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United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 92^d CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 117

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 1971

No. 65

Senate

BOEING 707's SOLD TO AFRICA

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I am pleased to announce that the United States has sold two Boeing 707's to Africa.

land, a veteran African correspondent for the Post and a recent recipient of the Pulitzer Prize for his series of articles on Africa. Mr. Hoagland treats the question of arms and related items sold by outside countries for use in the wars in Portugal's African colonies.

In spite of our declaration in 1961 embargoing the sales of arms to Portugal for use in that country's African colonies, we continue to supply the planes that fly Portuguese soldiers there.

In his 1971 state of the world message, the President made a protest against policies which serve colonialism in Africa. He said:

Both our statements and our actions have made it patently clear to all concerned that racism is abhorrent to the American people, to my administration, and to me personally.

We cannot be indifferent to apartheid. Nor can we ignore the tensions created in Africa by the denial of political self-determination. We shall do what we can to foster equal opportunity and free political expression instead. We shall do so on both moral and practical grounds, for in our view there is no other so solution.

Mr. President, Mr. Hoagland's article points out some practical steps which have in fact been taken to support, rather than to oppose, the denial of political self-determination in Portuguese colonies. The article notes:

Two or three times every week the [Portuguese] military charters Boeing 727 jetliners from the government-owned airline to transport troops to Mozambique. Charters have also been arranged in Boeing 707's to bring troops from Portugal to the three territories.

These are planes, Mr. President, whose sale was approved by the U.S. Government to Transportes Aereos Portugueses.

Now, Mr. Hoagland continues, the Portuguese Government will not have to charter the planes from its own airlines. In January, the administration approved the direct sale of two Boeing 707's to the government.

This action was defended by the administration in a letter from the State Department to the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Case), published in February in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. A spokesman described the sale as "deemed not to come within the terms of the 1961 embargo on the export of arms for use by any of the parties to the disputes in Portuguese Africa."

Portugal's foreign minister Rui Patricio—

Mr. Hoagland notes:

Said flatly in a recent interview in Lisbon that Portugal would not give any assurances about the use of the planes.

"If I buy an American car, can America tell me how I can use it?" he asked. "If I want to drive it in Africa, I will drive it in Africa. The Boeing is not an arm," he said with a smile.

Hoagland also reports an American diplomat in Lisbon defending the sale in the same way: The airplane is not an arm, and does not fall under the arms embargo.

What practical meaning is there, Mr. President, in a foreign policy which would condemn colonialism verbally and support it with material goods? Boeing 707 jetliners may not, strictly defined, be arms under the terms of the 1961

embargo. They may fall into that gray area that exists between the intent of a measure and its language.

But the airplanes are clearly used to further repressive policies in Africa, policies the United States is on record as opposing. It will certainly be so regarded by Africans.

In another instance, last September a State Department spokesman indicated that the administration stood ready to approve sales of small, civilian aircraft to South Africa. This amounted to a reversal of the policy of the Johnson administration, which had held that such aircraft could easily be adapted to military purposes, that they thereby fell into the same gray category, and that their sale would not, therefore, be approved.

Similarly, the administration has failed to take a strong stand against Britain's violation of the South African arms embargo in its recent provision of helicopters to the South African Government. As I have said before, I believe we must both maintain the arms embargo ourselves and seek to persuade our allies to do likewise.

Mr. President, if there is to be any strength of purpose to this country's policies, it will be determined by the actions we take, not simply by declarations of high moral purpose.

If we exploit ambiguities, take actions abhorrent to the intent of our declared policies—the world will be aware of the emptiness of our words.

This sale of jets to Portugal is clearly such an action.

Mr. President, I addressed this question in a speech delivered at the opening session of the African-American dialogues in Lagos, Nigeria, last month. I said then that—

We have an obligation to try to persuade Portugal to see the wisdom and necessity of bringing to a prompt end her military activities in Africa and to grant the right of self-determination to all people in her overseas territories.

If Portugal refuses to end her colonial policies in Africa, we may be confronted with a hard choice between our treaty relations with Portugal and our interests in the peaceful development of self-determined nations in Africa. I hope they change their policies, and we are not faced with that choice. But if we are, then we must not operate on the automatic assumption that these relations with Portugal are more important than our African interests and responsibilities.

Neither our interests in Africa nor our responsibilities are well-served by this sale of jets.

