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Why Haiti?: A case study of human processes in a "natural" disaster

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Why Haiti?: A case study of human processes in a "natural" disaster

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By

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Abstract

This thesis problematizes geophysical disasters by examining the human processes that affect the extent of damage incurred by these "natural" events. Using the incredible aftermath of the 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010 as a case study, this thesis explores how foreign intervention in its various forms permeated the country from independence to the present day and respectively impacted the scale of devastation. In particular, this lens of foreign activity renders visible historical vulnerabilities and fallacies of aid that have since left the country destroyed and dependent. A critical analysis of Haitian history followed by a comprehensive assessment of various facets of the relief effort illuminate the human implications in the devastation that succeeded the earthquake. Ultimately, this devastation can be used to suggest that the past and present reliance on foreign actors to rebuild and redefine the nation largely failed to recognize local agency, hindering the development of Haitian sovereignty, capacity, and independence. Nonetheless, despite a critical assessment of the relief effort, a point of hope remains for future models of aid provision incorporating local agency and downward accountability. Thus, through a synthesis of historical, environmental, economic, and political fields of study it becomes apparent that foreign intervention has long dictated the course of Haitian state building, and as such, that human processes are implicated in environmental issues.

Key Words: Haiti; humanitarian aid; foreign aid; non-governmental organizations (NGOs); earthquake; cholera; United Nations

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

BNH- Banque Nationale d'Haiti (National Bank of Haiti)

CARE- Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

CCCM- Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster

CDC- Center for Disease Control

DINEPA- Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable (National Directorate for Potable Water and Sanitation)

EPGF- Enriquillo-Plaintain Garden Fault

FAO- Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations

IDB- Inter-American Development Bank

IDP- Internally Displaced Person(s)

IFI- International Financial Institutions

INGO- International Non-governmental Organization

MINUSTAH- United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti

MSPP- Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (Ministry of Public Health and Population)

NGO- Non-governmental Organization

OCHA- Office of Coordination of Human Affairs

PAHO- Pan American Health Organization

PVO- Private Voluntary Organizations

UN- United Nations

UNICEF- United Nations Children's Fund

USAID- United States Agency for International Development

WHO- World Health Organization

INTRODUCTION

On January 12, 2010, within seconds 1.5 million Haitians became homeless, 25 government buildings were reduced to rubble,[1] and 45,000 to 50,000 people lost their lives.[2] On this day, the country experienced a 7.0 magnitude earthquake, a geologic event that registered as a "Major" event on the Richter scale. Yet, the degree of loss of human life and infrastructure far surpassed that of earthquakes of similar magnitudes. This "natural" disaster then did not solely implicate geologic forces, as the definition of a natural disaster may suggest. The extent of damage sustained in Haiti revealed that the causes of devastation exceeded the work of natural processes. As such, natural disasters implicate historical events and societal processes as well. Thus, a natural disaster cannot merely be assessed as an isolated incident; rather, the magnitude of ruin suggests that these events also have roots in human-made processes. This thesis demonstrates that the Haiti earthquake unfortunately embodied this hypothesis, revealing that natural disasters fail to be the consequence of merely geologic processes, but rather embroiling human-made constructions and global inequalities, grounded in both history and the provision of humanitarian aid.

From its independence in the nineteenth century to present day, Haiti faced ill fated, reoccurring themes throughout history. A legacy of slavery and patterns of colonialism placed the country in a subordinate, isolated position within global politics. Internally, weak leadership characterized by a frequent turnover of power and dictatorial

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[1] Oliver Cunningham, "The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the Republic of NGOs: The Fallacy of Building Back Better," *The Joseph Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies* 4, (2012): 109.
[2] Simon Romero and Neil MacFarquhar, "Haiti's Many Troubles Keep Bodies Uncounted," *New York Times*, January 20, 2010, accessed January 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/world/americas/21deathtoll.html?_r=0.

regimes degraded the appearance of Haiti to outsiders. These conditions coalesced to justify repeated foreign intervention. For nearly two centuries, external actors have determined the political and economic structures within this "independent" Caribbean country. Liberated on French terms and infiltrated with humanitarian aid, Haiti offers a history and present reality narrated by foreign actors. Thus, throughout the years following independence, foreign actors remained omnipresent in the country's affairs, hindering the building of local sovereignty and capacity. This history established a cycle of Haitian dependency, necessitating continual humanitarian relief which was implicated in the aftermath of the earthquake.

While foreign actors provided necessary aid, goods, and services to the Haitian population, this humanitarianism failed to serve the subjective needs of the local population. Foreign aid may seem to promote respectable altruistic motives: alleviating poverty, encouraging the spread of democracy, or supporting economic or political transitions. However, foreign aid tends to also advance foreign policy, belittling the needs of beneficiaries. Political, cultural, and economic ideologies can permeate humanitarian work, ironically undermining the effective impacts of altruism. Moreover, non-governmental organizations, as carriers of aid, display skewed accountability systems. With a greater loyalty to donors, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) tend to prioritize demands from above rather than requests from below, the recipients of the aid. As such, humanitarian aid often fails to serve local needs and incorporate local institutions and infrastructure, completing projects incongruous with on-the-ground conditions. Therefore, one must ask: "whom does aid serve?"

The foreign humanitarian aid actors within Haiti exhibited these failures in the provision of relief services following January 12, 2010. The incredible loss and devastation incurred by the earthquake revealed the human-made processes implicated in this "natural" disaster. Conditions throughout the country, and particularly within Internally Displaced Persons camps, revealed the skewed systems of aid. Without an incorporation of local knowledge, a recognition of local agency or an adherence to local needs, this botched humanitarian aid effort sustained subhuman living conditions for those displaced from their home following the earthquake. But more importantly, reinforcing theoretical qualms of relief systems, foreign aid following the disaster perpetuated Haiti's historical reliance upon external actors. As a result of these human processes, the country remained dependent upon the infrastructure of foreigners, undermining the building of capacity and sovereignty.

Nonetheless, this thesis suggests that hope remains for the provision of humanitarian aid both in Haiti and in a general context. In the midst of the earthquake relief effort, a cholera epidemic occurred. Following this subsequent disaster within Haiti, humanitarian aid deviated from previously debilitating models. The implementation of ideal structures of aid incorporated local knowledge, voices, and agencies. This participation served to benefit the Haitian population suffering from the expansive spread of a deadly disease. In addition, this provision of foreign humanitarian aid recognized and subsequently empowered local agencies. Through this empowerment, while only directly impacting a specific sector of Haitian infrastructure, the country gained a sense of agency and capacity, acquisitions instrumental along the path towards sovereignty and true independence. Thus, the humanitarian response to the cholera epidemic became a specific

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moment in which relief pointed the way forward for a more efficient and effective form of foreign aid.

Thus, this thesis problematizes geophysical disasters by examining the human processes that affect the extent of damage incurred by these "natural" events. Building upon NGO theory and an understanding of foreign aid, this thesis demonstrates that humanitarian aid exasperated the aftermath of a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti. Following, the argument of this thesis is three-fold. First, I argue that as human processes are implicated in environmental issues, skewed systems of foreign aid and humanitarian relief are directly implicated in the scale of the earthquake. Through a synthesis of historical, political, and environmental work, it becomes apparent that foreign actors have long dictated the course of Haitian state building or lack thereof. Second, given the devastation that ensued after the earthquake, this thesis suggests that the past and present reliance on external actors to rebuild and redefine the nation hindered the development of Haitian sovereignty and perpetuated patterns of weakness and dependence that characterize the country to date. These patterns proved detrimental to the future of Haiti, as reliance upon foreign aid and intervention continued a cycle that impeded upon movement towards sovereignty and independence. Third, this thesis demonstrates the benefits of humanitarian aid that is more accountable to and inclusive of local institutions. This model of humanitarian relief incorporating local actors points the way towards sustainable and effective foreign aid. Within Haiti, this thesis shows that such a model proved particularly significant in working to abandon a debilitating historical dependence upon foreign actors and the ushering in of hope for the building of Haitian agency and capacity.

Literature Review

An earthquake is often naively identified as a simply a natural disaster. However, ample scholarly work puts this identification into question. While addressing a variety of natural disasters, scholars show that these are not purely geologic events (Cunningham 2012; Farmer 2011; Gros 2012; Katz 2013; Oliver-Smith 2012; Schuller 2012). Rather, global inequalities are implicated in environmental issues. As such, human and social processes affect the extent of damage incurred by a "natural" disaster (Cunningham 2012; Farmer 2011; Gros 2012; Katz 2013; Oliver-Smith 2012; Schuller 2012). This effect can be either beneficial in improving a state's preparedness and ability to respond, or incapacitating by making a population increasingly vulnerable to devastation and loss. In the case of Haiti, the latter is the unfortunate reality. Historical intervention imbricated with the arrival of foreign aid and humanitarian relief organizations constrained and informed the conditions of the country following the earthquake.

Prior to the earthquake, the arrival of neoliberalism fostered the overwhelming inundation of non-governmental organizations into communities both across the globe and specifically within Haiti, an inundation later implicated in the aftermath of the "natural" disaster. Much debate surrounds the forms of neoliberalism. Wendy Larner (2000), articulates these forms, asserting that neoliberalism can serve as a policy, an ideology, or to paraphrase Foucault, as governmentality. While acknowledging the legitimacy of neoliberalism as an ideology in which power is hegemonic and as a governmentality affecting systems of meaning that constitute institutions, this thesis

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interprets neoliberalism as a set of policies that shift the political agenda (Larner 2000).

This policy enacts changes to economic, political and social spheres of civil society

(Castree 2010; Larner 2000). Scholars find that in hopes of improving economic

efficiency, neoliberalism implemented privatization, free markets, free trade, the growth

of a third sector, and a shrinking reliance upon state-provided goods and services (Castree

2010; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Harvey 2005; Klak 1997; Peet and Hartwick 2009). As

a result, neoliberalism changed the role of the state, shifting political responsibilities.

Scholars then cite this policy change as making states less active in the provision of

goods for the welfare of the general population (Held and McGrew 2002; Larner 2000).

However, most importantly, across various works, there is a general recognition that this

shift in the role of the state simultaneously creates space for new actors, non-

governmental organizations, to fill the responsibility of delivering services (Bebbington,

Hickey, and Mitlin 2008; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Fisher

1997; Larner 2000; Uphoff 1996).

     Foreign aid actors, in particular non-governmental organizations, filled the space

left vacant as a result of a changing state role, arriving in new areas of the global

community. While some scholars do recognize that foreign aid promotes altruistic

motives rather than colonial or imperial justifications, scholars simultaneously doubts

these intentions (Dreher Klasen, Vreeland, and Walker 2013; Heinrich 2013). Economists

and political scientists have critically analyzed foreign aid, better illuminating the true

realities that background the motives of this seemingly philanthropic assistance. While

economists investigate various aspects of foreign aid, most arrive at similar conclusions.

Critically approaching aid commitments, contracts, or distributions, these scholars

suggest that foreign policy determines where aid is allocated (Alesina and Dollar 2000;

Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Dreher, Klasen, Vreeland, and Walker 2013). In addition to

these economic approaches to understanding foreign aid, social science and political

lenses provide similar conclusions (Ali 2013; Hook 1995; Lancaster 2007; Wedel 2005).

Synthesizing historical trends of aid allocation with respective national policies, scholars

within these fields find that foreign policy impedes upon the philanthropy of foreign aid.

Thus, despite promoting democratization, the stabilization of an economy, the

abolishment of poverty, or the provision of needed goods or services, foreign aid often

encumbers rather than assists the target population.

Following an analysis of foreign aid, significant literature addresses the theory

that underlies particular providers of humanitarian aid, non-governmental organizations,

(NGOs). First, ample scholarly work recognizes the double-edged sword of NGOs (Ferris

2011; Fischer 1997; Schuller 2012). While some scholars rightfully find NGOs to be

necessary and productive, an overwhelming majority of critics find that the flaws of these

organizations ultimately undermine altruistic purposes (Riddell 2007; Uphoff 1996).

Amongst scholars critical of the ability of humanitarian aid providers to "do good,"

Michael Edwards and David Hulme (1996) identify particular cause for the flaws in the

systems of performance and accountability. On the notion of accountability, scholars

recognize the multiple conflicting loyalties of NGOs, but cite the prioritization of

upwards loyalties to financial providers, rather than the adherence to downward

accountability to local populations as impeding in the execution of humanitarian purposes

(Biggs and Neam 1996; Tandon 1996; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Ferris 2011; Fisher

1997; Schuller 2012).

In particular, upward accountability hinders the just deliverance of aid and development assistance through what scholars identify as a politicization and instrumentalization of aid (Atmar 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Ferris 2011). Mohammed Atmar (2001) defines the politicization of aid as the pursuit of political objectives by donor states. As a result, non-governmental organizations deviate from a loyalty to the local community and beneficiaries, falling victim to political considerations. Thus, literature on NGO theory recognizes that these organizations are not true to their name and are not as "non-governmental" as their title suggests. But rather, aid becomes instrumentalized and used for objectives beyond humanitarianism (Arthus 2011; Schuller 2012). As actors and distributors of foreign aid, NGOs then reflect previously mentioned fallacies of foreign aid within a particular organizational context. This deviation founded upon accountability and coordination, then holds significant consequences for those receiving aid, for example, a country like Haiti after the earthquake in 2010.

Thus this thesis builds on these theoretical interventions with on-the-ground research and reports. Blending various fields of study- historical, political, economic, and environmental- this work offers a unique application of foreign aid and NGO theory to a case study in Haiti. As a result of both examining NGO theory in practice, as well as investigating Haiti from the time of independence to present day, this thesis argues that the earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2010 was not an isolated, "natural" disaster. But rather, human activity in the form of foreign intervention throughout Haiti's past and present contributed to the devastation. However debilitating this presence was to the subhuman conditions that immediately succeeded the earthquake, the cyclical foreign

intervention necessitated a perpetuation of this external presence, which held long-term consequences for the sovereignty and independence of the country. Nonetheless, this thesis concludes on a hopeful note, arguing that an incorporation of Haitian participation in a humanitarian aid response not only recognized, but also empowered local agency to provide instances of an abandonment of the country's dependent history and a movement towards the building of sovereignty and independence.

Limitations of Study

I chose to take a multidisciplinary approach to understanding the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake. In order to blend fields of study in a unique way, I utilized a variety of secondary sources, personal interviews, as well as meeting notes and reports. This approach focused my thesis through an institutional lens, utilizing the resources available to me. However, this thesis lacks the voice of the Haitians. Unable to travel to Haiti I could not talk with Haitians and observe or interact personally with the environment. In order to compensate for this inability to access the local voices, I used personal interviews with Haitian scholars, Haitian activists, and foreign relief workers who spent significant time in the country prior to and after the earthquake. While I recognize that these interviewees maintain a second order difference from the Haitian population, they provided valuable insights, observations, and analysis to support my focus on the institutional and theoretical frameworks of humanitarian relied. These interviews, combined with reports and meeting notes following the earthquake provide a significant foundation of research on foreign intervention for critical analysis.

Chapter Outlines

Chapter 1 provides a historical background of Haiti, introducing central themes that coalesce for a better understanding of the humanitarian relief effort. A long-term pattern of colonialism, a legacy of slavery, frequent foreign intervention, and recurrent weak domestic leadership all plagued the country's history. As a result, Haiti became vulnerable to an inundation of foreign actors, an inundation that would prove detrimental to the country's capability and sovereignty following the earthquake.

Chapter 2 then provides a theoretical framework for the work of non-governmental organizations and foreign aid. This chapter explores the arrival of massive amounts of humanitarian organizations into Haiti at the turn of the twenty-first century in conjunction with a theoretical explanation of this relief. It demonstrates that botched systems of foreign aid became implicated in the capacity building of Haiti, or lack thereof, and established how the relief effort unfortunately happened following the earthquake.

Chapter 3 recounts the earthquake and puts humanitarian aid theory into practice, presenting particular instances of relief after the disaster in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. The skewed characteristics of foreign aid impacted the livelihoods of thousands of Haitians following the earthquake. An investigation of the United Nations response to the disaster, focusing specifically upon Camp Management and Camp Coordination, revealed the fallacies of the international community's response and reinforced a theoretical understanding of foreign aid as foreign policy.

Chapter 4 concludes the body of this thesis with a crisis in Haiti created by foreign aid. In October of 2010, months after the earthquake, a cholera epidemic spread across the country, resulting in massive death tolls. However debilitating this disease proved, the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene response exemplified an ironically hopeful model for effective humanitarian relief. While only a specific instance, the recognition of Haitian agency and capability in the response to cholera illuminated a promising paradigm of foreign aid and the growing sovereignty of a historically dependent island nation.

CHAPTER 1

The History of Haiti from Revolution to the "Republic of NGOs"

Chapter Overview

A natural disaster, such as an earthquake, proves to be more than a single catastrophic geologic event. It implicates human constructs in the ensuing destruction. Historical, political, social, and economic processes that predate the disaster have a significant impact on the scale and amount of damage incurred. These processes dictate the vulnerability of a population to detrimental short-term and long-term effects. In theory, a strong, stable state with well-developed infrastructure, a wealth of resources, and a pre-established coordinated response should have the capability to sufficiently prepare for and react to catastrophic events. Meanwhile, a weakened state ill prepared for a "natural" disaster, lacking coordination, resources, and a response protocol, renders the population significantly more susceptible to the destruction.

Unfortunately, Haiti falls within the latter category. Throughout its history, both external and internal processes combined to reduce the small island country to a defenseless population in the wake of a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in 2010. Internally, cycles of weak, minimally democratic leadership and frequent military rule contributed to the weakened state. Externally, colonialism, foreign occupation, and economic extraction plagued the development of Haiti. Together, these processes hindered the establishment of a sovereign, self-sufficient state capable of preventing and responding to a disaster. Therefore, the history and processes anteceding a "natural" disaster foster an understanding of the events and conditions following the event itself. Examining the historical conditions within Haiti, this chapter contends that long-term patterns of

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colonialism, a legacy of slavery and internal challenges impacted how outside actors

viewed the country as a repository of humanitarian aid in the years to come. Thus, this

chapter ultimately argues that history established a cycle of dependency that necessitated

future continual humanitarian relief, aiding in an understanding of the aid response in the

aftermath of the earthquake.

This chapter begins in the late eighteenth century, addressing the slave rebellion

that began in 1791, as well as Haitian independence from France in 1804. This portion of

the country's history proved pivotal in the following years, dictating Haiti's place in the

global system characterized by inequalities, the ousting of a colonial power, and the

respective implementation of policies to usher in new economic and political precedents.

Next, the chapter will move into the early nineteenth century, years typified by both

internal and external difficulties. The state struggled to establish new internal systems.

Meanwhile, external foreign actors isolated the country whilst maintaining Haitian

dependence and subordination. The second-half of the century reinforced larger themes

and patterns of a weak, unstable, temporary state that encouraged foreign occupation and

economic extraction, this time on behalf of the United States. The chapter concludes in

the twentieth century with the "Duvalier Years", characterized by the authoritarian rules

of Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier. The cruelty and incapacity of these regimes

ultimately created the space for the arrival of foreign aid and services. The exploitation of

this space by foreign actors ultimately and rightfully led to the distinction of Haiti as the

"Republic of NGOs." An understanding of Haitian history, laden with internal struggles

and external interventions, provided an imperative framework to contextualize the

earthquake of 2010 and the scale of disaster that ensued. This chapter unearths the

tumultuous history of Haiti, to argue that central themes of weak leadership and domestic capacity coupled with continued debilitating foreign intervention implicated historical and social processes in a natural disaster and the aftermath of the earthquake.

Slave Rebellion and Haitian Independence

After initial Spanish conquest in 1492 and succeeding colonization, the territory of Santo Domingo, present-day Haiti, came under French rule and was renamed Saint-Domingue. As a French colony, Saint-Domingue offered a wealth of resources and labor to Europe on behalf of its thriving plantation system, enabling the territory to ultimately "become the most profitable colony in the world. By the late eighteenth century, it was the world's largest producer of sugar… and also grew fully half of the world's coffee…"[3] Saint-Domingue provided a lucrative export-based business for France. The French dominated and benefited from the established economic system founded upon slavery. These colonizers reaped the benefits of the rich resource and slave labor pool available. Therefore, even prior to the existence of Haiti as an independent country, foreign powers occupied the territory and executed a system of economic exploitation, impairing the development of a sovereign Haiti. This dangerous precedent and history of colonialism became entrenched in the economic and political systems of Haiti, reverberating effects even after independence.

In particular, the plantation system while seeming to empower white French elites simultaneously proved to be a rationale for resistance and uprising for Haitians against French colonizers. The plantation system particularly swelled during the eighteenth century, binding slaves to the land and establishing an engine for the production of goods

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[3] Laurent Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2012), 19.

such as coffee and sugar, tobacco, and indigo. The abundance of slavery in conjunction

with natural resources permitted the large-scale cultivation and exportation of goods for

French profit.[4] However, despite the profit generated from this system, it also established

a dangerous social structure capable of strongly opposing colonizers and plantation

owners. A small consortium of white elites retained political, economic, and societal

power. Yet, slaves and free people of color constituted the majority of the population.

"Whites comprised fewer than 10 percent of the colony's population (40,000 versus

approximately 500,000 slaves and 30,000 free people of color)."[5] The awareness by

slaves of violations of human rights coupled with and advantage in numbers posed a

significant threat to the pre-existing plantation system. After the French Revolution,

knowledge spread of the "Rights of Man," one of the main documents of the French

Revolution. This document ignited a revolutionary consciousness among the free black

and slave communities by stating that "men are born and remain equal in rights."[6]

Therefore, this recognition established the framework for an overwhelming enemy in the

colored population of Saint-Domingue.[7]

    With this framework, protests on the ground in Haiti, infused with tenets of the

French Revolution, instigated rebellions in Haiti. Beginning in 1791, free people of color

rose up advocating for their rights, leading the French government to extend the Rights of

Man to these constituencies and to eventually abolish slavery. Despite emancipation,

without gaining complete freedom from a plantation system and colonial rule, the black

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[4] Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution* (United States: First Harvard University Press, 2004), 18.

[5] Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 14.

[6] Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: the story of the Haitian Revolution*, 77.

[7] Under this system, attention must also be drawn to the racial prejudices. Enslavement set a precedent for policy enacted with respect to the colored population. This precedent established a racial attitude that percolated throughout future Haitian relationships with foreigners.

population within Haiti mobilized yet again in hopes of achieving independence from France in 1804. In response to continued plantation life after the slave rebellion, many cultivators feared that this system could remain permanently. Thus, to avoid such a harsh reality, the whole country became completely engulfed in war.[8] The overwhelming effort to expel French colonizers proved successful in 1804, when Saint-Domingue gained independence as the new country of Haiti. However, the departure of the French left the Haitian state and economic system completely vacated, a steep challenge for the new country to undertake.

With regard to the state, disagreements ensued over the establishment of an executive branch. The placement of the capital and the powers that ought to be vested in the executive branch came under intense debate. Additionally, the country faced a significant task in creating a new economic system after the dismantling of the plantation system, a lucrative system for the export-based colony. Alyssa Sepinwall addresses these concerns, and more, when saying "Haiti faced a triple challenge after the independence: simultaneously founding a new state, reinserting itself into the international community and establishing a new economic system to succeed slavery."[9] Therefore, for all its triumphs, independence, much like emancipation, brought new challenges that would plague Haitian development.

Unfortunately, the events that ensued in the wake of independence from France, dictated countless consequences for Haiti in the years to come. First, as aforementioned, Haiti could not immediately establish a strong state with democratic leadership. Dissention also reigned over the creation of a new economic system. These internal

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[8] Robert Fatton, *The Roots of Haitian Despotism* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2007), 53.
[9] Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, 105.

quarrels hindered the building of a new state and economic infrastructure after

independence. Too many questions and opportunities remained unfulfilled and

unanswered by Haiti. Further, relations with external actors, such as European countries

and the United States, only multiplied these domestic difficulties. Foreign powers in the

colonized world politically isolated the new country while also establishing a precedent

of economic dependence. With fear of similar insurgencies in their respective territories

and disapproval for the liberties granted to blacks, European countries as well as the

United States, refused to recognize Haitian independence. Economic policies towards

Haiti following independence supplemented the already weak foundation. Dependency

on foreign loans and the presence of foreign banks within Haiti hindered the development

of a monetarily secure and stable state. Therefore, moving forward after independence

was no clear, easy path. Haiti faced both internal and external challenges in founding new

systems. These challenges would haunt the advancement of Haitian society hundreds of

years later.

