Welcoming New Mainers: Local Economic Development and its Effects on the Politics of Immigration

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Welcoming New Mainers:
Local Economic Development and its Effects on the Politics of Immigration

An Honors Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Politics
Bates College
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts

By Trevor Fry
Lewiston, Maine
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Abstract

This thesis examines the policy and rhetoric directed toward immigrants from elite municipal actors in Maine’s two largest metropolitan areas: Lewiston and Portland. These cities, situated in one of the least diverse states in the nation, have recently seen large changes to their demographic makeups. While both share a similar history, in recent years they have diverged in terms of their politicians’ policy and rhetoric toward immigrants. The scholarship on immigration in the United States suggests that certain factors, such as the levels of economic anxiety present in an area, the existence of a so-called “creative class,” and an infrastructure of support services can influence how receptive a city’s existing residents may be to anti-immigrant rhetoric. This thesis employs a historical institutionalist framework emphasizing critical junctures, path dependency, and political entrepreneurship to account for the distinct economic development undertaken in Lewiston and Portland since the mid-twentieth century. By analyzing the histories of Maine’s two largest cities and the norm-breaking behavior of the former Governor of Maine, Paul LePage, this thesis offers an explanation as to why anti-immigrant rhetoric is more salient in certain locales.
# Table of Contents

**Acknowledgements** ........................................................................................................... ii

**Abstract** ........................................................................................................................... iii

**Introduction** ....................................................................................................................... 1  
The Plan of this Thesis ........................................................................................................... 7

**Chapter One - Literature Review** ....................................................................................... 12

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 12  
1. The Construction of Race and the Immigrant Other ......................................................... 15
2. Outgroup versus Ingroup Dynamics: The Immigrant as the “Other” ................................. 22
3. Economic Threat .................................................................................................................. 25

4. The Presence of a Creative Class ........................................................................................ 31  
   4.A Attracting the Creative Class ......................................................................................... 35
   4.B Creative Class Members and Immigration ..................................................................... 37

5. Normalization of Right-Wing Rhetoric ............................................................................. 39  
   5.A Rise of Support for Right-Wing Actors ....................................................................... 40
   5.B Paul LePage and Norm-breaking in Maine .................................................................... 47

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 49

**Chapter Two - Narrative History of Lewiston and Portland** ............................................ 51

1. Maine: A State Built on Immigration .................................................................................. 53

2. Lewiston’s History .............................................................................................................. 54  
   2.A Growth of the Immigrant Community ....................................................................... 55
   2.B Early Discrimination in Lewiston ............................................................................... 58
   2.C Lewiston’s Economic Downturn .................................................................................. 60
   2.D Changing Immigration in Lewiston ............................................................................. 62
   2.E Somali Arrivals ............................................................................................................. 64
   2.F City’s Reactions ............................................................................................................ 65

3. Portland’s History ................................................................................................................ 67  
   3.A Immigration to Portland .............................................................................................. 69
   3.B Backlash to Immigration ............................................................................................... 71
   3.C Portland’s Economic Woes and Future Investment ....................................................... 73
   3.D Recent Immigration to Portland and Subsequent Reactions ......................................... 75

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 77

**Chapter Three - Model Cities Program** ............................................................................ 80

1. History of the Model Cities Program .................................................................................. 85

2. Portland’s Post-War Decline .............................................................................................. 87  
   2.B Portland’s Revitalization .............................................................................................. 88
   2.C Portland’s Model Cities Program .................................................................................. 91
   2.D Provision of Social Services ......................................................................................... 93
   2.E Institutional Structure and Support of the Program ....................................................... 94
   2.F Program’s Repercussions .............................................................................................. 96
   2.G Changing Downtown ................................................................................................. 98
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Lewiston</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.A Lewiston’s Model Cities Program</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.B Institutional Structure and Support</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Data Related to Levels of Economic Anxiety</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four – Political Entrepreneurship, Further Injections of Capital, and the Creative Class</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. A Second Injection of Capital into Portland in the 1990s</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.A Elizabeth Noyce’s Business Investments</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.B Rise of Portland’s Cultural Institutions</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lewiston Today</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.A Development in Lewiston</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.B Difficulty in Attracting the Creative Class to Lewiston</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5 – The Normalization of Right-Wing Discourse in Maine and Its Repercussions</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Rise of Paul LePage</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.A Modernization and Economic Grievances</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.B Cultural Grievances and Ingroup vs. Outgroup Dynamics</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mayoral Rhetoric and Policy in Lewiston</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.A Election of Larry Gilbert</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.B Election of Robert Macdonald</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.C Election and Resignation of Shane Bouchard</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rhetoric and Policy in Portland</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.A Portland Post-LePage</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Findings</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Further Research</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Suggestions</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works Cited</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

In her book *One Goal*, Amy Bass beautifully and poignantly describes the story of the Lewiston High School soccer team and its “meteoric rise” to the pinnacle of the sport in Maine.¹ Bass follows this team beginning in 2015, and she highlights how many of the young men who made up this diverse squad fled with their families from war-torn countries in Africa to arrive in Lewiston. I read this book rapidly and was immediately taken in by the vibrant, ever-changing, and, at-times, contentious community of Lewiston that Bass describes. She notes that Lewiston is not the “Maine of blueberry pie and lobster boils, sailboats and the Bush family,” but rather a city that had seen decades of economic downturn and, in 2000, had a population where “more than half of the city’s families with children under five lived at or below the poverty line.”² Bass eloquently describes the immigration of Somalis beginning in 2001 and paints the picture of a small city struggling to adapt in a rapidly globalizing world.

While the story of the Lewiston High School soccer team emphasizes success over adversity and that its triumphs are grounded in diversity, Bass is far from blind to the combative political climate present in Lewiston – a climate that is often openly hostile to immigrants. She notes such events as the throwing of a pig’s head into a Lewiston mosque, a particularly venomous act as pork is forbidden in Islam, and a letter penned by former-Mayor Larry Raymond urging the burgeoning Somali population to stop migrating to the city.³ After reading Raymond’s letter, I began to read about other Lewiston politicians, and I became suddenly caught up in a whirlwind of hostile comments about immigrants used by multiple elected officials in the city. The anti-immigrant stance taken by Raymond and others caught my attention

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² Ibid.
³ Ibid., 60.
and furthered my interest in the subject. While not all mayors of Lewiston have espoused distinctly anti-immigrant platforms since the arrival of the Somalis in 2001, since 2011, the city has repeatedly elected into office mayors who do employ anti-immigrant rhetoric. Why was this happening repeatedly? What was the political value of this rhetoric? And, why were voters in Lewiston – as evidenced by repeated re-election of mayors who gave voice to this anti-immigrant sentiment – receptive to this rhetoric?

In the first chapter of her book, Bass describes the early waves of immigration to Lewiston. From the first English settlers to the massive waves of French Canadians who came to work in the city’s prosperous mills, Lewiston has been a city defined by immigration. But this history presented a paradox to me. If Lewiston has been, as Bass describes so eloquently, a city built on the backs of immigrants, then how could it become a city in which anti-immigrant rhetoric was prevalent among elected officials?

While certain factions of the community have welcomed the new arrivals from Somalia and other parts of the African continent with open arms, the electorate in Lewiston has, over the past decade, repeatedly elected into office mayors who spout distinctly anti-immigrant rhetoric. Instead of seeing consequences for their actions, politicians in Lewiston have been able to maintain their political vitality even after uttering racist, divisive comments. This rhetoric and the popular electoral response to it stand in stark contrast to recent history in the city of Portland, Maine, Lewiston’s more southern neighbor and Maine’s largest metropolitan area. The vast majority of elected politicians in Portland in the twenty-first century have been decidedly pro-

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Ibid., 45-46.
immigrant and have repeatedly used welcoming language; many have even gone as far as to repeatedly bring forward a proposal to give non-citizens the right to vote in city elections.\(^5\)

As I began to research into the histories of immigration in both cities, I uncovered a range of historic similarities between Portland and Lewiston that only seemed to make their divergent recent politics all the more paradoxical. Both are built on the back of many waves of immigration; both are cities in which certain of these early immigrant populations experienced racism and prejudice; and, both are cities that lost their major, defining industries in the twentieth century. And, yet, even with these commonalities, Portland and Lewiston have developed into cities with different levels of receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric.

By reading about the rise of anti-immigrant rhetoric in Lewiston I also discovered how these comments were mirrored in the election and re-election of Paul LePage to the Maine Governorship in 2010 and then in 2014. I argue that LePage’s bellicose, racialized, and ignorant rhetoric may explain how certain issues, such as perceived racial or economic threats, have become more salient in the cities in question. In short, the goal of this thesis is to examine how Portland and Lewiston have developed from cities with similar histories, regarding immigration and the loss of industry, into two metropolitan areas where elected politicians espouse very different rhetoric and policy with regard toward immigrants and immigration as a whole. Ultimately, I contend that the distinct economic pathways pursued by each city has created contexts receptive or hostile to anti-immigrant rhetoric, and, the norm-breaking behavior of Governor LePage gave cover to local politicians to give public voice to this rhetoric.

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This thesis relies on a theoretical framework derived from the scholarship on path dependency and critical junctures. Paul Pierson contends that “outcomes at a critical juncture induce path-dependent processes.”6 Path dependent theory highlights that “history matters” in the development of institutions, but also that crucial events can create pathways that politicians and other elite political actors may follow. These critical junctures are periods during which “significant change” may occur, change that has a “fundamental impact on subsequent historical dynamics.”7 I argue in this thesis that certain events in the histories of Portland and Lewiston can be considered as critical junctures inducing path dependent processes causing a divergence between the two cities. While linked, critical junctures and path dependency are importantly not one and the same.8 Path dependency is best described as the “reproduction of a critical juncture’s legacy rather than the production of the critical juncture itself.”9 I contend that events in the histories of Lewiston and Portland further reinforced their distinct paths forward.

In particular, I argue that the distinct implementation of the Model Cities Program, a federal plan part of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society initiative, represents the critical juncture that inspired path dependent processes affecting economic development. This critical juncture, and further events that reinforced this path, fostered different popular senses of economic well-being; in Lewiston, where economic anxiety has persisted to far greater levels than in Portland, receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric has been more prominent.

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8 Ibid., 77.
9 Ibid., 77.
Much has been written in the secondary scholarship on how economics motivates either pro or anti-immigrant viewpoints among a populace. Daniel Tichenor writes in *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America* that economic booms or declines at the national level cannot perfectly explain the introduction of more exclusionary or more welcoming policies toward immigrants.\(^{10}\) However, in this thesis, I argue that within the smaller localized contexts of Lewiston and Portland the effects of perceived economic adversity can explain the rise of support for anti-immigrant platforms. And, other research suggests that these effects are also particularly potent if an economic downturn coincides with the arrival of a racially different other within a certain area.\(^{11}\) Thus, the fact that the recent waves of immigration into both cities are predominantly black African is of particular salience when evaluating why hostility toward immigration seems more politically rhetorically prominent in Lewiston than in Portland. To make sense of this contemporary situation, this thesis examines the economic histories with particular focus on the post-World War II economic downturns and attempts at revitalization undertaken in each city to highlight how their levels of economic development and anxiety differed.

Important as well to the explanation in how a city becomes welcoming to an immigrant population is its ability to attract, what scholar Richard Florida has dubbed, the creative class of individuals. Florida’s work posits that economic development in the United States is now driven by people who work as “scientists, architecture and design professionals, artists and


entertainment industry professionals,” or in any profession where individuals “earn their money by means of creative thinking, designing, and producing.”

Florida’s thesis has been critiqued at length with regard to the creative class’ actual ability in engendering economic growth. Critiques suggest that “the existence of vibrant bohemian neighborhoods was most likely a consequence of economic growth, rather than a cause of it.” Other scholars have argued that Florida has ignored many “uncreative” cities, such as “Las Vegas, Memphis, and Oklahoma City,” who have seen explosive growth in recent years. However, these critiques do not directly trench on the claim in the scholarship that cities with greater populations of creative class individuals are more hospitable to racially different populations. And, it is this claim that bears directly on the analysis undertaken in this thesis. Indeed, additional scholarship suggests that a higher population of creative class individuals and the institutions that attract them to such an area, such as museums, “cafes, sidewalk musicians, and small galleries and bistros,” so-called “third places,” may foster an environment wherein cultural capital is increased and racial threat is mitigated. Furthermore, the work of Elaine B. Sharp and Mark R. Joslyn contends that perceived racial threat is “clearly mitigated [in cities] where the new creative class…holds sway.” These factors are integral in the support of pro-immigrant elected officials in contexts where racially different immigrants make up the bulk of new arrivals. In this thesis, I examine how Portland and Lewiston have attracted different levels

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14 Ibid.
15 Sharp and Joslyn, “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America,” 575.
17 Sharp and Joslyn, “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America,” 575.
of creative individuals and have developed into cities with different numbers of institutions readily offering cultural capital to their populaces.