I would hope that the administration would reconsider and reverse its approval of the transaction, before it is completed. But failing that, perhaps the best safeguard against further such action lies in broadened public awareness of such activities by this country in support of colonialism in Africa.

To this end the public is well-served by such articles as Mr. Hoagland's. I commend him on it and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

ARMS FROM EAST, WEST USED IN AFRICA (By Jim Hoagland)

LUANDA, ANGOLA.—Communist and Western countries are supplying increasingly sophisticated arsenals to the opposing sides in three guerrilla wars being fought in Africa.

Portugal appears to need little direct help from her NATO allies in containing the black revolts flaring across her colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. But whatever help Portugal needs, she gets, and the need is growing.

French-made helicopters are becoming more vital to the Portuguese as they switch to more aggressive and mobile tactics. Airplanes manufactured in West Germany drop napalm and crop-killing herbicides over some contested areas. And American jet liners are used routinely for Portuguese troop movements to and within the embattled provinces.

The guerrillas, divided among half a dozen movements, depend on Communist countries for an estimated 80 to 90 per cent of their supplies and training. Some turn to the Soviet Union, China or Cuba out of ideological kinship, others do so out of necessity. An exception to the general pattern is an Angolan exile group that receives Belgian and American weapons.

The source of war materials for the three conflicts is becoming a highly volatile, if confused, issue. Each side attempts to exploit its cold war overtones, while deliberately clouding the question of its own reliance on outside help.

Weapons used by the Portuguese stir more controversy, largely because allies like France, West Germany and the United States say they disapprove of Portugal's efforts to hold her colonies, and claim they are not aiding Lisbon's war effort.

Portugal manufactures most of the small arms and ammunition she needs for the three separate but related wars. But she must turn to her allies for big items, especially air transport.

Senior Portuguese officers in Angola believe, for example, that the 10-year-old struggle here may have reached a decisive point last month with the delivery of three large French manufactured SA-330 helicopters for use across this vast territory.

Riding with Portuguese troops on the helicopters' first combat mission in late February were two French mechanics checking for modifications needed on future deliveries. They were sent to Angola by Sud Aviation, the French company that builds the SA-330.

The mission came a few weeks after French President Georges Pompidou pledged in Senegal that France would stop selling to South Africa French helicopters and other weapons that could be used internally against a black uprising.

Paris has not made any commitment on the Portuguese territories, where guerrilla wars are in progress.

The Portuguese already have stationed in three territories a total of about 60 French-made Alouette helicopters, which carry a maximum of six combat soldiers each. The SA-330 can carry four times that number, and will greatly expand Portuguese mobility.

"Three [SA 330s] is enough to enable our patrols to disrupt the guerrillas' supply lines," said a high-ranking intelligence officer in Angola during briefing.

France also supplies Noratlas transport planes and Panhard armored cars for use in Mozambique and perhaps in Angola.

The propaganda debate over weapons turns especially bitter on the guerrilla accusation that Portugal uses American supplied napalm and crop destroyers over contested areas much as U.S. forces do in Vietnam. Portugal has in the past denied using napalm and herbicides.

Observations and interviews during a five-week trip through the three territories in-

Heated strongly that napalm and herbicides have in fact been used in the three areas. The origin of the materials is uncertain.

Napalm bombs were seen stored at several bases in Angola and the commander of the Portuguese forces in Angola, Gen. Francisco de Costa Gomes, readily confirmed in an interview that his forces use both substances. "We use very little of them," he said. "They are not very good for us" because of Angola's terrain. "It is easier for us to destroy crops with a good infantry squad."

General Gomes emphatically disputed the guerrillas on the effects of the herbicides on the population. "They do not affect the people at all. We have tested them."

Observation of scar burns and defoliation in wooded area of all three territories and private conversations with Portuguese military sources suggest that napalm and herbicide use by the Portuguese has almost certainly been on a much smaller scale than the American effort in Vietnam.

Portugal, the United States and Australia were the only countries to oppose an international ban on herbicides considered by the United Nations in 1969.

The markings on the grayish-blue colored, 100-pound napalm bombs seen in Angola—including the words "in end" "napalm", and the letters "RFX" and "MI/65" do not match the official markings placed on equivalent American war material.

General Gomes and other Portuguese officials said they believe Portugal manufactures her own napalm. They were less positive about the origin of the herbicides.