Early Nineteenth Century Haiti: Post-Independence Challenges

      The beginning of the nineteenth century unfortunately brought numerous

difficulties for Haiti. The newly independent country encountered internal divisions over

the establishment of new systems, as well as external isolation from foreign countries and

the incursion of an indemnity from France. The country suffered from a weakened state

and economic system manipulated by foreign powers. Together, these challenges

hindered the stable development of a Haitian state. The consequences of such conditions

rendered the country economically dependent on external actors, and thus vulnerable to the demands of these respective powers as the century came to a close.

Internally, with the departure of French governance, Haiti gained an opportunity to found a new political system; however, the freedom that accompanied independence led to debilitating controversy among the population rather than to unifying and empowering the country. With the departure of an emperor, the Haitians deemed a democratic system with a parliament and president the ideal foundation for the newly independent country.[10] Yet while determining the details of this new system, two distinct factions arose within Haiti, disputing the location of the new capital and the new president. An official decision inaugurated Alexandre Pétion as the first president, a candidate from Southern Haiti, but did not do so without initiating long-term dissention within the country.[11] The North and the South, supporting respectively different leaders became distinctly demarcated. A population once unified to expel a colonial power was now divided over the creation of a new state political system.

Debates over the political system created further distinctions between the rural and urban citizens. With questions surrounding the future structure of governance, rural citizens developed their own system.[12] The Lakou system "developed largely in the absence of- indeed opposition to- the Haitian government… rural residents… created an egalitarian system without a state."[13] This rural model of society established both social

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[10] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 56.
[11] Ibid., 57.
[12] The Lakou system has since spread to cities as rural populations migrate to urban dwellings. During the 1800s, 85 percent of the Haitian population resided outside of the cities (Dubois 2012, 107). As this number has since declined, urbanization brings not only human capital but also imports social structures to the cities. Thus, with the peak of this urbanization occurring in the late nineteenth century, the ideals of the Lakou system: family, respect, self-sufficiency, and egalitarian cooperation infiltrated into urban communities (Law and Housing in Haiti, 2012).
[13] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 108.

and cultural practices with objectives to ensure autonomous land ownership as well as equal access to freedom.[14] As a result, the vacancy of a state after independence provided the space and opportunity for a new unifying, democratic system. However, as the Lakou system demonstrated, unification proved more difficult with the emergence of competing systems, competition that unluckily ingrained unbridgeable classes amongst the Haitian people.[15] The creation and implementation of the Lakou system, then, established a new distinct class in rural Haiti, a class that posed strong opposition to the urban dwellers who attempted to create a national political system, only to be undermined by the competing Lakou system. Soiled partitions now divided the population not only into Northern and Southern factions, but also into urban and rural factions. More importantly, the Lakou system displayed early examples of Haitian agency. Amidst an absent state, rural residents took initiative to forge their own respective system of governance and organization. Centuries removed from the present day, the Lakou system promoted a communal network to respond to state inadequacy. A present recognition of this agency and activity proves important as similar networks reemerged following the earthquake in the absence of an effective state.

In addition to the Lakou system as a precedent of the forging of a new state in the absence of what once existed, around this time, Haiti set another precedent that established the nation's export-driven economy. The dissention over the political future of the country only grew with bitter disagreement over the economic system. Under French rule, Saint-Domingue had thrived as an export-driven economy, deeply rooted in plantations and slavery. For many, the expulsion of these colonizers then promised an

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[14] Ibid., 107.
[15] Ibid., 133.

end to bound labor. In particular, Haitian laborers desired a society with a respective

economy founded in the principles of the revolution, void of any human subjection.[16]

However, to Haitian elites, a continuation of the plantation system seemed the only viable

option for a sustained economy. To compete and succeed in the globalized, colonial

economy of the time, exportation of goods to foreign countries was a sure means of

staying afloat.[17] As a result, many fervently fought against the termination of the

plantation system. Therefore, the opportunity for a redistribution of land and a re-creation

of the Haitian economy after independence proved counter-productive; state building and

the unification of the Haitian people evolved into internal tensions that only further

weakened the capacity of the new country. The domestic stagnation and divisions within

the country unfortunately became apparent, reinforcing an outward perception of Haiti as

an incapable state and ultimately encouraging foreign involvement.

In addition to the internal disagreements, Haiti faced difficulties from abroad,

combatting isolation from foreign powers. These foreign powers, in particular Britain and

the United States, feared the spread of revolution. Haiti served as "a powerful symbol of

black liberation, racial equality, a harbinger of African emancipation, and a beacon of

hope for the anti-slavery movement."[18] The Haitian revolution established a precedent of

granting freedoms to the enslaved, black population, a precedent that struck fear in

Britain and the United States. After independence, the racial anxiety associated with the

uprising in Haiti then had a definite influence on isolation policy. These countries feared

the spread of anti-slavery movements. Therefore, race remains an important lens through

which one can understand the country's history.

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[16] Ibid., 104.
[17] Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, 105.
[18] Ibid., 157.

The granting of such freedoms to the black population jeopardized economic as well as social conditions for countries such as Britain and the United States. Economically, emancipation threatened the plantation systems and extraction economies. Socially, the values accompanying emancipation usurped social norms along racial lines. Dubois explains the reaction of foreign actors to Haiti,

> In decreeing a universal and immediate emancipation, [Haiti] created an example that would be both celebrated and vilified, held up by some as a model of uncompromising and principled action, and denounced by others as an example of the dangers of giving liberty to slaves who were not ready to be freed.[19]

The denunciation came to fruition through the complete isolation of Haiti from the global system and a common refusal to recognize the newly independent country. As a result, Haiti quickly found itself on the periphery of world order. The shockwaves sent around the world after the revolution and independence thus immediately placed Haiti in a position of subordination and subsequent dependence on foreign powers.

Coupled with isolation, in order to establish a precedent of economic dependence and further impair development, France imposed an indemnity upon Haiti as a precondition for recognition of independence. "An indemnity was an elegant way of solving the problem of political recognition: the country would remain free and independent, but those who had been victims of its revolution would receive some form of compensation."[20] Without rightful political reign over Haiti, an indemnity allowed France to maintain control over the country through economic dominance. The imposition of an indemnity left no room for compromise, but rather, assertively forced the acceptance of such a document and respective dependence. One article of the indemnity, in particular, debilitated Haiti for years to come, plummeting the country into

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[19] Dubois, *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution*, 165.
[20] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 79.

debt and reliance on foreign loans as it "declared that Haitians would deposit in the French treasury 150 million francs 'to compensate the former colonists who request indemnity' for damaged or destroyed property."[21] With acquiescence and fulfillment of the aforementioned articles "[France] concede[s] with this ordinance to the current inhabitants of the French part of the island of Saint-Domingue the full and complete independence of their government."[22] Thus, despite the expulsion of France from Haitian territory, the country remained weakened by and subject to the demands of the previous colonizers.

The reparations of the indemnity not only indebted the country to France but also hindered any creation of domestic infrastructure. Haiti incurred a steep debt to France, so steep, 150 million Francs, that the country was forced to take out massive loans from foreign banks.[23] After nearly eighty years, Haiti still had not repaid the full sum and the French eventually took over the Haitian national bank in 1880, establishing the Banque Nationale d'Haiti (BNH). "But the BNH was not really a national bank: it was a French bank accountable to its French shareholders and not the Haitian people. This meant that the Haitian government, unlike the governments of most other nations, did not have the ability to set fiscal policy…"[24] The inability of Haiti to initially pay off a 150 million Franc indemnity began a cycle of economic dependence. After an initial loan, the eventual abdication of a national bank to a foreign power robbed the Haitians of autonomy over domestic economic initiatives. Further, as the country worked to pay off the debt, money that could have been channeled to fund industry and infrastructure

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[21] Ibid., 99.
[22] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 99.
[23] Today, 150 million Francs would be equivalent to approximately US $21 billion.
[24] Ibid., 176.

instead flowed abroad, a process deemed the "castration of capital."[25] In fiscal terms this

meant that,

> Year after year, Haiti's population watched as money that could have been used to
> build roads, ports, schools, and hospitals simply vanished. In 1838, according to
> Victor Schoelcher, about 30 percent of Haiti's total annual budget was spent
> servicing the national debt...[26]

Thus, the indemnity severely debilitated the capacity of the Haitian government

and people to build state infrastructure and a sovereign economy. Accepting loans from

multiple global actors in concordance with the inability to strengthen domestically put the

country in a vulnerable position. This vulnerability soon opened the way for more

involvement of foreign actors and foreign policies meddling in domestic affairs in the

second half of the nineteenth century. Independence in Haiti was then a far cry from true

liberation.

Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century: United States Foreign Occupation

Internal challenges during the beginning of the nineteenth century rendered Haiti

vulnerable to foreign intervention. Constant internal upheaval created a platform for

external activity within Haiti. Domestically, insurrection and political change plagued the

country during the middle and late 1800s. In fact, with respect to this time period, many

scholars apply the term "kleptocracy" to describe the frequent turn over of power that

occurred with transient military regimes. Suffering through a seemingly constant civil

war, "between 1843 and 1889, there were twelve presidents and nearly as many

constitutions… Almost always the changes in government came as a result of a military

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[25] Ibid., 103.
[26] Ibid.

campaign in which the president was ousted by a rebel at the hand of a regional army."[27] Thus, with each new change in government promised to fulfill the demands of only a regional constituency, the succeeding regime and respective constitution served a portion of the population. In failing to be the result of a national consensus, each military rule, however initially encouraging, was only to fall to a subsequent coup. Unfortunately, this detrimental cycle inhibited the building of the Haitian state.

In a transition from French to US foreign occupation, the United States used internal corruption and racist notions of a black state to justify intervention. The United States identified and manipulated Haitian political instability in order to establish an indirect power in the former colony. To begin this changeover from French colonialism to American imperialism, the United States disregarded prior isolation policy and recognized Haitian independence in 1862. However, this sovereignty did not persist. Under the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904, the United States reserved the right to intervene in neighboring countries to ensure a "stable, orderly, and prosperous" country.[28] Observing the "kleptocracy" in Haiti during the late 1800s, as well as the succession of seven different presidents between 1911 and 1915, the United States turned its attention to the seemingly needy Haiti. Thus, the United States used Haitian corruption as a justification for subsequent occupation.

However, such a rationale for occupation only masked self-serving political and economic motives, motives that robbed the independent country of is very sovereignty. At the turn of the century, the United States felt pressure to compete with foreign

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[27] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 168.
[28] "Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," U.S. Department of the State Office of the Historian, accessed October 21, 2013, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/roosevelt-and-monroe-doctrine

colonizers such as France, Britain, and Spain.[29] To compete meant to colonize and one of

the few independent countries remaining was Haiti. Thus, in August of 1915, Woodrow

Wilson deemed Haiti "incapable of self-governance" and occupied the country.[30] The

United States may have further grounded this perception of Haiti as unfit for government

on behalf race. Not only was the majority of the population black, but also, prior to

occupation, Haitian presidents were black. Occupation then maintained possible racial

undertones and worked to further exclude the black race from positions of governance.

Thus, internal upheaval coupled with neo-colonial rule during the second half of the

nineteenth century established a precedent that permitted the presence of foreign actors

and subverted the development of the Haitian state and economy. The United States

gratefully, but not rightfully, accepted the responsibilities of the Haitian state, instilling

policies compatible with American rather than Haitian interests. This occupation

hindered the development of Haiti, creating conditions for future involvement and

fortifying colonial dependence.

First, during occupation, the United States further thwarted the maturation and

building of a sustainable Haitian economy. The Haitian economy, already in a vulnerable

state, thus became increasingly inefficient and incapable of capacity building. First, the

United States imposed new agricultural practices. These new methods failed to respect

the local environment and context. New techniques introduced by the United States did

not align with traditional planting or agricultural programs.[31] For example, the corporate

production of cotton, pineapples, and other products did not account for the restrictions

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[29] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 177.
[30] Ibid., 213.
[31] Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, 248.

on land or water use characteristic of the region.[32] This imperial naivety characterized

American economic policy in Haiti and revealed a lack of local knowledge and a sense of

cultural superiority that justified an imposition of unsuitable, and thus largely

unsuccessful agricultural production methods. Further, this policy altered pre-established,

functioning labor systems. The United States formed banana plantations for export and its

own economic gain. However, these plantations disrupted small-scale informal peasant

economies. Under the guise of American agricultural systems, previously independent

farmers became field laborers to a "foreign master."[33] Therefore, not only did profit flow

to a foreign power, but that foreign power also debilitated the local economy through the

application of disjunctive policy and agricultural practices. Haiti suffered from policies

that did not provide answers to a question of the future sustainability of the country's

economy. As a result Haiti relinquished economic independence to the United States, an

abdication that ultimately crippled internal governance structures and institutions.

Further, with respect to the state, the United States imposed legislation,

undermining and annulling the governing power of Haitian political institutions. In 1917,

the Haitian legislature rejected a document drafted by the United States State Department

to serve as the basis for a constitution. This rejection spurred a twelve-year suspension on

behalf of the United States of that respective legislative body.[34] Thus, the United States

effectively dismembered a Haitian political body, hindering the development not only of

legislation, but also of the state itself. Further, the United States declared martial law in

Haiti, implanting U.S. Marines in positions traditionally held by local administrators. The

Marines accepted responsibilities with respect to tax collection, public works, and

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[32] Ibid., 248-249.
[33] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 201.
[34] Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, 242

judicial affairs.[35] Therefore, in addition to suspending Haitian political bodies, the United States replaced Haitian administrators. While the United States maintained clear political and economic justifications for intervention, ideological justifications influenced intervention as well. These ideologies, rooted in race, undermined the capabilities of the ruling black population, thus calling for American replacements in previously black roles in Haiti. An understanding of Haitian history then explains the justifications of foreign occupation and the long-term patterns of intervention in various forms. The United States occupation further incapacitated the Haitian state. The policies and personnel incorporated in occupation hindered the nation's development. Accusations of "kleptocracy" justified occupation, which only hindered the development of the state, necessitating repeated foreign intervention. A vicious cycle had been created.

Thus, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, foreign intervention and interests undermined the work of a previously colonized country to gain political and economic sovereignty. The occupation by the United States promoted American interests, with little regard for those of Haiti. This approach not only set a precedent of foreign intervention with seemingly justified motives, but also provided space for foreign actors to inhabit space of the Haitian state on political, economic, and ideological platforms for subjective benefit. In doing so, Haiti could not advance or develop as a nation. Rather, the country was subject to foreign demands, thus creating debilitating conditions of internal incapability that only furthered a cycle of Haitian domestic weakness and foreign abuse. All in all, integration of American policy in Haiti allowed for the country to maintain a foothold and significant control for years to come.

The Early Duvalier Years: Authoritarian Rule and the Arrival of NGOs 1957-1972

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[35] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 233.

With time, the United States' regime in Haiti no longer stood unopposed. Haitians no longer associated progress with American-imposed political and economic systems. These systems evoked antipathy towards the United States particularly amongst the rural peasant population that suffered the consequences of an unsuitable economic system. Moreover, the general Haitian population shared a frustration over feeling a loss of sovereignty with foreign occupation.[36] This exasperation galvanized dissent, sparking several protests and strikes across the country throughout the 1920s. Such demonstrations successfully expelled the Marines, and respectively, ended United States occupation of Haiti in 1934.[37] However, despite initial optimism for democratic self-rule, authoritarianism and violence marked the succeeding years of Haitian history. From 1957-1986, Francois Duvalier and his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier led regimes of violent, forceful political repression. Under the Duvalier regimes, Haiti continued to confront ineffective and unconstitutional rule, only reinforcing the precedent of a weak, incapable state. The government became repressive, unengaged, uninvolved, and disregarded the welfare of the population. As a result, the Duvalier years came to a close with the mass arrival of foreign actors disapproving of the abuses of the inhumane and irresponsible Haitian state.[38] The arrival of these foreign actors displayed a theme throughout the country's history of intervention, and fortified the vulnerable position of Haiti in the global system. Undermining of the Haitian state not only disempowered this already weak body, but also continued to impede capacity building inherent to the prevention of a repeated cycled of both internal and external abuse.

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[36] Ibid., 277.
[37] Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, 217.
[38] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 335.

Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier came to power in 1957 and immediately established a dictatorial regime, distancing Haiti further from the possibility of a democratic rule and the external respect that accompanies such democracy. Upon coming to power, Duvalier created a paramilitary force to suppress opposition, as well as centralize and expand executive power. Francois Duvalier, a keen student of Haitian history, recognized that his predecessors consistently lost power to some form of a military coup. Therefore, even prior to election, Duvalier created a private paramilitary force to carry out violent raids to repress his adversaries.[39] In particular, Duvalier used this force to "[imprison], torture, murder and exile to silence his opponents, and the armed forces were neutralized from the outset."[40] Domination even extended beyond these means to include "… martial law, dusk-to-dawn curfews, press censorship…" in order to fortify his leadership.[41] Thus, Francois Duvalier established a violent regime, suppressing any and all challenges to his authority. Such leadership proved to only further weaken, rather than strengthen the Haitian state, a state still searching for a strong democratic solution to years of colonialism and foreign intervention.

Further, with respect to executive power, Duvalier enacted a new constitution in 1957, granting himself and his government mechanisms to ensure almost total control. According to Dubois, the new constitution "expanded the government's right to declare a state of siege: Duvalier could now do so not only in the case of foreign invasion but also in response to 'civil disturbances' within the country."[42] Civil disturbances served as a loose term, easily manipulated to further the ends of the government. Therefore, the

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[39] Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, 180.
[40] Ibid., 275.
[41] Ibid., 276.
[42] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 327.

ability to declare a state of siege with respect to "civil disturbances" equipped the government with an uncontested capability to suspend Haitians' political and civil rights. This power granted Duvalier almost complete authority over Haitian citizens. Such a change to the constitution hindered Haiti's achievement of a long desired democratic political system. Moreover, violations of human rights that characterized this period of Haitian history proved detrimental to the place of Haiti in the geopolitical world order and attracted continued attention from foreign actors. This attention would only be heightened by the succeeding rule of his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, beginning in 1971.

Chapter Conclusion

Haitian history displayed a legacy of colonialism and slavery, foreign intervention, economic and political dependency, internal corruption, and authoritarian leaders. These patterns and themes ultimately coincided to hinder the development of Haiti as a sovereign nation. First, after independence, the country failed to recover from French colonization. Politically, Haiti never established a democratic system under strong leadership. Economically, Haiti did not efficiently or effectively establish an alternative to the plantation system. Moreover, frequent military regimes and turnovers of power plagued the country, hindering any sense of continuity or empowerment. Such trends permeated almost every regime that came to power throughout Haitian history. The unfortunate perpetuation of these themes established a weak state, which was used by foreign actors as a justification for frequent intervention.

Foreign actors did not hesitate to exploit these political, economic, and ideological vulnerabilities of Haiti. France created space for such exploitation of Haiti

through the imposition of an indemnity and the subsequent incursion of Haitian debt.

This indemnity degraded Haiti to a position of economic independence, allowing other

powers to establish footholds in the country. The United States in particular, abused such

footholds, taking over where France left off, heavily meddling in Haitian affairs. During

occupation in the twentieth century, the United States undermined any responsibilities or

legitimacy of the Haitian state and economy, creating conditions that countered any

movement toward sovereignty and autonomy. Thus, these patterns hindered the building

of the capacity of the state and the strengthening of internal infrastructure. Foreign

intervention exploited such conditions, inundating the country during the late twentieth

century under Jean-Claude Duvalier, beginning a new republic in Haiti, a "Republic of

NGOs."

Thus, this chapter argued that foreign intervention as well as weak internal

leadership and corruption permeated Haitian history and state building. Going forward,

this understanding of Haitian history is imperative to understanding the humanitarian

relief effort in the aftermath of the earthquake. Throughout history, foreign powers

manipulated Haitian politics and economics by intervening in domestic policy. As a

result, on January 11, 2010, the lack of a sovereign state and economic infrastructure

hindered the ability of Haiti to execute an effective response to the 7.0 magnitude

earthquake. The quake both literally and figuratively leveled the Haitian government.[43]

With physical infrastructure damage as well as the damage of two hundred years of

history, "helping is difficult in a broken and under funded system."[44] After the disaster,

without strong central leadership or well-established resources, the state proved incapable

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[43] Paul Farmer, *Haiti: After the Earthquake* (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2011), 59.
[44] Ibid., 70.

of an immediate coordinate rescue effort. A state without sovereignty and autonomy cannot sufficiently establish internal protocols or infrastructure, accrue sufficient resources, or coordinate efficiently amongst varying actors involved in the state. Thus, the correlation between Haitian history and the extent of damage from the earthquake suggests that "natural" disasters are not merely a single event, but calls into question the roots of the disaster, found in historical and societal processes.[45] In Haiti, human constructs exaggerated the destruction incurred by tectonic activity. The cycles of economic dependence, foreign intervention, and a weak state lacking sovereignty established human-made inequalities that rendered the country highly vulnerable to destruction as a result of manmade causes. Haiti's history reveals that the global inequalities and dependencies established as a result of long-term historical processes are then highly implicated in environmental issues.

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[45] Anthony Oliver-Smith, "The 500-Year Earthquake," in *Tectonic Shifts: Haiti Since the Earthquake*, ed Mark Schuller and Pablo Morales (Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, 2012), 18.

CHAPTER 2

The Republic of NGOs: Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy

Chapter Overview

In Chapter One, this thesis argued that the history of Haiti provided imperative insight necessary to later understand the earthquake and its aftermath. This chapter continues that theme by focusing upon a particular period in Haiti's recent past that exhibited foreign intervention through the emergence of an unprecedented number of foreign actors and aid groups. The Haitian proverb *sak vid pa kanp* translates to "an empty sack cannot stand up." Plagued by debilitating internal leadership and external intervention, the Haitian state was all but an empty sack, incapable of performing basic functions and responsibilities for its population. Recognizing this incapability, foreign actors once again descended upon the country to fill the gaps of the weakened state. However, this time, prior to the turn of the twenty-first century, foreign intervention promoted a different image. Justifying their arrival with philanthropic, humanitarian motives, external actors entered Haiti in the form of aid organizations, flooding the country at unmatched rates and in unheard of quantities. This complete inundation soon garnered Haiti the title, the "Republic of NGOs." This chapter explores the continued foreign intervention within Haiti in conjunction with a theoretical exploration of aid and humanitarian organizations, arguing that the arrival of massive amounts of foreign aid characteristic of the Republic of NGOs shaped the conditions of Haiti after the earthquake and further perpetuated a state of dependence.

Without an effective state, NGOs became service providers. Humanitarian aid organizations brought along a patchwork of needed goods for the neglected Haitian

population.[46] Providing potable water, food, shelter, education, and medicine, an overwhelming number of NGOs filled the spaces left behind by an incapable state. Therefore, towards the end of the twentieth century, the host of foreign actors involved in the satisfaction of Haitian needs brought about a "golden age" of NGO activity. Humanitarian aid organizations compensated for the shortcomings and inabilities that plagued the Haitian state. However, the underbelly of humanitarian aid reveals that the power to do harm accompanies the power to do good.[47]

The first part of this chapter continues an analysis of Haitian history, showing the internal turmoil within the country, and the global policies influencing the domestic milieu. This chapter opens amidst another dictatorial rule under the second Duvalier regime, in 1972. Jean-Claude Duvalier not only resumed the state terror that marked the years of Haiti under his father, Francois Duvalier, but also encouraged foreign investment and the involvement of external actors in the provision of services to Haitian citizens. Coupled with executive fraud and a consequential redirection of foreign activity around the government, these developments marked the initial steps toward the creation of a "Republic of NGOs."