Finally, this thesis looks to the scholarship on the normalization of right-wing rhetoric. Matt Golder writes that politicians use “modernization grievances, economic grievances and cultural grievances” to garner support for their platforms. By focusing on creating divisions, capitalizing on people’s frustrations with their economic standing, and making populations harken back to when times were supposedly “better,” Golder argues that right-wing actors are able to drum up support for the campaigns.¹⁸ This thesis argues that these tactics, as employed by former-Governor Paul LePage in Maine, made the continued election of anti-immigrant politicians in areas already experiencing higher levels of perceived economic or cultural/racial threat more likely.

The Plan of this Thesis

To restate, this thesis employs a historical institutionalist framework emphasizing critical junctures, path dependency, and political entrepreneurship to account for the distinct economic development undertaken in Lewiston and Portland since the mid-twentieth century. It contends that the divergent paths help to explain the occurrence of and receptivity toward different framing of immigrants by local politicians’ rhetoric and public policy advocacy.

Chapter One begins by surveying the racialization of the immigration debate in the United States. Immigration policy is deeply racialized, and consequently, discussion of immigration policy is often marked by ingroup versus outgroup dynamics and positions are often influenced by triggers of anxiety. In particular, the chapter explores motivators of economic

anxiety before summarizing two other areas of scholarship important to the broader arguments: Florida’s creative class argument, and the dynamics of normalization of right-wing political rhetoric. Through these sections, testable explanations are derived that are evaluated in later chapters. While many explanations are offered in Chapter One, this thesis does not make an effort to test each one; rather, they are included to show the immensity and multifaceted discipline that is the scholarship on immigration.

Chapter Two offers a broad historical survey of Lewiston and Portland in order to underscore some similarities in the cities’ development. Specific attention is paid to the industrialization of both cities, their shared periods of anti-immigrant sentiment, and the distinct waves of immigration to both. In examining these two cities, Chapter Two seeks to situate the reader within the specific context and to begin to underline important junctures that may explain how and why the two cities have diverged in terms of their politicians’ rhetoric about immigrants. In particular, why has anti-immigrant rhetoric thrived, particularly among mayors in Lewiston, but been rarely seen in Portland?

Chapter Three lays out an important critical juncture that may answer this question: the Model Cities Programs that were pursued in both Lewiston and Portland. This section employs the theoretical framework suggested by Pierson: that critical junctures can produce path dependent results, change institutions, and, in this case, influence politicians’ responses to immigrants. I argue that the Model Cities Programs in Lewiston and Portland represent the important critical juncture that created a divergence between the two cities. Chapter Three details funding discrepancies, organizational differences, and differing program development that established two distinct economic development pathways taken by each city. This chapter also utilizes data from the United States Census Bureau in order to suggest differing levels of
economic anxiety between the cities. It contends that the differences between Lewiston and Portland’s Model Cities Programs had important repercussions down-the-line for how both cities’ populations and politicians would view newcomers.

Chapter Four delves into the story of economic investment into Lewiston and Portland during the 1990s. This chapter suggests that the large influx of capital into Portland, spearheaded by millionaire Elizabeth Noyce, aided the city in becoming a regional hub for the creative class of individuals with a diverse selection of institutions promoting cultural capital. Noyce is then positioned as a political entrepreneur, or a “strategic, self-activated [motivator] who [can] recast political institutions and governing relationships” through “singular acts of individual creativity” – her consequential vision and material investment reinforced the pathway of economic development initially begun by the Model Cities programs in the 1970s.\(^1\) It also looks at Lewiston and suggests that the lack of such outside funding or political entrepreneur, the city’s inability to attract large populations of creative class individuals, and its overall dearth of institutions offering increased cultural capital may suggest a greater receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric. While not a second critical juncture, I contend, in this chapter, that Noyce’s injections of capital into Portland and the lack of such development in Lewiston, further reinforced the economic development path that the two cities were set on in the wake of their Model Cities Programs.

Chapter Four also applies Florida’s scholarship to the divergent contemporary histories of Lewiston and Portland. It seeks to understand the so-called creative class of individuals and elucidates links between further scholarship that suggests that a larger population of creative

class individuals in a certain locale may create an environment where racial threat is mitigated. Employing a path dependent approach, this chapter argues that this second injection of outside capital – now from a political entrepreneur – represents a moment that reinforced the pathways already initiated by the city’s distinct experiences with the Model Cities Program. The opportunity for divergent political rhetoric about immigrant “others” was thereby bolstered.

Chapter Five is an examination of political rhetoric of municipal actors in Lewiston and Portland. I argue that the rise of Paul LePage as governor of Maine created a normalization of right-wing rhetoric in the state and heightened perceived economic and cultural threats posed by immigrants and racialized others. Building on a scholarship of the normalization of right-wing rhetoric from the secondary sources, this chapter examines speeches, campaign platforms, and interviews with mayors and city councilors from the two cities to describe how politicians, in Lewiston specifically, have exploited the city’s increased economic anxiety to inspire support by adopting anti-immigrant platforms. This chapter compares this rhetoric to that used by politicians in Portland who have generally not utilized a similar discourse.

The conclusion of this thesis highlights the main findings from the research, identifies areas where further research may be needed, and offers policy suggestions.

As suggested by the outpouring of support for the victims of the recent terrorist attack in New Zealand in Lewiston’s Kennedy Park, even as other political actors across the world erroneously link the attacks to increased immigration from predominantly Muslim countries, these actions suggest that pro-immigrant sentiment does remain strong in a state and a city founded by many waves of immigration.20 However, recent events also highlight deeply racist

undertones still present across Maine, as evidenced by the anti-immigrant tweets of Waterville’s Mayor.\textsuperscript{21} These occurrences show the vitality and prevalence of this debate in Maine, and this thesis serves to disentangle and make sense of the issues at hand. By suggesting the important repercussions economic decision making at the local level has on support for immigrant-related rhetoric, this thesis contributes to the important topic in question and the ways forward in the context of the Pine Tree State.

Chapter One - Literature Review

Introduction

The arousal of anti-immigrant policy action, and political rhetoric is complicated; there is no specific path in terms of how municipal politicians begin to exhibit a certain hostility to newcomers. Indeed, myriad explanations account for anti-immigrant political rhetoric, policy, and public opinion. While this thesis acknowledges the breadth of this discipline, the research question remains as follows: how have Lewiston and Portland’s differing histories of economic development and recent economic situations played a role in present-day municipal politicians’ views and professed policy and rhetoric toward immigrants. This chapter is divided into five sections that position the reader within the existing scholarship on immigration and ways in which politicians may adopt either anti or pro-immigrant policy and rhetoric.

In Part One of this chapter, I examine the racialization of the immigration debate in the United States. In tracing the development of immigration within the country, this first section gives the reader a necessary background for the examined case studies where these issues of race and immigration exist. Part Two offers the reader an overview of the pertinent secondary scholarship on outgroup versus ingroup dynamics; giving a necessary background as to how and why different groups may perceive a threat from the “other.” In Part Three, I look at the literature on economic threat and how differing levels of economic anxiety in a community may have repercussions on how their respective politicians frame immigrants in either a positive or negative light. This section provides a pivotal testable explanation in this thesis: that an economic downturn in an area coupled with the arrival of a racially different other creates an environment in which people, and ergo politicians, are more likely to support anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. Part Four of this chapter examines the work of Richard Florida and his
creative class thesis. In examining Florida’s scholarship on economic development and the potential of a city’s politicians to be more or less welcoming to immigrants, this section creates links to previous discussions of economic threat. In Part Five, I suggest how right-wing rhetoric has been normalized in the context of the state of Maine, has magnified threats at hand, and how such a normalization has created a space in which political actors adopting anti-immigrant viewpoints are able to be elected and remain in office.

While a cultural narrative of inclusion often defines a national ethos in the United States, there is also a longstanding history of federal and state policy grounded in exclusion. Such practices have been motivated by a combination of factors over time and some have become more salient in recent years. Therefore, it is imperative to examine how anti-immigrant political standpoints develop in a country where political elites and ordinary citizens alike employ the cultural narrative of the welcoming immigrant while simultaneously endorsing covert and overt hostility to immigrants. By examining scholars’ work on how anti-immigrant hostility might take root, a framework to examine specific cities in Maine and to suggest which factors account for hostility toward immigrants can be developed.

To that end, this chapter begins by offering a brief overview of the construction of race and the related “othering” of the immigrant in U.S. politics that can be dated at least to the mid to late-nineteenth century. Understanding the racialization of immigration remains integral to the full comprehension of the dynamics that exist in the U.S. today at both the local and federal level. It is also empirically relevant given that the vast majority of more recent immigrants to the state of Maine are racially different from much of the native population. By understanding the genesis of the racialization of immigration in the United States, this section serves to contextualize later discussion.
By exploring how perceived cultural or economic threats may be lowered in certain cases, this chapter engages the work of Richard Florida and examines the power of the creative class of individuals and their effect of changing the political leanings of a city. By discussing Florida’s and other scholars work, this section seeks to understand how certain industries, cultural institutions, or other opportunities may attract a certain type of individual to a city. While acknowledging critiques to the work of Florida, this section posits that the presence of such individuals positively influences the local economy and also create environments that are more welcoming for a racialized immigrant other. Later chapters look to the different economic development histories of Lewiston and Portland and their ability to attract the creative class. This section posits that different levels of economic and cultural development may have an effect on how a city’s politicians and populace view an immigrant “other.”

By grappling with the economic and cultural threats sometimes associated with the presence of immigrants, this chapter then seeks to connect these concerns with the scholarship on political rhetoric in the United States. By examining how and when more extreme political views are “allowed” in local contexts, this section seeks to understand when anti-immigrant platforms may resonate more fully with a community. Using explanations derived from the literature on political rhetoric, this section proposes hypotheses that explain the election, continued success, and presence of municipal politicians with certain policies in the examined case studies.

The purpose of this chapter is to situate the reader within the discussion of immigration in the United States and to examine scholarship linked to the specific cases studies in subsequent chapters. In focusing on issues that apply to the situations in Portland and Lewiston, this chapter offers testable explanations that can be used to examine policy and rhetoric in both cities. While wide-ranging in its breadth, this chapter shows the complexity and interconnected nature of
immigration issues in the United States. It is necessary to approach this discussion from a wide lens in order to comprehend the origins of the immigration debate within this country. However, this project’s specific focus is a qualitative approach to the professed policy and rhetoric developed by political elite in Lewiston and Portland. Chapter Two details the immigration histories of the two cities and highlighting certain and events and actions that begin to suggest a critical juncture between the two areas.

Certain testable explanations that arise in the literature delve too far into questions of sentiment or individual feelings and are thus outside of the scope of the project and this thesis has no intention of testing each of the explanations derived from the literature. However, they remain in the broader literature review as they highlight important schools of thought within the wider discussion of immigration in the United States. This chapter will highlight certain testable explanations that will be applied to the case studies in further chapters to suggest how anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy arises in Lewiston and Portland.

1. The Construction of Race and the Immigrant Other

In her book In the Shadow of Race, Victoria Hattam traces the discursive development of racial and ethnic divisions as well as how discourse surrounding immigration has changed since the mid-nineteenth century in the United States. She offers a framework and timeline that elucidates the development of race, the creation of the concept of ethnicity, and the associated exclusionary immigration tactics derived from both. The scholarship surrounding racial and ethnic divisions offers important insights into how race has been constructed and how immigrants have been defined as the “other” in political discourse in the United States.

Hattam begins by discussing race in terms of the work done by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, whose work became the prevailing view in racial science in the nineteenth century. The
distinguishing feature of Lamarck’s work was the belief that there existed a “notion of heritability of acquired characteristics,” or the idea that “all human behavior could, over long periods of time, become habitual and ultimately heritable.” Lamarck’s idea of race suggested that “religion, language, nationality, and even institutions and social practices could become part of one’s genetic makeup.”

