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THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the nuclear arms race has taught us a valuable lesson, and it is time that we took this lesson to heart. It has taught us that buying more arms does not necessarily buy us more security; it may only lead to new and more chilling forms of insecurity.

The nuclear arms race should have taught us by now that in the long run, the control of arms can provide us with a more stable peace and more security than the best weapons money can buy and the minds of men can devise.

We have seen that this is true as we have watched each side develop new strategic weapons systems in response to real or imagined programs by the other side. The net effect has been, at least, a tragic waste of valuable resources. At worst, it could mean catastrophe for all mankind.

Too often, nations have resisted the idea of arms control in the mistaken belief that it would mean unilateral disarmament. And we have sometimes thought of arms control in terms only of reaching agreements and signing treaties. As in the case of the current SALT negotiations, reaching such agreements is an urgent need.

There is, however, a further dimension to arms control. Even in those areas of competitive strategic military spending not covered by treaty or agreement, we should try to establish a pattern of mutual self-restraint with other nations. We should recognize that the other side can and often does react to what we do. A pattern of mutual restraint would enhance our security as well as the security of others. Moreover, the unilateral defense program decisions we make now can alter the prospects for agreement in the future.

It is important, therefore, that we consider the effects of our strategic defense budget on the prospects for agreement at the SALT talks now and in the future and on the military spending decisions of other nations, particularly the Soviet Union.

Actions which we and the Soviets have taken since the SALT talk began have already adversely affected the prospects for agreement.

While the talks go on, the Soviets may be making changes in their offensive weapon deployments. We do not yet know what these changes will prove to be. Whatever they are, they increase our uncertainty as to Soviet intentions, and they make it more difficult for us to conclude an agreement to halt the arms race. They have also resumed work on their ABM system centered on Moscow.

Since the talks began, the United States has begun to deploy a vastly improved, new warhead system, the MIRV—a multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle—and pressed ahead with the ABM program.

In a talk which I gave in Philadelphia early last month I emphasized the urgency of making progress at the current round of the SALT negotiations. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have that speech and two earlier speeches which I delivered on SALT inserted into the Record at the conclusion of these remarks.

I emphasize this urgency again.

Thus far, little progress appears to have been made at this round of SALT. The Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control will be holding public hearings at an appropriate time to explore what progress has been made and what the obstacles to agreement are. Among other questions, we will want to consider the desirability of separating out ABM systems for limitation as a first step toward a more comprehensive agreement.

While pressing for agreement at SALT, we must not lose sight of the fact that the defense programs authorized and funded by the Congress affect the prospects for agreement. This is an area of clear congressional responsibility.

The Congress of the United States in the last few years has begun to subject the defense budget to the scrutiny formerly given only to the domestic budget. The defense budget has proven no more complex than a health bill or a program to rejuvenate our cities.

In exercising the congressional prerogative on the defense budget, we have looked at:

Technical problems—will the weapon work? Is it needed or superfluous?

Economic problems—how much does it cost?

Foreign policy problems—how does the budget affect our commitments?

What has been missing is the arms control perspective—how our defense budget affects the possibilities for sound arms control. Too often, this perspective has been applied only after the decision to proceed with a new program has been applied; only after the decision to proceed with a new program has been made and carried out.

Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control will be holding two sets of hearings in the coming months: first, one on the arms control implications of the administration's defense program as submitted to the Congress; and, second, on the advisability and feasibility of extending the present limited test ban treaty to prohibit all testing of nuclear weapons in any environment including underground.

I want today to outline briefly the kinds of questions these hearings will explore.

First, the subcommittee will investigate the arms control implications of the defense budget. The focus of these hearings will not be whether the weapons work or how much they cost. We will want to look at the net effect of the deployment of these weapons on the arms race and thus on United States security. If we deploy new weapons knowing full well that Soviet deployment of similar weapons will follow, will the result be more or less security for our Nation?

We want to apply a new perspective and a new set of criteria to judge the billions we spend on defense. By this new measure—the effects of weapons deployment on arms control—we may find that some weapons actually reduce security precisely because they might work; and the Soviets would deploy them as well; and that certain weapons, despite their high costs, actually stabilize the arms race and enhance the prospects for peace.

We have been generally aware that these problems existed, but there has never before been any really systematic examination by the Congress of these weapons systems from the arms control perspective.

The United States, ever since the beginning of the nuclear era, has been committed officially to the search for control of these armaments. Progress, though significant in some areas, has been dangerously slow and limited.

A great part of the difficulty lies with the Soviet and our own failure to see that when either makes certain military decisions, it—quite unwittingly—forecloses future arms control possibilities. They may do that directly or because of the response they induce from other countries. Too often, each side fails to analyze how its weapons decisions will look to the other side.

