Biographical Note

Dan Lewis was born February 3, 1944 in New York City, New York to David Lewis and Muriel Ozar (sp?). He attended Yale Law School and began his legislative career as an assistant to Senator Tydings in 1969. In 1971 he began working for Senator Muskie’s office both on policy issues and the 1972 campaign. After the 1972 primary loss, he joined the Arnold & Porter law firm, where he was still employed at the time of this interview in 2001.

Scope and Content Note

Interview includes discussions of: family background; committee work with Senator Tydings; meeting Senator Muskie; 1972 campaign; briefing sessions anecdotes; “old school” senators; and Muskie as a mentor.

Indexed Names

Agnew, Spiro
Eagleton, Thomas F., 1929-2007
Humphrey, Hubert H. (Hubert Horatio), 1911-1978
Don Nicoll: It is Friday the 23rd of February, 2001. We are in the Arnold & Porter Law Offices in Washington, D.C. Don Nicoll is interviewing Dan Lewis. Dan, would you state your full name, spell it, and tell us your date and place of birth.

Daniel Lewis: Daniel Lewis, L-E-W-I-S. I was born on February 3rd, 1944 in New York City, New York.

DN: And what were your parent’s names?

DL: David Lewis and Muriel Ozar (sounds like).

DN: And what were, what was your father’s occupation?

DL: He was a small businessman.

DN: Was your mother working outside the home?

DL: No, she was a homemaker.

DN: Did you have brothers and sisters?

DL: I have two brothers, an older brother Steve and a younger brother Robert.

DN: Did you grow up in New York?
DL:  Grew up in New York City.

DN:  And where did you go to school?

DL:  I went to the Fieldstone School, both grade school and high school, in Riverdale, New York.

DN:  And from there?

DL:  I went to Yale College, graduated in 1966 with a B.A., and then went to Yale Law School and graduated in 1969 with an L.L.B.

DN:  Did you go directly to Washington from law school?

DL:  I did. I got a job as a legislative assistant for Senator Joseph Tydings, a Democrat of Maryland, and I joined his staff in September 1969.

DN:  How did you happen to land in his office?

DL:  When I was a first year law student I applied for a summer job as a summer intern in a number of Senate offices, and I was selected to work for him in the summer of 1967. And based on that I was gi-, he gave me a job offer to work with him upon my graduation.

DN:  That’s where you met John McEvoy.

DL:  Right, John McEvoy was, during the summer of ‘67 he was the chief legislative assistant for Tydings. When Tydings became chairman of the D.C. committee, John became a staff director and that actually opened up some space on the personal staff, and John and Tydings hired me to work as a legislative assistant.

DN:  What kinds of issues were you dealing with in the Tydings office?

DL:  My assignment was by and large to do the committee work, other than the D.C. committee. So I did commerce committee work and judiciary committee work, and occasional freelancing in other domestic issues.

DN:  I should have asked you this before, but had you had an interest in working in the legislative branch before you graduated from law school? Well, obviously you had that summer internship in ‘67.

DL:  Well, I had a general interest in politics, pretty undefined, as an undergraduate. But in law school, when I got this job, I was introduced to the legislative side of things which was totally new to me and was quite attracted to it, and therefore seized the chance to work for Senator Tydings.
DN: Had your family had much interest in politics?

DL: Only as concerned citizens.

DN: They were not active in partisan politics.

DL: Well, they were mildly active. They were mild contributors and part of the liberal Democratic establishment of New York City.

DN: Had you had any exposure to candidates in New York during that, during the growing up years?

DL: Not more than any suburban kid would have.

DN: Now, you were with Tydings from ‘69 until ‘71?

DL: Well, late ‘70. Tydings was up for reelection in the ‘70 campaign, which was the Agnew campaign against radical liberal senators. And Tydings was one of those who was targeted by the Nixon, then Nixon administration, and he lost to a fellow named J. Glen Bell. So as of December of 1970 I was out of a job.

DN: And you and John came over to the Muskie office at that point.

DL: That’s right, it was a couple of months thereafter.

DN: What was your responsibility in the Muskie office when you first came?

DL: Well, John was, we were both in his personal staff. John was his AA, his administrative assistant, and my job was as his chief legislative assistant.

DN: And when you, had you met Ed Muskie before this in the course of your work in the Senate?

DL: Yes. I didn’t deal a lot with public works because that was not one of my committee assignments, but I had occasionally dealt with Senator Muskie. And he was one of the very prominent leaders on the liberal Democratic side, so I was pretty familiar with him and his reputation. And, of course, his national prominence which grew out of the 1970 campaign speech.