Lamarck’s hypothesis had an important effect of changing prevailing notions of race in the nineteenth century. While some debate existed, scholars agreed that there was a distinction between the “historic” and “natural” races. These natural races were believed to line up with specific areas of the globe and could match up with the widely-used nineteenth century color classifications of race: “Black, White, Red, and Yellow.” The definitions of historic races were more similar to what are now classified as nations. “Americans, French, and Germans were all considered historic races,” as scholars of the time argued that their once diverse populations had been slowly molded into “common bloodlines” over the passing of many years. Important to the definition of such historic races was the belief that such factors as environment and geography had a direct influence on their formation.

The Lamarckian concept of race also laid the groundwork for the idea of “race superiority,” or the belief in an innate hierarchy among races from different regions. Building on Lamarck’s concepts, the sociologist E. A. Ross argued that there was a “race superiority” among different historic races, and that only races that had inhabited “great cities” for extended periods of time could possess the increased mental capacity and social functions derived from the

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2 Ibid., 25.
Lamarckian concept of inheriting acquired characteristics. Ross’ theory highly valued the Western European civilizations surrounding the Mediterranean and placed such races at the top of the proposed ranking.

Hattam highlights how these early discussions of race “did not refer to ethnicity or ethnic groups;” rather, scholarship in the mid to late nineteenth century was framed in terms of “scientific and historic races” instead of the more recent categories of “ethnicity and race.” Consequently, she posits that “tracking the shift from the language of ‘historic races’ to that of ethnicity” can help us understand how the world has functioned over the course of history and, most importantly, how the U.S. has arrived at its present assumptions about immigrant and racial difference. The examination of the development of the definition of race and ethnicity can help make sense of how the U.S. has manufactured an infrastructure of identity difference and the construction of the immigrant “other.”

The Lamarckian views of race and heredity began to break down with the rediscovery of Gregor Mendel’s work on genetics, and scholars began shifting away from the hypothesis that social and biological factors were closely linked. The writing of William Ripley exemplifies the shift toward accepting the disjunction of race and such cultural factors as language. He wrote that while “nationality may often follow linguistic boundaries...race bears no necessary relation whatever to them.” In his writing, Ripley moved away from the Lamarckian notion that race and environment were closely linked. The concept of race, which had once been an open border where “racial transformations [accompanied] geographic locations,” was now developing into defining stricter boundaries between nation and race.

1 Ibid., 27; Hattam, In the Shadow of Race, 25.
Due to this shift, political elites began to worry over how to bind together the fabric of a nation if one’s race was not simply derived from a physical location. With the agreed upon loss of race as the binding glue of a nation, Mendelian concepts of heredity forced social scientists to redefine what it meant to be part of a nation. Nationality was no longer determined merely by “place, blood or allegiance,” rather it became a more complex notion, breaking away from the simplistic definitions of historic races. While scholars such as Richmond Mayo-Smith were optimistic about the assimilationist powers of the U.S. – noting the success such effects had on even the strongest “national peculiarities and habits” – the worry over preserving the Anglo-Saxon stock of the nation became particularly salient with the mass migrations to the U.S. beginning in the late nineteenth century.

With the creation of a dividing line between race and nation, the question arose of how to bind together different races into a cohesive polity. During this time period, as immigration to the U.S. increased, scholars began to use the terms “foreigner” and “alien” to frame their examination of immigrants, altogether distancing themselves from previous notions of race. This created their own separate classification among scholars, apart from a race or a nation, in essence creating them as an “other” in U.S. society.

Immigration thus became defined as a “question” or a “problem,” as this subset of aliens was deemed to pose a direct threat to the continuity of a nation. John Hawks Noble, another scholar of the time, defined the onslaught of immigrants as a “danger.” Noble regarded the newcomers as having “habits of thought and behavior [that were] radically different from those

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1 Hattam, *In the Shadow of Race*, 25.
3 Ibid., 431.
4 Ibid., 431.
5 Hattam, *In the Shadow of Race*, 40.
which the founders of the nation hoped to establish,” making them dangerous to the vitality of the country.¹¹ Scholars began to propagate the idea that such immigrants were “unfit to be adopted by the community” already present in the U.S., and that they posed a threat that would only grow more potent as this “foreign” and “alien” class began to grow.¹²

Immigration law and policy in the nineteenth century began to reflect these ideas of the immigrant as a racial “other” and thus a potential threat to national unity. This so-called immigration problem triggered laws and policies that created the idea that while immigrants were welcome under certain circumstances, they were considered as a distinct subsection of the U.S. population. Indeed, the country’s political tradition, while defined by an aspirational “allegiance to liberal democracy,” is often best understood as plagued by “exclusionary ascriptive beliefs” of which this late-nineteenth century emergent racialized “immigrant problem” is a clear manifestation. Rogers Smith argues that politics in the U.S. has been marked by “complex patterns of apparently inconsistent combinations of the traditions” of liberal democracy and white supremacy. His writing posits that policy and rhetoric in the U.S. is not a product of the high and mighty ideals articulated by the Framers; rather, it must be understood that U.S. political rhetoric and policy is the “product of often conflicting multiple traditions.”¹³ Consequently, exclusionary rhetoric is not antithetical to the U.S. cultural identity; rather, it is part of a longstanding tradition.

The Chinese Exclusion Acts of the early late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are excellent examples of such conflicting traditions. These laws banned the immigration of Chinese

¹² Ibid., 233.
into the U.S., but never restricted birthright citizenship as it was “enshrined in common law” thanks to *United States v. Wong Kim Ark* (1898). Smith points out that the path of such acts speaks to the existence of the multiple tradition’s thesis in the U.S. The laws “maintained a valued inclusive feature of American law” in the form of birthright citizenship, and, at the same time, the reduction of the Chinese immigrant flow “fully satisfied the increasingly powerful champions of Anglo Saxon supremacy.” This again suggests that the political tradition in the U.S. has been marked by such a dichotomy; exclusionary policies and rhetoric are not antithetical to being American, rather they are a distinct part of the country’s identity.

An examination of the history of immigration and citizenship law suggests that race and culture were the most important factors defining who was allowed to enter the U.S. and who was allowed to become a citizen. These laws and policies “sought to cultivate an Anglo-American identity within the United States through the law.” The passage of the national quotas system in 1924 further entrenched the creation of racialized politics and the hierarchical nature of twentieth century conceptions of race and ethnicity. Consequently, immigrants from Northern European countries were offered the largest quota. This policy introduction showed that U.S. politicians were unafraid of showing their commitment to preserve the country’s “European stock.”

Hattam argues that scholars began to focus intensely on assimilation. Many began to argue that “immigrants were not dispersing throughout the nation,” rather they were forming “alien colonies” that would lead to “disorder and crime.” Such clusters of foreigners presented an intense threat in the eyes of political elites to the maintaining of the Anglo-Saxon institutions

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14 Ibid., 560.
16 Ibid., 658.
17 Ibid., 659.
18 Hattam, *In the Shadow of Race*, 42.
that were supposedly integral to the nation’s unity. Early twentieth century scholarship was also marked by the view that the new immigrants of the late nineteenth century were different than those who had come before. They were perceived to be of lower classes and of different mentalities than the earlier Northern European immigrants who became the dominant force in the country. Scholars such as Madison Grant articulated the threat in warning of the dangers of lower classes of Europeans spoiling the country’s “Nordic blood.”

The belief arose that such newcomers posed a serious threat to “native Americans,” in that their increased infiltration and proliferation would lead to a devastating loss of the nation’s identity. Grant argued that the new bodies of immigrants from Italy, Slavic nations, and Ireland were “racially incompatible” with the existing racial identity of the U.S. Motivating the writing of Grant and other social scientists was the fear that intermarriage would have dire consequences for the nation’s racial purity.

Hattam describes how scholars of the age pointed to the need for assimilation policies. The perceived importance of such initiatives exemplifies both the racialization of immigration law and policy by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as how policies began to take shape that positioned newcomers as not only different but threatening. Their racial differences and the fact that many of the new immigrants to the U.S. came from countries or cultures that had previously not contributed to the population of the pre-existing country, exacerbated the belief that the newcomers were different and incompatible with the system and culture in place.

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"Ibid., 349.
"Ibid., 352.
2. Outgroup versus. Ingroup Dynamics: The Immigrant as the “Other”

The perceived threat of the “other” is a motivator for political rhetoric and public policy actions throughout history. The creation of inter-group anxiety is a particularly strong factor and it can increase the potential for virulent rhetoric, and, in extreme cases, violent actions. One needs to look no further than the late-twentieth century Rwandan Genocide to see the awful power of intergroup anxiety and how the threat of the “other” can be perceived in dangerously extreme ways. As immigration law and policy developed in the latter stages of the nineteenth century, this belief that immigrants constituted a “foreign,” “alien,” or “other” population became more entrenched.

While immigration is woven into the “racial and cultural mosaic” of our society, the anxiety of change brought by newcomers is an occurrence that has played itself out again and again over the course of U.S. history.\textsuperscript{22} The “otherness” of such immigrants and the fact that many come from diverse cultural backgrounds, dissimilar to the supposed Anglo-Saxon/Nordic hegemony, poses a perceived threat in the eyes of some to the integrity of the nation. Citizens in a host country feel threatened as they are concerned about “negative outcomes for the self,” and potential intergroup anxiety may be particularly salient if one is ignorant of the immigrants’ different customs.

The literature suggests that citizens will feel more threatened by immigrant populations who are racially different from themselves. A study conducted by Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay highlights that citizens in examined U.S. states feel more

threatened by Latino immigration, not European immigration.\textsuperscript{23} This hypothesis is directly in line with the discussion of the development of racial overtones in U.S. immigration policy and law. As the overall immigration population became more heterogeneous, political elites reacted in ways that attempted to protect the nation from the threat of the “other:” in this case the racially distinct immigrant.

Much of the research on people’s reactions toward immigration is rooted in Herbert Blumer’s theory of group position. Blumer, in looking at relationships between whites and blacks, made the important theoretical advancement that fear of the “other” would exacerbate when differences between groups became more salient through conflict.\textsuperscript{24} Blumer’s work also offers important insight into when the threat of the “other” may be less potent. He argues that when events of racial conflict or differences are not expanded upon by political elites into “big events,” potential adverse images or the perceived negative differences will be less salient.\textsuperscript{25} When political leaders, or the leaders of a certain in-groups or out-groups, actively work toward crafting rhetoric with the goal of “racial harmony,” Blumer posits that intergroup anxiety will lessen.\textsuperscript{26} However, if politicians exacerbate a perceived racial threat from an “other,” continued support from the population may increase.

The sense of threat of the “other” can be lowered in what scholars call the social contact hypothesis. While equal group status is difficult to define, animosity between groups can be decreased if “both groups expect and perceive” that they are on a level playing field. Common

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
goals offer ways for groups to come together around a “goal-oriented effort.” For example, Thomas Pettigrew argues that these may manifest themselves in the form of sports teams or other group activities. Intergroup cooperation must be “independent from intergroup competition,” and can be achieved through two differing groups of people coming together in the form of solving problems in a classroom setting or other public arena. Support of authorities, law, or custom is also integral, as with “explicit social sanction, intergroup contact is more readily accepted.”

This theory of structured contact offers important insight into when immigrants and native communities may avoid the negative effects caused by “othering”. If local politicians explicitly support and condone cultural differences, the work of Pettigrew and Blumer suggests that the fear of the “other” will subside.

The literature on out-group anxiety offers several testable explanations for how and when political actors in certain cities may employ either exclusionary or inclusionary rhetoric and policy. Racial differences certainly play their role as an explanation for the existence of exclusionary rhetoric toward an out-group and the feeling of anxiety among in-group members. For example, Brader et al. supports the claim that racial differences between immigrants and citizens in a host city can explain certain anti-immigrant reactions. While these expectations are grounded in perceptions of racial difference or histories of conflict between groups, there are also other factors that may inspire or quell anti-immigrant reactions. For example, the contact hypothesis put forth by Pettigrew offers insight into situations where animosity may be lessened.

