control over admission and recruitment. Through negotiations at the Federal level, Quebec made a series of agreements under which it gained almost total sovereignty over admission, selection, integration, and language policies. Concurrently, the Quebec government, and many civil society organizations rethought the issue of immigration, placing an emphasis on creating members and re-articulating nationality policy in a way that, for the first time, expanded the horizons of membership. Language policies became a critical measure of this integrationist effort, and began a significant debate about the prospects and limits of integration and the role of French language and culture in Quebecois identity.

Even before the Quiet Revolution itself, various political, social and religious associations the level began to rethink the question of demography. In 1952, Pierre Dumareau drew attention to differential birth rates (between Anglophone and Francophone Canada) and immigration to project that Quebec’s demographic future, particularly with respect to its place and proportional size in Canada, was in serious jeopardy.\textsuperscript{258} The previous model of defense and exclusion had led to a system where immigrants integrated into the Anglophone community almost by default. This separatism of immigrants from the francophone public sphere is consistent with an exclusionary ethnic nationality policy, as Shafir predicts, but also demonstrates choice by immigrants to gravitate towards English as the language of prestige and economic life in Canada.

\textsuperscript{258} Behiels, 11
However, beginning in the 1950s, the Quebecois neo-nationalists, the Church, and the government began to believe that their survival depended on integration.\textsuperscript{259} This change coincided with a growing rate of immigration following the Great Depression.

\textbf{From Depression to Quiet Revolution}

\begin{table}
\centering
\caption{Ethnic origin of the population of Quebec, 1931–1961}
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
 & 1931 & 1941 & 1951 & 1961 \\
\hline
French & 2 270 059 & 2 695 032 & 3 327 128 & 4 241 354 \\
British Isles & 432 696 & 452 887 & 491 818 & 567 057 \\
German & 10 616 & 8 880 & 12 249 & 39 457 \\
Greek & (not given) & 2 728 & 3 388 & 19 390 \\
Italian & 24 845 & 28 051 & 34 165 & 108 552 \\
Jewish & 60 087 & 66 277 & 73 019 & 74 677 \\
Polish & (not given) & 10 036 & 16 998 & 30 790 \\
Asian & 2 793 & 7 119 & 7 714 & 14 801 \\
Indian and Inuit & 13 471 & 13 641 & 16 620 & 21 343 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textit{Source: Census of Canada}

As the tables above indicate, the arrival of “more than 420,000 immigrants [after WWII]...significantly altered the composition of the province’s non-francophone population.”\textsuperscript{261} In particular, note the significant rise of Italian, Jewish, Greek, and Asian immigrant groups that far outpaces the growth of ethnically French Canadians. This demographic change provides an important context for the rapid transformation of the Quiet Revolution, particularly as it concerns Quebec’s increasing competency over immigration policies.

What is called the Quiet Revolution in fact comprises a series of changes across nearly all aspects of Quebecois society, state, and economy. This was a period of rapid industrialization, in which the Quebecois government drastically expanded in its control of the economy (e.g. nationalizing private companies), established a welfare state, and

\textsuperscript{259} Behiels, 16
\textsuperscript{260} Table from Dickinson, 274. Original Source: Census of Canada.
\textsuperscript{261} Dickinson, 274
increased its presence in language, education and immigration control. All at once, Quebec underwent interrelated developments of neo-nationalization (including national re-definition), economic industrialization, and the renegotiation of Quebec’s status within Canada. While all of these broader societal changes influence the position of immigrants within Quebec, Behiels argues that two factors are particularly salient in producing this new demand: a staggering drop in birth rates, triggered by economic development, and “longstanding integration of allophone immigrants into the Anglophone community.”

In 1900, Quebec had a birth rate of 39.5 births per thousand. By 1950 this rate hovered around 30 per 1000, and by the 1970s it was consistently between 14 and 17. It has remained low since, to the point that in 1995 Quebec’s birth rate was “the lowest in the industrialized world.” Not surprisingly, this fact instilled the fear of shrinking population size (due to low rates of growth) within Canada. This was coupled, as Dickinson shows, by an aging of the population consistent with fewer new workers seeking employment.

This outward facing fear compounded an inward-facing one: the fear of minorization of the Francophone community within Quebec, and specifically the community of Montreal, where the vast majority of Allophone immigrants settled and continue to do so today. Although many earlier immigrants – Scottish, Welsh, Irish, British, and Americans – already spoke English and naturally assimilated to the

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262 Behiels, 17
265 Dickinson, 308-9
Anglophone system, even new waves of Allophone immigrant children opted for English-language schools nearly 75% of the time.²⁶⁶

However, during the Quiet Revolution, neo-nationalists, particularly in the middle class, changed their perspectives towards this demographic and linguistic insecurity. Marc Levine describes this pro-secular, pro-national, pro-francophone group as a modern, economically oriented new class:

This was not the defensive nationalism of *la survivance* that encouraged isolation and underdevelopment as the keys to French-Canadian cultural survival. For the technically competent, Francophone middle class, these ideas were anathema. To the new class, the survival and *épanouissement* of the Francophone community depended on effectively reconciling Francophone identity with the reality of modern, urban society.²⁶⁷

Here, we see not the abandonment of nationalism, but rather its adaptation to modern economic, demographic, and political circumstances. This movement achieved significant ends in the realms of immigration policy and integration policy that I review below.

Quebec developed, through a series of negotiations, four separate agreements with the federal government between 1971 and 1991, each of which increased the province’s control over immigration. According to Kostov, during the Quiet Revolution, Quebec began taking an active interest in controlling immigration both to “counteract the birthrate and to strengthen the economic vitality of the province.”²⁶⁸ It established a Ministry of Immigration in 1968, which continued to grow over time. The agreements demonstrate a slow but substantial increase in competency, which corresponds to ever-increasing demands. The first agreement (Lang / Cloutier, 1971) allowed Quebec to place

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²⁶⁶ Behiels, 15  
²⁶⁷ Levine, 45  
²⁶⁸ Kostov
representatives in federal immigration offices abroad. The 1975 (Andras / Bienvenue) expanded this authority to allow Quebec to make non-binding recommendations to visa officials.269

However, “[the] demands of the provinces significantly increased,” as they began to desire a more active role in recruitment and decision-making capacity (to counteract declining population).270 The nationalist politician Jacques Couture, for one, insisted on complete control, declaring federal immigration selection process as “unable to take into account the economic, cultural, and demographic disparities of the provinces.”271

The Cullen-Couture Agreement of 1978 achieved most of these demands, which were built upon even further with the Canada-Quebec Accord of 1991. Quebec acquired both the ability to set its own quotas, and to establish its own point system for evaluating immigrants (which is still in place).272 In addition, it acquired the ability to actively recruit and select immigrants, and even powers of positive and negative veto with respect to Canada. By these powers, granted in the Cullen-Couture Agreement of 1978, Quebec could both permit an immigrant to enter who met its own criteria and not Canada’s, and deny entry to an immigrant who met Quebec’s criteria but not Canada’s criteria (in effect overruling the Constitutional provision of freedom of movement in Canada).273 Though these powers primarily affected selection of “independent” immigrants,” Quebec could now “determine its own objectives…while respecting the framework of the Canadian

269 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “The Canada Québec Accord”
270 Kostov
271 Jacques Couture, cited in Kostov
272 For the most recent updates to Quebec’s point system, see Immigration Canada, “Quebec Immigration Rules,” http://www.immigration.ca/permres-qc-rules.asp
273 Kostov
Immigration Act." With respect to non-voluntary immigrants, who fall into a number of different categories under Canadian law, we can say as a general rule that in terms of family reunification and refugees, powers of selection remained mostly with Ottawa. Neither the Liberals nor the Parti Quebecois demanded executive power over the processing of these refugee or non-voluntary claimants.

Quebec’s powers were expanded further in the Canada-Quebec Accord (1991), which gave Quebec exclusive power over quota, selection (with the exception of refugees and those applying for family reunification), and management and enforcement of commitments for permanent migrants. It also obtained significant consultative authority (Canada must obtain its consent) across categories of temporary migrants. Under this framework, Quebec is still limited to the overall immigration quotas and categories chosen by Canada, but can exceed the quota limit by up to 5% “for demographic reasons.” Kostov makes it clear that demand played a significant role in these concessions.

At the beginning of the period, in 1971, the government of Canada had all the jurisdiction in the area of immigration under its control, and by the end of the period, with the last immigration agreement of 1991, the federal immigration control over Quebec had become symbolic. Every new agreement led to additional powers for Quebec. While the federal government generally preferred to preserve the status quo, it always gave in under the consistent pressure by consecutive Quebec provincial cabinets, regardless of their political colors.

277 Parliament of Canada, “Accord.” See also Peter S. Li, Destination Canada: Immigration Debates and Issues, on categories of immigrants, 39.
278 Kostov
In terms of policy – that is, how these competencies are exercised – there are a number of noteworthy points. First, the evaluation system adopted by Quebec differs only marginally from that of Canada. The notable exception to this general assessment is that Quebec includes additional points for knowledge of French rather than English. As Carens points out, this preference cannot be “a cover way of reintroducing racist criteria,” because it generally facilitates the entry of immigrants from Asian or African ex-French colonies. Moreover, Quebec, like Canada, actively commits to a policy of non-discrimination. Another notable point is the contested “likelihood of adaptability” score, at the discretion of Quebecois immigration officers (a similar subjective scale is used in Canada). Though initially even its defenders conceded “room for improvement” in ensuring non-biased application of this score, more recent immigration policies have decreased the number of points allocated and defined clearly market-oriented criteria for its evaluation.

Second, Quebec has actively sought to increase the number of immigrants it admits. It might seem counterintuitive that a national minority would seek to increase the entrance of immigrants if we take it to be primarily concerned with cultural survival. However, Quebec’s desire to increase its target numbers of immigration is consistent with Hypothesis 2, in that as Quebec developed mechanisms for immigrant management, it was able to expand immigration to fill a demographic need without jeopardizing its cultural survival. I intentionally avoid specific hypotheses about the exercise of

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281 See Carens, 30, for a discussion and critique. For the 2009 Quebec Immigration Rules, see [http://www.immigration.ca/permres-qc-rules.asp](http://www.immigration.ca/permres-qc-rules.asp)
competencies to allow for this type of finding. Although lack of knowledge of French does not bar one from admission, the use of knowledge of French differentiates Quebec’s immigrant pool significantly from that of Canada. In 1991, more than a decade after the Cullen-Couture accord, 37% of immigrants reported knowing French when they arrived. This number has risen to 65% by 2010.\textsuperscript{282} Active recruitment shows the way that admission policies and the “intercultural” framework (as I discuss below) manage and benefit from difference. In 2007, Quebec selected a full 70% of those admitted.\textsuperscript{283}

The second important area of increased competency-conditional policy is integration policy. With respect to immigration in Quebec, the most significant integrationist policies Quebec enacted came in the form of language policy. Across parties, Quebec began employing a series of contested language normalization policies which sought to regulate the use of French in business and the economy, address the demo-linguistic challenge of Anglophone immigrant assimilation, and maintain French as a key identifier of Quebec.