This chapter then examines the rise of neoliberalism in Haiti, a global policy that furthered these initial steps activated by the Duvalier regime. Neoliberalism influenced the way in which the world was connected, transforming relationships among global actors and the forms of aid. This policy particularly affected underdeveloped countries throughout the world, such as Haiti. Neoliberal policy realigned the priorities of the state,

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[46] Kevin Edmonds, "Beyond Good Intentions: The Structural Limitations of NGOs in Haiti," *Critical Sociology* 39 no. 3 (2012): 442.
[47] William F. Fisher, "DOING GOOD? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices," *Annual Review Anthropology* 26 (1997): 442.

neglecting previous responsibilities. As a result, foreign actors entered Haiti under a new

pre-text and identity: as philanthropic, humanitarian actors. However, the seemingly

altruistic deliverance of goods and services through humanitarian actors simultaneously

further entrenched global inequalities and prejudices, particularly impairing countries

such as Haiti. Thus, the introduction of neoliberalism marked a major turning point in the

conditions of Haiti that predate January 12, 2010.[48]

The last part of this chapter culminates with an analysis of these new actors,

NGOs, first in a general context of foreign aid and then within the context of NGO theory

under the "Republic of NGOs." An initial exploration of foreign aid reveals the

politicization of humanitarian aid. Foreign aid can often be synonymous with foreign

policy. Patterns in the allocation of aid display that while foreign actors promote altruistic

motives, they never remain immune to the influence of foreign policy, subjective

motives, and cultural or political ideologies. This section initially speaks generally to

foreign aid. Yet, a subsequent, specific focus upon foreign aid within Haiti during the

Republic of NGOs suggests that botched systems of aid proved detrimental to the country

in the long run. The prioritization of foreign benefits over Haitian needs undermined the

building of Haitian capacity and sovereignty.

Further, a specific focus upon NGO theory reveals the discrepancies that exist

between the theory and the practice of humanitarian aid deliverance, discrepancies

implicated in the aftermath of the earthquake. Unfortunately, the incongruity between

ideal and actual forms of aid undermines two central characteristics of humanitarian

service provision: downward accountability and the incorporation of local participation.

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[48] Alex Dupuy, "The Neoliberal Legacy in Haiti," in *Tectonic Shifts: Haiti Since the Earthquake*, ed. Mark Schuller and Pablo Morales (Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, 2012), 23.

Deviance from the accountability to, and incorporation of, the local community in humanitarian activity holds significant consequences for the receiving communities. Haiti, a country overwhelmed by aid organizations at the end of the twentieth century, experienced an exaggeration of the consequences of such discrepancies between theory and practice. Unluckily, these detrimental effects of humanitarianism further encouraged the geopolitical exclusion of Haiti.

The Late Duvalier Years: The Establishment of the "Republic of NGOs"

Since the revolution, weak leadership, an unstable state, and foreign intervention plagued the development of Haiti. The combination of these long-term processes and patterns with circumstances immediately predating the establishment of a "Republic of NGOs," encouraged the arrival of humanitarian aid organizations towards the end of the twentieth century. This process began under the regime of Francois "Papa-Doc" Duvalier. Throughout his rule from 1957-1971, Francois Duvalier consolidated an state power. However, this authority derived from political violence rather than through the ability of the state to serve the welfare needs of its people.[49] As mentioned in Chapter One, torture, murder, and exile dominated political activity rather than service provision. Harsh conditions and state policy garnered attention from abroad as foreign powers observed Duvalier's human rights violations.

The subsequent policies under the second Duvalier regime transformed previous foreign attention upon Haiti into actual intervention within the country. However this time, foreign involvement took a new form. With the sudden passing of Francois Duvalier in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier followed the precedent set by his father

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[49] Laurent Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2012), 346.

of violent political oppression. The amount of Haitians exiled, put in prison, and tortured increased significantly under the second Duvalier regime.[50] In addition, Jean-Claude Duvalier suspended the constitutional guarantees of citizens, centralizing state and executive power. Foreign actors had a heightened awareness of the human rights violations within Haiti.

This awareness developed into involvement when Duvalier invited foreign investment into Haiti. With this invitation, external actors jumped at the opportunity to provide economic assistance to the Haitian citizenry. "The amount of aid that came into Haiti during the Jean-Claude Duvalier years was staggering: between 1972 and 1981 alone it amounted to $584 million…"[51] Two main foreign actors answered Duvalier's call for investment, the first of which were foreign governments. The United States in particular funded 80% of the aid flowing into Haiti, despite knowledge of the atrocities of the Duvalier regime.[52] This aid most often took the form of grants or loans intended for economic support or development assistance.[53] Meanwhile, NGOs, INGOs and other organizations provided significant financial support, including "the World Bank, the IDB, the UN Development Program, the World Food Program, the FAO, the World Health Organization, the Organization for American States, the Inter-American Institute for American States, the Inter-American Institute for Agricultural Cooperation, and about 130 private non-governmental organizations…"[54] NGOs entering Haiti included small agencies such as the Armenian Church Association or the Taiwan International

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[50] Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 282.
[51] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 351.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Terry Buss, *Why Foreign Aid to Haiti Failed* (Washington DC: National Academy of Public Administration, 2006), 7.
[54] Alex Dupuy, *The prophet and power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the international community, and Haiti* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007): 43.

Cooperation and Development Fund, as well as larger international agencies such as the Red Cross, CARE, Habitat for Humanity, and Partners in Health, to name a few. Organizations initially channeled donor money and aid through the government to provide basic services neglected by the Duvalier regime, such as access to clean water, electricity, education, as well as food and agricultural security.[55] Thus, towards the end of the 1970s external actors took significant initial steps of involvement in Haiti through aid and service provision, establishing footholds for external actors in the creation of a parallel state, a "Republic of NGOs".

However, the Duvalier regime selfishly exploited the influx of foreign money to commit extravagant fraud, rerouting aid around the government, and further establishing a parallel welfare state. It became apparent "that Duvalier and his associates were simply taking much of the official aid money sent to the country for their own private gain."[56] Foreign governments, aware of this misappropriation, continued to channel aid money through Duvalier. For the United States, a significant supplier of donor money, Haiti provided a large market for U.S. products, and the diversion of aid around the government threatened this lucrative economic opportunity.[57] As a result, the subsequent financial institutions controlled by the United States similarly continued to provide funding for Haiti directly through the government.[58]

However, NGOs observing the fraudulent activity of the Duvalier regime did not hesitate to redirect aid donations around the state, an important step in the creation of a "Republic of NGOs". By bypassing the state, NGOs slowly came to embody one of the

[55] "Projects and Operations- All Projects," The World Bank, last modified 2014, accessed November 20, 2013, http://www.worldbank.org/projects/search?lang=en&searchTerm=&countryshortname_exact=Haiti
[56] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 351.
[57] Dupuy, *The prophet and power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the international community, and Haiti*, 43.
[58] Ibid., 47.

many roles of state government.[59] As a result, in the late 1970s and early 1980s donors began to channel money primarily through "private voluntary organizations, or PVOs, which now largely go under the name of non-governmental organizations."[60] Unlike donor governments, these aid organizations did not rely on Haiti for economic or political gain, and thus could bypass the state without any detrimental ramifications. Therefore, the re-direction of money through non-governmental, private groups rather than public avenues respectively routed aid around the government. These agencies adopted the responsibility of ensuring for the wellbeing of the impoverished and suffering Haitian population through service provision, ultimately taking on the role of the state. For example, food donations, previously filtered through the government, now entered Haiti as $500,000 worth of foodstuffs each year via the Catholic Relief Services.[61] Thus, the practices of the Duvalier regime altered the identity of foreign involvement in the country, ushering in an inundation of non-governmental organizations delivering humanitarian aid. Throughout the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier, this alteration worked to further the creation of a parallel state within Haiti and a "Republic of NGOs."

Eventually, the fraudulent acts of Jean-Claude Duvalier terminated his regime in 1986, but not without continuing the legacy of weak Haitian leadership, further undermining the development of the state and initiating the creation of a "Republic of NGOs." Continual disregard for the rights and wellbeing of the population throughout his dictatorship called for and justified the intervention of humanitarian aid agencies. The continuation of executive money laundering, despite significant allocation of money

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[59] Kathie Klarreich and Linda Polman, "The NGO Republic of Haiti," *Nation*, November 19, 2012, accessed October 24, 2013. http://www.thenation.com/article/170929/ngo-republic-haiti.
[60] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 351.
[61] Philippe Girard, *Clinton in Haiti: the 1994 U.S. invasion of Haiti* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 143.

through private organizations, undermined economic development plans. Recognition by the Haitian population of the deterioration of economic conditions within the country led to a series of strikes and youth demonstrations that ultimately forced Jean-Claude Duvalier to flee in February, 1986.[62] Duvalier left behind a state that had regressed rather than progressed under his rule and his father's rule. By the time it ended, the Duvalier regime had created the ideal conditions for the arrival of foreign actors. This regime ultimately turned significant state responsibilities over to financial institutions, foreign governments, and NGOs to create a parallel "Republic of NGOs."

A Global Framework in the Late Twentieth Century: Neoliberalism

The internal conditions particularly prevalent under the regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier established the space for, and initial role of, humanitarian organizations within Haiti. Meanwhile, external forces and policies further created the room and need for aid agencies within Haiti. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s globalization and a subsequent form of globalization, neoliberalism, spread throughout the world, infiltrating countries within Latin America and the Caribbean, such as Haiti. Globalization and neoliberalism altered global connections and the flow of goods, ideas, and actors.[63] In particular, actors such as NGOs became increasingly participatory in new networks, accepting responsibility for government welfare activities. With the entrance of non-governmental organizations, Haiti became a testing ground for a model of development emerging towards the end of the twentieth century facilitated by foreign actors. Thus, in Haiti, the infiltration of neoliberalism further entrenched the need for aid and donor agencies.

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[62] Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, 220.
[63] A. Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," *Theory, Culture & Society* 7, no.2 (1990): 296.

Globalization is not a contemporary phenomenon as global relations predate the

current age. As Chapter One demonstrated, colonialism and imperialism are just a few of

the processes throughout history that superseded spatial limitations and boundaries.

These processes established initial global inequalities and geopolitical domination,

consequences that permeated succeeding forms of globalization. Globalization of the late

twentieth century represented yet another, contemporary form of worldwide relations.

International, external, and non-territorial politics began to transcend prior domestic,

internal, and territorial conventional concepts.[64] Countries like Haiti became increasingly

woven into transnational relationships, serving as a laboratory for foreign political,

economic, and social endeavors, one of these noteworthy paradigms being neoliberalism.

As a result, Haiti suffered the consequences of geopolitical domination that affected the

conditions within the country for succeeding years.

Across territorial boundaries and varying applications, neoliberal policy modified

the characteristics of connections and relationships amongst global actors. Held and

McGrew articulate these evolutions as,

> A growth in communication, economic, and political connections within and
> across states and regions… that there has been an expansion in the number and
> role of intergovernmental organizations, international non-governmental
> organizations, and social movements in regional and global affairs.[65]

To affect global modifications, neoliberalism changed economic, political, and

social paradigms.[66] Neoliberal policy achieved such changes by striving for economic

efficiency on behalf of a few main principles: privatization, economic liberalization, and

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[64] David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 50.

[65] Held and McGrew, *Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002), 165.

[66] Noel Castree, "Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 1: What 'Neoliberalism' is and What Difference Nature Makes to it," *Geography Compass* no.4, (2010): 1726.

state deregulation. Neoliberal ideals first appeared in the 1940s and 1950s, but did not take effect in global policy until thirty years later.[67] Fully entering the world stage in the 1970s, neoliberal policy altered preexisting networks and relations established by globalization.

Neoliberalism infiltrated Latin America and the Caribbean as a new extensity of global networks brought this policy to wider regions of the world. In particular, in the early 1990s, Haiti felt increasing external pressure from dominant world powers to subsume and conform to neoliberal policy. After the departure of Duvalier, Haiti abdicated significant power to International Financial Institutions (IFIs).[68] Haiti suffered from an informal contractual relationship with these institutions, "As a condition for their support, the International Financial Institutions insisted that [the president] follow the neoliberal economic doctrine."[69] Moreover, in 1994, the United States aided in the return of former elected-president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. However, stipulations accompanied this return, as President Clinton required that Aristide accept strict neoliberal reforms.[70] Under such pressure from both IFIs, and the United States, Aristide "acquiesced to a program of structural adjustment designed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund" causing the "modernization of public enterprise."[71] Thus, neoliberal theory began to affect Haitian policy in the early 1990s, and subsequently realigned the roles of the state under Aristide, as a result of privatization, economic liberalization, and state deregulation of the country.

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[67] Ibid., 1727.
[68] Dupuy, *The prophet and power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the international community, and Haiti*, 43.
[69] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 363.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, 295

Privatization addressed a shift in the market from the public to a private domain. The perceived increased efficiency of the private over the public sector justified such a shift.[72] As a result, neoliberalism "[assigned] clear, legally enforceable, private property rights to hithero unowned, government owned or communally owned aspects of the social and natural worlds."[73] These privatizations particularly occurred Haiti in 1995. Acquiescing to foreign demands in order to continue to receive aid, Aristide agreed to the privatization of nine previously state-run enterprises.[74] Specifically, the United States identified the state-owned companies in Haiti of flour and cement products as significant impediments to economic efficiency.[75] Thus, this foreign power advocated for privatization of these industries and the movement from a public to a private domain. Unfortunately, this neoliberal shift undermined the role and responsibilities of the Haitian state.

Further, neoliberalism entailed the process of economic liberalization, enabling the free movement of goods and services throughout an unregulated market. As a result, both producers and consumers enjoyed respective freedoms, "producers are portrayed as being 'free' to deliver goods and services at a competitive price… consumers, meanwhile, are portrayed by neoliberals as equally 'free' to determine from which producers they buy which commodities."[76] In Haiti, taxes on products drastically decreased, to 0 to 3 percent on staple goods and half of the total goods moved through the

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[72] Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, *Theories of Development: contentions, arguments, alternatives* (New York, NY: Guilford Publications, 2009), 86.

[73] Castree, "Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 1: What 'Neoliberalism' is and What Difference Nature Makes to it," 1728.

[74] Larry Rother, "U.S. Influence Grows in Haiti as People Shed French Culture," *New York Times*, January 1, 1995, accessed November 21, 2013, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1995-01-01/news/9412310268_1_french-official-haitians-foreign-aid

[75] Girard, *Clinton in Haiti: the 1994 U.S. invasion of Haiti*, 142.

[76] Castree, "Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 1: What 'Neoliberalism is, and What Difference Nature Makes to it," 1727.

Haitian market duty free.[77] The Haitian market became one of the most "open" markets

throughout the world, encouraging an untethered flow of goods. As a result, foreign

countries exploited this liberalization, inundating the country with external goods,

weakening the Haitian domestic economy, and buttressing preexisting global inequalities.

Finally, neoliberal policy caused a movement towards state deregulation. This

meant the "diminution of government intervention in certain areas of social and

environmental life."[78] Thus, as governments conformed to neoliberalism, the role of the

state underwent significant change. A common misunderstanding associates the changing

state role with a "state rollback." However, neoliberalism did not diminish or curtail state

power and government, but rather altered the spheres through which the state exercised

power.[79] With a greater focus on market provision and economic efficiency, the state

maintained a lesser focus on the provision of public goods and services.[80] This shift

reconfigured "state/governmental policies so as to extend the frontiers of privatization

and marketizations. Here then, the state in its various forms became a 'market

manager'… and less of a 'provider' to the citizenry or special interests therein…"[81] The

state abandoned its role and responsibility as a welfare state, abdicating much of this

power to the private sector. This shift is often viewed as a "degovernmentalization" of the

welfare state.[82] Thus, neoliberalism did not necessarily debunk or erase the state. Rather,

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[77] Girard, *Clinton in Haiti: the 1994 U.S. invasion of Haiti*, 143.

[78] Castree, "Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 1: What 'Neoliberalism is, and What Difference Nature Makes to it," 1728.

[79] Held and McGrew, *Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002), 125.

[80] Wendy Larner, "Neoliberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality," *Studies in Political Economy* 63 (Autumn 2000): 7.

[81] Castree, "Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 1: What 'Neoliberalism is, and What Difference Nature Makes to it," 1728.

[82] Larner, "Neoliberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality," 13.

this policy affected new limits on state actions and transferred state responsibility to a new set of external actors, NGOs.

In the relocation of state responsibility a new set of external actors entered and modified global networks and connections. Humanitarian aid agencies inhabited the space vacated by the state as a result of "degovernmentalization." Neoliberal policy outsourced functions of the state as, "the social and regulatory operations of the state are increasingly 'destatized', taken over by a proliferation of 'quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations.'"[83] As a result, the worldwide community experienced an increase in the quantity of aid organizations between 1990 and 1998 from 6,000 organizations to nearly 60,000 organizations.[84] Moreover, an increase in funding mirrored the increase in aid organizations; NGOs became the preferential means through which governments and donors channeled money. Gaining traction and recognition as effective vehicles of aid and change, "it is estimated that NGOs channeled anywhere from $3.7 billion to $7.8 billion of humanitarian assistance, and $24 billion in overall development funding."[85] Thus, through the space provided by neoliberal reforms, humanitarian aid organizations entered into global networks, becoming responsible for the well being of civil society.

Haiti displayed neoliberalism in action. The arrival and implementation of a neoliberal doctrine stimulated foreign intervention in Haiti, in the form of humanitarian aid and NGOs. With an initial wave of international agencies entering the country under

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[83] James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, "Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality," *American Ethnologist* 29, no. 4 (Nov. 2002): 989.

[84] Mark Schuller, *Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2012), 8.

[85] Mark Schuller and Pablo Morales, *Tectonic Shifts: Haiti Since the Earthquake* (Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, 2012), 57.

Duvalier, the implementation of neoliberal policy only increased the quantity of the preexisting organizations. After the return of Aristide to power and the subsequent enactment of neoliberalism, "foreign NGOs began springing up all over the country, creating a patchwork and sporadic delivery of basic services to Haitian people…"[86] As a result, services previously run by the state, came under the realm of NGO governance. These services included the provision of food, medicine, shelter, education, and clean water, to name a few. For example, "80 percent of the schools and 90 percent of the clinics were run by NGOs."[87] Non-governmental organizations exemplified a powerful alternative to the state, ensuring the wellbeing of Haitian citizens.[88] Hence, despite the overwhelming presence of NGOs, these humanitarian aid agencies performed important roles, doing a significant amount of good in a weakened and impoverished country. Yet, despite providing necessary services and goods, these new foreign actors were not immune to skewed self-interests and motivations.

Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy

Towards the end of the twentieth century with the implementation of neoliberalism, foreign intervention in Haiti took on a new form. Humanitarian aid became the leading form of foreign intervention, deviating from previous forms including colonialism, imperialism, and military occupation. This time, foreign actors arrived in Haiti on behalf of relief. However, despite these commendable motives, the governments, banks, and non-governmental organizations within Haiti often deviated from such

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[86] Edmonds, "Beyond Good Intentions: The Structural Limitations of NGOs in Haiti," 442.
[87] Mark Schuller, "Haiti's Bitter Harvest: the NGOization of Humanitarian Aid," in *The Golden Fleece: Manipulation and Independence in Humanitarian Action*, ed. Antonio Donini (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2012), 182.
[88] Klarreich and Polman, "The NGO Republic of Haiti," 4.

altruism. A politicization of foreign aid recognized the unfortunate reality that original country or regional ideologies and political beliefs often influenced the providers of aid, non-governmental organizations. These actors maintained either direct or indirect relationships with governments in developed countries allocating foreign aid funds and resources. For example, donors simultaneously doubled as political actors. Moreover, organizations received funding from political institutions. These links between aid providers and government agencies impacted the approach through which actors worked, influencing where actors carried out projects, which projects they chose to enact, and how they framed their work.

Non-governmental organizations often implement economic or political development projects in underdeveloped countries. However, these projects tend to be funded by the governments of developed countries, influencing the particular identities of development projects. Therefore, one must ask, whom does foreign aid serve? Through a critical analysis, it seems as if foreign aid represents a form of foreign policy, serving as an arm for political motivations and subjective benefits of developed nations and their respective governments. The United States proved to be a common culprit of this manipulation of aid. Within Haiti, foreign actors and NGOs were not immune to these biased systems of aid, distortions that held grave consequences for the capabilities of the country at the time of the earthquake.

Prior to this instance of foreign aid within Haiti, connections and networks among global actors established a precedent that foreign aid served as a means by which actors could accomplish their interests. Private interests of developed nations came to the

forefront of the global political landscape.[89] First, during a time of rapid decolonization

from 1945-1981, superpowers used foreign aid as a means to incorporate newly

independent states into their respective spheres of control.[90] Further, during the Cold

War, foreign aid continued to reflect donor interests to either foster or deter the spread of

communism.[91] In particular, the United States and the Communist Bloc competed to

extend corresponding ideologies and political doctrines. For example, the United States

"threw billions to… lure [countries] into an anti-communist camp."[92] With the end of the

Cold War, motivations for foreign aid changed once again, this time with a less

competitively driven justification. Instead, during the 1990s foreign aid promoted

development by supporting economic and political transitions, addressing global

problems, furthering democracy, and managing conflict.[93] Trends of foreign aid during

this time respectively reflected this prioritization of development aid as "the distribution

of aid during this period titled toward the poorest countries, rising from just over 10

percent of total aid in 1970 to 25 percent a decade later."[94] This trend interestingly

coincided with the rise of neoliberal development schemes emerging around the

conclusion of the Cold War. As a result, these new goals encouraged foreign aid to focus

upon primarily poor, underdeveloped countries like Haiti, struggling with political and

economic stability. Haiti as a "Republic of NGOs" displayed this focus, saturated by non-

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[89] Murad Ali, "Aid for Development or Foreign Policy: Objectives behind US Foreign Aid Allocations to Israel," *The Dialogue* 3, no.4 (October 2013): 385.
[90] Axel Dreher, Stephan Klasen, James Raymond Vreeland, and Eric Werker, "The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective?" *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 62, no. 1 (October 2013): 158.
[91] Janine Wedel, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Building Strong Relationships by Doing it Right!" *International Studies Perspectives* 6, (2005): 35.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 48.
[94] Ibid., 39.

governmental organizations promoting the growth of civil society and government infrastructure. However, despite this hopeful provision of development aid, the end of the twentieth century brought criticism and skepticism of foreign aid. Recognition spread that donors seemed to make foreign aid decisions without adherence to the preferences of the intended beneficiaries.[95] This criticism unveiled the failures of foreign aid experienced by Haitians under the Republic of NGOs.

An analysis of the actors making foreign aid decisions reveals that foreign policy influences humanitarian aid allocations. First, governments provide significant funding for foreign aid programs. With this financial influence, political institutions obtain control over foreign aid decisions. Institutions determine "who sets the issue agenda, who has access to decision-makers, who decides policies, and who can veto decisions."[96] Consequently, institutional space exists for political ideologies or motives to infiltrate into foreign aid discussions and allocations. As previously mentioned, in the 1900s, the governments of developed countries served as the leaders of foreign aid allocations. During this time, the United States and Japan provided the greatest quantity of foreign aid, followed by a host of Western European countries including, but not limited to, Britain, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and Finland.[97] Second, NGOs maintain similar biased impulses. These organizations maintain cultural or religious affinities, as well as commercial, or agricultural interests. Moreover, government policies and leaders can influence NGOs. Some NGOs maintain informal alliances with government

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[95] Ibid., 51.
[96] Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza, Peter Nunnenkamp, Rainer Theile, and Luis Triveño, "Assessing the allocation of aid: developmental concerns and the self-interest of donors," *The Indian Economic Journal* 54, no.1 (2006): 19.
[97] Roger Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 96-97.

agencies.[98] These alliances can take many forms. On one hand, governments provide

funding for NGOs, particularly those specializing in humanitarian relief.[99] An exemplary

illustration of this relationship exists between USAID and United States NGOs. USAID,

the United States Agency for International Development channels a noteworthy portion

of its funding through these NGOs.[100] As a donor, USAID, a government agency, can

then influence aid decisions. Thus, foreign aid becomes an extension of foreign policy,

manipulated by government dogmas.

Further, the flows and direction of aid reveal that humanitarian actions are

influenced by geo-political strategies. Ideally, "if aid is to be allocated on the basis of

recipient needs, the poorest countries should receive more, and the richest countries

less."[101] However, this ideal allocation fails to be actualized. The countries of China and

India serve as contradictory examples to this ideal. Both China and India display

conditions imploring for an overwhelming arrival of aid with high levels of poverty and

very large populations. Yet, these countries receive infrequent commitments of foreign

aid.[102] Therefore, there exists some ulterior motivation to shift the just appropriation of

foreign aid. Economic regressions and critical analysis of aid distributions reveal such

motivation.