If communities experience equal group status, work to common goals, have intergroup cooperation, and are given support by persons in authority, in-group anxiety may be lessened. A

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28 Ibid., 65.
combination or existence of several of these testable explanations can explain when and if anti-immigrant stances may emerge.

3. Economic Threat

In his canonical text on immigration policy in the U.S., *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in the United States*, Daniel Tichenor argues that “economic forces are unquestionably significant for immigration policy making.” He contends that political elites in the U.S. have, for centuries, seen the economic potential of allowing in immigrants as a valuable source of labor in order to fuel the country’s economic development. Tichenor also posits that during period of economic downturn, “immigrants can become political scapegoats for a host of societal woes.”

While he does not deny their influence, Tichenor argues that economic booms or declines cannot always perfectly explain immigration policy and the introduction of exclusionary policies towards immigrants. He employs the example of the Immigration Act of 1917 as a restrictive policy toward immigrants that was enacted during a time in which the U.S. saw “sharp increases in GDP and low unemployment.” Similarly, he cites the legislation passed under President Jimmy Carter that increased the “total annual immigration roughly 10 percent;” a policy that was enacted during a period of economic stagnation in 1979-1980. Based on this and on other cases used by Tichenor in his writing, he suggests that the model of economic causation is far from perfect.

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 21.
However, Tichenor’s assumptions have some limits. His focus is on a national scale, and while he does admit that economics play a large role in the shaping of immigration policy in the U.S., he does not attempt to tackle the issue at the state or local levels. As this thesis addresses policy and rhetoric at the more local scale, the question must be asked as to how, when, and why economic factors may influence policy on a smaller level. The literature suggests that while the economic model may be imperfect at a national level, the perceived economic threat posed by immigrants at a local level is a salient factor causing increased receptivity to anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric.

The existing literature highlights the question of whether policy decisions and rhetoric are caused by factors such as job competition, large tax burdens, or “dimming financial prospects.”\(^{32}\) The research does support the claim that some of these factors alter responses to newcomers. Most salient is the power of pessimism about the national economy as a motivator for anti-immigrant responses; however, this claim is open to “ambiguous interpretations” of what constitutes an economy in distress.\(^{33}\) While the economic causation model is far from perfect, there are certain testable explanations that can be applied to cases.

One such explanation is the theory of scapegoating which contends that perceived economic adversity “acts as a trigger for the displacement of anxiety and anger onto minority groups.” In simpler terms, it suggests that when times are bad or when “there is less to go around,” people are unlikely to share societal benefits with those who exist outside of the perceived ingroup as they will begin to blame outgroup members for their hard times.\(^{34}\)


\(^{33}\) Ibid., 876.

\(^{34}\) Ibid.
The literature suggests that the most powerful motivator of a “rational fear of competition over scarce resources” is the belief that immigration will have “economic consequences,” independent of the current economic situation.\textsuperscript{35} If there is a period of economic downturn, the literature suggests that we should see a blaming of the “other” in a society, which in more cases than not will be the minority immigrant population. Additionally, the scholarship also suggests that while economic downturns do play a role in opposition to immigration, if increased levels of economic anxiety are coupled with the arrival of a racially different immigration population, the perceived threat and opposition may be even higher than simply in times of economic duress.\textsuperscript{36} This explanation is integral to this thesis and is examined in more depth in coming chapters.

The power of the perceived economic threat is also exacerbated when media use economic or cultural anxiety in any framing of policy concern. The use of the perceived economic or cultural threat can greatly increase people’s propensity to support anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. As news media and politicians have begun to focus more on immigration related issues, the support of anti-immigrant populism has grown.\textsuperscript{37} However, the literature suggests that the use of an economic threat posed by immigrants was not as significant a motivator as when media used the wording of a perceived cultural threat.\textsuperscript{38} If media propagates information about immigrants in terms of economic threats or cultural differences or if they publish political rhetoric highlighting the same threats, we will expect to see a rise in support of anti-immigration policy and political rhetoric.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 876-877.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 224.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
While the literature does not discount the motivating economic fears that immigrants will
take jobs or create a drain on the economy, twenty-first century immigration policy and rhetoric
has been intensely motivated by racial prejudices as well. This claim is supported in the literature
by a study looking at the enactment of anti-immigrant legislation after the Great Recession as
there is a “clear relationship” between the financial burdens felt by states and the increased
“restrictive/punitive immigration policy enactment across the American states.”39 The authors of
the aforementioned study make the important point that states experienced changing
demographics during this same time frame. The data suggest that the growth of the Latino
population has played a large role in the increased restrictive immigration policy across the U.S.
This theory supports the power of the racialization of immigration policy and perception in the
country. While economic pressures do play a role in the enacting of more anti-immigrant policy,
their impact “must be considered alongside the growth and presence of
racialized...populations.”40

This research posits that if economic fear motivators are present – such as the fear that
immigrants will create job competition or if the economy is on a serious downturn – and if the
immigrant population is of a different race from the dominant white culture in the U.S., the
arousal of anti-immigrant rhetoric will be present and potent.41 If an economic downturn occurs
in conjunction with the arrival of a racialized “other” group of immigrants, we should expect to
see an increased presence of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric.

39 Vickie D. Ybarra, Lisa M. Sanchez, and Gabriel R. Sanchez, “Anti-immigrant Anxieties in State Policy:
40 Ibid., 329.
41 Burns and Gimpel, “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration
Policy,” 224.
Even though scholars have continually downplayed certain roles of economic factors in the production of support for anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric, studies do support the claim that specific economic factors do play a role in the arousal of such hostility. On more local scale, less-skilled workers in a community “are significantly more likely to prefer limiting immigrant inflow into the United States.” This is a statistically “robust” result that has important implications, as the data suggest that areas with higher populations of low-skilled workers will be more in support of exclusive policy and rhetoric, while areas with higher levels of high-skilled workers will be more open to more liberal and inclusionary policy.

An important consideration highlighted by the literature is also whether or not immigrants and natives work in the same or different industries. While it has already been suggested that less-skilled workers will be more wary and more fearful of an increased flow of immigrants, further scholarship also contends that if “immigrants tend to work in the same industries as a particular subgroup of natives” the negative effects of newcomers’ arrivals will be exacerbated. High “immigrant share” industries are identified to be in “low-wage manufacturing jobs” such as in apparel, miscellaneous manufacturing, and textiles. Additionally, jobs in “private household services, hotels and motels…and transportation services” are also identified as being arenas in which the economic threat posed by natives and immigrants working in close quarters may be magnified.

This explanation is also closely linked as to what kind of skill-level immigrants both high and low-skilled respondents in a host country are receptive to. The literature suggests that

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43 Ibid., 144.
respondents of both skill levels “strongly prefer high-skilled immigrants over low-skilled immigrants.” If a state or locale is taking in many high skilled immigrants, there will be a dearth of restrictive policies. While not examined in further chapters, this explanation suggests the power of perceived economic threat in causing increased receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric.

The research also points to the power of public finances and their ability to influence support of anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy. In states and cities with “high fiscal exposure,” “poor natives” are much more likely to be opposed to immigration. When an “overcrowding” of public services is perceived to occur, anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric may flare up. Closely linked to the theory of scapegoating is the belief that immigrants pose a significant burden on the public services offered by either the municipal or federal government. Jeffrey Passel and Michael Fix contend that this issue has developed into “the most hotly contested question in U.S. immigration.” Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox note that the belief that immigrant groups are posing a burden to the financial health of a locality or are simply freely benefiting from programs in place are serious motivators for the arousal of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. Based on this tax burden hypothesis, if there is a perceived “negative assessment” of the costs of immigration on publicly offered services, opposition to immigration will rise. This explanation is integral to this thesis and is examined in more depth in later chapters.

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2. Ibid.
The economic threat here is thus not perceived on an “economic self-interest” level, as such concerns over more individual threats are largely discredited, rather the literature supports the explanation that the threats to services offered by a city or state may be more powerful. If immigrants are perceived to be taking advantage publicly offered services, there will be an increased opposition to their presence. However, if a city or state has fewer visibly offered public services, support of anti-immigrant rhetoric or policy may be lessened.

Among these publicly offered services, the topic of welfare has emerged as the most powerful motivator of anti-immigrant sentiment among the populace and policy and rhetoric from elected leaders. In a study conducted in the United Kingdom by Christian Dustmann and Ian P. Preston, concerns over welfare were associated with negative changes in public opinion. While it is not the goal nor within the bounds of this thesis to research public sentiment, the thoughts and feelings of a populace have effects on the adopted policy and rhetoric of municipal politicians. The findings of Dustmann and Preston suggest that concerns of welfare burdens are potent motivators of anti-immigrant sentiment among a populace. This finding is robust as it is in-line with multiple other studies that have identified welfare concerns as an integral motivator of anti-immigrant feelings, which leads to anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric.

4. The Presence of a Creative Class

This section examines the scholarship of Richard Florida and his explanation for differing paths of economic development in cities in the United States. Florida’s work contends that the major factors influencing economic success have recently changed. While cities with robust manufacturing options, massive corporations, or large firms were once seen as the gold standard...
in fostering economic vitality, Florida posits that other sites, attractions, and institutions now create the driving force behind cities’ economic opportunities. He states that “museums, art galleries, and concert halls, as well as high-end shopping districts and bohemian artist enclaves,” and diverse recreation opportunities now represent attributes that attract a highly educated and desirable workforce known as the “creative class.”\(^5\) His central thesis suggests that the presence of persons of this creative class within an urban area can attribute to that locale’s economic growth.

Building on Florida’s scholarship and other related pieces in the secondary literature, this section puts forth testable explanations as to why Lewiston and Portland have experienced different levels of economic development. By highlighting these explanations, this section contends that the presence of creative class individuals can lower economic anxiety indicators, create a more welcoming diverse environment, and, in turn, create a space in which anti-immigrant is not tolerated – thereby incentivizing politicians to put forth pro-immigrant policy and rhetoric.

This creative class is defined as persons who work as “scientists, architecture and design professionals, artists and entertainment industry professionals,” among other professions, and as a large presence of “gay, foreign born…[or] artistically creative bohemians” in a certain area.\(^5\) While somewhat loosely defined, the creative class can be considered as individuals who “earn their money by means of creative thinking, designing, and producing,” rather than by more traditional business or manufacturing methods.\(^5\) Florida contends that urban regeneration and

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economic development are now driven by the presence of such persons with higher levels of education and by cities that have the institutions necessary to attract such people to their locales.  

Florida writes that the conventional wisdom in economic theory held that urban development was driven by “companies, firms, and industries” located in specific cities. Previous scholarship focused solely on the location of large industries or companies as motivators for economic development; however, community partnerships, vibrancy of neighborhoods, and the presence of certain cultural institutions creating an attractive city culture were largely ignored. In redefining the scholarship on urban development in the United States, Florida contends that “human capital” has a large amount of influence on such processes and that “economic and lifestyle considerations both matter” in how a certain area experiences an economic upswing. This goes directly against the older concept that the presence of a large business alone would contribute to a city’s economic rise. The work of Florida and others suggests that the presence of other institutions that can attract the creative class of individuals is necessary.

While he does not fully rule out the presence of major industry or companies as a motivating factor, key to Florida’s thesis is the idea that this newly defined creative class does not merely choose their city of inhabitation solely by the industry or well-known multinational corporation, but rather they choose “cities that match their tastes and interests” outside of purely the professional atmosphere. In this way, Florida’s concept builds on the work of Richard Putnam and his social capital theory.

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54 See footnote 4 in Chapter Four for a discussion on the critiques of Florida’s work.
56 Hospers and van Dalm, “How to create a creative city?,” 9.
Putnam contends that “regional economic growth is associated with tight-knit communities where people and firms form and share strong ties,” Florida’s research suggests that these processes may actually inhibit growth. Through his interview process, Florida noted that his subjects were more in search of a “quasi-anonymity,” where they could exist with relatively weak ties to a greater community. This suggests that economic development potential may now be more potent in areas lacking outdated social structures that are more exclusive, “restricting, and invasive.” While once thought to be beneficial, Florida posits that these structures create larger barriers to entry and effectively “shut out newcomers.”