By the 1970s, existing federal law recognized bilingualism, and Bill 63 had begun and failed effective reform at the provincial level. One challenge with language legislation is that, federal constraints aside, policymakers had to consider how any legislation would affect the Anglophone, Allophone, and Francophone communities. Moreover, official bilingualism protected and recognized equally the rights of francophone minorities in majority-Anglophone provinces, just as it protected the rights of Anglophone minorities in Quebec and particularly Montreal. As Levine compellingly

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
demonstrates, the Liberal government under Robert Bourassa was torn between the increasingly impassioned demands of neo-nationalist Francophone, the business interests and political power of Anglophones, and the individual rights of the Allophone (and Anglophone) community. Furthermore, it was bound by the limits of federal language policy. The Liberal Party’s Bill 22 passed in 1974, establishing French as the official language of Quebec, not surprisingly fell subject to criticism from all sides.

Partially as a result of the fiasco of Bill 22, the Parti Québécois won election in 1976 on a platform of ethnic pluralism and linguistic unilingualism, soon after passing Bill 101, “The Charter of the French Language.” As Behiels writes, “Bill 101 was much tougher than Bill 22…[it imposed] a policy of francization of all local institutions such as municipalities, school boards and health and social clubs…[and] streamed all immigrants and children entering Quebec from other provinces into French-language schools.” This legislation demonstrates compelling Quebec’s newfound emphasis on integration, and was coupled with a new public philosophy of immigration and nationalism, as I show below.

The goal of linguistic integration grew teeth with the implementation of Bill 101, which within a decade had dramatically shifted enrollments of immigrant children into French-language schools. In 1978/9, French Catholic schools enrolled 27.3% non-French students; 72.7% were enrolled in English schools. “Within a decade, the numbers had changed to 65.19% in the French sector and 34.82% in the English sector.”

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284 Levine, 90-109
285 Levine, 101
286 Behiels, 22
287 Ghosh, 559
Moreover, Bill 101 took extensive measures with the aim of “language status planning; that is, with improving the status of French in Quebec society in order to make it the dominant and preferred language of business, government and education.”\textsuperscript{288} Not surprisingly, there have been extensive debates about the necessity or appropriateness of these policies, particularly as they concern limiting the freedom of immigrants and Anglophone minorities. While certain aspects of the law were overturned (for example, a French-only signage requirement and mandatory French-language schooling for Anglo-Canadian inward migrants\textsuperscript{289}), it is clear that these laws attempt to impose perhaps-illiberal restrictions on the use of language in order to ensure its protection and status.

With respect to Hypothesis 1a, Quebec’s developing demand confirms many of the interactions I speculate. As the previous section reviews, Quebecois already exercised a general demand for increased autonomy, which I relate to its role as one of two “founding peoples” in Canada. Demographically, demand for control over immigration seems clearly linked to the linguistic and demographic variables I consider: in particular, high rates of immigration coupled with a devastating drop in birth rates, elevating demographic and cultural survival to the public consciousness. One variable that seems to be significant, that I do not explicitly map out, is the high rate of immigrant integration into the Anglophone community. While this might fall under the variable “fluency rates” or even the more general concept of “linguistic insecurity,” long-term trends of integration seem critical in the increase in demand. Furthermore, as I speculate, the presence of French-language potential migrants had significant appeal to Francophone Quebecois nationalists.

\textsuperscript{288} Richard Handler, \textit{Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec}, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 170
\textsuperscript{289} Levine, 128
With respect to Canada’s receptivity to these demands, where my hypotheses are less clear cut, Hypothesis 1b nonetheless seems to provide a convincing account of the relevant conditions. Bargaining power seems most important here, as Quebec articulated unambiguous and weighty demands. During this period, Quebec was at the height of its economic power, particularly relative to Canada. Demographically, by 1976 Quebec represented a little over 27% of Canada’s population as a whole.\footnote{Statistics Canada, “Population of Canada, by Province…” \url{http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/pdf/5500092-eng.pdf}} This decline, though just a few percentage points, proved far more significant in increasing demand than it did in decreasing bargaining power, if, as I assume, population size is a relevant indicator.

Quebec’s status in Canada also seems important in understanding the high degree of devolution of powers. First, because Canada is an asymmetrical federation, it was able to devolve powers to Quebec without necessarily according similar competencies to all provinces. Quebec’s unique status arguably derives not from its economic or political importance, but from the fact of its linguistic, cultural, and religious distinctiveness in comparison to Anglophone Canada. Finally, Quebec’s guaranteed representation in federal parliament may have also played a role in influencing the devolution of powers, though this role is harder to determine. By the 1974 “Amalgam” formula, Quebec’s designated seats in the House of Commons increased by 10 (from a steady 65 since 1867). However, it is not clear whether this increase in seats increased, or mere reflected, Quebec’s bargaining power.\footnote{Elections Canada, “Representation in the House of Commons of Canada,” \url{http://www.elections.ca/scripts/fedrep/federal_e/red/representation_e.htm} Accessed March 22, 2012.}

Overall, the devolution of powers in Quebec during and following the Quiet Revolution seems consistent with what we would expect from the configurations in

\footnotesize{Linton 150}
Hypothesis 1, both in terms of increasing demand and state receptivity. I turn now to test Hypothesis 2, exploring Quebec’s changing nationality policy and model of multiculturalism, focusing on how these outcomes evolved over the course of the Quiet Revolution and beyond.

III. Intercultural Nationalism: Preservation and Pluralism

Above, I discuss the evolution of Quebecois power over immigration policies, and the increasingly prominent role Quebec played during the Quiet Revolution. Throughout this time, nationality policy and national identity changed dramatically, as did the dialogue surrounding accommodation. This section details these changes as they relate to the changing case conditions and competency-conditional policies; it explores the development of a model of interculturalism, as well as the modern challenge of “accommodation.”

In 1990, the Ministère des Communautés Culturelles et de l’Immigration (MCCI) published Let’s Build Quebec Together: A Policy Statement on Immigration and Integration. This policy statement presents Quebec’s agenda with regard to immigration, and also takes steps to set out a normative vision for integration in Quebec in the framework of interculturalism. As Carens notes, [this document] is truly remarkable…for a government publication” in that it “offers a sophisticated, self-conscious articulation of the goals of Quebec’s policies and some of the normative presumptions underlying them.”

The fundamental basis of this document is the establishment of a “moral contract” between immigrants and Quebec, based on three principles:

- A society in which French is the common language of public life

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292 Carens, 22-3

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- A democratic society where everyone is expected and encouraged both to participate and contribute
- A pluralist society that is open to multiple influences within the limits imposed by the respect for fundamental values and the need for intergroup exchanges

These three points speak volumes about the expectations and vision of Quebecois society as it regards immigrants, and expresses obligations for both the immigrants and the host society. As McAndrews sees it, these three points are directed to different audiences within Quebec: “The first principle [French language] represents the effort required from newcomers, whereas the second principle is directed primarily toward the Francophone community, which might give in to a temptation to exclude…” In her view, these principles reflect specific elements of a social contract that imposes obligations on immigrants and hosts equally.

The third point, which applies to society as a whole, merits closer examination. It speaks of pluralism and openness, but also limitations and fundamental values; these are the hallmarks of Quebec’s model of interculturalism. This model can be defined by the idea of “exchanges within a Quebec culture,” employing the symbolism of “convergence” in contrast with the Canadian multiculturalism’s imagery of a mosaic. This distinction is intentional. In fact, interculturalism is generally treated as an explicit rejection of pan-Canadian multiculturalism (which dates back to 1971). Quebecois nationalists view the official policy of multiculturalism, which holds all cultures as equals, as an affront to Quebec’s unique identity and status in Canada.

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294 McAndrew, 3
295 Quebec Government Cultural Development Policy (1978), cited in McAndrews, 8
296 Alain-G. Gagnon et al., Federalism, Citizenship, and Quebec: Debating Multinationalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). As they write, “The Canadian model was not predicated on a genuine
Though *Let’s Build Quebec Together* is often treated as the definitive statement of interculturalism, this public philosophy and terminology traces back to the initial focus on integration within a francophone framework which crystalized during the 1960s. The Ministry of Immigration, from its foundation, offered language courses with the goal of linguistic assimilation, but also funded ethnic organizations and helped Allophones preserve their cultural and linguistic heritage.\(^{297}\) Interculturalism, as the policy statement above makes clear, simultaneously emphasizes pluralism and commonality through the French language. As Rocher et al. summarize, “In Quebec, […] the French language is presented as a centre of convergence for diverse groups which can nevertheless maintain and let flourish their specificity.”\(^{298}\) Though I address competency-conditional policies above, it is clear that these policies evolved along side and in relation to Quebec’s increasingly open and accommodating view of diversity.