Foreign policy influences the flow of foreign aid as former colonies, democratic

nations, and countries offering strategic political advantages often receive greater

allotments of humanitarian aid. As displayed by the cases of China and India, prior

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[98] Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, 213.
[99] Ibid., 14.
[100] Ibid., 105
[101] Jean-Claude Berthélemy and Ariane Tichit, "Bilateral donors' aid allocation decisions- a three-dimensional panel analysis," *International Review of Economics and Finance* 13 (2004): 255.
[102] Ibid.

loyalties tend to supersede conditions of poverty, overpopulation, and underdevelopment that would otherwise warrant the arrival of foreign aid. Looking at bilateral aid flows, Alberto Alesina and David Dollar found that "a country that is relatively open… receives 20 percent more aid. A country that is relatively more democratic… receives 39 percent more aid; a country that has a relatively long colonial past… receives 87 percent more aid."[103] This statistic reveals that allocations of aid reflect colonial ties. Haiti fits this pattern. As a former French colony and subject of American imperialism and occupation, respective domestic politics of these developed powers influenced aid allocations to Haiti.[104] Under President Bush, the United States disapproved of the leadership of Aristide. As a result, "the administration continued the suspension of U.S. aid and blocked other multilateral donors from providing aid already approved."[105] Nonetheless, despite this temporary suspension of aid, the historical ties and valuable location of Haiti funnel aid to the island country.

In addition, flows of foreign aid follow geo-political concerns or strategies, often disregarding poverty or other conditions that implore for assistance. For example, the United States continues to provide considerable support to Israel, a wealthy country according to GDP per capita. Between 1948 and 2006, this nation received the greatest portion of United States economic aid.[106] The political and security implications of maintaining a strong relationship with Israel directed aid towards this otherwise well-off country. Similar motives have funneled foreign aid towards Haiti. The island's strategic

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[103] Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 5, no.1 (March 2000): 40.

[104] Terry Buss and Adam Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008), 69

[105] Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It*, 77.

[106] Ali, "Aid for Development or Foreign Policy: Objectives behind US Foreign Aid Allocations to Israel," 393.

location offers advantages to foreign aid providers. Haiti's close proximity to both the United States and Cuba makes this island nation a strategic American partner in the region.[107] Further, Haiti offered markets for American goods.[108] Therefore, these patterns of flows of aid reveal political motives in aid provision. As aid can elude those in need, a close tie between foreign aid and foreign policy becomes apparent. This tie is then highly implicated in Haiti with the inundation of foreign aid under the Republic of NGOs.

In addition to the flows of foreign aid, the projects funded reveal political or ideological motivations and biases. External actors hold the power to manipulate the purpose of aid and thus, the respective project. While most foreign donors or agencies outwardly promote development as the purpose of aid, there often remain a variety of purposes.[109] Subsequent rationales for foreign aid projects deviate from such altruistic motives, introducing self-serving intentions. For example, within Haiti the purposes of foreign aid that extended beyond development misaligned donor programs. Around the turn of the twenty-first century, the World Bank, an international financial institution influenced heavily by developed countries, attempted to institute the privatization of many of state-owned industries.[110] Privatization can increase efficiency. However, privatization benefits domestic and foreign elites. This transfer subsequently can make goods more expensive and less accessible to the local population. In 2007, the Haitian government signed an agreement to privatize "nine state-owned firms in the areas of electric power, telecommunications, transport, banking, construction, and

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[107] Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It*, 68.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*, 2.
[110] Buss and Gardner, *Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid Has Failed and What We Can Do About It*, 113.

agribusiness."[111] While the Haitian government signed this agreement to implement privatization, such acquiescence to foreign aid projects met great popular resistance. In fact, the resistance proved so overwhelming that the World Bank elected not to execute the privatizations. Thus, with ulterior goals beyond development, foreign aid projects digress from the purposes, preferences, and needs of local populations. This digression once again renders visible the reality that foreign aid is foreign policy, motivated by self-serving political and ideological motives. As a result, foreign aid is incongruous with development, only perpetuating a need for debilitating foreign assistance.

The unfortunate use of foreign aid as a vehicle of foreign policy is then implicated in Haiti with the overwhelming inundation of NGOs and external actors. One must remain skeptical of the effectiveness of foreign aid here, as the country "has received billions in foreign assistance, yet persists as one of the poorest and worst governed countries in the world."[112] A critical analysis of trends and patterns in foreign aid allocation suggest that foreign aid is not synonymous with development. Botched structures and motives that underlie humanitarian efforts undermine the effective execution of aid projects. Foreign political, ideological, and cultural predispositions affected aid. As a result, projects failed to adhere to local needs. Within Haiti, foreign aid took the form of macroeconomic policy, security, military demobilization, health, and infrastructure creation.[113] Despite the necessity for such services, the country primarily implored for aid that resolved political and governance issues had plagued the nation for years. The failure to deliver such projects "nullified attempts by the donor community to

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[111] Ibid., 177.
[112] Ibid., 1.
[113] Ibid., 101

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improve conditions in Haiti."[114] The allocations of aid are thus implicated in perpetuating

a dependence upon foreign actors and the failures of a Republic of NGOs. Governments,

bilateral and multilateral agencies, and non-governmental organizations acting on behalf

of foreign policy then only seemed to make the country worse-off in the long run,

undermining Haitian capacity and sovereignty.

Thus, foreign aid projects do not exist in a vacuum. These plans "involve people

and institutions: people, with their own interests and cultural frameworks; institutions

grounded in culture and politics."[115] Therefore, humanitarian actions remain influenced

by purposes beyond development that serve to benefit donor governments or

organizations. This influence furthers the argument that foreign aid is representative of

foreign policy. To this end, David Baldwin states, "foreign aid is first and foremost a

technique of statecraft. It is, in other words, a means by which one nation tries to get

other nations to act in desired ways."[116] With foreign aid in Haiti, these botched systems

of aid, influenced by ideology and policy, became implicated in the Republic of NGOs.

The "Republic Of NGOs": Discrepancies Between NGO Theory and Practice

Throughout Haiti, and worldwide, the spread of neoliberal policy caused an

explosion of humanitarianism, a form of foreign aid. An overwhelming and rapid arrival

of NGOs, and other humanitarian service providers led to the naming of this era as the

"golden age" for aid organizations.[117] These organizations willfully adopted relief and

development projects, both in the global North and South. However, the growth and work

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[114] Ibid.
[115] Wedel, "U.S. Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: Building Strong Relationships by Doing it Right!" 39.
[116] Steven Hook, *National Interest and Foreign Aid*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), 15.
[117] Schuller, *Killing with Kindness*, 175.

of the aid sector was not purely constructive and beneficial. In addition to the influence of foreign policy upon foreign aid, the discrepancy between NGO theory and the practice of aid provision hindered the effective and sustainable deliverance of goods and services to those in need. Structural characteristics of aid organizations compromised and undermined their respective performances. The deviance from theoretical accountability structures and the ideal coordination with the local government characterized humanitarian efforts in Haiti. Here, the ability of humanitarianism to do harm as well as good exacerbated pre-existing state weaknesses.

A main tenet of humanitarian aid is accountability. "Accountability is generally interpreted as the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions."[118] Theoretically, humanitarian agencies maintain downwards accountability. Downwards accountability implies the alignment of humanitarian action with the needs and wants of beneficiaries[119] This idealistic positioning of accountability allows humanitarian actors to remain autonomous and independent. In doing so, these actors regard those receiving aid as the most decisive constituents, ensuring that aid gets to those most in need in the necessary form. Maintaining downwards accountability thus upholds humanitarian aid goals of service provision, development, and "saving lives."[120]

However, in reality it no longer proves possible for NGOs to remain exclusively accountable to beneficiaries. Rather, aid organizations satisfy donors' demands,

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[118] Michael Edwards and David Hulme, *Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 1996), 8.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Mohammed Haneef Atmar, "Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid and its Consequences for Afghans" (conference paper, Politics & Humanitarian Aid; Debates, Dilemmas & Dissension Conference, London, February 1, 2001). http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/events-documents/3772.pdf

influencing the intentions and processes of service provision. This reality reflects a shift

from downward accountability to upward accountability. Upwards accountability implies

the alignment of aid action with the ideals and desires of "trustees, donors, and host

governments."[121] As a result, funding often determines NGOs loyalties and priorities.

With an overwhelming portion of funding increasingly coming from private donors and

donor governments, humanitarian organizations display a greater allegiance to the

demands of these actors rather than the demands of beneficiaries. Norman Uphoff

explains that "[the] fiduciary relationship between NGO staff and trustees and those who

provide NGOs with their funds is greater than the NGO obligations to recipients of

benefits. If trust and confidence are not maintained with an NGO's contributors, it will

collapse."[122] Given this reality, humanitarianism does not truly serve those whom it

should, as "he who pays the piper chooses the tune".

  The Creole pig incident in Haiti serves as one notorious example of the problems

with upwards accountability. Between 1981 and 1985, humanitarianism particularly

digressed from the needs of Haitian citizens, failing to ensure the wellbeing of an already

impoverished population. During this time, USAID, a major donor of international aid

funding, led an initiative to replace the native Haitian Creole pig with imported pigs from

the United States. The United States foresaw this replacement as prevention to the spread

of swine flu in pigs originating in the Dominican Republic.[123] Therefore, USAID

slaughtered nearly two million pigs, replacing this livestock with American pigs that

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[121] Edwards and Hulme, *Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World*, 8.

[122] Norman Uphoff, "Why NGOs Are Not a Third Sector" in *Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. Michael Edwards and David Hulme (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 1996), 28.

[123] Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, 221.

could not withstand the Haitian climate.[124] The next wave of imported pigs to replace the deceased were then too expensive for farmers previously owning Creole pigs to afford, causing the USAID initiative to ultimately undermine a significant portion of Haitian livelihood.[125] Haiti's rural farming population lost an estimated $600 million in livestock.[126] As a significant portion of donor money flowed from the United States, in particular USAID, this country heavily influenced humanitarian performance. Humanitarianism aligned with the wellbeing and economic prosperity of the United States, rather than with the livelihood of local Haitians. This example highlights the gap between theoretical and actual humanitarianism, and the respective consequences of humanitarian aid in practice that fortify global inequalities.

The purpose of humanitarian aid deviates from serving the needs of the beneficiaries to reflect the needs of actors with fiscal influence over an NGO. Scholar Mohammed Haneef Atmar recognizes this misappropriation of aid as processes of instrumentalization and politicization. This suggests that donor agencies use humanitarianism as an instrument to further political or economic pursuits.[127] The reality of upward accountability then allows donors, foreign countries, and other actors to influence the purpose of humanitarian action for subjective ends. Unfortunately, this influence often results in a deviation from purely philanthropic work as "humanitarian action is used for purposes other than humanitarianism, notably of foreign economic or geopolitical interests."[128] Thus, a granting of preference to donors to determine the

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[124] Dubois, *Haiti: The Aftershocks of History*, 352.
[125] Ibid., 353.
[126] Sepinwall, *Haitian History: New Perspectives*, 221.
[127] Atmar, "Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid and its Consequences for Afghans."
[128] Schuller, *Killing with Kindness*, 177.

purpose of humanitarian efforts then holds detrimental consequences for the intended beneficiaries, as aid is no longer tailored to the actual needs of the recipients.[129]

The power of donors to control humanitarian aid entering Haiti greatly determined the projects that received funding, disregarding articulated local needs. For example, Haitian citizens stated a priority of "revitalizing national agricultural production."[130] However, despite this expressed priority of aid, only 4.3 percent of USAID in 1996 addressed issues of agricultural development.[131] By contrast, food aid constituted 13 percent of the USAID budget in the same fiscal year. Under a humanitarian aid system that prioritized downwards accountability, agricultural development would receive a greater portion of donor funding. However, the process of instrumentalization and politicization caused a misappropriation of humanitarianism. In this case, food aid better served the United States economic interests, by providing a market for American goods, than did agricultural development within Haiti. With this in mind, USAID filtered a greater portion of funds towards food aid rather than towards agricultural development. Thus, Haiti was not exempt from this failure of humanitarianism as aid catered to the objectives of donors while overlooking the requests of Haitian citizens.

In addition to altering the purpose of humanitarianism, upwards accountability also influences which projects an NGO elects to undertake. As donors provide funding to a humanitarian aid agency, they simultaneously establish standards and expectations for the use of that money. In order to then monitor the adherence to such standards, donors

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[129] Atmar, "Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid and its Consequences for Afghans."
[130] Laurie Richardson, *Feeding Dependency, Starving Democracy: USAID Policies in Haiti* (Boston, MA: Grassroots International, 1997).
[131] Ibid.

implement a reward structure of evaluation. The reward structure of evaluation requires

an organization to prove that the use of funds aligns with pre-established quantified

benchmarks. Only in doing so can these organizations receive supplementary contracts

and donations. It is then most beneficial for organizations to carry out projects whose

progress can be quantified and rendered visible to donors.[132] This structure, however,

limits the projects of humanitarian aid organizations. Short-term projects tend to be easily

quantifiable and visible. Meanwhile, long-term projects often entail positive externalities,

beneficial consequences of a project, and second/third order sustainable effects that are

not immediately quantifiable.[133] In order to continue to receive funding, long-term

projects are then sacrificed on behalf of short-term initiatives, as "many of the things that

add most of our quality of life are not readily quantifiable."[134] Thus, the need to remain

accountable to donors heavily influences the projects and performance of humanitarian

organizations.

Throughout the golden age of NGOs, Haiti suffered from the implementation of

projects that satisfied donors' evaluations rather than prioritizing sustainable long-term

projects. In 2005 on his visit to Port au Prince, Haiti, it became clear to Mark Schuller, an

active participant, protagonist and scholar in Haiti, that the neoliberal Haitian state no

longer accepted the responsibility of clearing piles of trash from roadways, and

unfortunately, and neither did aid organizations. As a result of the encroaching piles, it

took public transit 45 minutes to travel 4 blocks.[135] To donors, picking up trash does not

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[132] Schuller, *Killing with Kindness,* 183.

[133] Uphoff, "Why NGOs Are Not a Third Sector," 33.

[134] Ibid.

[135] Mark Schuller, "Gluing Globalization: NGOs as Intermediaries in Haiti," *Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 32, no.1 (2009): 88.

have the same attraction as building a school or health clinic.[136] Moreover, an organization cannot quantify picking up trash. Therefore, despite the articulated need for trash pickup from beneficiaries of humanitarian aid, only one volunteer in this city amongst a wealth of volunteerism was willing to pick up trash. Rather than developing a sustainable waste management plan, organizations funneled funds into the construction of quantifiable projects such as the construction of schools or clinics.[137] Thus, in order to ensure donor support for initiatives in Haiti, humanitarianism disregarded the needs of local citizens to satisfy upwards accountability systems.

An analysis of theoretical humanitarian action extends beyond the notion of accountability, also addressing the ideal role of the local government. The overwhelming presence of third parties within a country can threaten the role of government. Consequently, there is a possibility for the creation of a parallel state, carrying out the responsibilities of the local government. To counteract this tendency, it is best for the local government to remain in a position of coordination. In this position, governments theoretically remain participative in and responsible for monitoring and regulating the actions of NGOs.[138] Local authorities assure that humanitarian aid complies with local structures, laws, and needs.[139] Therefore, despite the incapacity to provide the needed services or goods for a population, the state should not completely excuse itself from the humanitarian aid effort; but rather remain a central actor in coordination and communication among the numerous organizations.

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[136] Ibid., 89.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Elizabeth Ferris, *The Politics of Protection: the limits of humanitarian action* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011), 68.
[139] Ibid., 69.

Nonetheless, in practice, NGOs tend to create an alternative governance structure, bypassing the local government. "International aid has often been criticized for ignoring, sidelining or actively undermining local capacities."[140] This ignorance originates from a lack of trust in the capacities and effectiveness of local governance structures and national governments to deliver aid.[141] NGOs view the state as an obstacle, slowing down the process of aid provision and simply bypasses the government.[142] As a result, humanitarian aid organizations replace the state and create a parallel structure. This parallel structure "undermines the social and political contract between a state and its citizens…"[143] Thus, a discrepancy lies between the theoretical inclusion of the state in humanitarian aid provision and the reality of state exclusion from this process, creating a parallel state by NGOs. Unfortunately, Haiti was not immune to this tendency of humanitarianism. While humanitarian aid agencies in the end of twentieth century provided necessary services, these aid agencies simultaneously side-stepped the already weakened Haitian government. Good intentions then led to a botched aid effort.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter argued that the rise of Haiti as the "Republic of NGOs" laid the groundwork for the relief effort after the earthquake. Historical patterns of intervention within Haiti had begun to look different towards the end of the twentieth century. Historic foreign intervention in the forms of colonialism and imperialism now evolved into the form of humanitarian aid. However, in the late twentieth century, onlookers

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[140] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 27.
[141] Ferris, *The Politics of Protection: the limits of humanitarian action*, 70.
[142] Ibid., 89.
[143] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 29.

doubted the worthiness of Haiti, justifying the arrival of external actors under the guise of humanitarianism. Ideally, these actors championed altruistic, philanthropic work, serving the needs of beneficiaries and including the local state for an eventual transfer of responsibility for citizen welfare back to the rightful owner. In practice, however, humanitarian aid digresses from this ideal. Ironically then, aid often cripples those whom it intends to serve. This reality of foreign aid, when placed in the greater context of Haiti, became implicated in the botched relief effort and the disaster that followed the earthquake.

The first irony exists in the interchange between foreign aid and foreign policy. Political and cultural ideologies realigned humanitarian relief efforts with donor motives. These donors can then influence not only the flow of aid and whom it serves, but also the form of aid and the implemented projects. With this influence, aid tends to deviate from the needs of beneficiaries. Humanitarian aid then fails to serve its purpose. As a result, the receiving populations remain hampered and suffering from the conditions that necessitated the aid. Moreover, the plethora of non-governmental organizations under the Republic of NGOs reflected the same skewed identity of humanitarian relief. Upwards systems of accountability and the disregard for coordination with local efforts encumbered the effectiveness of efforts to provide services to the Haitian population and rebuild a weakened nation.

In general, these critiques of foreign aid and humanitarianism demand a greater respect for beneficiary needs and of state capabilities. The humanitarian response must be case-sensitive and context-dependent. In cases such as Haiti, ideal systems of accountability, coordination, and independence were not even initially achievable

following the earthquake. The pre-existing weakness of the state hindered capacity building. Built upon years of historical domestic challenges and foreign intervention, Haiti remained a dependent state. The country could not independently adopt or move forward programs to improve state autonomy or authority. While this reality in itself had a stagnant effect, the amalgamation of preexisting conditions with the unfortunate realities of foreign aid and humanitarianism only further hampered the capability of Haiti to respond to what would ensue.

Thus, the patchwork convergence of these conditions, forces, and actors suggests an answer to the question 'Why Haiti?' Why did Haiti experience a level of unmatched disaster? What processes and contexts predicated the seismic waves? And who may be ultimately responsible for the extent of damage? A seemingly natural disaster occurred within a country already tainted by global prejudices as a result of history, global policy, and most importantly, fallacies of humanitarian aid. The Republic of NGOs, which existed prior to January 12, 2010, set up how relief worked following the earthquake. A lack of accountability, a lack of cultural sensitivity, as well as a lack of history and local knowledge, further skewed aid already manipulated by foreign policy. Thus, before the earthquake foreign humanitarian aid and a host of non-governmental organizations established systems that undermined the effectiveness of a response to the disaster and the rebuilding of a nation.

CHAPTER 3

The Earthquake: "Building Back Better"

Chapter Overview

"It was like driving through a city following being totally bombed. There was nowhere I went that buildings were not totally collapsed or partially collapsed. The streets [were] full of people that were either displaced or were trying to recover people out of the rubble that had either been killed or wounded…"[144] This description of Haiti the morning after the earthquake by Lieutenant General Ken Keen, who served as the Command of Joint Task Force Haiti, depicts the unfathomable scale of physical devastation succeeding the tremors that shook the country on the evening of January 12, 2010. Unfortunately, on this date, Haiti felt the wrath of centuries of human-made historical processes that rendered the population defenseless and vulnerable at the hand of tectonic plate motion. Geologic forces leveled a nation, destroying livelihoods, industries, and infrastructure within seconds. While the casualties caused by these natural forces must be recognized and respected, those that ensued as a result of foreign humanitarian aid deserve far greater attention and critical analysis.

After the earthquake, the Haitian government had little capability to face the rebuilding effort independently. The demand and rightful place of humanitarianism can be neither ignored nor denied. At a loss, the devastated country requested the resources and funds of the international community. In response, incredible quantities of organizations and foreign actors arrived to supply this demand. This overwhelming presence made imperative a system of organization and ultimately an institutionalization of aid to better streamline relief efforts. Yet, while offering unique capabilities towards

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[144] Ken Keen, interview by author, January 21, 2014.

the rebuilding of Haiti, humanitarian aid perpetuated the historical pattern of foreign actors holding central roles in the development of the country. As such, the dominance of these actors neglected the agency of Haitians and the pre-existing systems within the country. Systems of accountability deterred Haitian participation, discounting rich networks of local support, informal markets, and cultural knowledge. This accountability scheme unfortunately then further amplified devastation to levels that far exceeded any geologic consequences. Thus, building on of a foundation provided in the previous chapter that unveiled the fallacies of foreign aid, a case study of the Cluster Approach in this chapter argues that an inundation of humanitarian relief after the earthquake compounded the loss initiated by geologic forces. Demonstrating a legacy of the failures of the Republic of NGOs in a new context, this chapter implicates human processes in the disaster and calls for new approaches to aid deliverance.

This chapter opens with an account of the earthquake. While much of this thesis illuminates the human-made processes implicated in the disaster, attention must also be given to the details and consequences of tectonic forces. Movement along the fault line that underlies Haiti caused incredible human and infrastructural devastation unmatched by earthquakes of similar seismicity. These geologic forces account for only a portion of human loss. Yet, such forces can be held accountable for the collapse of homes, government buildings, airports, and seaports. As the media recounted and reported on the damage, painting a picture of chaos, the international community reached out to Haiti in ways it had never done before.

The chapter then explores the humanitarian aid response. Throughout its history and development, Haiti was frequently subject to a foreign presence. While the form of

such intervention evolved from the time of independence to the earthquake, after January 12, 2010 foreign actors entered the country under the veil of institutionalized humanitarianism. The United Nations (UN), established in 1945, served as a coordinating agency, organizing the overwhelming multitude of volunteers, resources, funds, and organizations. As a global governing body the UN aids in the formulation and execution of international solutions to political, economic, social, and humanitarian disputes. Under such a broad scheme of work, this body maintains an active role in relief for both human and natural disasters. In the midst of, and after such events, the UN coordinates and oversees the humanitarian aid response. To efficiently disperse aid the United Nations instituted the Cluster Approach, a system that looked to cohesively structure both international and local efforts after a disaster. However, once implemented within Haiti, this model of coordination excluded local voices and institutions from the rebuilding process. This exclusion continued to devastate the country, further entrenching a dependency upon external systems of aid.

Critically analyzing this institutionalization of foreign aid, this chapter investigates the realities within the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster (CCCM) and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. With homes destroyed across the country, Haitians congregated in IDP camps. Camps varied throughout the country in size, location, and services. While some existed in the rural countryside others were located throughout the capital city, Port-au-Prince. Moreover, some camps gave refuge to upwards of 30,000 Haitians, while others housing only a few hundred displaced persons failed to be recognized formally. Although these camps sought to promise security and refuge, the reality could not be farther from the ideal, with respect to shelter, sanitation,

health care, education, and the provision of food services. The realities within these camps revealed the fallacies of humanitarian response. The consequences of a domination of foreign actors were two-fold. First, on the ground, a lack of coordination with the local government and a failure to integrate the local economy left many Haitians living in sub-standard conditions. But more, the disregard for the infrastructure and government of the country held implications for the perpetuation of a reliance on foreign aid that so heavily characterized the development of Haiti.

In juxtaposition to this institutionalized response of foreign actors, this chapter concludes with an exploration of the local markets and systems within Haiti. The Cluster Approach failed to take into account these local systems, subsequently discounting Haitian agency. Aid workers and scholars offer first hand observations of a surprising activity within the country even after the destruction of livelihoods. The vibrant informal economy within Haiti, while immediately devastated, worked to utilize and build upon formerly established structures soon after the earthquake. These accounts serve to illuminate the palpable sense of Haitian agency often discounted by the institutionalization of humanitarian aid. A deliberate refusal by humanitarian aid organizations to recognize the local participation and agency significantly impeded the rebuilding of the Haitian state and Haitian sovereignty. Upwards accountability schemes undermined the rebuilding of damaged local processes, replacing rather than repairing, a far less sustainable solution. This chapter then begs for new questions to be asked amongst foreign actors in coordinating roles with respect to the structure of humanitarian aid.