Florida contends that economic development is stronger in areas with “inclusive and socially diverse arrangements” that allow for inhabitants to feel a sense of community but not be burdened by the same past restrictions placed on people, especially those in minorities who could not easily gain access to the same communities. Places with weaker ties and fewer strict community structures are more “open to newcomers and thus promote novel combinations of resources and ideas.” This suggests that cities with fewer exclusive community structures and an acceptance of new forms of social interaction will more readily experience economic growth due to the presence of creative class individuals.

Florida builds on the human capital theory that contends that people, not companies, are the driving force behind economic development. He adds to this principle by introducing his own creative capital theory. Florida posits that creative people, as a distinct class, are most responsible for the economic growth of a region and that they choose areas based on certain attributes and attractive qualities. In this way, he explains that cities are not arbitrarily chosen as

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57 Florida, “Cities and the Creative Class,” 5.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
creative class destinations; rather a series of attributes factor into becoming an attractive location for this class.

4.A Attracting the Creative Class

The genesis of Florida’s concept began during his time at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, a city with historically strong ties to manufacturing and industry, but an area that had seen its fair share of young professionals leaving – preferring instead to relocate to cities such as Austin, Boston, San Francisco, or even smaller, lesser-known urban areas. Florida states that cities like Pittsburgh, who have spent in vain large quantities of money to create more attractive downtown options for large, creative-oriented business, have lost out to other cities away from traditional economic hubs. He notes that cities such as Pittsburgh, with rich histories of manufacturing and industry, tend to become “trapped by their past” and are “unwilling or unable to do what it takes to attract the creative class.” This suggests that if a city has a long, storied history with a defining industry, it may be less likely to quickly adapt and formulate a plan to attract creative class individuals.

While some cities, such as Chicago, have been able to maintain both a traditional industrial economy and new creative class of individuals based solely on the city’s immense size, Florida’s scholarship examines why other, smaller, less well-known cities have recently become hubs to the new development. This work ties directly into the further examination of Portland, Maine, as to how and why a small city on the East Coast has seen economic development increase in recent years, even though it lacks and has even lost major industry and manufacturing jobs that once supported the city’s economy. Florida’s work suggests that simply the building of

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“ Ibid., 23.
new office space, the renovation of older buildings, and the attraction of major companies cannot solely explain the rise of cities in the twenty-first century. While this has taken place in Portland and in Lewiston, this thesis seeks to elucidate differences in the two city’s development.

Florida contends that places become centers for the creative class for many reasons. He posits that if cities have “low entry barriers for people” and are able to make newcomers feel quickly “accepted” by the city’s culture, they will more easily attract members of the creative class. This ties into the aforementioned discussion of whether or not a specific city has the strong and exclusive community structures that defined certain areas in the past. Exclusive structures such as an ethnic-group making up the majority in an area or a city focused on a certain industry may suggest higher barriers to entry for newcomers. Florida terms cities that are able to quickly adapt and welcome newcomers as “plug and play communities;” areas where “anyone can fit in quickly.”

Key to a city being seen as “accepting” is the presence of a diverse populace. Florida suggests a link between his scholarship and that of Gary Gates who focuses on the “location pattern of gay people.” Both the work of Gates and Florida suggested a large overlap on cities with high percentages of creative class members and areas with high numbers of gay individuals. Florida writes that “talented people seek [environments] that are open to differences.” In such communities, people are exposed to a variety of different family backgrounds, cultures, and other sources of inspiration needed to drive forth an economy. “Visible diversity” can aid an area in becoming a hotspot for creative class individuals.

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64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
Florida notes that diversity remains important to the creative class in terms of entertainment and recreational options and not solely racial or sexual diversity of an area. Important to the attraction of this class is the presence of a diverse selection of choices for nightlife, arts, and other various forms of entertainment and recreation. A creative class-attracting city is not one with many chain restaurants and big-box stores near its downtown. Florida also contends that this new driving economic force of individuals prefer “participatory recreation over passive, institutionalized forms.” He notes that the creative class is particularly attracted to cities that can offer a “teeming blend of cafes, sidewalk musicians, and small galleries and bistros.” Through the presence of such institutions and activities, they are able to seek the “stimulation” they desire and continue to interact in more modern, less structured forms of interaction.

The work of Florida suggests that for cities to attract creative class individuals, they must have a diverse set of cultural, recreational, and entertainment offerings outside of merely employment that can attract individuals. Based on this scholarship, if a city has “a solid mix of high-tech industry, plentiful outdoor amenities, and an older urban center” that retains some of its historical charm, the population of creative class individuals will increase thus injecting an economic lifeblood into the respective city.

4.B Creative Class Members and Immigration

This thesis’ central focus remains to examine how and why politicians in Lewiston and Portland have developed remarkably different rhetorical platforms in terms of their stances.

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66 Ibid., 21.
67 Ibid., 21.
68 Ibid.
toward recent immigrants. It is important to discuss the links between the work of Florida on creative class individuals and the effects that the presence of such a population can have on the overall tolerance and political leanings of an area. This section examines the links between such scholarship and examines how the presence of a young, diverse, group of individuals participating in the creative economy may welcome newcomers and a racialized “other.”

The work of Elaine Sharp and Mark Joslyn suggests a correlation between areas with more creative class individuals and higher levels of racial tolerance. As the immigrant communities most recently arrived in Maine are primarily areas in Africa and are of a different racial background than the majority of the native residents, the work of Sharp and Joslyn remains highly relevant in this context. The previous work of Sharp suggests that there exists a relationship between cities with large populations of creative class individuals and a different view on “urban politics and policy making,” than cities of the more traditional mindset, again underlining the claim that the presence of creative class individuals may drastically change the political atmosphere of a city.69

Building on this previous scholarship, Sharp and Joslyn find “dramatic evidence” that cities with larger percentages of creative class individuals are likely to experience lower levels of perceived racial threat. White persons living in such contexts can “experience a higher level of minority-group presence without the racial threat dynamic taking hold than can whites living in cities with traditional subculture.”70 This ties into the work of Florida suggesting that cities with large populations of creative class individuals are markedly different in terms of economic development, culture, and, as suggested by the work of Sharp and Joslyn, how they perceive and react to a racialized “other.”

69 Sharp and Joslyn, “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America,” 574.
70 Ibid., 589.
This scholarship contends that if a city has higher percentages of creative class individuals, the respective city’s electorate may support, and subsequently vote into office, elected officials who do not espouse anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy. As stated by the work of Florida, creative class individuals look to relocate to cities wherein diversity remains a core tenet of that city’s professed culture. Candidates who do not proclaim these values as core to their campaigns are unlikely to succeed in cities where this new political culture has taken hold.

5. Normalization of Right-Wing Rhetoric

As our current political climate has changed dramatically over the past decade, one of the most noticeable changes is how certain “formerly taboo subjects and expressions” are now entering mainstream discourse. Ruth Wodak defines this phenomenon as the rise of “normalization” of certain rhetoric in the political sphere. She posits that the limits of what is acceptable has shifted and that both our conventional rules and what we permit as acceptable political discourse has drastically changed.\(^7\) Rhetoric and or action that was once regarded as a politician’s downfall has now become permissible and even heralded by the voting public. Wodak grounds her claim in the rise of right-wing populism in Western politics, and her examination of the development and consequences of this trend brings to light certain more salient issues in the local context.

This section highlights explanations for how such rhetoric has been normalized and it examine this type of discourse’s implications on a state-level. It also works to elucidate links between the origins of such normalization and the already mentioned sources of economic and

cultural threat as they both affect anti-immigrant rhetoric. This section seeks to tie these sources together in an effort to synthesize the extent of the testable explanations set forth in this chapter. Furthermore, it offers testable explanations for how the normalization of right-wing rhetoric can have repercussions at the city-level in the state of Maine.

5A Rise of Support for Right-Wing Actors

Populism is defined by a belief that there exists a corrupted, elite political class who are at direct odds with “the people.” Populist politicians attempt to situate and portray themselves as the only actors capable of truly representing “the people’s” wishes in the political sphere.\(^72\) Populists create an “us vs. them” dichotomy in their rhetoric and seek to exacerbate divisions to drum up support for their own viewpoints.\(^73\) This is evident in both left-wing and right-wing populist rhetoric, as both sides claim to represent the wishes of the people against the power of the all-powerful elite. However, right-wing populists add another nuance to this definition. Many politicians who consider themselves members of this school of thought choose to assume that the people they represent are “culturally homogenous” and that they are at risk of being overrun and sullied by the “others,” mainly immigrants and minorities, whom they paint to be supported by the corrupt, political elite.\(^74\) By infusing this vehemently xenophobic rhetoric into their speeches and campaign platforms, right-wing populists show their differences from left-wing political actors.

Right-wing actors define the population they represent in clear terms and make no mistake in creating stark divisions between native residents and the “other,” or the threat that

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\(^73\) Wodak, “‘Driving on the Right.’”

\(^74\) Ibid.
poses a large problem to the continued success of a country. In this way, the literature on the normalization of right-wing rhetoric ties into the aforementioned discussion of outgroup anxiety theory. As previously stated, if political actors employ a rhetoric of racial threat and exacerbate differences among communities, the research of Herbert Blumer suggests that support for anti-immigrant policy will expand. Inversely, if politicians work toward creating “racial harmony,” Blumer posits that support for anti-immigrant rhetoric will decrease.\(^7\) The work of Blumer suggests that as right-wing populists gain more traction and explicitly state anti-immigrant positions, their words may drum up more continued support for their policies within a local context.

Thomas Greven also notes that right-wing politicians also tactically use “negativity” in their discourse. Greven argues that they throw out “political correctness;” preferring instead to declare immigrants or other minorities as enemies of the people through the use of over-the-top, sometimes violent, rhetorical devices. This allows right-wing actors to “allow the staging of calculated provocations and scandals” and the exacerbation of minor issues into hot-button topics. Due to their brazen provocations, Greven also notes that their discourse is often picked up by media outlets and given greater prominence in the news cycle, furthering the reach of their previously hidden viewpoints. He posits that this is directly connected to the rising “market demands” for media, the seemingly never-ending news cycles, and the need for click-bait headlines.\(^6\)

The mainstreaming of anti-immigrant, racist rhetoric and professed policy of the right-wing populists has occurred in large part due to the “politics of provocation.”\(^7\) This provocation

\(^7\) Blumer, “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position,” 3.


has led many newly powerful populists across the globe to demand a “witch-hunt” of the “liberal elite,” whom they blame for many of the woes of the populace. This tactic of blame has become an integral part of the mainstreaming of right-wing discourse. The central claim to this argument has been defined as the “pitting [of the] ‘the people’ against an out-of-touch elite.” This elite is portrayed as a “parasitical class” that seeks to only further enrich themselves at the expense of the downtrodden people. This is suggested by Trump’s repeated saying that he represents the “silent majority” within the United States. While not necessarily a radically new statement in the United States’ political discourse, Trump has brought this phrase back into the limelight.

It is important again to stress that this tactic has not been used solely by the right-wing populists across the globe; rather, liberal politicians have used similar methods. Bart Cammaerts argues that the rhetoric of “99% vs 1%” surrounding the Occupy movements created a divide between the people and the greedy capitalist system. However, Cammaerts contends that the methods of division used by the populist right have not used words that create “inclusive equivalences,” rather they have been articulated in much more exclusive and divisive manners. By highlighting the exclusive themes and content in right wing rhetoric, clear connections can be seen between these rhetorical devices, the psychological scholarship on outgroup anxiety, and the way politicians create in-groups and out-groups in order to induce divisions.

While Cammaerts writes extensively on Dutch and Flemish national identities, he posits that the creation of “the people” as a community remains integral to the creation and normalization of extreme right-wing rhetoric beyond the European context. By creating the myth that a native population is somehow “better” and “more virtuous” than a group of perceived

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78 Ibid.
outsiders, Cammaerts posits that the creation of a “convincing and imminent threat must be created.”

This notion builds off Jacques Derrida’s idea of the “constitutive outside.” Derrida contends that social relations are born of “the construction of antagonistic relations between social agents inside and outside.” By creating such a harsh dichotomy, right-wing populist politicians create an evil that warrants a fear from the “people.” After the genesis of a fear, politicians then are able to justify “extreme measures and solutions” that are outlined in their extremist rhetoric. As long as a fear exists, right-wing actors argue that the use of normally uncouth rhetoric and policy can be justified.