The development of interculturalism, and the open model of nationality policy and accommodation it suggests, is intimately linked to Quebec’s practice of admission policy (selecting or favoring francophone candidates) and integration policy based on linguistic assimilation. By the time of MCCI’s 1990 policy statement, Quebec had developed three elements of integration policy, combining a recognition and commitment to pluralism within a Francophone context. As Marie McAndrew summarizes, the MCCI’s approach involved three components: 1) developing and promoting French as the language of common life through language-learning programs and French-language education, 2) “increasing support for the openness of the host society the full

\(^{297}\) These programs were initially bilingual (French and English) but switched to being offered “only in French after the Parti Quebecois came into office in 1976” Behiels, 19

\(^{298}\) Rocher et al. cited in Gagnon and Iacovino, 99
participation of immigrants,” and 3) facilitating harmonious intergroup relations.\textsuperscript{299} That
is, though Quebec officially and actively promoted French as a primary identifier of belonging, it did so while consciously “extending the boundaries of the community.”\textsuperscript{300}
As Juteau writes, “belongingness was redefined, at least in governmental discourses and official documents.”\textsuperscript{301}

The Ministry of Immigration began implementing recruitment with the goal of increasing the overall number of immigrants to Quebec, while maximizing the proportion of Francophone immigrants among this group. Correspondingly, at the level of nationality policy, Quebec took significant strides to foster membership among new arrivals; this demonstrates both a new official conception of de-ethnicized Quebecois identity from the top-down and the bottom-up. As Labelle and Rocher write,

A minority ethnic identity, that of French Canadian, has been taken and another identity, the Quebecois citizenship and political identity, has been superimposed on it or chosen exclusively. This citizenship identity is inclusive: it recognizes the internal diversity of the political community and leaves room for ancestral identities [while trying bridge that gap between them].\textsuperscript{302}

What stands out, in the context of Hypothesis 2, is the co-evolution of competencies and openness. In fact, it becomes hard to distinguish between the MCCI’s policy goals and the normative vision of society that they reflect. One of the potentially confusing elements of the model of intercultural nationalism is that it speaks both of a public philosophy and of institutional arrangements that support this philosophy. The competencies Quebec enjoys are not just a necessary pre-condition to a model intercultural nationalism; they are an element of it as well.

\textsuperscript{299} McAndrew, 6
\textsuperscript{300} Juteau, 444
\textsuperscript{301} Juteau, 444
\textsuperscript{302} Labelle and Rocher, 66
The model of interculturalism has remained constant since its inception, although iterations and language have changed. In particular, Quebec has demonstrated an inconsistent approach to the language of citizenship and the concept of Quebecois nationalism. Following the failed 1995 Quebec referendum on sovereignty, which many took as a sign of the failure of measures intended to foster belonging among non-ethnic Quebecois, the government changed tactics. Quebec official discourse stressed the notion of citizenship, attempting to “rebuke the notion suggesting that it is solely a state for Francophones.” However, under the Liberal government, which came to power in 2003, Quebecois identity was “re-ethnicized,” according to Labelle and Rocher.

Summarizing this fluctuation, they write, “Quebec policy is the result of a crossover between a citizen perspective and a communitarian discourse, with a divergence in underlying political interests…This requires managing a fundamental contradiction at the heart of…[the] political community.” These alternations show Quebec struggling to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable – its national identity with its commitment to pluralism. Still, it seems clear that the significant shift to a more open, though still-contested, nationality policy and a model of intercultural accommodation are closely associated with Quebec’s increasing competency over admission and integration. The linguistic stability it enjoyed as a result of its language policies and selection criteria seem to provide the stability and security necessary to transition Quebec from an ethnic to a de-ethnicized model of nationalism, as Hypothesis 2 predicts. At the level of official discourse, therefore, Quebec seems to exemplify the model of intercultural nationalism, as Blad and Couton suggest.

303 Labelle and Rocher, 70
304 Labelle and Rocher, 73
IV. Enduring Challenges: Belonging and the Crisis of Reasonable Accommodation

At the level of individual identification and practices of accommodation, the intercultural model reveals some unresolved difficulties. Part of this problem is the distinction between official and subjective markers of belonging. For example, on the question of Quebecois sovereignty, considered by many neo-nationalists to be a preponderant identifier of Quebecois identity, 60% of French-Canadians favored secession while “95% of non-French Canadians” voted against the 1995 referendum.\textsuperscript{305} As Premier Jacques Parizeau addressed the crowd, he infamously blamed the narrow defeat on “money and the ethnic vote.” Juteau sardonically summarizes, “The strategy to woo immigrants and ethnic groups in Quebec did not swing their vote; it did not bring them to embrace the nationalist project.”\textsuperscript{306} For both immigrants and nationalists, it seems, an us/them dynamic persisted despite largely civic terms of belonging.

This is consistent with Handler’s findings where respondents openly acknowledge a distinction between what makes one Quebecois, “in theory” (any person residing) and in “popular mentality” (francophone, nationalist, culture, customs, traditions, etc.).\textsuperscript{307} These popular definitions often included by-birth Quebecois and may have excluded people who actually live and work in Quebec. From the perspective of immigrants, too, studies have shown lower levels of identification with Quebec.\textsuperscript{308} As Juteau concludes “Official discourses don’t necessarily create bonding and their performative power can be

\textsuperscript{305} McRoberts, cited in Juteau, 446
\textsuperscript{306} Juteau, 446
\textsuperscript{307} Handler, 33
\textsuperscript{308} See Van Schendel and Helly (2000), cited in Juteau
limited.”\textsuperscript{309} Still, others find cause for optimism. For example, a 2004 survey of young people born abroad or to immigrant parents found that “28% identify themselves first as \textit{Quebecois}, compared with 34% as Canadians first. Moreover, 67% of the people surveyed acknowledged the existence of a Quebec nation.”\textsuperscript{310}

These results together point to the complexity of belonging in nested nations, which by Miller’s definition combine both a particular (Quebecois) and overarching (Canadian) nation identity. For immigrants, integration and self-identification are further complicated as they are encouraged to adopt competing, yet overlapping, identities simultaneously. This adds yet another dimension to the already-complex question of integration, as we must consider how the national minority and state may engage in a “fight for primary / secondary allegiance among newcomers.”\textsuperscript{311}

Finally, we must ask how accommodation actually functions in practice: debates about interculturalism often attempt to compare interculturalism with multiculturalism. For McAndrews most of the distinction – emphasis on language and a pluralism within a common culture – is semantic: “[Quebec] carried a very de facto multiculturalism…in line with the Canadian model…with, perhaps, the slight exception of the stronger emphasis put on the promotion of a common language.”\textsuperscript{312} Nonetheless, based on her extensive fieldwork, she concludes, “Quebec interculturalism has given a weaker recognition to the persistence of interethnic inequalities and to the role of racism in this regard.”\textsuperscript{313}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{309} Juteau, 446
\bibitem{310} Beaulieu 2004, cited in Gagnon, “Immigration in a Multinational Context,” 53
\bibitem{311} McAndrew, 4
\bibitem{312} McAndrew, 8
\bibitem{313} McAndrew, 9
\end{thebibliography}
Since 2005, issues of accommodation have risen to the surface, and re-opened debates about the limits of accommodation. Interestingly, despite Quebec’s emphasis on language acquisition and interculturalism within a francophone society, the majority of new controversies stem from religion, not language.\footnote{At this time, 85\% of Quebecois were Catholic, although the Muslim population doubled in the two decades before the turn of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, Seidle, 9} Beginning in 2006, a series of events related to religious accommodation sparked a considerable public debate, the general tenor of which was that “society had become too tolerant of difference, too willing to compromise.”\footnote{Meena Sharify-Funk, “Muslims and the Politics of ‘Reasonable Accommodation’: Analyzing the Bouchard-Taylor Report and its Impact on the Canadian Province of Quebec,” \textit{Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs} 30.4 (2010), 536-7} Though tolerance of illiberal cultures featured significantly in these discussions, most commentators are quick to point to Quebec’s “anxieties about the gradual erosion and eventual erasure of Francophone identity and culture,” as a significant factor in this outcry.\footnote{Sharify-Funk, 537} The public frenzy over incidents of accommodation was amplified by media attention and eventually led the government to establish a commission to assess accommodation practices, analyze the relevant issues, and make recommendations to the government.\footnote{For a review of these controversies, see Seidle “Testing the Limits of Minority Accommodation”}

As the final report of the Bouchard-Taylor commission states, tensions surrounding issues of accommodation above all reflect a crisis of perception; this crisis, they conclude, though related to the insecurity of Francophone identity, also has much in common with similar public debates occurring elsewhere in the world.\footnote{Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, “Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation,” Government of Quebec, 2008. http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-abrege-en.pdf} Still, this crisis suggests that issues of accommodation, particularly religious accommodation for Quebec’s growing Muslim population, continue to pose challenges to the largely secular,
Francophone community. For example, at the time of the commission, “two-thirds of Quebecois believed there should be no accommodation of religious and cultural minorities in public places such as schools, hospital and government buildings.” Furthermore, 81% claimed to be ‘opposed’ or ‘somewhat opposed’ to the idea of providing prayer spaces in public facilities. To be sure, the very existence of this report and widespread participation in the public forums demonstrate the willingness of the Quebecois, at the institutional and individual level, to grapple with issues of accommodation and identity. This indicates astonishing progress for a nation that less than a century before was defensive and exclusionary and defined belonging in ethnic terms. Still, as this most recent crisis showed, despite the commitment to pluralism offered under the model of interculturalism, Quebec continues to struggle with accommodation in the public sphere.

In sum, the characterization of Quebec as a model of intercultural nationalism seems accurate. Quebec represents the general hypothesis that I test, where competencies are associated with increased openness. Through the use of selective immigration policies and strong linguistic assimilation, Quebec has negotiated a framework of pluralism within the host society that continues to struggle with how to define belonging, though it does so in almost exclusively civic terms. The conditions surrounding the devolution of powers to Quebec during the Quiet Revolution seem consistent with my first hypothesis, both in terms of demand and receptivity. Furthermore, it seems clear that the security Quebec gained through competency over admission and integration coincided with a transition from an ethnic to a culturally civic definition nationality policy. These policies

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319 Seidle, 22
also facilitated, but also formed a part of, Quebec’s model of interculturalism as an open and pluralistic model of integration.

However we can also see the limitations on this openness. Even as Quebec has tried to transition away from a cultural definition of the nation to a discourse of citizenship, new waves of migrants, particularly Muslims, have challenged its ability to do so. In particular, the Bouchard-Taylor commission shows underlying unresolved questions regarding the public culture and public values of Quebec. These shortcomings are reflected in the identities of immigrants, and the continued ambivalence on behalf of native Quebecois towards questions of accommodation.

Quebec encapsulates the key elements of the model of intercultural nationalism, and seems to confirm the configurations I suggest are most likely to produce this model.
Chapter 6: Catalonia - A Challenge to the Intercultural Nationalism Hypothesis?

In this chapter, I focus on a second ‘most likely’ case, Catalonia. Examining a second case here is critical in order to draw distinctions between the two cases, and help to determine what conditions might be necessary to maximize the openness of then national minority. The case study of Quebec largely confirms the hypotheses that I develop, but much of the literature I use both in plotting my variables and even in developing these hypotheses is influenced by Quebec. Exploring another ‘most likely’ case of compatibility is necessary to test the generalizability of the findings in Chapter 5.