Thus this chapter problematizes the institutionalized humanitarian aid response. The international community titled the effort in Haiti "Building Back Better." Although establishing an eloquent and optimistic title for the relief effort, this act symbolically granted foreigners authority in the rebuilding of the country, perpetuating colonial and imperial mentalities. As a result, foreign actors figuratively robbed Haitians of their rightful agency to define the country's relief effort. Foreign actors, once again, took a prominent and leading role in governing the reconstruction of the country. This literal and symbolic responsibility not only proved detrimental to the immediate wellbeing of the Haitian citizenry, but also to the future sovereignty and identity of the nation. Without local voices, upwards-accountability structures dominated rebuilding conversations and decisions, failing to recognize and empower local processes. The work of the United Nations then illuminated a broader point of humanitarian assistance, captured by the subhuman conditions which many Haitians must survive. The position of foreign actors to dominate the relief effort empowered these actors to remain in the country in a justified position. Thus, Haiti's unique history renders visible the greater implications of foreign intervention, as a continued undermining of local agency hindered the future development of a sovereign nation and perpetuated a history of foreign dependence after the earthquake.

January 12, 2010

Human processes have figuratively disrupted Haiti since its foundation. On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake shook the country. Haiti is located atop the Enriquillo-Plaintain Garden fault system (EPGF), which runs east to west both in

northern and southern Haiti.[145] Particularly, along the southern border the transform fault

begins "offshore to the west of Haiti, bisects Haiti's southern peninsula and then extends

into the Dominican Republic…"[146] On this day, despite historically low seismicity,

transform plate motion disrupted the small island country.[147] The epicenter of the

earthquake, with a shallow depth of only 13km below the surface, was located

geographically approximately 25 km WSW of the capital city, Port-au-Prince.[148]

Unfortunately, this close proximity of the earthquake to Port-au-Prince doomed much of

the Haitian population.

At the time of the earthquake, Port-au-Prince was an incredibly fragile city,

leading to significant tallies of human and physical casualties at the hand of geophysical

forces.[149] This region of the country was particularly vulnerable to devastation, due to an

overwhelmingly dense population as well as an unsatisfactory construction of buildings

and homes. As is a common theme in Haiti, the inundation of foreign actors and their

respective policies created this reality. Mark Schuller, as an active participant in the relief

effort, serves as an inside actor and protagonist in the effort for Haitian solidarity.

Schuller, an assistant professor of Anthropology at Northern Illinois University, as well

as a professor at Université d'État d'Haïti, has completed noteworthy research on

globalization, NGOs, and the convergence of these concepts within Haiti. In addition to

publishing over 20 books and peer-reviewed articles, Schuller first traveled to Haiti in

2001. Most, importantly, since the earthquake, Schuller has spent extensive time within

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[145] Hermann M. Fritz et.al, "Twin Tsunamis Triggered by the 12 January 2010 Haiti Earthquake," *Pure and Applied Geophysics* 170 (2013): 1464.
[146] Ibid.
[147] Meredith Nettles and Vala Hjörleifsdóttir, "Earthquake source parameters for the 2010 January Haiti main shock and aftershock sequence," *Geophysical Journal International* 183 (2010): 375.
[148] Fritz et.al, "Twin Tsunamis Triggered by the 12 January 2010 Haiti Earthquake," 1463.
[149] Paul Farmer, *Haiti After the Earthquake* (New York, NY, 2011), 55.

the country working and completing research. In an interview with the author, Mark

Schuller articulated: "the model, the neoliberal model for development in Haiti is the

cause for why Haiti was so vulnerable to disaster."[150] Neoliberal development

encouraged the overwhelming movement of rural citizens to cities.[151] Lower tariffs on

agricultural products drove local farmers from their land and into urban centers in search

of revenue.[152] Therefore, with respect to the population, "732,000 people lived in Port-au-

Prince in the 1980s, growing to 3 million by 2008. Unplanned, uncoordinated

[shantytowns] sprung up to accommodate the 2 million people who were pushed off their

land…"[153] Moreover, the construction of buildings was "infamous for sloppy, makeshift,

and almost entirely unregulated conditions."[154] Population density and unsatisfactory

construction caused the immediate devastation from the earthquake to far surpass the

devastation produced by earthquakes of similar seismicity in different regions of the

world.

    While exact values following the earthquake fluctuate, a significant quantity of

Haitians were proclaimed dead immediately after the earthquake on January 12, 2010.

Many sources credit tectonic forces alone for the death of 45,000 to 50,000 people.[155]

The collapse of poorly constructed buildings and homes trapped many people in rubble

where they could not escape. However, these numbers fail to tell the whole story. Three

years later, the government of Haiti estimated that after the earthquake a total of 316,000

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[150] Mark Schuller, interview by author, January 25, 2014.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Mark Schuller, "Genetically Modified Organizations? Understanding & Supporting Civil Society in Urban Haiti," *The Journal of Haitian Studies* 18, no. 1 (2012): 53.
[153] Mark Schuller and Pablo Morales, *Tectonic Shifts: Haiti Since the Earthquake* (Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, 2012), 4.
[154] Farmer, *Haiti After the Earthquake*, 55.
[155] Simon Romero and Neil MacFarquhar, "Haiti's Many Troubles Keep Bodies Uncounted," *New York Times*, January 20, 2010, accessed January 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/world/americas/21deathtoll.html?_r=0

people had been found dead. The large discrepancy between this value and the death toll attributed to natural forces immediately following the earthquake reveals the implications of human processes in the devastation. The death toll, sickness, and devastation continued to be documented months and years after the earthquake itself. This perpetuation then implicated further actors and processes in the scale of disaster.

In addition to human casualties, the country suffered considerable structural damage and physical casualties. The seismic tremors leveled homes, as well as commercial, and government buildings throughout the country. The Haitian government estimated that the earthquake destroyed approximately 250,000 homes.[156] As a result, more than two million people were forced to leave their homes, most seeking refuge in IDP camps.[157] In addition to the grounding of homes, the earthquake also destroyed government buildings, severely impairing the capabilities of the state to respond to the disaster. In the capital city, geophysical forces leveled 25 out of 27 government buildings.[158] Notable buildings damaged from the quake included Parliament and the Ministry of Health. As a result, the Haitian government lacked the means to adequately respond to the needs of its population and accept the responsibility for the relief effort. Thus, Haiti began to look to outside help and foreign aid.

However, the arrival of aid proved difficult due to the destruction of airports and seaports. Reflecting on the earthquake, Ken Keen explained, "Because of the geography of Haiti being on an island, the lifeline to Haiti was its airport and seaport. The airport,

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[156] United Nations Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC), "Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti: Following the 12 January 2010 Earthquake," July 5, 2010, http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-news-newsdetails&newsid=143.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Oliver Cunningham, "The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the Republic of NGOs: The Fallacy of 'Building Back Better," *The Joseph Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies* 4, (2012): 109.

fortunately, was not significantly damaged to the point where we couldn't land… the

seaport was a bit larger challenge because two of its piers had collapsed…"[159] In

addition, the collapse of structures throughout the country blocked roads and hindered

transportation and easy movement. This damage across the country impeded the ability of

foreign actors to respond in a timely manner. As a result, it was difficult for aid to

immediately reach those in need. By delaying the relief effort, damage to the airport,

seaport, and roadways caused by natural forces only amplified the devastation and chaos

that ensued.

As destruction and frustration mounted, media reports flowed out of Haiti

describing utter desperation. These numerous accounts spurred an incredible response

from both public and private society. On location after the earthquake, a reporter from

The *Wall Street Journal* detailed "cries from victims entombed beneath concrete debris

pierced the air of seemingly every street in this crowded capital Wednesday…"[160]

Similarly, a week after the earthquake, another reporter for *Washington Post* depicted a

sense of hopelessness and despair as "The streets were filled with beleaguered residents

milling about, left with no jobs, no instructions of what to do, and no place to buy food or

to take the injured."[161] Others described the scene as a "horror show" illuminating the

poverty, rubble, and bloodshed that characterized the capital city after January 12,

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[159] Keen, interview.

[160] P. Bhatia, "Haiti despairs as quake deaths mount- prime minister says toll may top 100,000 people buried in rubble around the capital; 'were are the rescue teams?' *Wall Street Journal*, January 14, 2010, accessed December 10, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052748704362004575000460345415900

[161] M. Roig-Franzia, M.B. Sheridan, and M.E. Ruane, "Digging through the destruction: Haitians struggle to find the dead--- and keep the survivors alive," *Washington Post*, January 15, 2010, accessed December 10, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/14/AR2010011401013.html.

2010.[162] Images also flowed out of the country. These images captured the surviving

citizens pulling limbs of those less fortunate out from under rubble evoking an emotion of

desperation. Wounded children and piles of dead bodies initiated sentiments of grief and

pain from onlookers. Buildings and houses reduced to rubble created a sense of utter

chaos.

Figure 1: see url https://www.worldpressphoto.org/photo/2011danielmorelsnsl-cl

Figure 1. *People help a woman who has just been rescued from rubble*, January 12, 2010. Photo Credit Daniel Morel/World Press Photo. https://www.worldpressphoto.org/photo/2011danielmorelsns1-cl

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[162] Simon Romero, "Haiti Lies in Ruins; Grim Search for Untold Dead," *New York Times*, January 13, 2010, accessed December 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/world/americas/14haiti.html

Figure 2: see url http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/handout-photo-provided-by-the-minustah-mission-on-january-news-photo/104205526

Figure 2. Young Haitian Boy Receiving Treatment, January 12, 2010. Photo Credit Logan Abassi/AFP/Getty Images. http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/handout-photo-provided-by-the-minustah-mission-on-january-news-photo/104205526

Figure 3: see url http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Haiti-Earthquake/a7c229e15d9a43b4b596ba544515c18b/101/0

Figure 3. *Bodies of earthquake victims lay on a street in Port-au-Prince, Wednesday, January 12, 2010.* Photo Credit Ricardo Arduengo/AP Images. http://www.apimages.com/metadata/Index/Haiti-Earthquake/a7c229e15d9a43b4b596ba544515c18b/101/0

Figure 4: see url https://www.worldpressphoto.org/photo/2011daneilmorelsns1-g1

Figure 4. *People look for survivors after a building has collapsed*, January 12, 2010. Photo Credit Daniel Morel/World Press Photo. https://www.worldpressphoto.org/photo/2011danielmorelsns1-gl

The symbiotic amalgamation of both images and media reports depicted the destruction in Haiti that rendered the country bewildered, overwhelmed, and in need. It must be noted, that these images unfortunately conformed to the historical image of a devastated state. Visual evidence of the effects of the earthquake then served to reinforce an outsider's perspective of the country's tumultuous history. Chaos, rubble, and grief both literally and figuratively permeated Haiti for nearly two centuries. Moreover, these images provide visual evidence of the racial identities of Haitians, particularly capturing blacks amidst the aftermath of the earthquake. This racial identity permeated not only Haitian history and geopolitical policy addressing the country, but also maintained some influence upon the response to the earthquake. These associations of the present reality

with history, served to inform the public and humanitarian aid response. As a result, the structures of aid implicated historical underpinnings and preconceived biases of the country, biases rendered visible in media representations of the disaster.

Thus, geophysical forces caused noteworthy damage in Haiti. Tectonic plate motion rendered visible the consequences of frequent foreign intervention and neoliberal policy. In this way, human processes in history considerably heightened the vulnerability of the country to disaster. On January 12, 2010, human casualties and infrastructure damage literally and figuratively leveled Haiti. The disaster left the island nation imploring for assistance from foreign governments and NGOs. While one must recognize that these actors do necessary, great work, unfortunately the processes employed further perpetuate Haitian dependence. Thus, humanitarianism, not innocent of detrimental effects, became implicated in the aftermath of the earthquake and the development of the country. Scholar Mark Schuller explained this negative feed-back: "In the long-term Haitian people are subjected to foreign intervention that is imperialist and that denigrates so that Haitians are out of the loop and less prepared for the disaster, less prepared for the future, meaning the long term consequences of this exclusion."[163]

Relief After the Earthquake: The Institutionalization of Aid

The earthquake in Haiti and the geophysical forces that caused visible and prominent damage garnered an unmatched response from the international community. An outpouring of private and public donations, organizations, and volunteers flooded the country. With respect to donations, the *Chronicle of Philanthropy* quantified this goodwill, recognizing that "$1.3 billion was contributed by private US citizens to NGOs

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[163] Schuller, interview.

within six months. At a March 31, 2010 UN conference, donors pledged US $10 billion for the long-term response effort…"[164] In addition to the money flowing into Haiti, additional aid organizations arrived after the earthquake, supplementing those already present, to raise the count of documented NGOs within the country to ten thousand.[165] This value fails to take into consideration the plethora of undocumented organizations, leaving the official quantity up for much debate. Nonetheless, the overwhelming amount of aid that entered the country required some order to ensure effectiveness. Foreign humanitarian aid became institutionalized and meant to adhere to a particular predetermined process.

The funneling of humanitarian aid that entered Haiti primarily through private organizations, respectively circumventing local structures, initiated the progression towards institutionalization. Of the relief funds that arrived, the local government received only a trivial sum. Oliver Cunningham quantified this sum as "A meager 1% of all relief funds have gone to the Haitian government."[166] This redirection of funds came as a consequence of external predispositions towards the country. First, histories of foreign domination undermined assumptions of Haitian capabilities. Second, fraudulent acts committed by political leaders in Haitian history only amplified the doubt on the part of foreign actors. Ultimately, this allocation of funds around the government reflected patterns of aid established under the Republic of NGOs. Mark Schuller explained these foreign biases as, "In general… a lack of trust in the government, a historical legacy of a

[164] Mark Schuller, *Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs* (New Brunswick, NJ, 2012), 171.
[165] Cunningham, "The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the Republic of NGOs: The Fallacy of 'Building Back Better," 109.
[166] Ibid., 112.

mistrust of Haiti in particular because of the role they played in ending slavery."[167]

Therefore, the overwhelming majority of aid bypassed the local government, destined for

the pockets of privatized and institutionalized aid organizations. This allocation of funds

in turn distanced Haitians from positions of decision-making or responsibility, positions

central to the rebuilding of a nation. The initial allocation of funds then permitted the

perpetuation of an exclusion of local structures as foreign actors acting upon foreign

policy received financial resources to then dominate the relief effort.

Not only did private agencies receive greater funding, but these foreign actors

also received the tremendous majority of work contracts. As a result, these external

organizations, agencies, and governments took a leading role in the relief effort. Foreign

businesses in the country received significantly more contracts for work than did Haitian

businesses. Reflecting upon this unfortunate reality, Cunningham continued to recount

the proceedings of humanitarian relief after the earthquake, narrating that,

> Shockingly, with the exception of limited efforts by the Clinton-Bush Haiti Fund,
> virtually no aid or reconstruction funds have been allocated to Haitian businesses,
> companies, or local NGOs. Of 1,490 contracts awarded by the U.S. government
> after the January 2010 earthquake until November 2010, only 23 went to Haitian
> companies.[168]

On one hand, the inequitable distribution of work contracts failed to foster the

inclusion of local businesses. A one-sided allocation did not recognize the vibrant agency

within the country. Meanwhile, on the other hand, contracts awarded to foreign

businesses further encouraged the role of these actors. This provision empowered foreign

actors to remain within Haiti in a justified position. An empowerment of the role of

foreign aid was unfortunate to Haiti as this aid promoted foreign policy rather than

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[167] Schuller, interview.
[168] Cunningham, "The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the Republic of NGOs: The Fallacy of 'Building Back Better," 112.

domestic needs. Thus, with both favorable distributions of funding and contracts, the

presence of humanitarian aid organizations skyrocketed. Such an increase in foreign

activity created the need for an organizing body, a need filled by the United Nations.

In Haiti after the earthquake, the United Nations accepted a leading role in

organizing the relief and response effort. Immediately following the earthquake,

President Préval declared a state of emergency.[169] Following this declaration and without

the capacity to respond, the Haitian government required the assistance of the UN and the

United States Military. The United States Military offered assistance with planning and

executing logistics of a timely relief effort.[170] Meanwhile, the United Nations initiated a

process to rebuild Haiti under the guise of institutionalized structures. In full, the United

Nations, created after World War II, maintains a founding principle to "[devise]

cooperative solutions to economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems…"[171]

More specifically, the United Nations offers disaster relief when the necessary response

to earthquakes, floods, disease, and famine surpasses the capacity of the local

authority.[172] In Haiti, with an "empty sack" government augmented by physical

destruction, the needed response far exceeded the means of the local government. As a

result, the United Nations, a foreign institution and global governing body, took a leading

participative role in the aftermath of the earthquake. While the need for this coordination

cannot by denied, the United Nations brought institutionalized models to Haiti.

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[169] Keen, interview.
[170] Ken Keen, Matthew Elledge, Charles Nolan, and Jennifer Kimmey, "Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force-Haiti Observations" *Military Review* (November-December 2010): 86.
[171] Linda Fasulo, *An Insider's Guide to the UN* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 1.
[172] *The United Nations Today* (New York, NY: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2008), 265.

From its conception in 1945, the United Nations continually revised the procedures of humanitarian aid provision. The UN made initial efforts to establish an international humanitarian coordination system with a General Assembly Resolution 48/182 in 1991.[173] While this resolution succeeded in recognizing the centrality of local activity in the relief effort in order to maintain sovereignty, it simultaneously exhibited flaws. This document granted the United Nations responsibility in coordinating relief efforts of the international community, but did not encourage communication and coordination amongst the international actors themselves.[174] As a result of this lack of coordination, the use of this system established by resolution 46/182 revealed many inadequacies. With humanitarian actors often working independently of one another, either gaps in services or overlapping efforts characterized relief efforts. Recognition of these inefficiencies required improvements to predictability, accountability, leadership, and partnership among humanitarian organizations.[175] These improvements looked to ensure need-driven and well-coordinated relief. Thus pitfalls of previous humanitarian relief coordination systems deemed the establishment of the Cluster Approach incredibly necessary.

A recognition of gaps in the coordination of humanitarian relief efforts led to a significant structural reform in 2005.[176] In the 2005 Humanitarian Reform Agenda, the United Nations introduced the Cluster Approach in order to "[enhance] partnerships between UN and other international humanitarian actors, [facilitate] information sharing,

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[173] Neils Scott, *OCHA on Message: The Cluster Approach* (Geneva, Switzerland: The United Nations, March 2012), 1.

[174] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 46/182, 78th "Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations," December 19, 1991, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm

[175] "Cluster Coordination," OCHA, accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination

[176] Ibid.

[improve] predictability of leadership, [limit] duplications and [enhance] coherence."[177] In other words, the Cluster Approach allowed for enhanced communication and coordination amongst humanitarian aid actors to ensure the effective delivering of aid. The work of clusters ranged widely to include the spheres of: Agriculture, Camp Coordination and Camp Management, Early Recovery, Education, Emergency Shelter, Emergency Telecommunications, Health, Logistics, Protection, and Water Sanitation and Hygiene.[178] In Haiti, the United Nations first implemented the Cluster Approach following hurricane seasons. However, after the earthquake, a need for foreign assistance, an incapable government, and an incredible quantity of preexisting organizations in Haiti, caused the United Nations to once again initiate the Cluster Approach on January 15, 2010. Although humanitarian aid was essential and the Cluster Approach set out to effectively coordinate the provision of humanitarian aid, the execution of this approach proved contradictory. The institutionalization of aid undermined Haitian sovereignty and failed to recognize local agency.

Amidst forthcoming identification of the shortcomings of an institutionalized response and subsequent advocacy for the recognition of Haitian agency, one must remain critical of the capabilities of the state and at times acknowledge the need for such a response. Despite the highlighted importance and recommended inclusion of local agency, one must remain critical of Haitian capacity. While advocating for the recognition of informal networks and scenarios of aid deliverance that deviate from institutional models to incorporate preexisting systems within the country, it is important to accept the limitations of the situation in Haiti after the earthquake. With the need to

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[177] Andrea Binder and François Grünewald, *Haiti* (Berlin, Germany: Global Public Policy Institute, 2010), 7.
[178] Ibid., 20.

deliver humanitarian relief resources both rapidly and effectively following the natural disaster, local agency was inadequate. In addition to the devastation of informal networks, the government of Haiti lacked the human and physical capacity to accept sole response responsibility. Although highly criticized and overwhelming at times, an institutional aid response then proved simultaneously imperative. The geophysical expanse and scale of need far exceeded the capabilities of Haitian networks, encouraging a response that required the participation of institutionalized actors.

The Cluster Approach: Camp Coordination and Camp Management Exclusionary Processes

After the earthquake in Haiti, the United Nations implemented the Cluster Approach, a series of particular predetermined protocols for a humanitarian aid response. Despite the goals of this approach, the protocols employed deviated from ideal structures of humanitarian relief work: bottom-up accountability, coordination, and local capacity building. In Haiti, after the earthquake, such an ideal structure of aid would have built upon and coordinated with preexisting systems in the country, prioritizing local needs and efforts over the institutionally identified needs and respective external response. Prior to the earthquake, there existed vibrant local networks and markets to build upon in a response. However, the Cluster Approach often deviated from this possible bottom-up structure of aid through the exclusion of Haitian activity. As a result, institutionalized humanitarian aid began to undermine the country's agency and sovereignty, entangling foreign actors in the conditions following the earthquake, foreign actors that maintained loyalties to foreign policy. While entrenched in this argument, one must remain critical of the plausibility of a locally grounded relief effort. The disaster damaged local networks

and markets, hindering the capabilities of Haitians to lead a relief effort. Nonetheless, humanitarian aid efforts can be held accountable for short-term subhuman conditions, as well as long-term consequences with respect to Haitian development. A critical analysis of these protocols and systems renders visible the human processes in the heightened devastation after the earthquake.

To this end, structures of the Cluster Approach, a result of an institutionalization of aid, caused greater exclusion of, rather than cooperation with, local actors. This exclusion hindered the empowerment of Haitian agencies. The Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster (CCCM) unfortunately served as a quintessential example of the exclusion of the local voice. First and foremost, this cluster had only one lead agency, the International Organization for Migration, an intergovernmental organization. Therefore, structurally, abdicating this power to a foreign organization, the CCCM excluded Haitians from roles of leadership and decision-making. A synthesis of personal interviews, meeting notes and agendas, and reports on the conditions in camps further renders visible exclusions and fallacies of this Cluster Approach in Haiti. Unfortunately, in consequence of these fallacies, the majority of Haitian citizens suffered in subhuman conditions and the Haitian state struggled to gain sovereignty.

To begin, the CCCM deterred Haitian participation by making it difficult to gain access to cluster meetings and thus excluded local actors from partaking in rebuilding efforts. Mark Schuller attended six CCCM cluster meetings and explained the steps needed to gain access to these exclusive conversations. In an interview, Schuller bluntly stated, "the very first exclusion took place in the checkpoint."[179] Here, those wishing to

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[179] Schuller, interview.

enter the military base needed to provide either a passport or a visa. Schuller continued, showing the inconsistencies and biases of this requirement,

> To prove a point, I went through the checkpoint not having my passport twice. To prove that I didn't need to… If you have a white SUV that has a NGO plate on it and you honk the horn… the driver talks to the people, you are more likely to be let in. But the people walking around, in mototaxis and motorcycles get stopped by the troops. So it is very much a class thing…[180]

In addition to what Schuller described as a scene rooted in class, racial exclusions also seemed to permeate cluster proceedings. Vehicles identified the clout of relief workers, distinguishing foreign actors from local participants. A white SUV granted Schuller access, while those using local means of transportation such as mototaxis and motorcycles were denied entrance into the base. Schuller easily entered meetings without question, despite failing to prove his identity with a passport. However, Schuller explained that military guards simultaneously forbade a very high-level Haitian government agent from entering without a passport.[181] Therefore, as a result of these conscious distinctions made by UN workers to refuse entrance to Haitians or others assumed to be Haitian, relief excluded voices with respect to class and racial assumptions. Foreign biases and procedures favored the participation of external actors while excluding Haitian voices. The CCCM cluster approach then literally excluded and discounted local knowledge and political networks. Therefore, procedures put in place just to gain access to CCCM cluster meetings immediately limited those capable of partaking in important conversations and decisions.

Further, the CCCM conducted meetings in English, establishing a language barrier that favored foreign actors and excluded local participants. Schuller continued to

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[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid.

describe these coordination meetings saying "Once you get to Log Base, meetings were held in English, which is another exclusion because…it is the common language of foreign humanitarianism and not the language of Haitian people. So literally it is a language of excluding people."[182] Most Haitians speak either French or Creole. These local actors then could not listen to dialogues about the distribution of aid or enhance these dialogues with knowledge of local needs. Meetings held in English not only made humanitarian efforts less effective, but also reinforced the governance and leadership of foreign actors.