DN: And had that called him to your attention more than the ‘68 campaign?

DL: Yeah, I think, I’d say so just because, I mean I knew him from the ‘68 campaign and I guess, although it’s a little hard to remember, that’s the first time, in ’68, that I really had focused on Muskie as a Democratic leader. But having been in the Senate and being immersed full time in politics, I remember the Chappaquiddick incidents and sort of the dethroning of Teddy Kennedy, and the emergence of others including Ed Muskie as Democratic leaders. So
that’s when I really focused on him.

**DN:** And in the Muskie office in early ‘71 when you went to work there, how many legislative assistants were there?

**DL:** There were three of us, three LAs and a legislative secretary. And I think we continued about the same size. No, no, we grew to eventually the four legislative, three legislative assistants and a legislative secretary.

**DN:** And you were in the Muskie office for how long?

**DL:** Until September of 1972.

**DN:** So you were there through the ‘72 campaign.

**DL:** That’s right, in ‘72 the Muskie campaign had ended, that was the middle of the McGovern campaign, presidential campaign.

**DN:** Where did, did you go to law practice at that point, or did you go -?

**DL:** Well, actually I took a couple of months off. But in December I came to Arnold & Porter of that year.

**DN:** So you’ve been here for thirty plus years.

**DL:** That’s right.

**DN:** In the 1971 and ‘72 period, when you were in the Muskie office as chief legislative assistant, how much of your work related directly to the campaign and how much of it was really focused on legislation in the Senate?

**DL:** We did a lot of campaign work. The segregation between presidential political work and legislative work was pretty casual in those days. Although we did, we were responsible for Muskie’s non-committee work. All the committee work was taken care of by committee staff. But we were responsible for his non-committee work, and in the beginning, in 1971, that was substantial. So I would say about half of our, or sixty percent of our work, was aimed at the Senate. But as time wore on, and the campaign geared up in ‘7-, late ‘71 and early ‘72, I would say that eighty percent of our work was campaign-related.

**DN:** What sorts of things were you doing for the, oh, before we get to the campaign, what legislation was particularly important in that ‘71, ‘72 period?

**DL:** Well, the legislation that Muskie was handling as leader and author was the environmental legislation basically, and as I said that was handled by his committee staff, and . . . .

**DN:** Was there a lot of interaction between you and the committee staff?
DL: No, not on substance because, well we didn’t really know that much about the substance, and that was something the senator dealt with directly with his committee staff. There was a fair amount of interaction because we, or I, had responsibility for delivering the senator to the campaign on Thursday afternoons and Friday mornings, and that meant frequently ripping him out of committee conferences. And conference committees on the, I guess it was the Water Act. And the Republicans were using that to tie him down. But beyond getting in those tug-of-wars, I didn’t have any substantive input.

The major role that we played on the Senate substantive side was to make sure that the senator was fully briefed and understood what was going on substantively, and making sure that what he was doing substantively in the Senate was consistent with the campaign substance. We did not use the Senate as a forum to present the substance of platform or a campaign position, that was done in the campaign, but what we were trying to do was to make sure that things were consistent. And, to the extent he had responsibilities, for example, he was chairman of the Arms Control subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations committee and we were, made sure that those hearings were coordinated with Tony Lake, who was campaign foreign policy aide. So that it fit within the over all strategic, substantive foreign policy position that he was espousing as a candidate. So we were coordinating that, and of course it was in the interest of our various Democratic candidate competitors, and the Republicans, to embarrass us and put us on the spot.

So it was a, something we had to do carefully. But it was basically a coordination function. Muskie in our view, and his view, had established himself well before we were on the scene as a very successful legislator who had led the environmental movement in the Senate, and established his credentials. So we didn’t think we needed to do anything to establish that criteria, a burden that many other Senate candidates who were running for presidency needed to meet. So we didn’t attempt to use the Senate forum for that purpose.

DN: How hard was it to maintain the coordination between what you were doing, or what he was doing in the Senate and the campaign?

DL: It was at times logistically difficult because it was difficult to get everybody on the phone, because we couldn’t, and confer about what to do, because we couldn’t control the pace of events in the Senate, votes and things like that. And Muskie and many of his key advisors were spread all over the country, and sometimes we were too, and it was a little difficult getting together. This is before the era of the cell phone. I guess it would be a little easier now but logistically it was challenging, but substantively, while you had to be careful, it wasn’t, it was not a daunting task. In those days, I’m not that familiar with what it’s like to be a staff member now and it may be very different, but in those days the issues that came up, the substantive issues, a high percentage of them, like eighty or ninety percent even, were issues that the Senate had faced before and some of them, issues that they’d faced every year for ten years.