Catalonia differs from Quebec in a number of ways that make it a valuable case to study. First, Catalonia’s position in Spain, as one of many Autonomous Communities, differs from that of Quebec, which, at least in the mind of the Quebecois, is one of two peoples of Canada. Second, and more importantly, Catalonia exercises no competency over admission policies, and has far less control over integration and language policies than does Quebec. Nonetheless, Catalonia has always displayed a significant degree of openness to the incorporation and inclusion of immigrants, even in circumstances we would expect to produce conflict. Moreover, over the past decade or so, Catalonia appears to be entering a stage of intercultural nationalism consistent with what we find in Quebec, but unsupported by control of admission; I explore this case here as a challenge to the hypothesis that competencies are a necessary precondition to intercultural nationalism.
Throughout most of its modern history, Catalonia has avoided ethnic national definitions, and has demonstrated a remarkable ability to integrate immigrants. Perhaps most surprisingly, the same held true during the cultural oppression Catalonia experienced under Franco’s dictatorship. The first section of this chapter provides a historic context for, and then attempts to explain these surprising findings, tracing the development of Catalan nationalism from its foundations through the end of the Franco dictatorship.

Scholars often point to the 19th century emergence of the ‘Catalanism’ movement as an important predecessor for Catalan nationalism. Catalan industry and culture bloomed together, and Catalanism combined economic self-interest with an emphasis on culture. One typical historical interpretation sees Catalanism as the “confluence of four distinct strains: cultural revival, traditionalist Carlism, Republican federalism, and industrial protectionism.”

The Renaixença (1840s to 1870s) saw a dramatic surge in the creation and emphasis on the restoration of historic Catalan culture. Though intellectual elites produced much of the new poetry and theater during this period, the populace as a whole “was caught up in the movement” as it spread from Barcelona into other cities and rural Catalonia, as well. Soon after, Modernisme (1890-1910) focused on the production of new culture, rather than celebration of the past. Both of

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322 Antoni Gaudí’s architecture exemplifies this time period, and continues to serve as one of the more prominent symbols of Catalonia.
these movements, and the corresponding standardization of Catalan, produced the sort of “collective consciousness” which characterizes the origins of nationalist movements.  

Catalan nationalism was born as this consciousness became politicized in the form of republican federalism. As Kenneth McRoberts notes, Catalan nationalism developed “rather late,” only being formalized at the end of the 19th century. Valentí Almirall was the first to articulate an “explicit nationalist programme… [that] outlined the transition from regionalism to nationalism…” The First and Second Catalan Congresses, (1880, 1883) focused on standardizing Catalan, economic protectionism, and maintaining Catalan civil law – in essence merging cultural and political Catalanism. Interestingly, these early movements advocated powers for Catalonia within a federal framework. Though some advocated secessionism, most believed that federalism was the appropriate structure.

However, as Pierre Vilar argued, Catalan history “was animated by one coherent thought, to construct a nation by and for industry.” Under the concerted efforts of a financial elite, Catalonia developed as, “the most modern and industrial” region of Spain. Therefore, to the extent that 19th century Catalan elites imagined Catalonia’s role in a Spanish state, the Spanish market may have been a significant motivation. This odd pairing, whereby Catalan elites kindled a cultural revival, while simultaneously wedding their economic fortunes to of Spain, “created a seesaw pattern of political expression: an aspiration to become the bourgeoisie of all of Spain combined with the

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323 McRoberts, 22
324 McRoberts, 43
325 Conversi, 17
326 Conversi, 19
327 McRoberts 26-28
328 Pierre Vilar, cited in Shafir 53
329 Shafir 56
desire to attain regional autonomy." This implies that Catalonia, in terms of its historic status and self-conception in Spain, displayed cultural distinctiveness concurrently with political and economic motivations for association.

In 1914, Spain granted Catalonia a commonwealth government, the Mancomunitat, at the demand of the nationalist Catalan party, la Lliga Regionalista, likely demonstrating Catalonia’s bargaining power with the central government as the most industrialized region. The Mancomunitat united the four provinces of Catalonia and focused on social and economic reforms, including institutionalizing the “revival and protection of Catalan culture.” Nonetheless, in the first decades of the 20th century, the lower class of Catalonia – many of whom were internal migrants attracted to Catalan industry – could be described as apathetic to Catalanism or even “anti-Catalan.”

Class issues, particularly the prevalence of anarchism, distanced the lower class (and acutely non-natives) from the regionalist and nationalists goals of the Catalan industrial and political elite. During this period, then, immigrants and nationalists divided over economic, rather than cultural boundaries.

The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, who came to power in 1923, quickly ended this period of autonomy. In the name of national unity, the state dissolved 150 Catalan nationalist organizations, banned the Catalan language and flag, and eventually ended the Mancomunitat in 1925. Despite this crackdown, many upper class Catalans nonetheless supported the dictatorship, fearing increasing class violence and anarchy in the region. Though the government was briefly re-established in 1932, the cultural repression was to be repeated again under Franco. During the Second Republic (1931-

330 Shafir, 56
331 Shafir, 59
332 Conversi, 36-38
1939), a Catalan Statute of Autonomy was approved by the plebiscite. This period laid the groundwork for autonomy arrangements affirmed in the 1978 constitution.

Under Franco, Catalonia and other non-Castilian cultures experienced “the most radical politics of assimilation in modern Spanish history.” Some scholars view the policies of the dictatorship as the first substantial nation-building program undertaken by modern Spain. The Fascists and Francoists were driven by national unity and anti-regionalism. They began a brutal crackdown on Catalan culture that continued throughout Franco’s regime.

[Franco] abolished all Catalan institutions, re-imposed the ban on public use of the Catalan language, and set out to purge the region of Catalanist influences by deporting, imprisoning or executing anyone with even the slightest link to political Catalanism... Education, censorship, and the Church were all used to convince Spaniards that Spain was a single nation with one national culture and language.

This process, termed “cultural genocide” by Salvador Giner, inevitably shaped the course of federalization and self-government in the fledgling democracy that followed. Under Franco, Catalan elites fled abroad en masse, and many who stayed were executed. At the same time, other members of the Catalan bourgeoisie, fearing the spread of anarchism or communism, supported the dictatorship as a means of protection. Still, as history has shown, Catalan nationalism was dramatically suppressed, but not eliminated. The growth of Catalan nationalism, in sum, combined the seemingly contradictory goals of economic development and cultural revival. Its status as a nation was far from secure, as these fluctuations in autonomy demonstrate.

333 Conversi, 39
334 Conversi, 109
335 Ambos and Puigsec (1980), and Giner (1986), cited in Conversi, 109
337 Cited in McRoberts, 40.
338 McRoberts, 41
Despite this political instability, Catalan nationalism was by and large open and inclusive. During this time, and throughout most of the 20th century, as well, there was hardly any foreign immigration to speak of – most immigrants to Catalonia came from less-developed regions of Spain and spoke either local dialects or Castilian Spanish. The number of immigrants as a percentage of the population steadily increased from the end of the 19th century until the Great Depression, rising from 1.25% on 1887 to 4.22% by 1900 and 14.03% in 1920.339 Though rates of immigration slowed following the Depression, immigrant inflows surged again in the midst of Franco’s cultural oppression in the 50s and 60s. During this period, Catalonia industrialized considerably, prompting unprecedented waves of immigration from other parts of Spain, particularly Andalusia. Between 1951 and 1970, approximately 1.16 million immigrants arrived in Catalonia.340 As Saéz notes, immigration accounted for a much larger proportion of the population growth than ‘natural’ growth through birth: 65% vs. 35% in 1965.341 Although figures differ, estimates place the percentage of Catalan residents borne outside the region at above 47% in 1970.342

The conditions seem poised to reinforce or spur an ethnic, defensive nationalism. As George Scott suggests, national identities should form all the more strongly in the face of opposition: “the greater the opposition – economic, political, social, religious, or some combination thereof – perceived by an ethnic group, the greater the degree to which its historical sense of distinctiveness will be aroused, and hence the greater its solidarity or

339 Josep Termes, _Immigració et Catalunya_ 1984, cited in Conversi, 190
340 McRoberts 46
341 Sáez, cited in Conversi 191
342 McRoberts, 46
the more intense its movement will be."\textsuperscript{343} This theory suggests that immigrants should be viewed as a threat, especially because Catalonia lacked any formal institutional or structural powers to manage the new immigrants. As Conversi writes, “Francoist prohibition made impossible the immigrants’ cultural integration at the very moment when a massive in that direction was most needed.”\textsuperscript{344} As Hypothesis 1 predicts, these circumstances should lead to a strong demand for control over immigration, which, when unfulfilled, would be likely to turn against and define itself in opposition to immigrants.

But this hypothesis fails to explain Catalonia’s inclusive national identity under Franco and before. Modern Catalonia has always defined itself by openness and inclusivity, even though it is culturally distinct from the other regions in Spain. Not surprisingly, there was a significant degree of debate within Catalonia about how to address the ‘problem’ of immigration. To be sure, some Catalan intellectuals responded with racism and ethnic definitions of what it means to Catalan. However, the scholarly consensus seems to be that the majority of Catalans rejected the “fiercely negative, and exclusivist, reaction to the 1950s and 1960s wave of immigration,” preferring more inclusive definitions of belonging.\textsuperscript{345} Consider Jordi Pujol’s widely cited affirmation:

> Our central problem is immigration, and hence, integration. The basic objective is to build up a community valid for all Catalans. And I would add that by Catalan I mean everybody who lives and works in Catalonia and who makes Catalonia his / her home and country, with which he / she incorporates and identifies.\textsuperscript{346}

At a time where no mechanisms existed with which to regulate immigration, Catalonia largely opted for a definition of citizenship based on residence. Even under a Francoist

\textsuperscript{342} George M. Scott, “A Resynthesis of the primordial and circumstantial approaches to ethnic group solidarity: towards an explanatory model,” \textit{Ethnic and Racial Studies} 13.2 (1990), 164
\textsuperscript{344} Conversi, 208
\textsuperscript{345} McRoberts, 131.
\textsuperscript{346} Pujol, cited in Conversi 195
regime where “[Catalan] integration policies would have been considered a contradiction in terms in a supposedly uni-cultural state,” Pujol’s proclamation shows that Catalonia had always engaged with the question of integration and its ‘differentiated reality’.  

Still, it should be noted that even within this civic national identity, common culture, and particularly language, was central. As almost all scholars stress, language has always been a decisive factor in defining Catalan-ness. As Pujol says, “Language is the decisive factor in the integration of immigrants to Catalonia. It’s the most definitive. A man who speaks Catalan, and speaks Catalan to his children, is a Catalan through and through.” Though his definition of national belonging certainly contains elements of culture, the nation is defined in way that is accessible to any potential migrant.  