The leadership of foreign actors in the institutionalized humanitarian effort, as well as in the CCCM cluster in particular permitted a top-down accountability structure to influence relief efforts. The location and language of humanitarianism that followed the earthquake limited access for Haitians to important deliberations. Subsequently, external non-governmental organizations and foreign governments narrated the relief effort. These actors influenced allocations of aid, allocations that met the needs of donors, national leaders, and outside decision-makers. With these actors in a leading role of the relief effort, foreign aid was not immune to foreign policy. Therefore, those making decisions were not those receiving the aid. Deliberations ignored Haitian infrastructure, pre-existing systems, and local needs. This ignorance proved counter-productive. Idyllic conversations such as the following did not occur: "Here is what we know, but you are the one that is local. What are the needs? What do you need us to do? What are your priorities?"[183] As a result, the dominance of foreign actors in conversations about the

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[182] Ibid.
[183] Ibid.

rebuilding of Haiti reinforced the position of the country as a subordinate, passive, dependent nation.

This dominance proved extremely detrimental to the effectiveness of aid. Different constituencies maintained different perspectives of reality. Humanitarian relief efforts shaped by foreign actors cannot fully understand the priorities, needs, and values of the local population.[184] These foreign actors can aim to understand the realities of Haitians, "but there will always be distortions."[185] In other words, external perspectives with a unique conditioning, different from that of the local, can never fully understand the Haitian reality. As such, CCCM cluster meetings that excluded and thus discounted Haitian voices and knowledge risked the effectiveness of aid provision. Moreover, the filters of foreign perspectives hindered an acknowledgement of dissimilar cultural processes. The conception of reality in the global North differs from the concept of livelihood, survival, and an informal sense of employment in other regions. Without participation of Haitians, non-Haitians underestimate these unique local characteristics and the agency of the population.[186] After the earthquake, as an institutionalized humanitarian response fell subject to these ills, relief efforts failed to recognize and reinforce local agency.

The Cluster Approach: What are the Consequences?

Scholars informally address the Camp Coordination and Camp Management cluster as Camp Management, intentionally failing to acknowledge the responsibility of

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[184] Chambers, *Whose Reality Counts: Putting the first last*, 162.
[185] Ibid., 163.
[186] Ibid., 173.

coordination.[187] The lack of participation of local actors suggests a greater sense of management by foreign actors than coordination with Haitian representatives. Discounting local knowledge and customs at the benefit of top-down accountability structures, held unfortunate consequences for conditions within the camps. Haitians could not voice local needs or priorities. Decisions and processes then reflected donor protocols, expectations, and foreign policies. Conditions within IDP camps remained significantly below UN established adequate standards of living. Moreover, major gaps arose in the services provided amongst the camps. This ironic reality problematized the institutionalized humanitarian aid response after the earthquake and shed light upon the implications of foreign dominated systems within Haiti.

First, the CCCM cluster failed to equitably ensure the provision of potable water and sanitation to IDP camps throughout the country. Months after the earthquake, a significant portion of camps still lacked access to potable water. To be specific, seven months after January 12, 2010, 40 percent of camps did not have water.[188] According to the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) guidelines on the Guiding Principles of Internally Displaced People, "At the minimum, regardless of the circumstances, and without discrimination, competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to… potable water."[189] Therefore, conditions within the camps failed to meet predetermined standards defined by the United Nations. An irony then became apparent as the institutionalized humanitarian response

[187] Valerie Kaussen, "State of Exception- Haiti's IDP Camps," *Monthly Review* (February 2011), 38.
[188] Mark Schuller, "Unstable Foundations: The impact of NGOs on human rights for Port-au-Prince's 1.5 million homeless," *Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti*, October 4, 2010, http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Report-unstable-foundations-final-2.pdf.
[189] United Nations, Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, September 2004, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GuidingPrinciplesDispl.pdf

inadequately provided goods and services, but an inadequacy according to self-made guidelines. This irony rendered visible the warped accountability structure that dictated Haitian relief and left many living in subhuman conditions. Without access to the CCCM cluster, local actors could neither report the realities within camps or voice needs to improve the post-disaster environment.

With respect to sanitation, an insufficient and inequitable dispersion of latrines and cleaning services made visible fallacies of a foreign dominated relief effort similar to those of potable water provision. The reports compiled with respect to sanitation in IDP camps were unfathomable. According to Sphere Standards, a compilation of minimum standards for humanitarian responses according to humanitarian actors, IDP camps should maintain a ratio of twenty people to one toilet or latrine.[190] However, realities within the camps gravely deviated from this ratio as within Port-au-Prince an average of 273 people shared one toilet.[191] In addition, 30 percent of all camps did not have toilets of any form .[192] The lack of coordination led to incredible gaps in the latrines provided amongst the camps. For example, at the Solino IDP camp, a camp for approximately six thousand displaced Haitians, "residents had to wait almost five months for the first toilets to arrive."[193] The absence of latrines, belittled residents to subhuman levels, "forcing them either to hold it and walk some 10 minutes away to an overused latrine across the ravine or to relieve themselves in a bag and throw it in the ravine."[194] Unfortunately,

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[190] *Haiti: Where Did the Money Go*, directed by Michele Mitchell (Film at 11, 2012), DVD.
[191] Mark Schuller, "Haiti's Bitter Harvest: the NGOization of Humanitarian Aid." In *The Golden Fleece: Manipulation and Independence in Humanitarian Action,* ed. Antonio Donini (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2012), 188.
[192] Schuller, "Unstable Foundations: The impact of NGOs on human rights for Port-au-Prince's 1.5 million homeless."
[193] Ibid., 11.
[194] Mark Schuller, "Shattered and Scattered: Haiti's Earthquake within the Lens of Human Rights," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 43, no. 5 (July-August 2010), 21.

Solino was not an anomaly. Therefore, without access to local perspectives, conditions within the IDP camps suffered. Foreign actors focused more intently upon the promotion of their respective goods and services rather than the real needs of the displaced Haitian population. As a result, CCCM meetings could not problem solve without an awareness of the problem.

Inadequate conditions extended beyond potable water and sanitation to include the adequacy of the shelter itself within the IDP camps. The CCCM cluster held responsibility for the provision of tarps or tents. However, the cluster did not execute a sufficient or uniform provision of such goods. Amongst an estimation of 1.3 million Haitians displaced immediately after the earthquake, only 10 percent of families in the camps had a tent, the remaining population residing in IDP camps slept under tarps or bed sheets.[195] Tents provided privacy, but more importantly security from looters and disease. While the lucky 10 percent of families received tents, many of these tents themselves proved unable to weather Haiti's climate. Not only did they rip easily in the wind, but also, the material itself trapped the tropical heat.[196] According to Schuller and his fellow researchers, "in at least one camp, Noailles, the researcher estimated that almost all the children had a rash on their bodies because of the heat that is trapped inside tents…"[197] Therefore, conditions within IDP camps continued to contribute to prolonged devastation among Haitians. Incongruences between institutionalized humanitarian aid and local needs hindered the effective provision of shelter to IDP camps.

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[195] Schuller, "Unstable Foundations: The impact of NGOs on human rights for Port-au-Prince's 1.5 million homeless", np.

[196] Schuller, "Shattered and Scattered: Haiti's Earthquake within the Lens of Human Rights," 20.

[197] Schuller, "Unstable Foundations: The impact of NGOs on human rights for Port-au-Prince's 1.5 million homeless," 10.

Finally, gaps within services permeated the accessibility of displaced Haitians within camps to essential medical services. In addition to establishing expectations for sanitation, the United Nations Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement further includes that "competent authorities shall provide internally displaced persons with and ensure safe access to essential medical services…"[198] However, despite this principle, "Only one camp in five [had] any sort of clinic facility on-site."[199] Camps densely populated and with pools of standing water saturating the small pathways amongst tents served as breeding grounds for disease and sickness. Therefore, the presence of health clinics and medical services was imperative to prevent further sickness and death after the earthquake. With respect to medical facilities, the failure of the humanitarian aid response extended beyond the shear quantity of clinics. Despite the fortune of few camps to have on-site medical centers, the quality within these camps proved extremely unsatisfactory. Amongst his observation of IDP camps, Schuller came across a clinic within camp Carradeux. "A tent was provided by UNICEF that [resembled] a clinic, but it was completely empty: no medicines, no first aid supplies, and no nurse practitioners…"[200] Without basic and crucial medical resources, health within IDP camps suffered. The lack of local actors detached foreign providers of humanitarian aid from a sense of accountability and responsibility to the Haitian population. A foreign dominated relief effort then held significant implications for the conditions, often described as subhuman, within IDP camps.

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[198] United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement."
[199] Schuller, "Unstable Foundations: The impact of NGOs on human rights for Port-au-Prince's 1.5 million homeless," 14.
[200] Ibid.

Amidst this analysis of the material distribution of goods and services, one cannot disembody aid, but rather, must recognize that people influenced foreign aid distribution. Aid happened through people, human actors made decisions with respect to the allocation of aid. NGOs such as Christian Aid, Habitat for Humanity, Red Cross, and Mercy Corps, to name a few, participated in the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster.[201] These organizations determined the allocation of temporary shelter with respect to the communicated locations and quantities of relief delivered by fellow NGOs. Leaders within the organization, donors, and government representatives made such allocation decisions. NGO and foreign aid theory included within Chapter 2 demonstrated that these decision makers maintained loyalties to foreign institutions, governments, or motives. Humans are then implicated in the prioritization of foreign benefits and the subsequent subordination of Haitian needs. The central role of people in the allocation of relief services further linked human processes to the aftermath of the earthquake.

Therefore, the unsatisfactory conditions succeeding the disaster perpetuated the devastation of the geologic event. One Haitian forced to reside in an IDP camp reflected upon life within the camp and the treatment of displaced peoples by foreign actors, saying "They treat us like animals'… 'Worse! Animals live better than us'."[202] Realities within the camps fostered continued suffering beyond January 12, 2010, augmenting initial calculations of loss and destruction. Limited access to potable water, unhealthy sanitation conditions, insecure and scarce shelter provisions, and inadequate medical services all contributed to this amplification. As the months passed and Haitians

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[201] Inter Agency Standing Committee. Haiti E-Shelter. CCCM Cluster. "Cluster Meeting," December 2, 2011, http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/jl/pdf/Shelter_CCCM_Cluster_Minutes_021211_english.pdf.
[202] Mark Schuller, "Cholera and the Camps: Reaping the Republic of NGOs," in *The Idea of Haiti: Rethinking Development,* ed. Millery Polyné (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 187.

remained in IDP camps people found dead after the earthquake elevated from initially

45,000 to an astounding 316,000.

The Cluster Approach: Lack of Recognition of the Local

Without representation of the Haitian administration within CCCM cluster

meetings, participating foreign actors discounted local knowledge, customs, and systems.

Local business and markets often remained external to the shelter rebuilding effort.

However, even after devastation of an earthquake, Haiti maintained a noteworthy and

incredible agency. Upon arriving in the country, Thomas Craemer explained what he saw

as a "beehive of activity. You saw people going about their business and removing rubble

and making their homes and engaging in informal markets. It was an extremely active

country."[203] A lack of coordination and communication with local actors discounted this

agency. The importance of local participation and the recognition of local activity did not

infiltrate into the mindset of foreign actors. As a result, a subsequent close-minded model

for relief and rebuilding impeded upon the development of Haitian sovereignty.

Institutionalized humanitarian aid operated within formal markets. However, Haiti

is a unique country in that it does not prescribe to the Western market model. Compared

to the majority of foreign actors who operate economically through formal markets,

within Haiti "90% of the total labor market comprises the informal market."[204] Despite

the destruction, even after the earthquake, this informal market remained active. On his

visit to Haiti in March, academic Thomas Craemer observed the liveliness and visibility

[203] Thomas Craemer, interview by author, January 15, 2014.
[204] Thomas Craemer, "Racial Stereotypes in US News Coverage of the 2010 Earthquake in Haiti" (University of Connecticut, 2013), 17.

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of this activity. He recounted in a personal interview, leaving the airplane and taking in

the capital city:

> The streets were lined with informal markets where you could buy absolutely everything, vendors running around, people buying and selling… and that included construction materials that were manufactured by the side of the road… there [were]… columns, embellished concrete, where you could see the workers on the side of the street filling wooden forms with cement and concrete and then… putting them in these forms out to dry…and you'd see pickup trucks come by and buy a few columns for their own construction. And you'd drive by construction sites where you would see homeowners with columns like that and they were putting them in.[205]

From this account, it becomes apparent that activity within Haiti continued after

the earthquake. Agency is particularly evidenced by instances similar to those described

by Thomas Craemer of informal labor. Geophysical devastation did not hamper

movement. Amidst streets lined with rubble, citizens continued to participate in economic

and material exchanges. The manufacturing of concrete columns revealed the inventive

and resourceful nature of the people. Instances of the exchange of goods and services

displayed continuing market activity. Both vendors and consumers remained active in the

local market. Vendors resumed business despite the devastation, providing needed goods

for the reconstruction process. Concrete columns, while only a sliver of the informal

market, were central to the rebuilding of destroyed homes. Thus, despite arguments to the

contrary, agency existed in Haiti. Media depictions of devastation and stagnation belie

ongoing efforts of Haiti to rebuild.

To move Haitians out of IDP camps, new shelters needed to be built. An

incorporation of the local economy with the required goods would not only support this

initiative, but would do so in a sustainable manner, by supporting local industry and

business. However, such investments were discouraged under a top-down accountability

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[205] Craemer, interview.

structure. As a result, Haitians had to endure subhuman conditions within the camps for a prolonged duration. But more, the local informal economy did not receive a potentially large humanitarian investment. While participating in relief work in Haiti with the organization Partners in Development, Thomas Craemer recounted having permission to purchase construction supplies solely from the formal market:

> When we were buying construction materials, buckets for concrete mixing, or something like that, we had to go to a business of the formal economy simply because as an aid organization we needed a receipt and a receipt is important to show that the money was spent for the right purposes.[206]

Therefore, systems of upward accountability undermined an investment in the Haitian informal economy. Nonetheless, local efforts existed, displaying Haitian agency and domestic structures that remained unincorporated into the humanitarian response. Thus, formal markets progressed while informal markets, vital to Haitian development, were majorly ignored.

Moreover, the institutionalized humanitarian response failed to repair local agricultural systems destroyed by the earthquake. Many IDP camps failed to provide sufficient food to refugees. In a documentary "Where Did the Money Go", Michele Mitchell asked the questions: "why did so much money buy so little relief? And why are many still living in squalor?"[207] Mitchell, the director recognized that despite the availability of an incredible sum of aid, a half million people remained in camps, camps that displayed subhuman living conditions.[208] Thus, this film sought to unearth how and where funds were squandered. On one of two visits to Haiti, Mitchell met Wilma Vital.

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[206] Ibid.
[207] "Haiti: Where Did the Money Go?" Film at 11, accessed February 24, 2014,
http://www.filmat11.tv/projects/haiti-where-did-the-money-go/
[208] Ibid.

Vital lived in camp Toussaint L'Ouverture with her daughter, still an infant. During this encounter, Mitchell found both Wilma and her daughter malnourished, living off of insufficient rice rations.[209] This reality revealed top-down decision making structures within cluster meetings that resolved to import American grain and rice for IDP camps rather than empower local agricultural systems.[210] American grain and rice provided insufficient nutrition to camp residents. Haitians like Wilma were left malnourished, reliant upon a nutrient-poor diet. Particularly for growing children, rice proved incredibly incongruous to a healthy childhood. But more, the outsourcing of food aid perpetuated historically similar programs implemented within Haiti. This solution filled the pockets of external actors, while also establishing an unsustainable solution that circumvented pre-existing Haitian agricultural systems. Schuller observed this provision, critiquing conversations in CCCM cluster meetings. Here, proper questions were not asked to address the distribution of nutritional goods in camps. He explained,

> A concrete manifestation of the humanitarian impulse for others that you have this unsustainable expensive system that could be captured by a lead and that could be mismanaged… and the easier option would have been just to repair what was already there. Similarly like how to get your food, there was definitely a need for food assistance, how do you do that?... Could they have done it in such a way that they could have bought from Haitian farmers and relaunched and revitalized the peasant economy.[211]

In this passage, Schuller critically questioned the structures of food assistance, imploring for the revitalization of local agriculture and economy, but his tone simultaneously recognizing the possible limitations of these networks. Schuller seemed to pose a rhetorical question, asking if Haitian farmers even had the capacity to independently supply the relief effort. While it remained essential to repair what

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[209] *Haiti: Where Did the Money Go*, directed by Michele Mitchell (Film at 11, 2012), DVD.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Schuller, interview.

previously existed, what previously existed alone could not have sufficiently supplied the demand. However, despite this identified need for external support, such support should not have completely excluded preexisting systems, but rather worked to buttress what Schuller identified as the peasant economy. The relief effort chose not to employ the work of local farmers to supply the demand for food, failing to leave room for alternative visions of aid. Haiti remained dependent upon foreign actors. Institutionalized aid structures and subsequent solutions perpetuated the external domination of the rebuilding of Haiti. As a result, those excluded from this rebuilding, local pre-existing systems, remained undermined and disempowered.

Thus, the dominant voice of NGOs and foreign country leadership influenced how aid looked after the earthquake. Under the coordination of the UN Cluster Approach, the CCCM excluded local actors vital to the rebuilding effort. Without access or the ability to participate in meetings, Haitians could not integrate local knowledge, systems, or markets into the top-down institutionalized humanitarian response. Haitian agency was noteworthy and active after the earthquake. Yet, external actors failed to acknowledge what already existed. Dominant foreign voices introduced costly, unsustainable fixes rather than empowering pre-existing processes. As a result, in the short-term, an overwhelming quantity of the Haitian population left homeless were forced to reside in IDP camps that Mark Schuller described as simply "subhuman."[212] In the long-term, an ignorance of local efforts further perpetuated foreign dependence, undermining the development of Haitian sovereignty. The circumvention of local efforts necessitated the perpetuation of foreign intervention that historically dominated the county.

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[212] Ibid.

Chapter Conclusion

Therefore, in this chapter, the theoretical framework comes together with on-the-ground examples of humanitarian relief aid to argue that humanitarian relief while necessary, compounded loss and undermined Haitian development following the earthquake. The subhuman realities within IDP camps and the work of the CCCM cluster demonstrated skewed systems of aid. The devastation from the earthquake exceeded any capabilities of the local infrastructure and government. Without local resources or administrative capabilities immediately following the disaster, non-governmental organizations and foreign governments filled a significant void. The resources made available by foreign actors far surpassed the capabilities of the country alone. However, a critique of this foreign arrival must simultaneously accompany the acknowledgement of the good of humanitarian aid, offering a "yes, but" argument to a complex dilemma. Therefore, one must ask, how could the humanitarian aid response have gone well?

Since independence foreign activity dominated domestic affairs in Haiti. For nearly two centuries, external actors determined the political and economic structures within this "independent" Caribbean country. Haiti was founded upon French conditions in 1804, subsequent to a historical foreign presence throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and rightfully named the "Republic of NGOs". The country offers not only a history, but also a present reality dictated by foreign actors. The evolving identity and form of foreign intervention and activity in Haiti did not cease after the earthquake, but only amplified. The institutionalized humanitarian response, coordinated by the United Nations and structured by the Cluster Approach caused foreign actors in unmatched numbers yet again to descend upon the country. However, this inundation of

not only foreign aid but also of subsequent foreign policy, established processes that despite altruistic motives ironically furthered the level of devastation within Haiti.

An aid response led by non-Haitian agencies and voices excluded the participation of those closest to the atrocity. Structural and procedural protocols hindered the accessibility of crucial conversations in the rebuilding effort to Haitians. The exclusion of Haitian government officials, businesses, and citizens unfortunately held grave implications for those finding refuge in IDP camps after the earthquake leveled homes across the country. Within the CCCM cluster, an inequity in power, as well as an inability to communicate needs between actors dispersing goods and those passively receiving such aid hindered the effective distribution of humanitarian relief. As a result of this exclusion in the CCCM cluster, the conditions of IDP camps suffered. Haitians left homeless after the earthquake, lived in unsanitary, insecure, and significantly under-sourced environments. Displaced peoples were forced to endure unbelievable realities, realities that demonstrated the fallacies of the Republic of NGOs and foreign aid. The absence of local knowledge from cluster meetings rendered these subhuman conditions unrepresented and unsolved. The Cluster Approach then exemplified and reinforced a theoretical understanding of aid. Dominant foreign actors and non-governmental organizations influenced by subjective motives implicated themselves in the scale of the disaster and the unfortunate livelihood of hundreds of thousands of Haitians after the earthquake.

However, the implications of a foreign-led disaster response were not isolated within the camps. Haiti faced larger issues as the country looked to rebuild its infrastructure, reestablish its government, and repair its image as a sovereign,

independent nation. Thus, while NGOs and foreign countries began to rebuild the nation physically, these actors also began to rebuild the nation figuratively, a process detrimental to the future of Haiti. The relief effort, titled by the international community as "building back better" symbolized the guidance and determining power of external actors. These actors literally gave a title to the relief effort, robbing Haitians of the agency to redefine and rebuild their country. Therefore, the presence of foreign actors following the earthquake continued to govern Haitian development. Without sovereignty, the presence of external actors not only proved detrimental to the conditions within Haiti, but also to the future of the country in years to come. A problematization of the humanitarian response thus challenged the work of foreign actors to recognize the evident and visible Haitian agency, agency that deserved respect, recognition, and participation in the rebuilding of the country.

CHAPTER 4

Cholera: An Ironic Opportunity for Haiti

Chapter Overview

In the final days of October 2010, Haitians took to the streets. Protests broke out in the town of Mirebalais and soon progressed into the north of the country. Jonathan Katz, an AP reporter on assignment in Haiti described a scene in which "Furious men pummeled aid stations with rocks and Molotov cocktails, burning tires and slashing clinic tents… Now the anger seemed ready to boil."[213] Dr. Louise Ivers served as a Senior Health and Policy Advisor for Partners in Health, a Clinical Director and most recently, as the Chief of Mission for Partners is Health in Haiti from 2003 until 2012. In an interview, Dr. Ivers recounted "people writing in Haitian Creole, 'down with the UN'…"[214] These outbursts of anger, directed towards the UN presence within Haiti escalated on October 29, when "hundreds of protesters marched from Mirebalais to the Nepalese base carrying tree branches, banners, and Haitian flags" chanting "Like it or not, the UN must go."[215] Poignant protests implored for the departure of foreign actors from Haiti. The United Nations, which had long maintained a peacekeeping presence within the country and embodied the frontline of humanitarian aid, had come to represent the polar opposite. Blue helmets adopted a new, deleterious significance.

Months after the 7.0 magnitude earthquake shook Haiti to its core, in early October, Haiti experienced yet another defining moment in its tumultuous, foreign-dominated history. In bitter irony, UN MINUSTAH troops responsible for the mission of holding peace within the nation, instead initiated unmatched domestic turmoil. Nepalese

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[213] Jonathan Katz, *The Big Truck that Went By* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 232.
[214] Dr. Louis Ivers, interview by author, February 3, 2014.
[215] Katz, *The Big Truck that Went By*, 233.

troops arriving in Haiti on October 9, 12, and 16 unknowingly carried along with their luggage, the *Vibrio cholera* bacterium, a strain of the cholera bacteria originally found in eastern Asia.[216] Conditions after the earthquake left the country particularly vulnerable to the unimpeded spread of disease from rural to urban settings. The reality of disrupted water and sanitation systems, overcrowded camps, and often-nonexistent health care provision not only problematized, but also revealed the limits of a foreign-dominated humanitarian response. Sickness proliferated across the country, resulting in upwards of 658,563 confirmed cases of cholera as of June 2013.[217] Foreign aid to Haiti directly undermined the wellbeing of the country and its people. Therefore, this chapter argues that humanitarian relief ironically created a new crisis in Haiti. However, amidst widespread death and loss, this chapter argues that a particular response to the disease pointed the way towards an accountable system of relief that encouraged local participation and thus recognized Haitian agency, an important step in the building of national sovereignty and capacity.