In his work on the rise of far-right parties in Europe, Matt Golder argues that there are three primary motivators contributing to the appeal of far-right parties in the twenty-first century. He lists these as “modernization grievances, economic grievances and cultural grievances.” Golder argues that from these factors, one can understand the rise of far-right politicians and how their professed policy resounds with the populations that have so recently voted them into power across the globe.

Recent studies point that the far-right’s recent rise to power can be attributed to so-called modernization grievances felt by workers across the globe. Golder states that the stereotypical scenario that motivates such grievances is the story in which an individual is “unable to cope with rapid and fundamental societal change … and turns to the far right.” These persons, unable to keep up with the rapidly globalizing economy, feel left behind and, as suggested by the theory of economic scapegoating, are in search of someone or some group of people on whom

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Ibid., 10.


Ibid., 44.


Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 482.

Ibid., 483.
they can assign blame. Golder contends that these modernization grievances oftentimes affect lower skill workers who are “adversely affected by the shift to a globalized and postindustrial economy.”

This theory is directly linked to the notions suggested by Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter in the previous section on Economic Threat. While mainly speaking of motivations for anti-immigrant positions, Scheve and Slaughter, like Golder, contend that differences in skill levels among workers remains a potent reason influencing their political positions. These workers, who were able to maintain solidly middle-class existences in the postwar economic system lack the “human capital” needed to gain access into similar jobs in the newly globalized economy. This loss of employment engenders a rising feeling of resentment among populations that have been left behind by the changing economy and are subsequently left more open to the “simplistic and nativist appeals of the far right.”

Golder also suggests that persons in communities that feel left behind by the changing economy may also less likely to support mainstream political parties. He posits that persons may perceive a certain “inability” among politicians who profess to be part of the entrenched political establishment. As suggested by this literature, if a political actor utilizes rhetoric or takes positions that differentiate themselves from the political mainstream, they may find more support in communities that identify as being forgotten by the newly globalized economy.

In terms of modernization grievances, Michael Minkenberg also posits that the process of modernizing the global economy has eroded away at people’s “traditional social and political

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“ Ibid.
“ Ibid.
With the loss of major industry in cities across the globe and the United States, workers, who formerly derived their place in society from identification with a certain job, factory, or employer, were left with no structure to bind themselves together either politically or socially. Minkenberg contends that individuals who remain without their former social glue and who feel as though the economy or certain political leaders have left them behind will be more likely to be swayed by right-wing rhetoric and candidates that “promise an elimination of pressures and a simpler, better society.”

Golder posits that economic grievances are also motivating factors in the rise and subsequent normalization of right-wing populists and their rhetoric. In times of “economic scarcity” or in locales with limited economic opportunities, he suggests that politicians who use rhetoric to “exploit...economic grievances by linking immigrants and minorities to economic hardship” will see more support for the policies. However, Golder does make the important point that “the impact of economic contextual factors on far-right success has been undertheorized” and that there is a dearth of literature on the subject. He states the high unemployment may not always correlate into support for right-wing politicians’ anti-immigrant rhetoric if the labor market is so constricted due to “labor market rigidities.” However, Golder does contend that if there is a belief that unemployment is high because of immigration, support for right wing actors will rise. This suggests that simply looking at unemployment data may create an inaccurate depiction of the situation in a certain context.

While imperfect at certain levels, Golder’s research does remain in line with the scholarship on economic threat’s influence on immigration. Citrin et al. state that if there is “less

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92 Ibid., 175.
to go around” in terms of a city’s economic opportunities, the propensity to support anti-immigrant politicians will be higher.\textsuperscript{94} When combined with the work of Golder, this scholarship suggests that if politicians take advantage of an economic downturn in an area and blame an immigrant “other” for the woes of the native population, they will see increased support for their rhetoric.

Finally, Golder underlines the power of cultural grievances in support for right-wing politicians. He uses the framework of Social Identity Theory to suggest that “individuals have a natural tendency to associate with similar individuals.”\textsuperscript{95} If far right parties or candidates are able to highlight the supposed “incompatibility” of a certain new group with the native residents, Golder posits that success will follow in terms of support for their platforms. The power of cultural grievances has been shown to be an especially potent motivator and a large reason for the rise of right-wing parties. Golder does suggest that cultural grievance and threat arguments may not function in areas where there exists a “widespread norm against prejudice and discrimination.”\textsuperscript{96} Scott Blinder, Robert Ford and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten posit that anti-immigrant politicians will remain unsuccessful in areas where they are not seen as legitimate or viewed as contrary to a majority party’s viewpoints.\textsuperscript{97}

Golder’s three main grievance arguments work to combine the already examined secondary literature and seek to put forth combined testable explanations that can explain the arousal and persistence of anti-immigrant rhetoric in this thesis’ chosen case studies.

\begin{itemize}
\item “Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong, “Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations,” 859.
\item Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” 485.
\item Ibid.
\end{itemize}
5.B Paul LePage and Norm-breaking in Maine

The rise of Donald Trump and the reformation of the Republican Party into one centered around right-wing populism has its roots in former GOP presidents. Ronald Reagan targeted “African-American welfare recipients to win northern suburban voters,” and George W. Bush played upon people’s unease with gay marriage in order to win election. The Obama presidency in conjunction with the rising power of the Tea Party movement allowed for right-wing populist rhetoric to begin to make forays into the Republican mainstream. Trump, by repeatedly using phrases such as “illegal immigrants” or “Mexican rapists and murders,” has in turn succeeded on playing into the creation of an ingroup vs. outgroup dynamic as suggested by Cammaerts. While Trump has certainly thrust these right-wing views into every facet of the national media and conversation, the case study of Maine suggests that its former governor efficiently espoused formerly taboo right-wing rhetoric from an executive office before Trump was elected into office.

Paul LePage, the former Republican Governor of Maine, has compared himself to the current president. Going so far as to say that “[He was] Donald Trump before Donald Trump became popular.” Like Trump, LePage and other right-wing political actors have seen recent electoral success across the globe. The scholarship suggests that the rise of such politicians can largely be attributed to the growth of media and the accessibility of said news.

While “there is little systematic research on why the media adopts the strategies that it does,” some scholars contend that as media outlets compete for advertising revenue they are

more likely to cover far right actors in an effort to “obtain larger audiences.” With competition increasing to have larger market shares, media companies have been tempted “to adopt a sensationalist black-and-white style and to focus its attention on the more extreme and scandalous aspects of politics that are central to the far right’s populist appeal.” With increased media coverage, Stefaan Walgraeve and Knut De Swert posit that media coverage does not solely help in terms of expanding a far right candidate or party’s visibility; rather, they increase the salient nature of the group’s viewpoints by simply covering their speeches, rallies, or campaign platforms. Walgraeve and De Swert argue that with extended coverage by nationally recognized outlets, right-wing leaders are able to exacerbate the support for their party. They contend that “steady exposure to news media content [can] have a diffuse influence on attitudes and opinions” and thereby whom a voting public is likely to support in an election. With an increased prominence and reporting on such issues, the media has succeeded in catapulting formerly fringe candidate’s opinions into the mainstream thought.

In terms of the context of Maine, with the help of increased media exposure, Paul LePage’s comments gradually brought him further into the mainstream throughout his candidacy and his term as Governor. Articles such as a 2016 piece in the New York Times entitled “How Controversial is Paul LePage? Here’s a Partial List” allowed for his comments to be dispersed throughout the state and the country. As suggested by Walgraeve and De Swert, by simply commenting on such issues, the New York Times and other papers allowed for his rhetoric to become part of the mainstream dialogue. Further chapters of this thesis argue that LePage’s

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101 Ibid.
103 Ibid., 483.
election allowed for the normalization of his, as put by Wodak, “formerly taboo” rhetoric and professed policy. This thesis posits that his election and time in office allowed for issues such as severely racist, anti-immigration, and anti-immigrant viewpoints to become part of the quotidian discussion among lawmakers and citizens in the state of Maine. LePage’s time in office and the comments he made during this period allowed for the repeated election of Robert Macdonald and the saliency of his statements on immigrants in the city of Lewiston.

Conclusion

This chapter has offered explanations as to how and when political actors may adopt either pro or anti-immigrant rhetoric or policy decisions. The research suggests that a nuanced approach must be taken to understand how such decisions are made. From this chapter, the immensity and complexity of the immigration question in the United States can be understood.

Consequently, while there is a large breadth of testable explanations put forth by this chapter, this thesis will test only those that can be observed in the available data and can be answered within the boundaries of the question that this thesis asks. To restate, the goal of this thesis is to examine how economic development and cultural differences between the cities of Lewiston and Portland can explain the very different framing of immigrants in local politicians’ policy and rhetoric. The chapters to follow seek to verify these explanations with available data. As suggested by this chapter, the scholarship for how and when anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric is highly interlinked, and further chapters elucidate links between multiple sections of the existing scholarship.

Chapter One highlights the racialization of the immigration debate in the United States and then embarks on a detailed explanation of economic and racial factors that contribute to the rise of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric from municipal politicians. Integral to this chapter is
the concept that differing levels of economic anxiety and the racial identity of a new group can play a large role in the framing of immigration in the local political context. Important as well is the work of Richard Florida which suggests that certain factors, populations, or events in a city’s past may make it more hospitable toward members of the creative class, and therefore experience more economic success and mitigated effects from the arrival of a racially different “other” in their midst. Finally, this chapter highlights how political rhetoric has changed over the past decade and how, as Golder suggests, politicians are capitalizing on cultural, economic, and modernization grievances in efforts to create stark divides between populations. Important to take away from this chapter is that the exacerbation of anti-immigrant sentiment is not the direct result of solely perceived economic or racial threats; rather, it is an amalgamation that engenders municipal politicians to adopt certain positions.

Through the understanding of these concepts, this thesis moves into an historical narrative of Lewiston and Portland in Chapter Two. By focusing on each city’s economic and immigration histories, this chapter seeks to highlight areas where the testable explanations derived from Chapter One may be applied. The following chapter serves as a narrative through which important events and decisions are highlighted – events and decisions that are explored in more depth in Chapters Three, Four, and Five.
Chapter Two - Narrative History of Lewiston and Portland

This chapter explores Maine’s immigration history and how different waves of newcomers, over the past 150 years, have been received by persons already resident in the state. It pays particular attention to how differences in religion, language, and culture present in specific cities have contributed to the rise of anti-immigrant policy or rhetoric. This chapter traces the economic histories of Lewiston and Portland in an effort to shed a light on the divergence in municipal politicians’ rhetoric between the two cities. By examining the immigration and local history of Maine and of its two largest metropolitan areas, this chapter highlights similarities between the two cities and also bring to light ways in which the areas have diverged over the past 25 years. This chapter is broken into three sections. The first part is a brief overview of Maine’s earliest populations and how original European settlement began. The second part concerns the history of Lewiston and its waves of immigration. The third part is an examination of Maine’s largest city: Portland.

Within the discussion of Lewiston, particular attention is paid to the Franco-American and Somali communities in this area and how each group was treated upon arrival. It seeks to underline the city’s anti-immigrant past and the perceived threat that these newcomers have posed to people already resident in the area. This section highlights the economic fortunes of Lewiston, and how these factors have played a role in immigration and reaction to immigrants in the area. It concludes by discussing the conflicting political movements present in the city today, with an eye toward suggesting case studies of particularly important moments of junctures that help to explain how each city has trended in distinct directions in terms of its political rhetoric and policy toward immigrant populations.
The third section on Portland describes the city’s early settlement and population growth. It then looks to the sizeable Irish community in Portland and the discrimination faced by this first major wave of immigration into the city. This part of the chapter pays particular attention to the economic situation in the city and it describes how the city’s fortunes have importantly changed over the past 25 years. After the economic discussion, it describes the most recent arrivals to the city from racially diverse backgrounds and looks at recent developments with regard to policy and rhetoric directed toward immigrants from Portland’s municipal politicians.

This chapter finishes with a conclusion that highlights events and junctures present in Chapter Two that prove important in understanding how Lewiston and Portland have developed different trajectories in their urban policy and the rhetoric of their politicians. By bringing these specific cases to the forefront, this chapter puts forth a plan for the subsequent chapters to explain how and why these cities have responded differently to immigrants. Parallel but different events in the cities’ institutions, economic fortunes, and elections suggest a divergence over the past 25 years. In other words, Chapter Two sets the stage for deeper examinations in later chapters and offers context to examine the critical junctures that explain the divergence of immigrant-related policy and rhetoric in Lewiston and Portland.