And Muskie was absolutely brilliant, he was extremely smart substantively and knew most of this stuff backwards and forwards, and understood most of the issues, and understood where he stood on the campaign. So most of it was in his head and it was not like dealing with a neophyte or anything like that. And in many briefings he was telling us rather than we telling him what
was going on. But there were new issues, and we had to coordinate things.

For example, on tax reform policy, we had a pretty elaborate tax reform campaign position that had been developed by our, we had a committee of tax lawyers, advisors, who had developed a tax reform position. And we had to coordinate that with the tax votes that came up to make sure things were consistent with the positions we wanted to take. And that would be an example where we would brief the senator and coordinate with his advisors.

**DN:** How did you find those briefing sessions and the exchanges with him? Do you remember any of them, or what it was like?

**DL:** He, a lot of the briefing was on the run. In the airplane, in motorcades as the things went on. But he had a remarkable ability to, no matter what was going on, to concentrate and he was very quick. On some areas, it varied enormously, in some areas he was, knew what he wanted and the discussion was a total waste of time. In other areas he didn’t know and was eager to find out what was going on. I do remember, and it would be fun to deal with a new area because he was interested and you could have a fairly complicated and sophisticated discussion very quickly. And I find that, at least in my brief experience working on the Hill and in politics, very unusual that a serious presidential candidate would be that intellectually sophisticated and that on the ball. It was really remarkable. Very different from a normal experience where you’re watering everything down and simplifying it and terrified that the candidate is going to say something that would make him look like an idiot. That was not at all ever our problem. I do remember at times disagreeing with the candidate on substantive issues, and that was, could be stormy. I guess, is reminiscence permissible here?

**DN:** Oh yes.

**DL:** One of the first things we did when we came in was to go through the book of his letters sent to constituents about issues, to see where he was standing on the issues, and it was a pretty straightforward set. But I got to the abortion, women’s rights issues. And this was in 1970, but even for that period of time Senator Muskie was behind the times, for a liberal Democratic candidate anyway, or even for a moderate Democratic candidate. And I did some revisions to bring things more into mainstream and sent them in and they came back all crossed out. And I sent them in again and they came crossed out. And I had a meeting with him and began discussing it with him and the more I discussed it, the more he didn’t want to hear of it. And we were sort of feeling our way about what to do, and I refused to back down and I said that he had to understand that he was really out of the mainstream and that when the campaign focused on this he was going to be seen as out of the mainstream.

And as a matter of substance, I’m not sure the difference between where he stood and the mainstream was all that much, but the way he said things and did things just was offensive to a lot of people. And he got angrier, and I got angrier, and he slammed the table, and I slammed the table, and he was pretty surprised when I went toe to toe. And when you had it out with him he would get mad, but he would never lose control. And so he yelled a little and I yelled a little, and he said he would consider what I had to say, and I was dismissed. But the letters came out about two days later the way I had written them, so, and that’s the way he, you know, sometimes
DN: Did the issue ever come up again, or did he raise it with you?

DL: I’m trying to remember. I remember some time during the campaign he said something that was very indirectly in acknowledgment of the wisdom of us having moved into the mainstream. I think someone else, maybe it was Scoop Jackson or Hubert Humphrey, was getting caught up for having not moved his rhetoric into the modern world, and he was acknowledging the prudence of what we had done.

DN: As you moved into campaign work as well as the Senate work, what sorts of things were you doing beyond what you’ve described, in terms of responses to constituents and making sure that the Senate activity and the campaign activity were consistent?

DL: Well, we had a number of tasks. They were all substantively oriented, issues tasks. We occasionally plugged into the political strategizing process, but it was very hit and miss and we were at the very periphery of that. Part of that was because the major key substantive issues of political impact were all pretty much set. One didn’t have to debate, you know, where the senator was going to be on the Vietnam War. That was set, and as a moderate liberal most of the big issues, except for innovative ideas, innovative proposals, were pretty well set. So there wasn’t a need for a lot of strategic thinking about where Muskie was going to be on most of the issues. What we did was we put together a book of every substantive question and answer in the world, which is a lot broader than constituent writing. And that was with him and we updated it constantly. So he was never asked a question the answer to which he didn’t know.