Nevertheless, this culturally civic nationality policy does not explain why the ethnic reaction my hypotheses predict never arose. Relatedly, why didn’t Catalan nationalism disappear entirely during nearly four decades of “cultural genocide?” I think three points interrelated points are particularly salient in explaining this puzzle: language status, the origin of immigrants, and cultural repression. From the case of Quebec, above, it is clear that one of the principle determinants of immigrant linguistic assimilation is language status. Regardless of origin (or native tongue), immigrants are not likely to work to learn a language unless they see it as being beneficial to themselves. For this reason, Quebec’s oft-debated language polices aim at raising the status of French by making it the language of social services, education, business, and daily life. These efforts seek to combat the tendency of immigrants to choose to learn the majority language (as they generally prefer to do, given the free choice).

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348 Jordi Pujol, cited in McRoberts, 132
Unlike pre-1960s Quebec, migrants were attracted to Catalonia for its advanced industry, and the Catalan language already enjoyed “high prestige.”\textsuperscript{349} The Catalan elite controlled and managed the flourishing regional economy; as such, linguistic assimilation, acted as a “tool for integration and social mobility,” as well. That is, immigrants actively wanted to become part of Catalan society.\textsuperscript{350} As Woolard shows, even once Catalonia enacted its language policies, these policies merely supported and maintained the already high status of Catalan.\textsuperscript{351} Even in the absence of linguistic integration policies, language prestige made immigrants more likely to learn Catalan and employ it in daily life, such that by 1981, approximately half of Catalonia could still speak Catalan, despite a multi-decade ban.\textsuperscript{352} The configurations I propose in Hypothesis 1 do not account for the importance of language prestige. In both the case of Quebec and Catalonia, therefore, we have seen relevant aspects language that are not accounted for by fluency rates alone – linguistic integration (into the Anglophone context in Canada) and language prestige. Given the importance of language as a key aspect of national and cultural identity in both cases, it may be necessary to go explore language more deeply.

Furthermore, language acquisition may have been facilitated by the fact that almost all immigrants were internal migrants, who already spoke and understood Castilian, a closely related language. While Shafir cautions against the “ease-of-learning” hypothesis (which posits that Castilian-speakers could almost effortlessly adopt Catalan), it is clear that internal migrants who speak the dominant state language are not faced with

\textsuperscript{349} Shafir, 80 His conclusion builds on Woolard and Inglehart’s analyses of language prestige.
\textsuperscript{350} Shafir, 81
\textsuperscript{351} Kathryn A. Woolard, “Catalan as a Public Language,” in Milton M. Azevedo ed. Contemporary Catalonia in Spain and Europe (Gaspar de Portola Catalanian Studies Program: University of California at Berkely, 1991), 58
\textsuperscript{352} Crameri, 22
the same choice as Allophones in Canada, for example. In the case of Quebec, it is assumed that immigrants will learn either English or French – they must choose between the language of the majority, or the language of the nested nation. The presence of this choice has led Quebec to mandate French-language education to counteract immigrants’ tendency to learn English, which they have typically seen as more beneficial. Internal migrants, though nonetheless faced with the difficulty of learning a new language, would only have to learn Catalan to be fully competent in a bilingual milieu, unlike an Allophone in Quebec. This has interesting implications for whether internal or external migrants pose a greater challenge to national minorities, a question my hypotheses leave open, though I do not think we can draw definitive conclusions based on this case alone.\textsuperscript{353}

Moreover, some scholars surmise that cultural oppression may actually have strengthened Catalan nationalism. Following Scott, we would expect what he terms ‘opposition’ to strengthen Catalan nationalism in opposition to all outsiders, including immigrants; however in the case of Catalonia, it seems that opposition from the dictatorship actually facilitated immigrant integration. Cultural repression “works for Catalonia because oppression validates the status and legitimacy of the Catalan identity in contrast with Spain.” This oppression, surprisingly, may have actually heightened the appeal of cultural assimilation and self-identification with Catalonia among immigrants. As McRoberts writes, opposition to the Franco regime increased the status of Catalan language and culture while simultaneously causing Catalan elites to “see immigrants as

\textsuperscript{353} For example, the strong Anglophone presence and institutional structure made the integration of Anglophone internal migrants into Francophone Quebec exceedingly unlikely.
allies, and even potential members of the Catalan nation.\textsuperscript{354} This helps to explain why Catalonia developed a civic national self-conception while simultaneously emphasizing its cultural distinctiveness, particularly through language.

To review, Catalonia developed as a late-blooming nationalism, built on the pairing of a distinctive culture and language with industrial and economic strength. Throughout this time, Catalonia still did not enjoy autonomy within democratic Spain. Still, Catalonia demonstrates a remarkable openness despite experiencing demographic instability, cultural repression, and no control whatsoever over massive waves of immigration. Does this openness indicate that my hypotheses fail to account for the development of Catalan national identity (the only ‘dependent variable’ to speak of before 1978)? Only partially: I stand by the hypothesis that demographic instability, high rates of immigration out of the minority control will lead to demand for control of migration (and by extension, indicate that the notion of uncontrolled or state controlled immigration is a “problem” for the national minority). However, in Catalonia, because of the economic strength, linguistic prestige, and status of Catalan culture (relative to Spain), immigrants arguably demonstrated a higher degree of willingness to assimilate. This points to a broad concept that should be incorporated into future models – the willingness of the immigrant population to integrate: language prestige, economic development, and cultural oppression may all play a role in defining this concept.

Furthermore, Catalonia’s relatively civic definition of nationalism comes with the territory of case selection that includes only ‘most likely’ cases. Given this selection bias, we should expect compatibility even in conditions that in other cases would produce conflict. As Shafir notes, of the four cases he reviews, “Catalonia is the exception in that

\textsuperscript{354} McRoberts, 133
immigration has not generated sustained opposition or served as the trigger of nationalism,” but instead advanced attempts at assimilation and inclusion.\textsuperscript{355} This finding, anomalous though it might be, suggests that institutional competencies may matter less than the integrative power of the national minority, however enforced. Still, though Catalonia articulated an inclusive nationality policy during this period, we have yet to see how its position towards immigration changed as it gained self-government within a democratic society.

II. \textit{Democratization and Devolution: Integration without Competencies}

The decentralization of the Spanish state and the establishment of Catalonia as an Autonomous Community accompanied the period of democratization after the fall of the dictatorship. However, the autonomy arrangements established in Spain maintain power at the federal level for many of the competencies that we see in Quebec. Notably, Catalonia exercised no competency over admission policies, and had to balance its own efforts at cultural and linguistic normalization with the constraints of overlapping jurisdiction with the Spanish state. Moreover, demographically, the significant proportion of immigrants who now formed part of the Catalan populace posed challenges for defining national identity. During this period, once again, we see Catalonia work to define an open and inclusive national identity, though belongingness still required a significant degree of assimilation. This section discusses the limitations on devolutions of power in Catalonia, and considers how Catalonia nonetheless demonstrated a significant willingness to incorporate immigrants into the nation, albeit on culturally civic terms.

\textsuperscript{355} Shafir, 4
Franco’s death in 1975 culminated a period of uncertainty and brought about Spain’s transition to democracy. Popular support in national elections heavily favored autonomy, and the new Spanish President Adolfo Suárez reestablished the Generalitat with Joseph Taradellas as its president in 1977, though it still lacked a formal statute of autonomy. McRoberts shows that for many politicians and civilians, decentralization and regional autonomy was treated as question of political necessity; the support of the regions was essential. “Like it or not, and many Spaniards didn’t, the goals of democratization and Catalan autonomy were intimately linked.”356 One of the key variables I identify above is the role of the nested nation in the formation of the state and drafting of the constitution. In the climate of uncertainty and pressure for a democratic break, Catalonia (and other ‘historic nationalities’) played a key role in the process of democratization and decentralization, albeit with mixed sympathy.357 As Oriol Pi-Sunyer affirms, “There is no question that in the Spanish context democracy and devolution have to be viewed as related elements of the same political transformation.”358 Of course, democratization, though it marked a dramatic break with Spain’s recent past, is not technically foundation of the Spanish state. Spain’s federal arrangement came about through decentralization, in contrast with Canada’s birth through confederation.

The two most important documents that solidified Catalan self-government were the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and Catalan Statue of Autonomy of 1979. Together, these laid the groundwork for Catalonia’s self-government in democratic Spain. The

356 McRoberts 48
357 As Conversi writes, “The Constitution can hardly be understood without taking into account the decisive role played by Catalan and Basque nationalism in the debates preceding its approval,” 145
Spanish Constitution reflects the tension and balancing act achieved by institutionalizing forms and procedures for autonomy, while simultaneously declaring “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards.”

Prieto de Pedro notes the complex cultural identities embodied in the Constitution: on the one hand, it makes reference to common culture, official language, and the Spanish nation; on the other, it subtly models an “integrative vision of the plurality of cultures.” For example, it speaks of multiple Spanish ‘peoples,’ ‘languages,’ and ‘nationalities’ and gives overlapping powers to the State and the Autonomous Communities with reference to culture.

Articles 143-158 detail the right to self-government, authorities granted to, and procedures for establish the Autonomous Communities. While Galicia, Basque Country, and Catalonia were given ‘fast track’ status based on their pre-Franco statues of autonomy, the Constitution also established process for granting autonomy to other territories seeking it. In total, 17 regions were granted autonomy between 1978 and 1983, making Catalonia one of many nations or cultural communities within a heterogeneous Spain. Though the specifics of each governmental arrangement were negotiated independently, and therefore asymmetrical, the Constitution provides the basis for the rights of the State and those of the Autonomous Communities.