Using these junctures, the chapter sheds light onto the origins of difference in political rhetoric and professed policy from the two cities’ politicians. The conclusion again gives the reader indication as to the importance of the following case studies, and how the testable explanations derived from the literature examined in Chapter One can be applied to these two cities in Maine.
1. Maine: A State Built on Immigration

Maine, much like the rest of the United States, has been built on the backs of various waves of immigration. Its immigration history began with the earliest occupants of the American continent who migrated across the Bering Strait and traversed vast territory to begin to populate what would become Maine. This area’s first inhabitants were Native Americans of the Wabanaki Confederacy who bound together to “decide mutually advantageous policies, and to better deal with Iroquois threats from the west.”¹ Maine’s native population was first threatened by European coastal explorations in the sixteenth century, and subsequently in the early-seventeenth century the first trading post was established by the English in coastal Maine. The arrival of English and French traders in the more northern parts of the territory signaled the fall of the Native American population, and the state’s original inhabitants were quickly reduced in numbers due to war and disease.²

Conflicts between the French and the British reached a breaking point with the French and Indian War in 1763 and followed with the subsequent expulsion of the French from New England. The lack of French influence in eastern and northern Maine opened up much more of the state to settlement and the area was settled by mainly English colonists. This first major push into the state’s interior brought with it the first major wave of immigration into Maine and defined the state’s Yankee Protestant hegemony for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, as this chapter further explains, changing economic conditions and international events brought with them new waves of immigration and different peoples into Maine from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present day.

² Ibid.
2. Lewiston’s History

Up until the latter portion of the nineteenth century, Lewiston and its environs had changed little in terms of demography, population size, or industry. It was a community centered around agriculture that had seen very little expansion since its original incorporation as a settlement by the first Europeans, mainly people of English ancestry. The city’s overall population was merely 900 people in 1800, and it took another decade to raise the population by another 100. However, the advent of the Civil War and the years leading up to this great conflict brought with them rapid change, expansion, and new arrivals to the city. In 1819, Michael Little made the first forays into harnessing the Androscoggin River’s potential, and he established a site on the banks for a “carding and woolen mill.” Following Little’s construction of a small factory, larger industry began to follow.

Soon afterward, a group of local men founded the Great Androscoggin Falls, Dam, Lock and Canal Company and began to investigate the possibility of constructing an establishment on a much larger scale that what had been seen before in Central Maine. However, they lacked the expertise and capital to fund and fully plan such a project. Changing tactics, they renamed their business the Lewiston Water Power Company and began to work to attract the money of important East Coast businessmen by selling shares in said company. Investors recognized the manufacturing potential of the Androscoggin River and by the 1850s the Lewiston Water Power Company “owned most of the land, the mill sites, and the rights to the river power.” By the eve of the Civil War, a number of mills had been established on the banks both by the original

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company, spearheaded by the Boston industrialist Benjamin Bates, and by companies who had leased spots and built mills of their own.

The start of the Civil War created an industrial boom in Lewiston, as the millowners had cleverly stocked up southern cotton before the first shots were fired in the chance that a conflict broke out. Due to this shrewd decision making, the mills of Lewiston were able to corner the cotton market in the northern states and create sustained economic success that positioned Lewiston as one of the foremost economic powerhouses in New England. The lack of cotton being exported from the South turned the Lewiston mill owner’s reserves into a valuable resource that gave the city an enormous advantage.

The fast expansion of the mills and Lewiston’s unprecedented economic success created a need for labor. The original millworkers were mainly women and children from the Yankee community that had settled the city and the surrounding countryside. These Yankees were mainly made up of the original English and other northwestern European Protestant peoples who had come to settle Maine after the expulsion of the French presence in the late-eighteenth century. However, as Lewiston’s economy its need for more workers grew as well.

2. A Growth of the Immigrant Community

The incredible demand for labor created a draw that was felt around the Northeast and the world. Indeed, by 1870, Lewiston’s population had almost doubled from 7,000 to 13,700. Many different immigrant groups were drawn to the mills, with the Lewiston School Department census of 1913 taking note of families from “American, Irish, French, German, Italian, Greek,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1} Ibid, 4.}\]
Jewish, Polish, Dutch, Belgian, Syrian, Albanian, ‘Canadian’ (indicating Anglo- and Irish-Canadians) and ‘colored.’”

The first major wave of immigration to the city was “a large influx of Irish” during the 1840s. These arrivals built many of the canals and mills in Lewiston and took on jobs that were seen as unsavory to the Yankee community. However, they were quickly followed by an even greater influx from Canada. The post-Civil War population boom was the first time that French-Canadians began to arrive en-masse in Lewiston to work in the mills. In 1870, only a couple hundred Franco-Americans lived in the city; however, by 1875 there were over 3,000, and their impact on both Lewiston and the surrounding area was unprecedented. Their arrival forever changed the demography and culture of the city and created a distinctly French flavor that has extended into the present-day. The Franco-American presence and their conflicts and interactions with the existing community in Lewiston set the stage for the complex immigration history of the cities.

The original Franco-American arrivals were an already “geographically mobile” population that had important roots on both sides of the Atlantic and had made journeys across both Canada and the United States before coming to Lewiston permanently. The first forays of French-Canadians into Maine occurred during the early-nineteenth century to work in lumber camps. These original short-term voyages in the state allowed the French-Canadians to realize the budding economic potential and opportunities for employment. The extension of the Grand

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4 Rice-DeFosse and Myall, *The Franco-Americans of Lewiston-Auburn*, 16.
Trunk Railroad to reach into downtown Lewiston from Canada, allowed for the quick and easy arrival to the area for a multitude of French-Canadian families. Originally the tracks had gone directly from Montreal to Portland, bypassing Lewiston, but, in 1874, the completion of a direct line into the city from the original railroad, allowed for a link between Canada and the area.11

Early arrivals were mainly migrants looking for brief periods of work rather than families looking to lay down roots for extended periods of time, and many of the early immigrants left during any slight economic downturn. However, as the mills became more established, family units of Franco-Americans began to arrive in Lewiston. This was a distinct difference from similar migrations to other New England mill cities by French-Canadians and was also different from other immigrant group arrivals to the area as a whole.12

Such a pattern of family migration created a vibrant, permanent community of French speaking residents who mainly settled in a downtown area of Lewiston positioned between the mills’ canals and the Androscoggin River. The arrival of families created a close-knit community, and this part of town came to be known as Petit Canada – a group of “hastily built tenements” near the city’s centers of industry.13 These early Franco-American immigrants lived at levels of extreme poverty and experienced incredibly difficult financial times during their early years of living in Lewiston.

These Franco-American families in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were marked by a traditional patriarchal structure where the men were heads of the household. Children of these families tended to begin work in the mills earlier than similar Irish immigrant families, and they “were expected to give the bulk of their wages to their parents to support their

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11 Ibid., 32.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 17.
Prejudice against Franco-Americans was often directed at the large size of their families and the nature of their religion. As practicing Catholics in a traditionally Protestant state, Franco-Americans experienced much discrimination on the basis of their faith.

2.B Early Discrimination in Lewiston

The city’s first major anti-immigrant event occurred in 1855 with the burning of Lewiston’s Irish Catholic-built church by members of the nativist Know-Nothing Party. This was a direct attack on the sect of Christianity practiced by the Irish immigrants and suggested a sense of unease among the predominantly Protestant native residents of the area. The First World War and the Russian Revolution of 1917 both acted as “catalysts for widespread anti-immigrant feeling” throughout the country, and the Franco-Americans of Lewiston, while having already seen opposition to their arrival, experienced increased targeting due to their religion, their language, and the fact that they were still relatively recent arrivals to Maine. Due to this increase in nativism, the state’s politics in the early-twentieth century were marked by the rise of the Ku Klux Klan as a “powerful political force.”

The rise of the Klan in Maine originated as a “Protestant backlash” to the growing populations of Catholics in the industrial centers of the state. By 1925, there were 175,000 Catholics in the state, a number significantly larger than the sizes of the state’s two largest Protestant denominations. As the numbers of French-Canadians grew and became more established in the Lewiston metropolitan area, they begin to create a larger perceived threat to the

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"Ibid., 18-19.
"Nadeau, “A Work in Progress,”, 54.
Protestant church’s hegemony in both religious and political institutions. The Klan’s response in Maine suggests the perceived potency of such a threat, as the group’s professed goal became to keep “Protestant Americans in the lead, not only in number, but in fact.”

Their vehement opposition is also in line with concept that the “American” identity has been defined by the ascription to a Protestant Christian nationalism. As the Franco-Americans practiced a religion other than the predominant school of worship in the United States, already-established Mainers were motivated to oppose their presence, because they did not fit into what was thought of as being the predominant identity. The Franco-Americans and Irish also presented a direct affront to the “Protestant’s desire to reassert control over their communities.”

Even faced with this discrimination, the early-twentieth century brought with it the first major forays of the Franco-American population into Lewiston municipal politics, and thus created a continued sense of fear among the predominantly Protestant political elite.

In 1923, F. Eugene Farnsworth, the King Kleagle of the Maine Klan chapter spoke to an audience in Lewiston, where he attacked Roman Catholics and all “hyphenated Americans” and gave a speech that focused on how the U.S. “always has been and always will be a Protestant nation.” While the Klan’s influence in actually engendering real political change was limited, the group’s actions suggested the rise of nativism and highlighted the ability of political actors to use such factors as cultural and religious threats to garner support.

Even though the Klan enjoyed limited overall political success, their apogee was in 1925 with the election of Owen Brewster to the governorship of Maine – a candidate whom they had openly supported. Brewster ran on a platform of “defending” the state’s public schools against

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Ibid.

Ibid., 291.

Ibid.
the threat of Catholic parochial schools. These schools, of which many existed in the Lewiston area, utilized a bilingual education curriculum where classes were taught in both English and French. While the Brewster and his compatriots were unsuccessful in causing the total downfall of parochial schools, as was their goal, supporters of the movement had already minorly succeeded in 1919 when the Maine state legislature passed a law “prohibiting children and teachers from speaking French in public schools.”

The Ku Klux Klan also had little success in preventing the Franco-Americans from making a permanent mark on city politics in Lewiston. In 1884, before the rise of the Klan in Maine, Dr. Louis J. Martel, a prominent Franco citizen of Lewiston was elected to represent the city in the Maine State legislature. More Franco-Americans quickly followed Dr. Martel into political office, with members of the group serving as chair of Lewiston’s Board of Aldermen and as City Clerk during the late-nineteenth century. While Dr. Martel narrowly lost the race for Mayor of Lewiston in 1893, it was not until 1914 that a Franco-American was elected to the city’s top office. Robert Wiseman, originally of Stanford, Quebec, became the city’s first mayor from the rapidly growing ethnic group, and his election signaled the beginning of an era, continuing to the present-day, during which members of the Franco-American community have “held the majority of local municipal offices, as well as many at the county and state level.”

2.C Lewiston’s Economic Downturn

The end of World War II signaled the beginning of the end for the great mills of Lewiston, and the start of what would become a long slide into economic downturn. At the beginning of the 1950s, the Bates Manufacturing Company of Lewiston remained the “biggest

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21 Rice-DeFosse and Myall, The Franco-Americans of Lewiston-Auburn, 16.
employer in the state” of Maine and the largest taxpayer in the city of Lewiston; integral to the city’s economic lifeblood. The first major mill closure came in the mid-1950s with the boarding-up of the Androscoggin Mill in Lewiston. This left 1,000 people out of work and created the first “downward trend in Lewiston population” since the start of the Industrial Revolution in the Twin Cities. During this time period, the Maine Central Railroad began to significantly cut down on its passenger and freight service to the area – symbolically a major blow to a city that had built its success on its access to the state and region’s train network. These events signaled the first failings of Lewiston’s mighty economic engine and the end of continued steady migration to the Twin Cities. As the mills began to close and textile manufacturing began to move to the south, immigration to Lewiston slowed down and people began to move out of the city in droves rather than enter into it looking for work.