In this sense, arms control begins not at a bargaining table in Vienna or Helsinki, but at home in Moscow and Washington. It begins in our defense budgets and in our national debates about how we can make our Nation more secure.

There are a number of specific issues the subcommittee hopes to examine in some detail. They are:

First, the multiple-deterrence triad. It has in the past been the policy of the United States to maintain not one but three essentially independent nuclear deterrent forces, in addition to our nuclear forces in Europe. These are our Minuteman land-based missiles, our bombers, and our Poseidon and Polaris missile-carrying submarines. The fiscal year 1972 budget and the President's discussion of strategic policy in his latest annual foreign policy message make it clear that the administration proposes to continue to maintain and modernize all three systems.

Since the Safeguard ABM is admittedly inadequate, the new hard-site ABM system is being proposed to help keep the Minuteman viable for the indefinite future. The new B-1 bomber is to be developed eventually to replace the B-52's and FB-111's we now have. The new ULMS submarine missile system is to be developed as a successor to the Poseidon/Polaris force.

All this will be very expensive, and there may be technical doubts about the feasibility or wisdom of some of the specific programs. Our hearings are not going to concentrate on those economic and technical issues. They will explore the basic policy problem of what it means for the arms race and arms control if we continue to seek to maintain three essentially independent, deterrent forces. I hope we can determine the answers to such questions as:

What is the effect of having these three systems on the possibilities for arms control agreements? Does our desire have to have triple redundancy in our deterrent add to the difficulties of agreeing with the Soviets on strategic arms limitation in the immediate future? In the long run?

What response are the Soviets likely to make if we carry through three independently sufficient programs? What counter-responses will we then feel compelled to take?

What, from the arms control point of view, should be the relative priorities of each of these three forces?

Assuming we do want to maintain all three forces, what is the leadtime for the threat to each system? That is, how can we react fast enough to protect our security yet avoid acting prematurely and provoking a response from the Soviets negating any added security from our own efforts?

Second, MIRV's. The deployment of MIRV's on both our land- and our sea-based missiles proceeds apace. This is an area where we are far ahead. We are already deploying operational units; the first Soviet test of a true MIRV may have come late last year or it may not have come yet. The multiple warhead previously tested was only a MIRV, that is, a multiple reentry vehicle from which each warhead cannot be aimed at a separate target. We have had such a MIRV system deployed on our submarines—not simply in tests—for more than 5 years.

The administration rejected the desire of many in the Senate, in the Nation, and in the world for a suspension of our deployment schedule to improve the chances of an agreement to ban MIRV's. A MIRV ban, if it has not been abandoned entirely, seems to have a very low priority in both Soviet and United States thinking about SALT. Nevertheless, the chances for agreement may not be entirely lost yet.

This is a program where current action is helping to close the door on a possible arms control agreement of potentially great importance. Before that door is finally closed, we must understand what is being done. This points up, once again, the problems of technology and of considering SALT agreements solely in quantitative and not in qualitative terms as well.

In examining the MIRV problem, the subcommittee will consider such issues as:

Does our MIRV program seriously threaten the chances of a genuinely comprehensive agreement at SALT?

What is the actual need for these systems at this time? Would there be risks in delay even at this late date in the hope of agreement?

What problems are there about a MIRV ban?

In the long run, would U.S. security be greater if neither we nor the Soviets had MIRV's or if both sides had them?

For the longer run, what are the implications of MIRV's for the stability of the United States-Soviet strategic relationship? How can we adjust our defense program today to minimize those problems in the future?

MIRV's even more than other systems, pose sharply the old question of how much is enough. To put the question in its most dramatic form, a single Poseidon submarine carries about 160 independently targetable warheads, each substantially larger than the bombs which leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Third, ABM's. ABM systems have a particularly fearsome potential for fueling the arms race. The strategic balance depends on each side believing it can destroy the other after the worst attack the other can mount on it. Thus, the prospect of defenses capable of defending our population centers and, therefore, threatening the Soviet deterrent is likely to stimulate massive increases in Soviet programs.

The subcommittee's examination of the ABM issue will consider such questions as:

What are the pros and cons of following up the opening which seems to exist now to secure an ABM only agreement as a first step toward a broader agreement?

Whether or not we seek an ABM only agreement, ABM's would surely be included in any SALT agreement. Should we suspend U.S. ABM deployment while continuing research and development to improve the chances of a SALT agreement?

What types of ABM limitation agreements would be stabilizing and useful in slowing the arms race, and what would not?

What are the implications of various possible U.S. ABM programs on long-run arms control possibilities? For example, if we insist on preserving the Safeguard ABM defense of some of our land-based missiles, what does that mean for the likely shape of an arms control agreement? What is the rationale for the so-called national command authorities defense?