As days passed from the time of the initial outbreak and more intelligence became available, an understanding of the preliminary cause of the epidemic came to directly implicate foreign actors in the arrival of the bacteria. Therefore, in October of 2010, the intervention of outsiders that for years permeated Haitian history, wrote yet another unfortunate chapter in the complex story of the nation. This chapter begins by delving into the cholera epidemic within Haiti. A synthesis of media accounts revealed the information and reactions in the early days of the epidemic, as the country dealt with

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[216] Ibid., 230.
[217] Richard Getling, Katherine Bliss, Molly Patrick, Gabriella Lockhart, and Thomas Handzel, "Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Haiti: Past, Present, and Future," *The American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 89, no. 4 (2013): 665.

widespread confusion and fear. With this context, the chapter then briefly regresses to

unearth the disease's symptoms as well as the conditions conducive to its spread.

Next this chapter builds off of a long-term theme in Haitian history of foreign

intervention, investigating not only the initial introduction of the disease, but also the

conditions that existed within Haiti prior to the outbreak of cholera that fostered the

disease's rapid diffusion. First and foremost, the arrival of cholera directly implicated

outsiders in another simultaneous disaster within Haiti. Secondly, both historical

processes and the humanitarian response to the earthquake made the country particularly

vulnerable to the subsequent spread of disease. Prior to the earthquake, Haiti suffered

from a lack of access to potable water and sanitation infrastructure. A compilation of

reports by the United Nations, the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP), and

a presentation by a Haitian government agency, the National Directorate for Potable

Water and Sanitation (DINEPA) provided statistics about pre-existing access to basic

services. Moreover, after the earthquake, conditions throughout the devastated country

and within IDP camps only amplified Haitian vulnerability. Therefore, conditions within

Haiti prior to the arrival of cholera, elucidated the insufficient infrastructure within the

country due to the state's inability to provide public services, and thus the debilitating

reliance on inadequate institutionalized humanitarian aid.

This chapter then concludes with an in-depth analysis of the Water, Sanitation,

And Hygiene (WASH) Cluster, a humanitarian response to the cholera outbreak that

offered a hopeful, new model for aid. The WASH cluster received praise for its unique

structure that encouraged the participation of local Haitian citizens and infrastructure.

The empowerment and participation of the DINEPA combined with an improved

accessibility to meetings facilitated sustainable improvements to conditions within Haiti.

As a result, the work within the WASH cluster not only curtailed the scale of loss due to

cholera, but also, more importantly, built the capacity of local government

administrations to hopefully accept exclusive future responsibility. I suggest that the

adherence to ideal humanitarian relief structures not only ensured an appropriate response

to disaster, but also presented an instance of hope for the sovereignty of the country

amidst a climate of fear and loss. Therefore, the work within this cluster to respond to

the cholera epidemic empowered preexisting Haitian institutions and infrastructure,

ultimately offering a new model of humanitarianism that pointed towards a future that

recognized and incorporated the country's agency.

Thus, while the cholera outbreak in Haiti brought incredible devastation to a

population already recovering from loss, this epidemic simultaneously illuminated points

of optimism in the revision of historical patterns of foreign intervention and the

establishment of Haitian sovereignty. To respond to the water, sanitation, and health

needs of Haitians, the country looked outwards, to foreign actors, seeming to suggest a

continued pattern of historical foreign intervention and domination of domestic

processes. However, the structures subsequently employed in the provision of these

services suggested otherwise. The implementation of theoretical humanitarian aid

strategies seemed to usher in a promising paradigm for the rebuilding of nation. Finally, it

seemed, aid began to empower local institutions, consequently substituting Haitian

agency and infrastructure for the work of foreign actors. Robert Chambers identified this

process as "putting the first last and the last first."[218] By "putting the first last and the last

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[218] Robert Chambers, *Whose Reality Counts?: Putting the first last* (London, UK: ITDG Publishing, 1997), 2.

first," multilateral agencies, international NGOs, and senior decision makers residing in foreign countries make way for the participation and empowerment of NGOs and government agencies of globally southern, underdeveloped, and impoverished countries like Haiti.[219]

Cholera in Haiti: Fear and Confusion

In October of 2010, a strain of cholera, *Vibrio cholera*, arrived in Haiti, initiating an unmatched scale of loss and fear. Three years after its arrival, cholera can be credited with the death of 8,111 Haitians and the reported infection of 658,563 citizens.[220] With these numbers, Haiti quickly became the country with the leading number of cholera cases, a title not to be championed.[221] Prior to 2010, cholera had infiltrated the Western hemisphere and countries of Latin America. However, the island of Hispaniola luckily remained isolated from these epidemics. As a result, "Haiti had never seen the bacteria before, [and] the population had no immunity against it. It bred prolifically, among the population and in each person it infected."[222] Without immunity or protection, cholera then swept across the country. Moreover, without prior exposure to cholera, a disease to which incredible quantities of citizens fell ill, Haiti became enveloped in a climate of fear. Anxiety and confusion characterized the country. Dr. Louise Ivers who was present in the country at the time of the outbreak, described the outbreak in that,

> It was really dramatic, and therefore very frightening, especially if you don't have any cultural experience of it. So you can imagine, just suddenly every single adult

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[219] Ibid., 210.

[220] Getling et al., "Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Haiti: Past, Present, and Future," 665.

[221] United Nations in Haiti, "Cholera in Haiti: An End in Sight," December 2013, https://haiti.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/UNhaitiCholeraBrochure20131216low.pdf.

[222] Katz, *The Big Truck that Went By*, 223.

person getting sick. People dying and not having any idea what or where it was coming from or how it spread or who had participated in it. So there was fear initially, which is somewhat expected in such a circumstance.[223]

The immediacy and expanse of such grave death rattled local logic. With the arrival of the disease and the fear described by Dr. Ivers, Haiti experienced yet another traumatic event that perpetuated the country's unfortunate history of human-made disasters. Amidst the recovery from a debilitating earthquake, Haiti experienced yet another disaster. While the earthquake and the cholera outbreak remained distinct incidents that cannot be directly linked, the reoccurrence of similar themes in a shared setting furthers critiques on humanitarian aid. The cholera outbreak served as the bitterest example of a relief effort.

Media reports coming out of Haiti after the outbreak of the epidemic further recounted the frantic scenes across the country, as victims received needed care in health centers and attempted to make sense of an unknown illness. In the first days of cholera at St. Nicholas Hospital, located in the Artibonite region where the outbreak first began, "500 people flooded in Thursday night with symptoms of cholera and a further 437 came in Friday morning…"[224] With this overwhelming inundation of patients, hospitals became chaotic silos of care. One reporter at St. Nicholas Hospital described that "Hundreds of patients lay on blankets outside…with IVs in their arms for rehydration."[225] Unfortunately, such a scene was not unique to this hospital. Another article coming out of Haiti reported commotion as "Medical staff rushed about to diagnose and treat more than

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[223] Ivers, interview.

[224] Becky McKay and Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, "Cholera Found in Haiti's Capital" *Wall Street Journal*, October 23, 2010, accessed January 15, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303738504575567882252623198

[225] Anonymous, "Haiti Disease Outbreak Kills Dozens," *Wall Street Journal*, October 21, 2010, accessed January 15, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304023804575566631692962708

80 people with oral rehydration salts and intravenous fluids…"[226] Thus, in the days immediately following the outbreak, already derailed from the aftershocks of an earthquake, Haiti began to deal with yet another challenge amidst the rebuilding of the country.

Cholera, a dangerous bacterial infection can cause rapid death amongst patients of all ages. Initially after infection, symptoms do not seem extremely abnormal, characterized by upset stomach, diarrhea, or a fever.[227] However, if left untreated, the symptoms of cholera can quickly worsen. Rapid dehydration can make victims unable to stand or eat, symptoms quickly followed by death.[228] The World Health Organization (WHO) articulates the dangerously swift nature of the disease in an institutional definition of cholera, stating: "Cholera is an acute diarrhoeal disease that can kill within hours if left untreated."[229] Once the bacterium is present within a region, inadequate water and sanitation conditions make populations and areas particularly vulnerable to the spread of the disease. Dr. Ivers explained "Cholera is a disease that is spread from largely contamination of water supplies, more rarely from direct person-to-person transmission.[230] As a result, countries with damaged or insufficient water and sanitation systems, such as Haiti are increasingly susceptible to waterborne illnesses like cholera.

Within Haiti, the conglomeration of many unfortunate factors caused a previously unmatched scale of atrocity. The death toll and instances of sickness grew

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[226] Ingrid Arnesen and Mike Esterl, "World News: Haiti Struggles to Contain Cholera," *Wall Street Journal*, October 28, 2010, accessed January 15, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303443904575578772971099344.

[227] D. Sontag, "In Quake-Crippled Haiti, Capital Braces for a Cholera Outbreak," *New York Times*, October 25, 2010, accessed January 13, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/world/americas/25haiti.html?_r=0.

[228] Katz, *The Big Truck that Went By*, 232

[229] "Cholera," World Health Organization, last modified 2014. Accessed January 15, 2014. http://who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs107/en/index.html

[230] Ivers, interview.

rapidly and to incredible heights in the days following the outbreak. The arrival of

cholera made the country, yet again, susceptible to a human-made disaster. The epidemic

represented a specifically paradigmatic example of foreign intervention gone awry.

Therefore, cholera in Haiti only further reflected the unfortunate theme and consequences

of intervention that began after independence and continued beyond the earthquake, a

theme that appeared for so long to ignore local agency and hinder the development of

country's sovereignty. With a particular focus upon the presence of foreign actors within

Haiti and the implications of this presence on the unraveling of the disaster, it becomes

pertinent to explore how the bacteria arrived in the country and the conditions that

fostered the spread of the disease

Cholera in Haiti: A Perpetuation of the Fallacies of Foreign Aid

Foreign actors within Haiti proved detrimental to the wellbeing of the nation and

the local citizens. Outsiders arriving in new locations often suffer from a potentially

harmful, yet unavoidable, naivety. In particular, within Haiti, foreigners lacked

knowledge of the local infrastructure, language, and lifestyles, such as the reliance upon

the public water supply that characterized daily activities for most residents. This lack of

knowledge was indicative of a longer-term pattern of behavior throughout the country's

history. Therefore, regrettably, months after the earthquake, this presence continued to

undermine the health of Haitian citizens and the development of the nation's agency.

In October of 2010, international UN peacekeeping troops became directly implicated in

the health of the country. These UN peacekeeping troops, also known as the

MINUSTAH, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, arrived in 2004, after a

coup that overthrew Jean-Bertrand Aristide. With an unstable political climate, the

peacekeeping mission placed "Chileans in the Haitian north, Sri Lankans covering the

southeast, Brazilians running much of the capital, and so on."[231] Since this period of

Haitian history, the MINUSTAH has remained in the country amidst times of peace and

turbulence. This continued presence, without regard for necessity, garnered some critical

reactions. Dr. Ivers provided a narration of this occupation, questioning motives. She

noted that "[the] UN did surge soldiers that were there because of the earthquake in an

effort to try and repair some of the physical infrastructure things…[Yet] they are there to

provide security, and they are there to provide security in a country that doesn't have any

conflict."[232] In other words, the troops served as a visible representation of foreign

intervention, with little regard for the domestic political climate. This presence then

epitomized the consequences of humanitarian aid, a form of historical foreign

intervention within Haiti.

Although on an institutionally launched mission, these troops continually

undermined Haitian sovereignty. Katz reflected this understanding of the MINUSTAH

throughout Haitian development, writing, "…the UN peacekeeping mission was the

vanguard of international aid and relief in Haiti- the most visible emblem of the

international presence in the country."[233] Therefore, the presence alone of MINUSTAH

troops served to visibly, undermine the movement towards a self-agent and sovereign

nation of Haiti. Amidst times of peace the blue helmets remained omnipresent. Beyond a

literal presence, the maintained occupation figuratively suggested mistrust in the

capability of local governance and in the pacific population. In such a way, the United

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[231] Katz, *The Big Truck that Went By*, 224.
[232] Ivers, interview.
[233] Katz, *The Big Truck that Went By*, 225.

Nations furthered a pattern within the nation's history of foreign intervention, an intervention often lacking respect for the Haitian context or conditions. Unfortunately, the perpetuation of this pattern incurred new consequences upon the vulnerable nation in early October of 2010 with the arrival of cholera.

During this time, a new contingent of MINUSTAH troops arrived in Haiti. This unit, as a group of outside actors, prompted an unfamiliar consequence of the foreign presence upon the health of the island nation's population. These actors initiated yet another human-made disaster through the introduction of a disease to which none of local residents had immunity. This introduction literally endangered the entire population to sickness and death. Specifically, this unit of peacekeeping troops arrived in Haiti on October 9, 12, and 16 respectively. Given these dates, the members of the unit were in Nepal during a cholera outbreak and thus exposed to the bacteria.[234] Once at the MINUSTAH base within Haiti, broken sewage drainage from the camp where Nepalese troops resided funneled contaminated waste into the nearby river. According to Benny Avni, a reporter for *Newsweek Global*, the cholera epidemic began in the following way:

> Several independent epidemiological reports concluded that the Nepali peacekeepers infected with a strain of cholera prevalent in south Asia and found specifically in Nepal's Katmandu, but never seen in the Western Hemisphere, contaminated a river near their MINUSTAH camp.[235]

Thus the lack of knowledge of these foreign actors held grave consequences for the local Haitian population. The insufficient sanitation conditions at the Nepalese camp permitted the entrance of human waste into the Meye Tributary or the Artibonite River.[236]

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[234] Ibid., 230.

[235] Benny Avni, "Did the U.N. Herald a New Age of Cholera?" *Newsweek Global*, November 1, 2010, accessed January 15, 2014, http://mag.newsweek.com/2013/11/01/u-n-herald-new-age-cholera.html.

[236] Dr. Alejando Cravioto, Dr. Claudio Lanata, Daniele Lantagne, and Dr. G. Balakrish Nair, *Final Report of the Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti* (United Nations Independent Panel,

Moreover, this proved to be an incredibly unfortunate location for the bacteria as the Artibonite River, "the most important river in the nation had become an artery of disease."[237] Haitians relied on the river for bathing, washing, cleaning, drinking, and cooking and often did not treat the water prior to use.[238] As foreigners, MINUSTAH troops lacked reverence for the significance of this water supply, an unintentional yet detrimental ignorance of outsiders. As a result, cholera spread easily and rapidly amongst the Haitian population. A peacekeeping mission paradoxically killed thousands and infected hundreds of thousands of citizens. The presence of outsiders weakened the country to the ramifications of a cholera epidemic. Cholera then, represented a specific, yet tremendous tragedy that reinforced the previous instances of botched intervention. A critical analysis of not only the literal arrival of the disease, but also the conditions of preexisting infrastructure that aided in the spread of cholera further problematizes the structures of foreign activity and humanitarian aid in a figuratively empty nation.

Poor sanitation and potable water provision, while particularly prevalent after the earthquake, dates back to the early 1900s, when poor water quality initiated the spread of disease and health concerns within the country.[239] Foreign assistance began to participate in the improvement of sanitation and water conditions within Haiti under Jean-Claude Duvalier. Duvalier recognized these poor conditions during his rule and coupled with the simultaneous opening of the country to foreign actors, sought outside assistance to improve sanitation and water systems projects in the 1980s.[240] However, political turmoil

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May 2011), 23, accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf

[237] Katz, *The Big Truck that Went By*, 232.
[238] Ibid., 223.
[239] Getling et al., "Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Haiti: Past, Present, and Future," 666.
[240] Ibid.

and violence that plagued the final years of the regime delayed foreign efforts, hampering the timely completion of improvement plans.[241] International donors and agencies hesitated to invest in a country amidst an unstable and unpredictable political climate. Therefore, given the lack of capacity of the Haitian government and infrastructure, leaders were forced to reach beyond national boundaries to improve conditions within the country. Yet, the failure to completely improve infrastructure revealed early signs of detrimental foreign intervention. External actors adopted domestic responsibilities, making the country vulnerable to the consequences of current humanitarian aid structures that often prioritized donor accountabilities and ran parallel to Haitian infrastructure or agencies. As a result of this Republic of NGOs that began in the late twentieth century, Dr. Louise Ivers explained decades later, that Haiti still "[had] so many baseline needs."[242] Specifically, the combination of deficient local systems with unreliable foreign aid, impeded the access of Haitian citizens to potable water and sanitation. Moreover, the earthquake in 2010 and the further arrival of external actors only further threatened access to potable water and sanitation services.

The unsatisfactory conditions within Haiti prior to the introduction of the bacteria into the Artibonite River amplified the scale of the epidemic. Poor water and sanitation infrastructure particularly aided in the spread of the bacteria throughout the country. First, sanitation infrastructure within Haiti was almost nonexistent, an absence that gave way to the rapid dispersion of cholera outward from the Artibonite region.[243] Several reports reveal this absence. At the time of the outbreak of the epidemic, the Ministry of Public Health and Population reported that 83% of the Haitian population had no access to

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[241] Ibid., 667.
[242] Ivers, interview.
[243] Avni, "Did the U.N. Herald a New Age of Cholera?", 2.

adequate facilities for human waste.[244] The Haitian population in both rural and urban areas displayed an inaccessibility to adequate facilities. To this end, "[access] to improved sanitation is low even in urban areas at 24%..."[245] Meanwhile, in rural regions of the country an astounding 43% of residents did not have access to any form of sanitation service.[246] Therefore, the poor sanitation conditions throughout the country that predated the cholera outbreak created the unluckily ideal environment for the wide spread of the disease.

In addition to lacking a sanitation infrastructure, prior to the arrival of cholera, Haiti suffered from poor accessibility to potable water. According to Dr. Ivers, "Very few people [had] access to potable water. Haiti [scored] very low on a list of access to potable water."[247] According to a United Nations report, "it was estimated in Haiti that 50% of urban residents and 30% of rural residents had no access to potable water…"[248] With this lack of potable water infrastructure, Haitians relied heavily on the country's river system. As previously mentioned, the river contaminated by the cholera bacteria proved central to operations within Haiti, providing residents with a resource for drinking, washing, cleaning, and waste disposal.[249] To quantify this reliance, prior to October 2010, 1.5 million people depended on the Artibonite River for these activities. Further, a Center for Disease Control (CDC) survey showed that nearly two-thirds of this population did not

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[244] Republic of Haiti. Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP). National Directorate for Water Supply and Sanitation (DINEPA). *National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti 2013-2022*, February 2013, http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=20326&Itemid=270&lang=en, 3.

[245] Getling et al., "Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Haiti: Past, Present, and Future," 665.

[246] National Water and Sanitation Directorate (DINEPA), *Challenges and Progress on Water Sanitation Issues in Haiti*, June 1st, 2012, accessed January 21, 2014, http://onetable.crs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/pres-water-toussaint.pdf

[247] Ivers, interview by author, February 3, 2014.

[248] Republic of Haiti. MSPP. DINEPA, *National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti 2013-2022*, 6.

[249] United Nations in Haiti, "Cholera in Haiti: An End In Sight," 15.

treat the river water before drinking.[250] Extrapolating from graphic data provided in the

National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti, the Artibonite and the central

departments of Haiti displayed the greatest deficiency in the level of access to running

water. As a result, the departments consequently had two of the highest incidence rates of

cholera between 2010 and 2013, with 8 percent and 10 percent respectively.[251] Data then

showed a direct correlation between potable water accessibility and an incidence of

cholera.

Finally, fears of the spread of disease rose tremendously given the subhuman

conditions that characterized IDP camps succeeding the earthquake. Standing water,

densely populated living quarters, and an absence of sanitation and potable water made

these environments particularly vulnerable and subsequently exposed to the spread of

disease. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, conditions within the camps did not meet

the minimum requirements established by the Sphere Standards. The United Nations

reported that only 11 formally registered camps had waste management systems,

providing for only 4 percent of the total population within the camps.[252] In early

November, a *New York Times* article reported that "A cholera outbreak that had been

largely confined to the countryside [had] begun to spread in the teeming capital filled

with overcrowded, unsanitary earthquake survivor camps, prompting authorities on

Tuesday to brace for a more sever epidemic…"[253] Death and sickness in the camps that

lacked latrines and running water abound with standing water, became an unfortunate

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[250] Katz, *The Big Truck that Went By*, 223.

[251] Republic of Haiti. MSPP. DINEPA, *National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti 2013-2022*, 12.

[252] United Nations in Haiti, "Cholera in Haiti: An End In Sight," 29.

[253] Randal Archibold, "Cholera Moves Into the Beleaguered Haitian Capital," *New York Times*, November 10, 2010, accessed January 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/10/world/americas/10haiti.html?_r=0.

common reality throughout the devastated country. The conditions within the camps then again implicated the botched systems of aid predicated by the work of foreign actors. A lack of local knowledge and the maintenance of upward accountability served detrimental to water and sanitation conditions for many displaced Haitians, making this population particularly susceptible to the spread of disease. Thus foreign intervention once again played a hand in a Haitian disaster, as the widespread proliferation of cholera can be attributed to human-made processes.

The absence of government capacity and preexisting systems made the Haitian population particularly vulnerable to the spread of disease. Emerging from decades of political turmoil and weak leadership, public infrastructure and institutions to provide goods and services to citizens were either non-existent or severely insufficient. Thus, it would be inaccurate to dismiss the role of the Haitian government wholly in predicating conditions for the spread of cholera. However, the government may not be the only actor culpable for this vulnerability. The Haitian history of political turmoil and weak leadership maintained a cyclical cause-effect relationship with external actors. Either in recognition of the needs of Haitians or in response to requests for assistance, foreign governments and humanitarian aid organizations entered Haiti. Warped systems of accountability favoring donors and bypassing the needs of local citizens hindered the construction of required infrastructure improvements. This foreign intervention and the adoption of Haitian administrative responsibility impeded upon the reconstruction of the country's agency. Therefore, in addition to the serving as the carrier of the bacteria into the country, foreign actors played a leading role in augmenting the preexisting vulnerability of the Haitian public, and ultimately in the largest cholera epidemic to be

recorded both temporally and spatially worldwide. However, born out of utter tragedy and loss, the WASH cluster seemed to exemplify a model for humanitarian relief efforts.

The WASH Cluster: The Recognition of Haitian Agency

Despite the disastrous impact of the cholera epidemic in Haiti, the WASH cluster not only efficiently worked to lessen the impact of the disease, but also pointed the way towards effective models of humanitarian aid that may indicate greater agency for the country in the years to come. With an epidemic developing, this cluster set out to repair and improve the preexisting, largely ineffective, water and sanitation infrastructure. The incorporation of a Haitian government agency, as well as the incorporation of local participation and knowledge made efforts extremely timely and successful. This cluster, then offered a new model for relief work, fulfilling ideal downwards accountability schemes and coordination with resident authority. While this cluster seemed to rectify dominant upward accountability and an ignorance of Haitian agency, greater improvements can still be made and challenges to this solution remain. Nonetheless, much must be said for the instructive example of the WASH cluster in response to an unmatched disaster in Haiti.

Prior to the arrival of the WASH cluster and subsequent aid organizations, the country suffered from poor sanitation and water provision. However, in the early years of the twenty-first century, the nation underwent a series of reforms, displaying an internal effort to enhance conditions within the country, and more importantly exemplifying local agency. Such local agency was visible in 2009 when the Haitian parliament voted into

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law the reform of the water and sanitation sector of the country.[254] This reform not only

came from the identification of continually unsatisfactory conditions, but also from the

fragmented, unregulated, and poor coordination amongst aid providers.[255] Thus to curtail

these inadequacies the reform of 2009 "created a regulatory body, the National

Directorate for Potable Water and Sanitation (DINEPA), and laid out its organizational

structure, as well as its funding evaluation and control mechanisms."[256] In other words,

Haiti established an institution, the DINEPA, a government agency, to better coordinate

domestic efforts with those of foreign actors. This institution then provided some

oversight and direction for aid entering the country to improve sanitation and water

provision.[257] Thus, the reform put a domestic government organization in the role of

regulation, monitoring, and development, revealing local agency and infrastructure of

Haitians to confront poor water and sanitation conditions. This reform then demonstrated

the initial steps taken by the hampered island country towards establishing domestic

capacity prior to the earthquake.

Nonetheless, the earthquake in January 2010 threatened to disrupt the reform and

the small effort towards Haitian sovereignty. As the effects of the earthquake further

damaged already inadequate infrastructure, foreign actors yet again infiltrated the country

to improve local conditions. Therefore, to better coordinate these efforts in the days

following January 12, 2010, as previously mentioned, the United Nations instituted the

Cluster Approach. While many clusters ineffectively orchestrated and coordinated relief

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[254] Getling et al., "Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Haiti: Past, Present, and Future," 667.
[255] Republic of Haiti. MSPP. DINEPA, *National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti 2013-2022*, 17.
[256] Getling et al., "Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Haiti: Past, Present, and Future," 667.
[257] Republic of Haiti. MSPP. DINEPA, *National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti 2013-2022*, 17.

efforts, the WASH cluster stood as an exemplary model. Improving conditions both in rural and urban areas, this cluster heavily worked to integrate local infrastructure, fostering Haitian participation. Unique characteristics of this cluster that made such participation possible included the nominations for lead cluster agencies, the locations of the cluster meetings, and the language of the cluster meetings. As a result, the WASH cluster reinforced Haitian agency and encouraged the growing capacity of local efforts. The dominating presence of foreign actors in the rebuilding of the nation seemed to be dissipating, making way for the development of national infrastructure and agency.