Despite the radical break with Francoism, many (particularly Catalans) viewed the powers delegated to Catalonia as insufficient. While the Autonomous Communities

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359 Spanish Constitution of 1978, Article 2
360 Though Spanish is the official Spanish language, the use of the term “Castilian,” indicates that Catalan, Basque, and other regional languages / dialects may also be considered languages of Spain.
362 Spanish Constitution of 1978, Articles 143-150
363 McRoberts, 54
assume “competency” over matters such as the institutions of self-government, public works, internal boundaries, city planning, and the promotion of culture, the Spanish state retained 31 exclusive rights.\textsuperscript{364} The notable centralization of powers has led some to question whether Spain qualifies as a federation. Ferran Requejo shows how the Spanish model differs from traditional federations, lacking both institutional and procedural elements such as clearly decentralized division of power, regional fiscal powers (e.g. taxation), and control over the judiciary or constitutional reform.\textsuperscript{365} Moreover, rather than a continuous process of devolution, as we saw in Quebec, Catalonia and the other regions have experienced fluctuating devolution of power, where central political parties attempted to restrict autonomy at some points, but curried favor when they viewed the regions as necessary for electoral success. According to Requejo, the erratic nature of devolution and centralization from the 1980s to today reflect a fundamental discord and confusion between the perspectives of “decentralization and multi-nationalism.”\textsuperscript{366} Since democratization, Catalonia has engaged in a process of continued negotiation in Spain, and still lacks many of the competencies we would anticipate. As Oriol Pi-Sunyer writes, “It should be stressed that it is the nature of the post-Franco structure of politics that many issues of particular importance to Catalans cannot be voted on.”\textsuperscript{367} This insecurity suggests that Catalonia may not have had the authority or ability to exercise greater demands, as it struggled to maintain its distinctive status.

With respect to culture and immigration, Catalonia demonstrates concerted efforts towards the promotion of a common culture in which the Catalan language was central

\textsuperscript{364} Spanish Constitution of 1978, Articles 148-9
\textsuperscript{365} Requejo, \textit{Multinational Federalism}, 83
\textsuperscript{366} Requejo, \textit{Multinational Federalism}, 83-5
\textsuperscript{367} Pi-Sunyer, 11
From its foundation, the Generalitat de Catalunya saw the revival of national culture and language as paramount. Under Convergència i Unió (CiU), which came to power in the first provincial election, Catalonia pursued a process of nation building and cultural restoration that sought to undo the traumas of the Franco dictatorship by focusing on language, literature, popular culture, and more modern forms of culture, like public media and journalism. But, as McRoberts writes, “the tasks to be faced were little short of staggering.”

During the 1980s and 1990s, Catalonia experienced relatively low rates of immigration, and focused on cultural revival, the development of strong civil society, education, media, and a welfare state. The Department of Cultura slowly began receiving funds from the central government and developing an internal organization and strategy for cultural policy. Simultaneously, however, the Spanish Ministry of Culture continued operation with powers over culture and heritage state-wide. According to Crameri, “this means that any competencies accorded to the autonomous communities in the area of culture run concurrently with the state’s own cultural institutions.”

Language policy quickly became the cornerstone of the CiU’s cultural agenda. Under the first Catalan Statute of Autonomy, Article 3, Catalan was declared the “llengua pròpia” (own language) of Catalonia, co-official with Castilian. This phrasing is consistent with the framework of the Constitution, which declared Castilian the official language of the state, adding that “all Spaniards have a duty to know it and the right to

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368 McRoberts, 47
369 Crameri, 32
370 Crameri Ch. 2-5 for a detailed exploration of Catalan cultural politics since 1980.
371 Catalonia Statute of Autonomy 1979, Generalitat de Catalunya, Section 3
use it,” with the provision that other languages could be made, at most, co-official.\textsuperscript{372} In comparison to Quebec, we see considerable overlap of competencies with the Federal government with respect to cultural and language policies.

Within this framework, Catalonia’s declaration shows momentous progresses relative to the Franco years, but also a fundamental inability to sufficiently address the question of linguistic normalization\textsuperscript{373} Yet despite debate and protestation, the Linguistic Normalization Act of 1983 worked within these limits to extend the official status of Catalan (as a llengua pròpia) to education, local administration, public media, and other institutional contexts.

The extent of this legislation “quite modest in scope” compared to Quebec’s Bill 101; Catalan normalization operates within an officially bilingual status (as mandated by the Constitution), and it does not cover the private sector.\textsuperscript{374} Despite the goal of making Catalonia the de facto language of public life, the language normalization act “establishes not exclusiveness [as in Quebec] but parity.”\textsuperscript{375}

Nonetheless, normalization has been reasonably effective. In 1981, 75% of Catalans understood Catalan, 53% spoke, and only 15% were able to write (a result of the lack of formal education under Franco). By 2001, these figures had reached 95%, 75%, and 50% respectively.\textsuperscript{376} As the discussion of language above suggests, these policies may have only reinforced already significant language status; nonetheless they represent remarkable progress given the constraints.\textsuperscript{377} However, the extent of use both in business

\textsuperscript{372} Spanish Constitution of 1978, Section 3
\textsuperscript{373} Crameri, 51
\textsuperscript{374} McRoberts, 145
\textsuperscript{375} Gershon, 83
\textsuperscript{376} Crameri, 57
\textsuperscript{377} Woolard, “Catalan as a Public Language”
and at home has been more modest. As I discuss below, perceived limitations to linguistic normalization led to a new language law passed by the Catalan parliament in 1997.

Cultural policy for the remainder of the 20th century began with a focus on linguistic normalization based on the “entrenched position on the link between languages and cultures which informed virtually all cultural policy decisions.” Though the CiU pursued revitalization of literature, museums, history, and the arts, language policy was its core cultural focus – albeit within the limits of the 1978 Constitution. As Crameri summarizes, “CiU effectively advocated a strong form of cultural normalization which was actually predicated on a weak form of linguistic normalization.”

However, with respect to immigration, Catalonia exercised no competency over admission, and shared competency over integration. In the negotiations related to the Constitution of 1978, immigration remained exclusively under the power of the state. Given Catalonia’s experience with immigration under Franco, it is all the more surprising that this demand did not play a larger role in negotiations leading to the Constitution: “There was never any real debate on the distribution of immigration-related powers in the Spanish framework of institutions and autonomous communities.” Immigration policy is only passingly mentioned in the Catalan Statue of Autonomy. Even the 2006 Statute of Autonomy (later ruled unconstitutional), sought exclusive control only over integration and reception, and shared control over quotas, rules, and international accords. Therefore, with respect to immigrant management, Catalonia displays a notable absence of competency. As Zapata-Barrero writes,

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378 Crameri, 68
379 Crameri, 68
380 Castiñeira, 164
If we focus our argument on an analysis of the actions and institutional output of the Generalitat in matters of immigration, and we try to identify those aspects related to self-government, it will not be surprising if we find nothing. This indicates that Catalonia is really at the beginning of a stage where it has not even begun to construct an institutional framework suitable to its own identity. In political terms, we have not yet entered into the ‘operational phase.’

This notable lack of competency (and immigrant-directed policies) makes examining how Catalan public philosophy of immigration evolved over time a worthwhile test of Hypothesis 2, particularly as it concerns national identity and multiculturalism. In this context, we can see the complex attitudes towards integration, particularly in reference to the question, “who is Catalan?”

During the 1980s and 1990s, the CiU pursued a national project defined in civic terms that are intentionally open to immigrants (at the time, still non-Catalan Spaniards). Pujol’s affirmation that anyone who lived in Catalonia was Catalan held constant throughout CiU’s governance, until the turn of the century. But as Davis notes, “while predominantly civic in nature, [the Pujolian approach] also imposes a large measure of assimilation into the nation-building process.” This can be seen in the gradual efforts at linguistic assimilation, particularly in the process of standardizing Catalan education, as well as the notable lack of immigrant-specific services. This last point, the absence of immigrant-specific services, supposedly indicates the philosophy “that all residents of Catalonia should be treated equally…[with] equal rights and equal responsibilities.” But this absence also indicates that the openness of the Generalitat occurs within a pre-defined framework, based on formal non-differentiation.

381 Zapata-Barrero, “Building a Public Philosophy,” 127
382 Davis, 13
383 Davis, 13
Despite its attempts at openness, Catalonia continued to grapple with remaining challenges from 1950s and 60s waves of internal migrants. First, as a matter of identity, most of these immigrants and their children, continued to identify themselves primarily as Spanish rather than Catalan.384 This points to the challenge of a nationality policy that is technically open but may still fail to absorb new members. As McRoberts writes (echoing Juteau’s similar claim about Quebec), “the predominant Catalan nationalist discourse may be deliberately inclusive and designed to embrace immigrants, but this is no guarantee that they will in fact adopt it.”385 Second, despite success at teaching Catalan, the Generalitat found more difficulty in expanding its use in daily life. These issues persisted and resurfaced anew in the 21st century, as I discuss below.

Why did Catalonia not gain or seek competency over immigration policies during this time? Following Hypothesis 1, we should look both at the level of demand, and at the state structure and Catalonia’s place within it. Turning to the demand side, Catalonia displays the demographic and linguistic concerns I consider likely to motivate demand. Still, it is important to consider the specifics of this immigrant population: internal migration in a state (Spain) that was an historic net exporter of migrants. In the early years of democracy, the status and powers Catalonia, Galicia, and Basque Country had been granted were already under assault. The overturned Organic Law to Harmonize the Autonomy Process (LOAPA), which sought to reduce the powers of these three historic communities, reflects the insecure position of the Autonomous Communities. Catalonia

384 See Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas chart, 1996 in McRoberts 176.
385 McRoberts, 136
could not be expected to demand more extensive sovereignty during this period, despite a demonstrably pressing need.\textsuperscript{386}

More importantly, it seems that Catalan politicians did not see themselves as having much to gain in establishing control over admission policies. Spain was a historic migrant exporter, and even extensive competency over admission would not allow Catalonia the ability to restrict internal migration. Furthermore, then and now, Catalonia does not have the luxury of speaking an international language the way that Francophone Quebecois do. That is to say, its potential for linguistic recruitment and selection is almost zero other than bordering regions and exiles.

At the federal level, devolution was complicated by the structure of the state: multiple Autonomous Communities saw themselves as historic nations; gains by one community would, and did, have repercussions across the state. Though Catalonia had a historical claim to some sovereignty in the form of pre-existing Statutes of Autonomy under the Second Republic, the fact that it was but one of many distinct communities within a multinational state likely impeded devolution of power.