And we had some mad scrambling times, because of breaking news we would add to the book. And he was quite, could be quite annoyed that the plane would land and some reporter would run up to him and say, “How about the revolution” in some country, something that occurred an hour before and he knew he had to say something, but he would vent his frustration that it was absurd to pretend that he knew all this stuff. So we would have to feed him with updated information on current events and all that. That was one function.

Another function we did was to put together task force in various issue areas. Like, tax, we had about fifteen of them. Education, housing, children, issue areas of importance, labor, to the Democratic candidate who came up with proposals. And we would form these into not legislation but speeches and campaign materials that we would pass out. And during the campaign we, it was a moderate part of the campaign, not the dominant part, to initiate proposals. And we did that during the primary season fairly regularly. So that was something we did. We didn’t feel the need to turn it into legislation and there was no ability to move the legislation on that pace, so we did that as a campaign effort.

We also did what we called “issues advance”, which was to go out in each of the primary states to confer with our political allies, to find out what the local take was on national issues, and what the local substantive issues were, to brief the campaign and the senator so he wouldn’t be surprised when someone asked him about the X issue. Not that he pretended that he knew about all the local issues, but if there was a local issue that had national import, like a local problem
with environmental debate and he was an environmental leader, he had to be briefed about what was going on. So we did that. We reviewed, Bob Squier was the TV guru, and we worked closely with Bob to make sure that the advertising, the TV and the radio, was substantively consistent with what the senator was doing.

We acted as issue liaison to every issue group known to mankind at that time. There were not as many then as now, but there were plenty, and we handled that liaison. And that was sort of an issue function, but it was basically political. A union group, or the teachers or somebody would come to you and they’d say it’s important for you to embrace our campaign position of seventeen points. And we would have to make a joint political substantive decision about what we would do, and say “yes” or “no” or “half way”, and that was quite a bit of time. We then had to review all the speeches to make sure they were consistent with his position on the issues. And that was a daunting political and logistical effort, because the speeches were always written at the last minute. And the writers had no interest whatsoever in us reviewing them and made elaborate efforts to make sure we couldn’t review them.

And there were the alliances between the speech writers. Bob Shrum was the head speech writer and he was a political pro from day one, and to the extent he disagreed with us he would find other sources and try to sneak them through. So that was a, spent a lot of time and energy doing that. We also carefully reviewed the political, the substantive positions of his opponents. And the, he went head to head with different candidates in different primary states, to focus on what was the issues we were going to emphasize to contrast Muskie’s position with the opponent in that primary.

DN: That was a very busy time.

DL: It was pretty busy, yeah.

DN: Were there any other difficulties from your perspective? You mentioned the problem of speech writers who weren’t interested in being, I guess from their point of view, second guessed by the legislative staff. Were there any other difficulties in relating to the campaign staff?

DL: No, the, I’m trying to think now. The campaign staff was an amazing group of highly talented individuals. Muskie was a, at least in my view, and I guess this is the accepted wisdom, the leading candidate in ‘71, or thought to be by many. So he attracted some of the best and the brightest of the Democratic professionals, substantive and political, and they’re spread out through the leadership of the Democratic Party and Democratic administrations since that time. It’s a very notable legacy for Senator Muskie. He assembled and trained and brought to politics a remarkable, in my view, array of very talented people who have served the country well. And there was plenty of elbowing and that kind of stuff, but the campaign got along pretty well.

The major difficulties in the campaign were political. Beating, positioning and bringing across a winning combination of advertising and appeals in the primaries. And substance played a, I was going to say a minor role. What we could do with substance played a minor role. I mean, the substance played a major role, but most of it was in concrete. For example, the war in Vietnam, Muskie was opposed to the war, or opposed to expanding the war. He came to that position
somewhat late. He was the vice presidential candidate for Hubert Humphrey and there was not much to be said about repositioning him and, if we wanted to, and even if we wanted to, Senator Muskie was not going to change his views on an issue of that importance for short term political benefit. So the angst and the bitterness and the conflict of a presidential campaign, one particularly that went from apparent leadership to serious difficulty, we were not in the middle of all that.