In this connection, too, the subcommittee will want to look at the effects of an ABM avowedly aimed at Chinese attacks.

How would it affect the prospects for agreement with the Soviet Union?

What would be its effect on the chances for improving relations with China?

How would it relate to the possibility of drawing China into the framework of international arms control efforts?

Fourth, there is the question of our strategic doctrines. In a sense, what we say about nuclear weapons and what we believe to be their function in our national security are even more important than any particular weapons system. For

our strategic doctrine helps to determine what kind of forces we maintain, and what we say about their purposes may have important effects on how other nations regard our strategic forces.

There have been a number of indications that the administration has made important changes—at least changes in emphasis—in our strategic doctrine. Secretary Laird in his "posture statement" has told the Congress of the criteria of "strategic sufficiency" the administration has developed. The President, in both his foreign policy messages, has appeared to see a need for a broader range of ways to use nuclear weapons than he believes he now has available.

In his Second Annual Review of Foreign Policy, the President stated:

We have reviewed our concepts for responses to various possible contingencies. We must insure that we have the forces and procedures that provide us with alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation. This means having the plans and command and control capabilities necessary to enable us to select and carry out the appropriate response without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction.

The subcommittee is not going to try to investigate the secret details of our war plans. Instead, it hopes to look carefully at the arms race implications of the apparent changes in strategic doctrine the administration has itself publicly announced.

The kind of questions we will be concerned with are:

What exactly do these suggested revisions of established doctrine mean? Are we planning on a damage limiting or flexible nuclear response capability?

What are the forces we would need to attain such a capability?

What would be the effect on command and control mechanisms? Would we seek to provide our forces with the ability to destroy Soviet missile sites—for example, by improved accuracy?

What would be the effects of building such forces on Soviet programs and doctrine? Is there a danger of appearing to build a first strike force ourselves?

What are the likely effects on our friends and allies of these announcements and the apparent changes in doctrine? What does it mean for such arms control objectives as non-proliferation?

UNDERGROUND TESTING

Later, in a second set of hearings, the subcommittee will explore the advantages of an extension of the nuclear test ban treaty.

The present test ban treaty, one of the great monuments to the memory of President Kennedy, is a limited one. It bans nuclear explosions in the air, in outer space, and underwater, but it does not ban tests underground. Since the test ban treaty, both the United States and USSR have conducted many tests underground.

In fact, there has been more nuclear weapons testing since the treaty than before. To be sure, this testing does not normally affect the atmosphere because, except in the case of accidents, little radioactive material emerges. This is an important consideration from an environmental point of view.

But from the point of view of arms control, the continued high rate of testing poses serious problems. It facilitates the continued arms building on both sides. It makes it more difficult to get France and China to adhere to the limited treaty. A ban on underground testing would discourage other countries from developing nuclear weapons.

The subcommittee will consider whether the United States ought now to make a high priority arms control objective the extension of the test ban treaty to cover underground tests as well. We will examine:

The risks and benefits of continued underground testing. Previously, we have thought that underground tests at least had no potential danger for the environment. But with huge explosions like the one in Alaska 2 years ago—and particularly with the several-times-larger one planned for Amchitka this fall—that assumption is being questioned by some. The plans for this test in particular, require the most careful scrutiny which the Congress and the public can give. What are the dangers? What will be the reaction of other nations?

How, if at all, do underground tests contribute to our national security? What would be the net effect on our security if all nations agreed not to conduct underground tests?

What kinds of weapons are we developing in these tests?

What do we learn we could not learn from other methods?

Has technology now developed to the point where an underground test ban could be verified without on-site inspection?

A major reason for the limitation on the current treaty was the consensus at that time that we could not be sure of verifying a ban on relatively small underground tests without on-site inspections, which proved impossible to negotiate. But technology has not stood still since 1963. There have been press reports that a group of scientists, meeting last summer under the auspices of the Advanced Research Project Agency, suggested that it is now scientifically possible to detect with very high confidence even very small nuclear explosions underground and to distinguish them from earthquakes and other disturbances. The hearings will explore these technical issues to see whether there is now a new and real opportunity to negotiate a broader test ban treaty.

Mr. President, I, for one, would feel irresponsible if we were to continue to learn of the arms control agreements we could have reached only after it is too late. We need to get on the record now the arms control implications of what is happening in the United States and the U.S.S.R. in developing new weapons systems. The subcommittee will try to get ideas from all knowledgeable quarters on what can be done.

It is time that we begin to act on what we have known all along: that arms control can yield greater security than the further accumulation of new military hardware.