In conclusion, during the period following its autonomy, the Generalitat, under the CiU, dealt with the seemingly insurmountable challenges it confronted at the end of the Franco dictatorship. It faced the problem of recovering an oppressed culture and language, while managing a population whose composition had changed dramatically during a period where Catalonia lacked any mechanism for integration. Once again, Catalan nationalists, politicians, and the majority of its citizens refused to revert to an ethnic or defensive nationalism. As Pi-Sunyer appraised the situation in 1991,

\textsuperscript{386} Pi-Sunyer, 7
What we have in Catalonia is not the defense of the ‘traditional’…but the reworking of values, usages and institutions to meet the needs of the present. It follows that ‘the culture’ is not a unified, homogenous system, but rather a dynamic sphere in which beliefs, objects, and ideas are being constantly manipulated and changed. That this makes for tension inside the society is not to be doubted, but it is also true that this tension is a manifestation of vitality. 387

The tensions Pi-Sunyer describes refer to Catalonia’s evolving status in Spain, as well as the challenges it encountered in terms of reviving an oppressed language and culture and defining belonging in a society where “immigrants and their children far outnumber natives.” 388 Despite this model’s shortcomings and the high degree of assimilation it mandated, Catalonia was able to define an officially civic national project with respect to the unprecedented levels of immigration it received in the 20th century.

III. New Immigration and the Via Catalana (2001-Present): Backlash or Interculturalism?

The 21st century brought new diversity to Spain and Catalonia that raised both new still-unresolved questions about the place of immigrants within Catalonia, and the place of Catalonia within Spain. 389. The past 10-15 years have been marked by a fascinating evolution and challenge to Catalonia’s seemingly unflappable readiness to accommodate and integrate immigrants through the promotion of Catalan culture and language as part of an official civic nationality policy. During this period, we can detect the seemingly incongruous trends towards ethnicization and defensiveness, as well as moves towards accommodation and recognition of diversity. In essence, Catalonia seems

387 Pi-Sunyer, 19
388 Conversi, 191
389 Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo and José Ignacio Antón, “From Sending to Host Societies: Immigration in Greece, Ireland and Spain in the 21st Century,” Industrial Relations Journal 41.6
to be at the precipice of developing a model of interculturalism, based on a clearer definition of a public culture and the recognition of pluralism.

As the table below demonstrates, foreign immigration increased substantially in Spain at the turn of the century, and affected Catalonia especially, probably due to the strength of the Catalan economy.

Foreign immigrants represent a different challenge entirely, and this period not surprisingly represents a new epoch in Catalan immigrant-host relationships. It should be noted that, as this graph indicates, foreign immigration to Catalonia did not begin entirely in 2000, although it did increase dramatically. McDonogh’s 1990 article, “Reflections on New Immigration in Catalonia,” for example, details the economic and social condition of various groups of immigrants in Catalonia in first decades of democratization. During this time, when foreign immigrants comprised around 2% of the population, McDonogh shows how social perceptions of immigrants differed by the their country of origin, which

almost presupposed their expected roles in society. During this time, external migrants represented a separate task, particularly with respect to linguistic assimilation: “Castilian, as a statewide language, can appear more valuable to them than Catalan…” Though Catalan still holds considerable prestige, Maghrebis, North Africans, and Filipinos faced a binary choice (Spanish or Catalan?) that recalls the situation of Quebec. These immigrants, even in small numbers, pose considerably different challenges in terms of language, culture, identity, and accommodation than non-Catalan Spaniards.

Not surprisingly, these challenges amplified as Spain quickly became an immigrant-receiving state. State immigration policy, previous operating under the poorly-enforced 1985 Ley de Extranjería, evolved with the Law of Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and Their Integration (2000) which shifted focus from regulating admission to integration and social rights. This law was supported by a broad coalition, including the CiU. At the institutional level, Catalan language policy was strengthened by a 1998 law mandating Catalan as the primary language of instruction for all students, Castillian-speaking or not. The Catalan Institute for the Cultural Industries (ICIC), created in 2001, focused on production of culture in the 21st century, through mediums like television and cinema. Yet by 2003, the new left-wing government sought to decouple what it saw as “the unhealthy link between language and culture.”

Not surprisingly, this new model corresponded with an increased demand for competency. The Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 2006, approved by the Catalan

393 Davis, 15
394 See Crameri, Chapter 5.
395 Crameri, 47
parliament, included provisions making Catalan the “preferential” language, as well as establishing exclusive control over integration and consultation powers over admission policies.\textsuperscript{396} However, in 2010, the Spanish courts over-ruled both of these changes, re-affirming the primacy of the state in issues related to immigration, and the co-official status of Catalan and Spanish.\textsuperscript{397}

The new challenge for the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, as Crameri persuasively argues, involves positioning Catalonia and Catalan nationalism in relation to globalization and hybridization. With respect to its place in an increasingly interconnected world, Catalonia has sought to clearly define itself, to protect against a homogenizing global culture. This involved attempting to package or “brand” Catalan nationalism in a way that essentializes what it means to be Catalan, in order that it might be protected and projected globally.\textsuperscript{398} This effort, not surprisingly, replicates the process of cultural preservation Catalonia has grappled with in Spain, but in a broader scope.

The newest challenge, spurred by immigrants who are visibly, culturally, and linguistically distinct, is what this global challenge indicates for Catalonia locally. As Crameri asks, “Does the preservation of singularity in the face of global homogenization presuppose the need to limit internal cultural diversity?”\textsuperscript{399} This question, though still unresolved, is a fascinating re-articulation of my research question herein. The answer, however, remains to be seen.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{396} “Statute of Autonomy of 2006, Generalitat de Catalunya” http://www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/titol_4.htm#a138
\item \textsuperscript{398} Crameri, 173-182
\item \textsuperscript{399} Crameri, 182
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Recent trends in immigration policy show the Generalitat adopting a contractual approach, clearly articulating what has consistently been the core of its integration policy:

Immigrants were therefore told that they must see their presence in the region as dependent on entering a pact: the Generalitat would provide the necessary help and advice to allow immigrants to settle in Catalonia, but in return they had to be willing to respect Catalonia’s “fundamental values” and “learn Catalan, the country’s language.”

This pact matches in many ways Quebec’s “moral contract,” and similarly, raises a number of challenges. This vision was articulated under the Interdepartmental Plan of Immigration in the early 2000s, which expressed a “Catalan Approach” (Via Catalan) to integration, emphasizing both the benefit and challenge of the newest waves of migration: “Its basic premise is that immigration holds great hope for the social and economic future of Catlonia, but also great doubts for a Catalonia that is intent on maintaining and increasing its political and cultural uniqueness.” This new approach to integration introduced the language of citizenship that was “plural and civic.”

Consider the specifics of the 2005-2008 plan:

1. Recognition of Cultural Diversity
2. Human Rights and Respect for Personal Dignity
3. Universality of public policies and respect for individual rights
4. Assurance of the stability and cohesion of Catalan society
5. Defense of the Catalan language as the language of the resident-citizens
6. Coordination, cooperation, and co-responsibility
7. Developing integration policies with European foundations

By this plan, Catalonia clearly articulates a liberal, individual- and human rights oriented perspective of citizenship (points 2, 3, and 7). Within this framework, it also

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400 Crameri, 183. Quotations come from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2003).
401 Zapata-Barrero, “Building a Public Philosophy,” 134
402 Zapata-Barrero, “Building a Public Philosophy,” 136
attempts to balance recognition of cultural diversity (point 1) with a clear emphasis on the prominence of Catalan language and the “cohesion” of Catalan society. Finally, this plan reinforces the notion of a pact with the notion of co-responsibility, or mutual obligations. Overall, it articulates a clearly integrationist and open model of Catalan society, which attempts to manage the cultural challenges of immigration while enjoying its economic and social benefits. This policy differs only slightly from what has long been the de facto and official discursive model of Catalan integration. However, it differs both in that it is a clear affirmation of pluralism, and that it speaks to the role of institutions in executing policies consistent with this model. In this context, competency over admission and integration jumped to the front of the agenda, as the changes to the 2006 Statute of Autonomy make clear. As Ricard Zapata-Barrero affirms, “from the point of view of self-government, without public intervention, it is necessary to recognize that immigrants are not allies.”

Only recently, these measures for increased competency were struck down in Catalonia, meaning that Catalan integration policy, national identity, and philosophy/practice of accommodation practices are still in flux. Nonetheless, we can draw some tentative conclusions about these most recent developments, in practice, over the past decade.

Racism in general has appeared in Spain and across Europe in response to new diversity, but in Catalonia, as in Quebec, these events have an added element of cultural anxiety, protectionism and xenophobia for at least some of the population. For example, since 2000, an anti-immigrant political part has had modest electoral success.

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404 Zapata-Barrero “Building a Public Philosophy,” 152
405 Aragón, 20-1
New waves of migration, particularly of North Africans and Arabs, have posed racial, linguistic, and religious challenges that Catalonia did not encounter in the past.\footnote{See Aragón, 3, for demographic data} As McRoberts writes, Catalonia’s civic nationalism is “now faced with much more rigorous challenges” than ever before, and its ability to meet these challenges is only now being tested.\footnote{McRoberts, 184} Similarly, Crameri notes that some elements of public rhetoric re-introduce an “ethnic” aspect of identity not present in previous articulations of what it means to be Catalan.\footnote{Crameri, 191} As he writes, there seems not to be room for hyphenated identities (e.g. Moroccan-Catalan), as there are in Quebec.\footnote{Crameri, 192}

Still, despite these institutional and social challenges, Catalonia has begun to develop the makings of an intercultural policy, with room for accommodation and public support. As the immigration plan above intimates, Catalonia is working to define a common public culture that, as a first point, recognizes cultural diversity. The Multiculturalism Policy Index indicates that the Catalan government now “provides grants to local authorities and organizations that facilitate the integration of immigrants and that undertake programs designed to promote interculturalism and diversity.”\footnote{Multiculturalism Policy Index, \url{http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/evidence/ImmigrantMinorities.pdf}, 89}

Similarly at the municipal level, Barcelona has made strides towards realizing itself as a plural but fundamentally Catalan city. The Ajuntament de Barcelona, in 2008, sought to promote equality and the commonality of citizenship, but emphasized, “intercultural relations take place in a specific milieu and context. For this reason, the cultural heritage
of the host society and its language are the essential foundations upon which interculturalism should be approached.\textsuperscript{411}

Catalonia now can be said to be working to define a public philosophy based on inclusion and preservation, much as Quebec did before it. Still, the foundation for this progress is shaky. In recent dealings with Muslim Catalans, Davis notes the “government’s willingness to put boundaries on the ‘limits’ of plurality in Catalonia.”\textsuperscript{412}

Recognition of diversity therefore, still has clear parameters. As Aragón affirms,

> Within the sphere of diversity, the presence of immigrants in society in general and in school in particular is accepted as something positive, but a vector of rejection emerges when faced with the possibility of establishing relations between cultures and religions beyond the assimilationist or integrationist model.\textsuperscript{413}

He concludes, though, that Catalonia’s developing model of diversity management “alienates the actions of the Catalan institutions both from the rigidity of the assimilationist models and from the relativism which certain forms of multiculturalism can reach.”\textsuperscript{414} To me, this seems to suggest that Catalonia is now entering a phase of interculturalism as a response to the new waves of immigrants and the particular challenge of linguistic, cultural, and racial pluralism.