**DN:** What, in your view, was the cause of the decline of his campaign?

**DL:** Well, I had, and I’ll see if I can recall it, what I think was a pretty unconventional analysis, and some of this I attribute to Bob Squier, who I think was a very insightful person. But I think, Muskie, in the country, had been established by his environmental work, so he was seen as a very serious, able leader, legislator. And the ‘68 campaign, where he was seen in contrast to what, everything else was going on, stable, rock of Gibraltar, traditional values. And that catapulted him to a political leadership position. But it was one of care and stability and serious leadership, and although that was a great advantage to someone who wanted to be, as president, it was a terrible disadvantage in the primaries. Because the primaries at those times operated, much like the Republican primaries in the last five or six years, as not in a predominantly a candidate selection process, but in a message-issue communication process. People were conveying their strong views into the system.

So, and Squier’s polls showed that in most of the primary states, if you asked people who they wanted to be president, Muskie led the pack consistently in all the primary states, the ones he won and the ones he lost. But if you asked the voters, the people who went out, they weren’t selecting a president, they were registering their disgust with the war in Vietnam or their disgust with the left wing drift of the country, and they were voting for candidates who were going to push that message. So someone like McGovern, who had very low ratings for presidential fitness, would get a lot of votes. So that was the, what was happening, and we were unable to convert because we weren’t focusing on this the atmosphere to candidate selection, and I’m not sure one can do that.

Added to that was the fractionalization that Muskie was in the middle, and he had two on the left and two on the right, or one or two. And the middle got sliced, with Humphrey and Jackson on his right, and McGovern and (name) for a while on his left. And it was very difficult in highly charged primaries to push the left and the right to give the middle a lot of room, a lot of momentum, a lot of enthusiasm. Because, as I say, here was someone whose attributes were stability, responsibility, sobriety, independence, and that didn’t attract a lot of rabid followers in the primary campaign.

I think there also was the, Muskie had a political problem, a serious one, with his personality, that I think hurt him. It was something, this was really ironic because what I viewed as his greatest strengths turned out to be campaign weaknesses. He had very little toleration and sympathy for the fake artificiality of the political process. Like, the example I gave, someone who runs up to the plane and says there’s been a revolution in Botswana twenty minutes ago, what are your views, and he would have to pretend that he had a view.
Or I remember very distinctly setting up a six A.M. visual for the news cameras in front of some sewer in Wisconsin to do an environmental piece. And, you know, it was March and it was freezing cold and we’re up at the crack of dawn, and the people milling around and the cameras are ready. And I hear Muskie’s voice, “What the hell are we doing at six A.M. in the morning in front of a sewer?” You know, it was phony, and he didn’t tolerate the phoniness, and I thought that was a sign of terrific mental health. But it was obvious not to the general public, but to the actors and the press particularly, and it made them feel uncomfortable, and that seeped through. And I think that had an unfortunate effect.

And he can be testy and short, and that didn’t bother me, I had a dad like that and I know how to deal with it, but it didn’t do well in the TV. It upset people and was viewed, and this was Squier’s thesis, and I thought it was very interesting, his calmness and stability in the ‘68 campaign, when compared to the chaos and violence and verbal excesses of that, when transformed into ‘72 in the primaries, seemed like truculence and lack of being with it, and stubbornness. And it was the same characteristics, but it was against a different background.

And that was, I think is Squier’s view, I can’t remember this as my view or Squier’s view but I’ll give him credit for it, the problem with the crying incident, which was, the press attributed so much to Muskie’s problems, I think it was highly exaggerated, but it did show up in our polls in Florida and Wisconsin, and a little in Ohio. But it was Florida-Wisconsin, the problem was not that Muskie cried or appeared to cry. And he didn’t really cry, he was choked up with anger as close examination of the films, but he, people thought he had cried. The problem wasn’t he was crying, because Hubert Humphrey was on that campaign trail and he would cry at the drop of a hat. It was, there was so, such an inconsistency between people’s image of Muskie as the granite man from New Hampshire and the crying, it made people uneasy. That was the problem, it made them uneasy. You know, “Is there something wrong with this guy?” Although I think that was highly exaggerated.

And the dirty tricks, and there were a lot of dirty tricks, and they played dirty tricks on our staff. I got caught in this. We had a campaign headquarters in downtown Washington and the Senate staff was in the Senate building. And we had a taxi driver who would run papers, memos, back and forth five or six times a day, and that taxi driver was a spy for the Republicans and some of our memos got published, stolen and published in the papers. It was ridiculous, because everything they published were things we’d be happy, we were desperately trying to get publicity for and so it wasn’t a very effective effort but they did try that. But I don’t think that had a major impact on the outcome and that the dirty tricks was a sideshow. So I think those were the issues.