First, the WASH cluster made an innovative yet necessary movement, establishing the DINEPA as a co-lead agency, pairing with UNICEF, a United Nations organization. Previously the WASH Cluster had "not always been coordinated with Haitian government entities, such as DINEPA and MSPP, or local municipalities."[258] The MSPP is the French acronym for the Ministry of Public Health and Population. As the title of the agency suggests, the responsibilities of this ministry include but are not limited to implementing public health and population policies, regulating both public and private institutions working in these fields, and participating in the writing of related legislation.[259] However, deviating from previous models and criticisms of the WASH cluster, this new approach served to include preexisting infrastructure in the cluster system, an inclusion that became increasingly significant with the cholera outbreak in October of 2010.

After the outbreak, WASH cluster organizations rushed yet again to Haiti. More than 100 organizations arrived to aid in the effort to protect the Haitian population from

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[258] Getling et al., "Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Haiti: Past, Present, and Future," 668.
[259] La Ministere, *Ministere de la Santé Publique et de la Population*, accessed March 1, 2014, http://mspp.gouv.ht/newsite/?page_id=15.

cholera, organizations that included CARE, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and PAHO to name a few. This overwhelming inundation then required organization and effective management in order to ensure an applicable and constructive response. Notably, this response empowered and incorporated the DINEPA. As a co-lead, the DINEPA received registration, legal documents, and descriptions for all projects pursued under the WASH cluster.[260] This submission process directly included Haitian agencies in the rebuilding process As a result projects were accountable to local institutions, allowing the DINEPA, a Haitian agency, to gain knowledge of domestic proceedings and a respective authority. Therefore, Haitian agencies adopted a central participatory role in the redevelopment of local infrastructure. The WASH cluster looked different as terms not often used to characterize relief efforts in Haiti, such as synergy and intersectional action, could then accurately describe the response of this cluster. These terms recounted the more beneficial total effect of collaborative work between Haitian agencies that offered local knowledge and international humanitarian aid organizations that provided resources and funds. Thus, this cluster illuminated a hopeful movement in the trajectory of foreign intervention in relief efforts.

In addition to the integration of a Haitian administration as a co-lead, WASH cluster meetings encouraged local participation. First, the locations of the meetings made these important dialogues accessible to Haitians. Uniquely, WASH cluster meetings were held outside of the UN Logistics Base, taking place instead in city halls.[261] This location then, symbolically combatted exclusivity that characterized the meetings of other

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[260] Dirección Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement (DINEPA). "WASH Cluster Sanitation Transition Strategy: Temporary Sites (Camps) & Return/Relocation Areas," April 23, 2011, file:///Users/lucybrennan/Downloads/MemoWASHCluster_StrategieTransition-Assainissement_2011-04-23v1%20(2).pdf.
[261] Schuller, interview.

clusters. In city halls and on a departmental level, the Haitian population theoretically, had an easier time becoming involved in decisions and conversations. Dr. Louise Ivers, who attended many cluster meetings after the cholera outbreak explained that these meetings, had a "different tone."[262] With a government member as a cluster lead, in charge of the meetings held in accessible locations, the WASH cluster fostered local coordination and utilized this opportunity to recognize local voices or needs. At one WASH cluster meeting, the Haitian president himself was present in order to assure the clearance of certain NGO goods through customs to make them accessible to the population.[263] Other Haitians present at the meetings also included representatives and coordinators of regional outposts of the WASH cluster.[264] Thus, although there currently remains a lack of evidence of participation of individual Haitians, these meetings became open forums for more location-specific conversations and bottom-up systems of accountability.

Moreover, WASH cluster meetings were often not held in English, a language that characterized not only the meetings of other UN clusters, but also humanitarian aid itself. Instead, the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene cluster conducted meetings largely in a mixture of French and Creole, using English sparingly.[265] French grounds language more in the Haitian context than does English. Yet, not all Haitians speak French, while all Haitians are fluent in Creole.[266] Nonetheless, these improvements continued to encourage clear, two-way communication between aid workers and the local population, a

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[262] Ivers, interview.

[263] Ibid.

[264] Dirección Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement (DINEPA). "Notes de la Reunion Pleniere du Cluster WASH," August 12, 2011, http://www.dinepa.gouv.ht/wash_cluster/index.php?option=com_rokdownloads&view=file&Itemid=41&id=1549:wash-cluster-notes-reunion-wash-cluster-12-aout-2011.

[265] Ivers, interview.

[266] Ibid.

communication that proved integral to effective aid deliverance. Mark Schuller reflected

upon this communication, stating in an interview: "The communication of needs and

resources, and the priorities of resources, is the most important of communication."[267]

Basic procedures implemented by the WASH cluster immediately curtailed exclusivity,

improving the accessibility of decision-making processes, and thus fostering coordination

with local infrastructure and civil society. Therefore, these procedures recognized

preexisting Haitian institutions and acknowledged local agency.

The WASH Cluster: Bearing Fruits of Coordination

Given these structures that encouraged cooperation with Haitian agencies,

response programs to cholera within the WASH cluster positively reflected the

integration of local infrastructure. This integration was constructively implicated in the

subsequent fostering of Haitian participation and the respective building of agency as the

country continued to rebuild after the earthquake. By combining Haitian knowledge with

foreign resources, projects served those in need, rather than those in positions of

power.[268] With the clear articulation of these needs, actors within the WASH cluster

efficiently communicated and organized the provision of goods and services. As such the

DINEPA accepted leading responsibilities on projects to deliver potable water, as well as

improve sanitation conditions. In this way, previously unrecognized Haitian

infrastructure not incorporated into relief efforts became an integral actor, directly

coordinating with the United Nations and the wealth of NGOs responding to the outbreak

of cholera.

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[267] Schuller, interview.
[268] Robert Chambers, *Whose Reality Counts: Putting the first last* (London, UK: ITDG Publishing, 1997), 205.

First, collaboration occurred between the United Nations, UNICEF, and the

DINEPA, the Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable, a Haitian government agency, to not

only respond to the needs illuminated by the epidemic, but also to build Haitian capacity.

Notes from a WASH cluster meeting reported that UNICEF delivered desludging trucks

to the DINEPA.[269] With this delivery, UNICEF equipped the DINEPA with the necessary

resources to have the capability to improve sanitation conditions, curtailing the spread of

cholera. Therefore, the transfer of trucks from an institutional actor to a local agency

subsequently transferred responsibility to the Haitian government. Moreover, this cluster

report detailed efforts of both UNICEF and the DINEPA to establish at a minimum, 50

Water Kiosks throughout Port-au-Prince to distribute free, clean water to local residents.

Beyond the Water Kiosks, DINEPA further established a partnership with city

governments to distribute aquatabs and soap at schools and camps.[270] As a result of these

programs in partnership with the UN and respectively affiliated agencies, the DINEPA

became incorporated into efforts to improve the provision of potable water, another

important task when responding to an outbreak of cholera. This incorporation ensured

benefits that were two-fold. First, the participation of local knowledge guaranteed that

humanitarian relief efforts appropriately responded to the needs of Haitian citizens

following the outbreak. But more, coordination between UNICEF and preexisting local

infrastructure in the DINEPA promoted the development of Haitian capacity, an integral

step towards Haitian sovereignty.

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[269] Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Cluster. "WASH Cluster National Sit-Rep #1- Cholera Response-Haiti," November 29, 2010, http://haiti.humanitarianresponse.info/Default.aspx?tabid=83&language=en-US.

[270] Ibid.

In addition, further coordination occurred between NGOs and Haitian agencies. After the outbreak, the Ministry of Public Health and Population, the MSPP, outlined a National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti. The compilation and subsequent recognition of this plan demonstrated the involvement of yet another Haitian agency in the Cholera humanitarian response. In this plan, the ministry established that "the NGOs will continue to provide their services within the framework of Haitian laws and in line with MSPP and DINEPA directives."[271] By establishing this procedure, the Ministry of Public Health and Population required that activities of the WASH cluster in response to the cholera epidemic must work within preexisting systems. As a result, NGOs could not create a parallel structure for service provision, but rather were forced to collaborate and coordinate with Haitian agencies. For example, given this prerequisite, the Red Cross collaborated with "WASH and Health partners to provide a temporary trucked chlorinated water supply to facilities in the affected areas and communities in flooded zones."[272] With this effort, the provision of potable water to affected regions of the country, once again, involved local actors in the response effort. These local actors included Haitian government agencies. As such, this participation proved historically significant, deviating from parallel structures of aid that dominated Haitian development for nearly two centuries. Further, working under Haitian systems also ensured that NGO activity suitably fit the needs of the local population. The Ministry of Public Health and Population recounted that "with technical support and guidance from DINEPA, [NGOs] established more than 11,000 water points, carried out more than 400 drillings, and

[271] Republic of Haiti. MSPP. DINEPA, *National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti 2013-2022*, 48.
[272] Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene Cluster. "WASH Cluster National Sit-Rep #1- Cholera Response- Haiti."

repaired nearly 100 potable water supply systems.[273] Therefore, the WASH Cluster

encouraged participation not only between institutions such as the United Nations and

Haiti, but also between the plethora of humanitarian aid organizations within the country

and local administrations, organizations that otherwise threatened and undermined the

country's sovereignty.

Praise for the efforts of the WASH Cluster is well deserved not only on behalf of

the effectiveness of relief aid, but also on behalf of building local capacity. With a well-

coordinated response to cholera, UNICEF, the DINEPA, the MSPP, and supporting

NGOs reduced the number of cases each month from a daunting 84,391 at the outset of

the epidemic in October of 2010, to 6,305 new cases in November of 2013. The fatality

rate also respectively dropped from 2.2% in October of 2010 to 1.2% in November three

years later.[274] These numbers are surely telling of the accomplishments of the

institutionalized humanitarian response. Structural characteristics of the WASH cluster

propelled sanitation and potable water provision forward, mitigating the damage caused

by the arrival of cholera into Haiti. More importantly, the procedures within the WASH

cluster also propelled the infrastructure of Haiti towards building capacity, and

respectively, towards building sovereignty.

Through coordination with preexisting infrastructure and local knowledge, the

WASH cluster began a transition of power from the historically dominant foreign actors

to local Haitian administration. While the WASH cluster cannot erase the debilitating

history of the country, it can serve as a hopeful model for similar efforts. Nonetheless,

this new distribution of authority ushered in recognition of Haitian agency, previously

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[273] Republic of Haiti. MSPP. DINEPA, *National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti 2013-2022*, 34.
[274] United Nations in Haiti, "Cholera in Haiti: An End In Sight," 8.

unacknowledged by foreign aid. Humanitarian relief theory recognizes that the

international aid community is best suited to build the capacity of the state in order to

empower local administration for further development.[275] Building capacity then entails

creating, strengthening, or maintaining programs through the commitment and

involvement of local government administration or infrastructure. Only through this

process, will the government adopt rightful responsibility and capability to progress as a

sovereign state.[276] As a result, the nation can begin to gain agency. However, in Haiti this

transition proved to be a daunting task, often derailed by foreign actors failing to

coordinate with Haitian administration.

Work within the WASH cluster stands as an exemplary model. Haitian officials

recognized in the National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera that "the contributions of

NGOs to the provision of health services in Haiti [are] very important. However, the

Government will take steps to ensure that they are well integrated into the public health

system in order to support long-term objectives."[277] In 2011, the total number of NGOs

within this cluster exceeded 100, including Oxfam, Save the Children, World Concern,

Plan Haiti, Pure Water for the World, and Samaritan's Purse. The National Plan for the

Elimination of Cholera represented the initiative taken by local institutions to shape the

response to the cholera epidemic. In particular, Haiti itself stressed the need for a bi-

national response, with Haiti providing leadership and foreign actors providing needed

resources. Through this model the long-term capacity of the DINEPA water and

sanitation provision improved, ensuring a durable, sustainable solution extending beyond

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[275] Jean-Germain Gros, *State Failure, Underdevelopment, and Foreign Intervention in Haiti* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 188.

[276] Roger Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 370.

[277] Republic of Haiti. MSPP. DINEPA, *National Plan for the Elimination of Cholera in Haiti 2013-2022*, 5.

the cholera outbreak.[278] While such a model is imperative in any humanitarian response effort, it proves increasingly so in Haiti.

Historical patterns of foreign intervention predated the outbreak of cholera, particularly during the Republic of NGOs and succeeding throughout the earthquake response. This domination of foreign actors respectively sidelined Haitian institutions and undermined Haitian agency. Therefore, the cholera outbreak, yet another human-made disaster, offered a chance to begin to rewrite a story of debilitating foreign aid that permeated the country's history. Ascribing to previous models would only serve to perpetuate the unfortunate reality through which Haiti suffers. However, the deviance from this model displayed by the WASH cluster offered a hopeful paradigm of development. This sustainable, participatory, and accessible model displayed a new path for similar efforts in the years to come, optimistically pointing to signs and directions ahead for the sovereignty of the nation.

Chapter Conclusion

Ironically, humanitarian relief within Haiti following the earthquake caused the cholera crisis and necessitated further humanitarian intervention. Despite this unfortunate reality, this chapter argued that the WASH cluster implemented a paradigm of aid that aligned with theoretical models of downwards accountability and the incorporation of local institutions, enabling a sustainable and effective response to an otherwise crippling disaster. For Haiti, this model held significant importance as an instance of empowerment of local agency, sovereignty, and capacity. Weakened by an earthquake, Haiti faced yet

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[278] DINEPA, "WASH Cluster Sanitation Transition Strategy: Temporary Sites (Camps) & Return/Relocation Areas."

another challenge in October of the same year. An epidemic quickly hospitalized citizens seeking medical treatment for an unknown disease, later identified as cholera. Sickness and death across the country reached unmatched quantities. These numbers not only represent lost mothers, fathers, children, friends, and community members, but also signify the consequences of botched foreign intervention. First, paradoxically, institutional United Nations MINUSTAH troops, responsible for maintaining peace, brought a strain of the bacteria to the island country. The introduction of cholera rapidly initiated yet another wave of chaos throughout the nation. Fear, confusion, and illness characterized the country still deeply entrenched in a rebuilding effort. Without previous exposure to the disease, Haitians lacked immunity, a reality that amplified the impact of cholera. Therefore, the way in which cholera arrived in Haiti directly implicated institutional humanitarian actors. Foreign actors, then, became incriminated in the sickness and death that continued to batter an already debilitated country.

In addition, while it would be unfair to completely ignore the absence of Haitian infrastructure prior to the outbreak, one can also recognize the implications of historically predicated foreign intervention in the unsatisfactory water and sanitation conditions predating the arrival of cholera within the country. The inability of the country to address the substandard provision of services left leaders requesting foreign aid. Even prior to the earthquake, this aid encountered difficulties to effective provision. Efforts to improve preexisting systems remained after the earthquake, continuing to be lead by foreign actors, perpetuating the role of foreigners in the rebuilding of the island nation. However, as was the reality prior to the earthquake, these efforts met significant challenges to deliver sanitation and potable water infrastructure to those in need. These challenges left

Haitians across rural and urban regions of the country, as well as within IDP camps, extremely vulnerable. As a result, conditions within Haiti prior to the arrival of the cholera bacteria created the ideal environment for the spread of waterborne diseases.

However, in the midst of tragedy and widespread devastation initiated in 2010, the humanitarian aid response to cholera pointed towards an empowering new direction for the country. The recognition of Haitian agency within the WASH cluster initiated a new phase of institutional humanitarian relief, a phase to build Haitian capacity. In response to the epidemic, the WASH cluster, a sector of institutional humanitarian aid took innovative steps. While other clusters ignored local coordination and subsequent local knowledge, the Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene cluster worked directly with pre-existing Haitian institutions. Through co-leadership, meeting accessibility, and linguistic accessibility, local voices could articulate needs, influencing the appropriation of services. Thus, a country historically lacking sovereignty, leadership, and independence gained responsibility in the sustainability of improvement projects. The involvement and subsequent ownership allowed the country to build capacity. Haiti could gradually begin to shed this debilitating and counter-productive reliance on foreign actors. Although further sweeping transformations remained necessary to rectify dominant upward accountability structures and foster more expansive local participation, the work of this cluster offered a beacon of hope for the future of Haiti.

Thus, while the cholera epidemic literally impaired the Haitian citizens, the disease simultaneously worked to abandon the country's crippling dependence upon foreign intervention, beginning a movement towards long-overdue sovereignty. Histories of foreign occupation, foreign exploitation, and foreign dominance plague the country.

An empty sack of a government not only encouraged, but also required the continued presence and assistance of foreign actors. With an earthquake and a cholera epidemic, it seemed as if the country would only continue to develop within the limits and visions of foreign actors. However, the WASH sector served as a point of optimism. Local coordination and capacity building moved this sector of Haitian administration in a desirable direction. The rebuilding of infrastructure under the guide of the DINEPA "puts the last first," initiating a unique instance of abandonment of historical foreign domination on behalf of the development of the country's long-awaited sovereignty.

CONCLUSION

This thesis critically analyzed the 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti, demonstrating that natural disasters are not truly natural. Rather, historical, economic, cultural, and political processes imbricate a human influence in a "natural" disaster. This "natural" disaster garnered heightened attention as the scale of loss and damage that ensued far surpassed earthquakes of the similar magnitude in other countries. Scenes of fear, grief, loss, and overwhelming rubble streamed out of the country for months and years following January 12, 2010. The incredible devastation raised questions and doubts in the minds of Haitians, as well as in the minds of many outsiders, as to why Haiti? Why did the country seem to endure unequaled, extraordinary ruin? What enabled a 7.0 magnitude earthquake to affect unfathomable desolation to the small island country? Thus, can this disaster be considered truly natural, or were other processes, human processes to be exact, at play?

Through a lens of historical, environmental, economic, and political fields of study, this thesis argued amongst its various forms, that foreign intervention- colonialism, imperialism, military occupation, foreign aid, and humanitarian relief- within Haiti exaggerated the scale of disaster. Building on this basic postulation, this thesis then contended that this foreign intervention gave external actors political and ideological influence during the development of Haiti, denigrating the agency of the country, hindering the building of local capacity and sovereignty, and necessitating further forms of aid. For Haiti this proved a detrimental cycle for the future of the country. The interchangeable nature of foreign aid and foreign policy compounded by the manipulation of altruistic acts of humanitarianism by donor policy contradicted

philanthropic relief. As a result of these botched systems of aid, not only did the Haitian population fail to receive the appropriate goods and services to efficiently recover from disaster, but also the country remained in a position of dependence.

While past and present governance of Haiti deserved a portion of responsibility for the aftermath of the earthquake, a history of crippling foreign intervention warranted an overwhelming share of the burden. Greedy, mercenary motives and foreign policy guided foreign activity within Haiti for centuries. French colonialism gave way to American imperialism, which evolved into neoliberal intervention. Ultimately, this intervention justified an unbelievable inundation of foreign aid and non-governmental organizations to deliver humanitarian relief. Behind all of these forms of interventions lie humans; people with connections to institutions promoting particular motives and prescriptions for change, that further donor, political, economic, cultural, or ideological demands. Yet theoretically, such decisions ought to be made on behalf of the benefit of the impoverished population of Haiti lacking basic goods and services. As a result, foreign actors dominated the development of Haiti for nearly two centuries. Human processes intercepted the building of local capacity and sovereignty, acting rather on behalf of subjective gains. Therefore, with this theme of external activity permeating the country's history, one can rightfully question: how much independence did Haiti truly gain following 1804 and how was this then implicated in the scale of devastation caused by the earthquake?

The earthquake in January of 2010, as well as the outbreak of cholera in October of the same year, illuminated the relationship between foreign intervention and foreign aid. The astounding images and accounts of loss rendered visible the ironic consequences

of external domination and saturation of the country's past and present development. Humanitarian and foreign actors became directly implicated in the crisis. Days following the earthquake, Haitians pulled loved ones out from the rubble of collapsed buildings. Cries of sadness filled the streets along with rooftops, toppled houses, and the population milling about in shock and confusion. Unfortunately, even as time passed, this atmosphere of devastation did not. Moreover, following the outbreak of cholera, accounts of overcrowded chaotic hospitals and mourning Haitians existed throughout the country. For many observers, these scenes served as a wake-up call to the debilitating long-term effects of colonialism, imperialism, globalization, neoliberalism, and paradoxically foreign aid. Nonetheless, a frightening reality remained as many NGOs and multinational agencies carried on with business as usual. Entrenched in systems of upward accountability, loyalty to donors, and a prioritization of domestic needs rather than beneficiary needs, foreign actors remain detrimental to the wellbeing of Haiti and similar countries.

Four years removed from the earthquake, significant work still remains. Since January 12, 2010 little rubble can be seen on the streets and most former inhabitants of IDP camps now reside in some form of shelter.[279] This progress does acknowledge the role of NGOs to provide needed goods and services to the population, a role that the Haitian government proved incapable of fulfilling. Nonetheless, the remaining 150,000 residents in camps, many who continue to lack water and electricity, offer a competing conclusion.[280] The suffering that persists within camps years after the disaster implores for amendments to foreign aid, and particularly humanitarian relief efforts. First, this

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[279] "Four Years After Earthquake, Many in Haiti Remain Displaced," Peter Granitz, *Weekend Edition Sunday*, aired on January 12, 2014, on NPR.
[280] Ibid.

reality begs for reflections upon historical implications of foreign intervention. Countries with a similar history to that of Haiti, like Jamaica, exist in an analogous position of vulnerability.[281] Exploitation and domination of domestic affairs by foreign actors place these countries unjustly at the mercy of demands from more economically powerful nations. Second, prolonged subhuman conditions appeal to current humanitarian aid practices. As the quantity of NGOs remains high throughout the global community, these providers of foreign aid remain in positions to affect positive change by improving the welfare and livelihood of suffering populations. However, the performance of an overwhelming sum of non-governmental organizations in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti challenged this hope. Skewed systems of aid served donors rather than the recipient population. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Haitians lived through subhuman conditions despite an incredible outpouring of private and public relief efforts. Therefore, through a case study of the earthquake in Haiti, this thesis revealed the implications of foreign activity and humanitarian aid in a "natural" disaster.

Yet, amidst overwhelming cynicism and frustration, this thesis concluded by pointing the way toward an accountable, sustainable system of relief. Through the response to cholera, a bitterly paradoxical humanitarian crisis, this thesis argued for aid that incorporates local participation, recognizes preexisting agency, and builds local capacity. For Haiti and other similar nations, these structures initiated a deviation from a demeaning and debilitating history of foreign intervention. The efforts and structures exemplified by the WASH cluster offered a new model for humanitarian aid. This model, while only embodying a small portion of humanitarian activity within a country entrenched in consequences of historical foreign intervention, offered a hopeful way

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[281] *Life and Debt*, directed by Stephanie Black (Tuff Gong Pictures, 2003), DVD.

forward. Through the recognition of preexisting agency and the respective incorporation of this agency, foreign aid under the WASH cluster prioritized local needs. Not only did the work of this cluster then address the epidemic in a timely manner, but also began to empower Haitian institutions. This paradigm of aid initiated a new phase in the development of Haiti, a phase dictated by local administration and hope for the future capability of the country. Thus, hope remains; in this specific instance of aid, the way forward for a nation dominated by foreign activity seems illuminated by agency and sovereignty.

In an interview, Dr. Louise Ivers emphatically contended that Haiti is a sovereign nation and it would be wrong to think otherwise. However, I beg the question, who recognizes this sovereignty? Can a country, saturated with foreign intervention both historically and presently truly express this sovereignty? A synthesis of the arguments of this thesis would answer that only through the implementation of relief systems that acknowledge and incorporate local agency can a nation rebuild. In Haiti, this model encourages a justified and overdue recognition by outsiders of the country's sovereignty and rightful independence. Beyond this small island nation, foreign intervention that compounds devastation is not an isolated case. Other nations throughout the global community are not immune to similar ills. Thus, while wide-sweeping change seems daunting, the implications of continued unfavorable foreign aid and humanitarian relief practices prove even more frightening.

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