Since 1961 the United States has embargoed the shipment of American arms to the Portuguese African territories, and has received assurances from Portugal that military equipment supplied under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not being used in Africa.

Partially as a result of this, the Portuguese have had to extend the operational life of many old American weapons, which are still being used throughout the colonies.

FV-2 Harpoon bombers, built 27 years ago bomb Nazi submarines, are still flying anti-guerrilla missions in Angola and Mozambique, as are aged Harvard T-6s. The Angola command has a half dozen operational Korea-war vintage F-84 jets, and Mozambique pilots fly the F-84 and a few F-86s.

The biggest need modern U.S. equipment is filling for the Portuguese military in Africa is jet transport. Two or three times every week, the military charters Boeing 727 jetliners from the government-owned airline to transport troops in Mozambique. Charters have also been arranged on Boeing 707s to bring troops from Portugal to the three territories.

This summer, the government will not have to go through the motions of chartering the planes from itself. The U.S. approved a few months ago Boeing's selling two 707s directly to the government.

Portugal's foreign minister, Rui Patricio, said flatly in a recent interview in Lisbon that Portugal would not give any assurances about the use of the planes.

"If I buy an American car, can America tell me how I can use it" he asked. "If I want to drive it in Africa, I will drive it in Africa. The Boeing is not an arm," he said with a smile.

An American diplomat in Lisbon who defended the sale used almost the same words: "The 707 is not an arm. He pointed out that the Portuguese already are using Boeings for military transport."

Patricio also dismissed guerrilla claims that NATO support enables Portugal to carry on the costly, widespread wars. "It is not true. We are complaining to our NATO allies that they don't give us any support. They won't even give us political support in Africa."

Portugal has about 140,000 of its 180,000-man army in its African territories. Military experts agree that the infantry division earmarked for mobilization with NATO forces if needed is below 50 per cent of its NATO requirement because of the strain of the wars.

West Germany is playing a key role in providing modern small aircraft—there are a dozen G-91 jet fighters manufactured in West Germany stationed in Portuguese Guinea, and about eight in Mozambique.

The Portuguese also use widely the German manufactured Dornier DO-27 light aircraft for reconnaissance, strafing and some light bombing.

Most of the guerrilla movements, which operate independently of each other, have been hammering on the theme of NATO aid to Portugal in their propaganda for the past year, apparently in attempts to embarrass the Western countries enough to bring a halt to arms deliveries to Portugal, or perhaps to get Communist countries to increase their aid to the insurgents.

For some guerrilla groups, that aid is already considerable.

The most effective of the guerrilla organizations is one known as PAIGC, which is fighting in Portuguese Guinea. The Soviets supply it with sophisticated long-range mortars and even, according to the Portuguese, antiaircraft guns. PAIGC seems to be able to obtain as many machine guns, automatic rifles and mines from the Soviet bloc as its 6,000 to 7,000 men can use.

No other group has such a blank check. The Popular Liberation Movement of Angola, known as MPLA, is supplied with both Soviet and Communist Chinese weapons less sophisticated than those that go to PAIGC, weapons captured by the Portuguese suggest.

The other major exile group fighting in Angola, known as UPA, has long been rumored to receive covert Western help. A few weeks ago, the Portuguese captured a new American recoilless rifle from UPA guerrillas.

Belgian and Israeli weapons, believed to have been channeled through Congo-Kinshasa where UPA is located, are also found on UPA insurgents. UPA is considered to be friendly to the West.

Frelimo, the main Mozambique nationalist group, depends heavily on Chinese weapons as well as some Soviet bloc shipments. The Chinese have recently greatly increased their training role of Frelimo soldiers, based in Tanzania.

The organization of African Unity and, with the exception of Algeria, individual African countries seem to contribute little military material directly to the guerrilla organizations. African states appear to concentrate on financial contributions and providing bases for the guerrillas.

The supply of weapons to the combatants gives East and West a definite stake in the struggles for Portuguese Africa. But it is still uncertain how much influence each side will gain with its clients.

Asked a year ago by an American congressman if PAIGC's acceptance of Communist arms indicated Communist sympathies, guerrilla leader Amilcar Cabral snapped:

"Portugal accepts NATO arms... but Portugal in spite of that says they don't accept the ideology of NATO. If Portugal doesn't accept foreign ideology why should we."