I think, looking back on it, that the mood of the country, which is set by the many instances, the events of the past four years, prepares the country to be receptive to certain personalities. And a lot of times it’s a reaction to the prior president - Nixon, we got Ford, and then Ford lost to Carter. And Carter was not a politically adept fellow, but he had a personality of integrity and independence and there was a reaction, and that dominates a lot of what happens in the political campaign. And there’s nothing you can do about it. You have the right personality or the wrong personality, and I think Muskie, had he been able to get the nomination, I think would have destroyed Richard Nixon because he, his stability and calmness and leadership, when contrasted
with Nixon, would have been a wipe out. But that wasn’t what was happening in the primary process and it’s not quite sure that even if you agree with what I say and we knew it at the beginning, we could have done anything about it.

Let me add one other thing that I think is very important from an issues point of view. Muskie was incapable, this is something for which I have the greatest respect, he was incapable of saying anything on substance that he seriously disagreed with or which would have been a problem had he become president. He was not someone who said, “Well we’ll say it and we’ll deny it,” or “we’ll pretend we didn’t say it,” or “we’ll fudge it over.” He was a man of intellectual integrity and we had to be consistent. And that made it tough, a lot tougher than a lot of other people. And he was a man of intellectual self respect. I remember campaigning in Florida and Hubert Humphrey came down and, you know, Hubert would make this stuff up and he’d advance some foreign aid program of frozen orange juice that they were going to ship to Africa because the orange juice people in Florida, he was appealing to. And the look of quiet contempt in Muskie’s face when he heard about this was very revealing. I mean, no one in his right, no one on his staff that didn’t, that wanted to preserve his job would ever come up with an idea like that. He was absolutely straight.

DN: What were the major things you learned from working for Ed Muskie?

DL: Well, I learned that you can be a very successful political leader, and be a very smart person on substance. Whether that’s still true, maybe, maybe not. I learned that intellectual integrity can be a strong motivating factor for political followers and staff. I think, there’s something I learned negatively. Muskie was in many ways an old style leader intellectually. He came with a belief system that was integrated. There were certain things that stuck out and all that, but basically he came with a set of political beliefs and values and substantive positions that had been worked out over time and evolved with his experience, and that was it. It wasn’t up for grabs, he didn’t go to meetings with his advertising people to find out what he stood for. And people understood him by and large. He was defined by those issues in large part. And that had developed over a career, and some people believed in those issues and they supported him and others didn’t.

And that is totally different from the dominant political leadership of the country today, in my view, where issues and world views and principles, set of principle and beliefs, are either absent or part of the campaign strategy. And I think people generally who dealt with Muskie, whether they believed it or not, learned that, and knew him as his opponents and adversaries, as well as his allies, and that defined him in large part. And that was very unique and I think that was a great strength.

DN: Is there anything else, Dan, about Ed Muskie that we haven’t covered that you think is important to know about him?

DL: Well, he had a sense of, he and his generation in the Senate, had a sense of public, the public interest. That’s too broad a word, but he had an acute sense of responsibility towards the general national political system. And there were certain things he could do but he felt would be harmful, even though they may have been politically expedient. And he was, it was sort of an
instinctual self-restraint not to say things too vicious, not things too divisive, not say things that would hurt the country internationally. There was a whole group of restraints, but they were restraints bred of people who felt a common responsibility to lead the country, and these were people with different political philosophies. And that was a very admirable quality.

**DN:** Who are some of those senators that come to mind?

**DL:** Well, Magnuson was one. The people that I dealt with, Eagleton who worked closely with him was that way. Mansfield was a prime example of that. The people that grew up in the fifties, the postwar generation, had these ingrained in them and I think they inherited them. But it’s something that I don’t detect as much. Part of it was that political parties still were important entities at that time, and there was a feeling that the Democrats and the Republicans to themselves, had responsibilities to each other. But you could, I was using this example the other day, if something terrible happened to the country, the president, no matter, even Nixon could call in his office fifteen people and say, “This is a terrible disaster and we’ve got to do X, and we must be united,” and it would have been done because people felt an obligation, whatever its impact on their careers, when it was clear that that was in the national interest it could have been done. And I don’t think that could be done now. There’s not that feeling of responsibility, shared responsibility for leadership, certainly not on the legislative branch. So I thought that was unique.

**DN:** Other comments?

**DL:** That’s all I can think of.

**DN:** Thank you very much, Dan, very helpful.

**DL:** Well, you’re welcome.

*End of Interview*