Catalonia, surprisingly, confirms what we would expect in the model of intercultural nationalism, but in the absence of significant political competencies over immigration and integration. What does this demonstrate about Hypothesis 2? By Blad and Couton’s model, interculturalism requires that a common political and cultural “milieu” be institutionally protected and promoted, but not that the national minority has

\textsuperscript{411} Ajuntament de Barcelona 2008, cited in Multiculturalism Policy Index, 89
\textsuperscript{412} Davis, 15
\textsuperscript{413} Aragón, 21
\textsuperscript{414} Aragón, 26
control over admission and integration. I hypothesize, building on Kymlicka, that the exercise of these competencies is a necessary pre-condition to the development of this model. Catalonia seems to disprove this hypothesis by showing that these competencies might not be necessary. How should we explain this?

Having reviewed this case, I would posit Catalonia does demonstrate institutional protection of a dominant culture necessary for the development of intercultural nationalism. Even without the significant cultural development and revitalization policy it has undertaken (spanning literature to media and broadcasting), the Generalitat is a Catalan nationalist government. Because Catalonia enjoys linguistic prestige and now mandates immigrant schooling in Catalan, Catalonia may simply have the competency it needs to provide it the security necessary for integration. Though it pursues control over admission policies and increased competencies with respect to integration, these policies are not necessary preconditions for openness.

Considering both Quebec and Catalonia, it seems that competencies of selection and integration may strengthen the national minority’s security, but are not necessary for national minority openness. These policies are just one aspect of the more important variable of an institutional framework that promotes and protects a common culture. Catalonia serves as a counter-point to the hypotheses of intercultural nationalism I develop, and suggests improvements to these hypotheses might take into account institutional competencies not strictly related to immigration, and immigrant willingness to assimilate.
Conclusion: Evaluating the Justice of Competing Demands

With these cases fully fleshed out, we can return to the theoretical question that drives this thesis in the first place – whether liberal multiculturalism can succeed on the liberal terms it sets itself. I feel that even at this stage in this project, I am just beginning to develop the language to consider these scenarios, and the contextual background to understand the complexities of the real world. Still, this chapter reviews the overlap between normative and political considerations, and offers some thoughts going ahead.

These cases show decisively that national minority self-government can be reconciled with internal diversity – that is, it is clear that not all national minorities are inherently defensive. In both cases, we see the openness of the nation to incorporate and to a significant degree even accommodate immigrants. Openness necessitates the willingness to receive immigrants, integrate them into the public sphere, and have them become members of the nation (admission, integration, and nation policy). Beyond these processes, openness to internal multiplicity poses a far greater challenge, suggesting the provocative idea that national minorities can (or should) themselves become multicultural. Multiculturalism, as I affirm from the outset, spans ideology, policy, and practice. A society that recognizes and accommodates cultural pluralism goes beyond formal inclusion to recognize and respond to diversity as a defining aspect of the nation; this requires that the government acknowledge cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity while taking steps to address the needs and demands that members of these groups make.

As both Quebec and Catalonia validate, national minority self-government can be compatible with the integration and accommodation of immigrants, but within the limits of intercultural nationalism. This assessment, of course, raises its own set of questions: is
there a right to cultural preservation? To what extent does protection for one group legitimize incursion on the rights of another? Can liberal ends justify illiberal means? How, if at all, can we assess the relative moral weight between immigrant minorities and national minorities?

In particular, the outcomes present in these cases – admission policy, language policy, ‘cultural nationalism’ and intercultural accommodation – call out for further exploration. I am drawn to these normative questions, which seek to assess the morality and justice of these real-world scenarios. Each of these variables, including the specific policies we see enacted in these cases, provokes a rich debate about which arrangements best suit liberal norms, where and how values might conflict, and finally, what we ought to do. Bringing these various philosophical assessments together, we might assess each of the policies on the liberal credentials of its ends or means.

I elect not to go down that road, though I believe that the model of intercultural nationalism warrants our endorsement. In part, I fear that by assessing each policy separately we run the risk of seeing the trees instead of the forest. Liberals have a tendency to concentrate on ever-narrower concerns, as my focus here on a minority within a minority reveals. This is referred to as the “Russian doll” dilemma; each doll (in this case, area of scrutiny) contains another “nested” inside it: states include nations include immigrants include Muslims include women, and so on, until we arrive at a single individual: the bearer of an unknowably complex identity. This process of narrowing, to a certain degree, is not a bad thing; on the contrary, I think it represents sensitivity to detail only possible when scholars and policy-makers have made so much
progress at a broader level. However, the utility of any specific focus should also be determined by how well it enables us to make inferences more broadly.

Most importantly, it is clear that any conclusions we draw from these cases are ultimately subjective – there is no set of ‘best practice’ rules of minority self-government that can avoid the general tension between preservation and openness present in these and other cases. This is not to say that there are no moral standards whatsoever by which we can evaluate them – the use of ethnic admission criteria or harshly homogenizing integration policies (e.g. banning minority languages) come to mind as examples of policies which fall below this minimum standard. However, to the extent that distinct arrangements reflect a balance of legitimate, liberal goals, which facilitate the coexistence of national minorities and immigrant minorities within a single territory, these arrangements by necessity demonstrate some compatibility. Moreover, without veering into cultural relativism, it is important to consider the way that institutional arrangements reflect and interact with the specific conditions present in a given case. Defining a single overarching value judgment or normative proposition for all possible cases is not only impossible, but also unfruitful.

Nevertheless, it is worth considering, in a more general sense, the meaning and conditions of compatibility these cases show, and what these findings suggest going forward. Following Zapata-Barrero, I define compatibility above as the absence of infringement: national minorities and immigrants are compatible to the extent that they are not locked in a zero-sum game where the cultural rights gains of one necessarily limit those of the other. However, having reviewed these cases, compatibility seems, ironically, to have an added dimension of mutual constraint. Both the national minority
and the immigrant minority limit the cultural rights of one another. It is easy to fall into the trap of considering only how national minority immigration policies affect immigrants in their territory – for example: what degree or type openness do these policies articulate, who does the national minority permit to enter, how does the national minority define openness? When analyzing policy, as I do in the cases, this top-down focus is necessary to scrutinize the exercise of self-government. This approach allows us to assess the relative defensiveness or openness of the national minority as a governing institution – and also provokes normative questions about what limitations the national minority can justly pose on admission, language policy, etc.

However, it is also worth considering how constraint works in the other direction. While national minorities generally exist within liberal states, the presence of internal diversity poses significant constraints and bottom-up challenges. The appearance of would-be immigrants or refugee claimants, the presence of members of distinct religions, cultures and languages speakers in public schools, courts, and the workplace, or the appearance of ethnocultural associations demanding recognition and public funding challenge the society and government in nested nations and liberal democracies alike. These challenges force all states, and national minorities in particular, to reconsider the meaning of belonging and national identity, what aspects or values are essential to the political community, and whether and how the maintenance of a national culture can be reconciled with the presence of internal diversity. Immigrants, as would-be members, defy the national minority to live up to the liberal values that enables their self-government in the first place. Compatibility, therefore, has both elements of mutual gain and mutual constraint. Not surprisingly, scholars and policymakers disagree about what
specific arrangements are just, best, or practical. But these subjective assessments reflect the very challenge I wish to highlight – the complex political and normative balancing act that occurs here.

Looking out from these cases, what conclusions can we draw? First, it is important to consider that these are most likely cases. Though we find compatibility in these cases, we also find limitations to multicultural accommodation and real tensions, particularly over time, in terms of nationality policy and accommodation. That is, though my assessment is that multinational federalism and immigrant multiculturalism can be reconciled, we would not expect to see this in every case. Interculturalism is a public philosophy of integration, couched in the idea of institutional promotion of a common culture, which necessitates limitations on both belonging and accommodation. The finding of limitations even in the most likely cases suggests that determining institutional arrangements and a philosophical basis for compatible immigrant-host interaction is no easy feat. This means that if we turn to less likely cases, like the Basque Country, for example, these findings of compatibility fall apart. Many minority nations remain hostile to immigration, and increased political competencies in these cases could do more harm than good.

Interculturalism succeeds, to the extent that it does, in that it is both a public philosophy and an institutional arrangement – but this duality is common to all policy-making: normative assessments must take into account political realities, just as political arrangements and policies express or embody philosophies about just or optimal arrangements.
Looking across the modern political landscape with this in mind, how different is intercultural nationalism from either the ‘ethnic’ or ‘open’ model I consider in Chapter 4? Even in comparison to archetypal models, of maximum defensiveness and maximum openness, the cases I examine here have far more in common with the latter. This finding is especially true when we consider that no society matches this ideal-type model of openness. All states both embody and actively promote some aspects of common culture, defining belonging and imposing limits. As liberal nationalists contend, these limits serve an important purpose within these states, facilitating redistribute politics, collaboration towards the common good, stability of institutions, deliberative democracy etc. We must consider, therefore, that “limitations” in the intercultural model do not necessarily represent shortcomings, but may actually serve liberal ends, as well.

In the modern, globalizing world, cultural and national identities risk being “swept up” in an increasingly interconnected, homogenized global culture. Assuming that we value diversity, which I think we should, we encounter the challenge of how to reconcile the preservation and promotion of cultural distinctiveness – so much a part of what it means to be human – against the hybridization, interconnection, and change that mark the global landscape. Immigrant-receiving national minorities, by nature of their embeddedness in larger states, exemplify the pulls of internal pluralism and external homogeneity.415

The backlash against multiculturalism that initially attracted my attention to this project shows that the challenges of defining culture and national identity in an

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increasingly hybridized world will not disappear in the coming decades. The challenge national minorities encounter in attempting to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable needs for preservation and openness can be seen to varying degrees in many states, which are working to more clearly articulate common public values. As these developments show, the questions raised by cultural pluralism in liberal states requires moving beyond the traditional empirical-normative distinction to see how the two interact.

If nothing else, this thesis highlight the complexities of multiculturalism for modern states, and considers whether and how it can achieve the liberal ends it sets for itself. The case of competing minority demands highlights the inevitable tensions in such cases, but also significant success and further room for improvement.
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