As these major businesses closed up shop and people began an exodus out, local leaders searched for ways to revitalize and diversify the area. Bates Manufacturing downsized dramatically and switched its production toward the making of high-end bedspreads, rather than products for everyday life. City officials created the Industrial Development Department to promote the “Industrial Heartland” of Maine and moved toward efforts to revitalize the manufacturing potential of the area. The endeavors provided Lewiston with some new businesses in the realm of light manufacturing, however nothing on the scale that the mills had once provided. Lewiston was also a recipient of the federal Model Cities Program whose goal was to revitalize urban areas across the country. However, this program was not fruitful in

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24 Ibid., 89.
25 Ibid., 87.
breathing life back into Lewiston’s downtown. Further chapters of this thesis examine the repercussions of this program in much more depth.

Raytheon Inc. briefly opened and then closed a semiconductor plant in the city and other smaller industrial operators erected offices or plants in the surrounding area. The two major hospitals in the city, Central Maine Medical Center and St. Mary’s, also made important growths and established the presence of a robust healthcare economy.\textsuperscript{27} However, no effort was able to match the tax-paying and job potential offered by the 41 separate mills that used to dot the area. The 1980s proved to be the bleakest time period for the city and, while recent indicators suggest an uptick in the city’s economic health, Lewiston is still the “least wealthy of Maine’s large cities.”\textsuperscript{28}

2.D Changing Immigration in Lewiston

After years of people leaving Lewiston, immigration to the area was forever changed in 1999. Almost fifty years after the mills first began to close, a group of Togolese refugees were settled in the area with the help of Catholic Charities of Maine. Their arrival began an era where the very fabric of the community would be permanently changed. While met with some hesitation from native residents, this first new group of immigrants were French-speaking Catholics who eventually found support from local partners in making connections and becoming acclimated to Lewiston.\textsuperscript{29} While the Franco-Americans themselves had entered into an environment where they spoke a language and practiced a religion vastly different from the people living in Lewiston in the late-nineteenth, the Togolese refugees shared two of these

\textsuperscript{27} Rand, \textit{The Peoples Lewiston-Auburn}, 101.
\textsuperscript{28} Nadeau, “A Work in Progress,” 67.
\textsuperscript{29} Rice-DeFosse and Myall, \textit{The Franco-Americans of Lewiston-Auburn}, 153.
important pillars with the community they entered, by now predominantly of Franco-American ancestry.

Even though these original Togolese arrivals did share a common language and religion, their arrival was met with some blowback. In an article published on December 21, 1999 in the *Lewiston Sun Journal*, the author painted a picture of a city that felt opposed to the arrival of newcomers in its midst. It suggested that residents of Lewiston were “uneasy” about the plan to settle West African refugees in the area.³⁰ Residents complained about the fact that the city was about to welcome even a small number of refugees. A former city councilor was quoted saying that he did not know “one person in the general public who supports” the arrival of the Togolese. Even though the director of Catholic Charities Maine made it clear that their organization would help the refugees and support them financially for the first eight months in Lewiston, the community became most upset by the fact that they might have to “foot the bill” for the newcomers.³¹

The reaction from the community in Lewiston highlights the potential for certain perceived threats to elicit anti-immigrant rhetoric. The city, at the end of the twentieth-century, was still in a tough economic predicament and lacked the abundance of jobs that greeted the Franco-Americans when they arrived a century earlier. As suggested by the secondary literature, when a perceived outgroup enters into a society that is experiencing an economic downturn, members of the ingroup will be quick to blame the outgroup for economic woes and will be less likely to support the sharing of public services or welfare systems. Scholarship also suggests that community support may have been lacking due to the fact that the newcomers were also racially


³¹ Ibid.
different than the majority of the native residents. However, the Togolese arrival merely heralded the onset of a new wave of immigration from the African diaspora that would change Lewiston completely.

2. E Somali Arrivals

In the late-1990s, fleeing civil war in their home country, many Somalis began arriving in the United States. Originally settled in major urban areas across the country, the budding communities became disenchanted with the poor schools and high levels of crime. A significant number of Somalis arrived in Clarkston, Georgia, a suburb of Atlanta. Here, they saw “prejudice, police brutality and a small community...shattered under the pressure of a broken refugee settlement system.”

Somalis tend “to settle in communities with other Somalis” and after Maine was first identified as a potential relocation site, families began to flood in. Somali have a history of being a mobile people with “dense kin and clan networks” connected through traditions seeped in oral culture and contact. When people first found Portland, then Lewiston, and the benefits offered by the state, news travelled quickly throughout the entire Somali community in North America.

A small Somali community began to develop in Portland during this time period, however the city had little “adequate housing” for the mainly large Somali families. Portland and Lewiston housing officials and Catholic Charities approached Somali families and suggested looking northward and taking advantage of the high vacancy rates of large apartments in

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Ibid., 26.

Cullen, “Struggle and Progress.”
downtown Lewiston. Originally drawn by the housing opportunities, Somalis across the U.S. began to gravitate toward Lewiston because of the quiet streets, low crime rates, and city officials who were “willing to work with them.”

While identified as a safer and quieter location for settlement by Somali elders, other factors also played into Lewiston’s attractive nature for the well-travelled refugees. The Somali relocation to Lewiston occurred at an “historical moment when the population decline was at its most severe and the availability of housing was respondingly high.”

The city that the Somalis entered was a shadow of the former glory experienced in the area, and they were met with a Main Street with many boarded-up doors, a symbol of Lewiston’s economy.

Mainly by the power of word of mouth, Somalis began to arrive in the community. While many have attributed their coming to Lewiston as being directly linked to the state’s more extensive welfare benefits as compared to other states in the U.S., research suggests that factors such as “increased social control, good schools, and affordable housing” were the main reasons the community decided to move to Lewiston. Regardless of their reasons, Somalis continued to arrive, and the most recent estimates gauge the population at being between 6,000-7,000, out of 36,000 residents in the city.

2.F City’s Reactions

The reaction to such a drastic change to the population of Lewiston has been mixed. Municipal government and citizens’ reactions in the city presents a divided story, where support for the immigrant community has remained strong amidst an equally aggressive anti-immigrant

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"Ibid.
"Ibid., 24.
viewpoint. Rumors spread quickly among the economically depressed Lewiston community that the Somalis were being given free cars by the city government upon their arrival in the city, and a town-hall organized by municipals officers and Somali leaders in 2002 did little to dissuade these rumors. Soon after this, the Franco-American mayor of Lewiston, Larry Raymond, in an “open letter to the Somalis of Lewiston,” asked the greater Somali community to stop coming to the city, as it was too stressed financially to handle the arrival of anymore. This sparked national outrage and had “ripples across the state and beyond.” In support of the letter, a rally was organized by a radical white supremacist group, however this was overshadowed by a large counter-rally in solidarity with the Somali community.

Regardless of such outpourings of support for the immigrant community, Lewiston, as a city, has moved firmly away from the Democratic stronghold that it once was and further toward leaning Republican in state and federal elections. It backed Republican Governor Paul LePage in both 2010 and 2014, a candidate famous for threatening to withhold funding to cities that offered welfare money to undocumented immigrants. More recently, the Lewiston mayoral race in 2015 again sparked debate over the municipal government’s stance toward immigrants. The election pitted the conservative incumbent, former police detective Robert E. Macdonald against the young, progressive activist Ben Chin. Macdonald, an opponent of welfare, and famous for saying that Somalis “should leave [their] culture at the door,” easily beat Chin in a runoff.

__Ibid.__
election.43 The campaign sparked debate on both sides of the immigration argument, but Macdonald’s win suggested a continued leaning towards a municipal government exhibiting more anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric.

These events suggest that Lewiston still has a contentious relationship with immigration within its boundaries. While people and organizations have risen up in support of the city’s immigrant community, municipal political actors have still suggested that they perceive the immigrant population to pose a significant threat to the city. Indicators do suggest that Lewiston is on the verge of experiencing an “economic and social renaissance,” however the question remains how a city, long defined by immigration and years of tough economic times, can adapt to this new wave of culturally different immigrants, even as they contribute to this growing economy. Further chapters of this thesis seek to examine what factors exist in the Lewiston context that make local political actors more willing to adopt anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric.

3. Portland’s History

The city of Portland was originally a quiet coastal town; a minor player in an area that was part of Massachusetts. The first settlement was established by European fishermen searching for fruitful fishing waters and the first charter was granted by King Charles the I of England in 1639. The settlement, originally named Casco, expanded slowly throughout the seventeenth-century and was twice destroyed by Native American and then French forces.44 By the end of the

American Revolution, the city had a population of 2,240, however, much like Lewiston-Auburn, a period of rapid change occurred in the years leading up to and following the Civil War.\textsuperscript{45}

At the end of the Revolutionary War, the city of Portland was smaller in size than the neighboring towns of Gorham, York, and Falmouth, and it was still a small player in the economy of the eastern seaboard.\textsuperscript{46} However, directly after the war’s final shots, the city began a period of unparalleled growth. Portland quickly became “a lively maritime center” with an economy centered around the trading of goods with both states to the south and European countries. After the state capital was moved to Augusta in 1832, Portland officially incorporated as a city and the community’s population hit 13,000.\textsuperscript{47} By this point, Portland’s commercial shipping fleet had grown to become the largest on the east coast. In these days, before the “age of steel, timber from Maine was an incredibly important commodity and Portland became a major site for its shipment across the country and the world. The trade of both timber and molasses, used as a “sweetening agent and to produce rum,” gave the city great wealth and began to attract residents from across the globe.

With the expansion of the country’s railroads in the mid-eighteenth century, businessmen in Portland became determined to secure the city’s designation as Montreal’s winter port. With the icing over of the St. Lawrence River during the winter, Montreal required access to the ocean to be able to ship its important agricultural products. In 1845, Portland was chosen by officials in Montreal to be the Canadian city’s winter port. With this act, Portland solidified its reputation as being one of the East Coast’s most important ports.\textsuperscript{48}

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\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 41.
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products, even during the winter months, enabled Portland to continue its steady economic growth. Ships frequently docked in Portland’s harbor to pick up shipments of Canadian grain, and this steady stream of maritime labor provided a draw for workers.\(^\text{49}\)

Following the end of the Civil War, a large fire devastated Portland in the summer of 1866. It particularly affected the “business and financial sections of Middle and Exchange Streets,” however the rebuilding of the city created more space for businesses in the downtown areas and created important, larger avenues throughout the center. The arrival of steamships in the harbor in the years following the Civil War and the regular railroad service from Montreal spurned even more growth, and a budding industrial sector also developed (though never on the scale of Lewiston). These healthy economic factors contributed to the rise of immigration into Portland, as people from Canada and Europe began to arrive by boat and train to partake in the city’s robust economy.

3. A Immigration to Portland

Up until the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of the working class in Portland came from “rural New England, Ireland, and Canada.”\(^\text{50}\) A large number of immigrants who had arrived in the city around this time were from the Canadian provinces, with French Canadians, “second-generation Irish as well as British-born Canadians” making up a large portion of the immigrant community.\(^\text{51}\) However, as time progressed, the Irish made up the largest arriving ethnic group from 1870 to 1890, with small numbers of European Jews, Italians, and Armenians


\(^{51}\) Ibid.
arriving as well. Portland did lack the massive manufacturing economy of other cities in the United States as it was primarily a maritime-focused economy, and the city proved largely “uninviting” to the waves of immigration into the country from Eastern Europe. While the city lacked the immense numbers of immigrant arrivals prevalent in the U.S.’ more industrialized cities, immigration from Ireland in particular continued at a steady rate throughout the nineteenth century. By 1890, Portland’s Irish population made up 58% of the city’s residents; other ethnic groups, while present, were “negligible” in number compared to the Irish.

This steady increase in the Irish population can be explained by how, toward the middle of the nineteenth century, large steamships began to arrive in Portland more regularly, offering steady work to dockhands. This increase in employment opportunities in the city coincided with the mass exodus from Ireland in the years following the Irish potato famine. Irish immigrants to Portland during the latter half of the nineteenth century were mainly from “the poorer western regions of Ireland,” and most immigrants to Portland specifically were from County Galway, an area where Gaelic was still widely spoken as the lingua franca. These newer Irish immigrants were also Roman Catholic, different from the earlier Irish settlers to Maine who were predominantly Scots-Irish Presbyterians from Ulster. As these newer Irish immigrants both practiced a different religion and spoke a different language than the Yankee majority and even the older Irish immigrants, a rise in the cultural threat perceived by the residents of the host city ensued. Similar to the rise of the Franco-Americans in Lewiston, the increase in the population of the Irish Catholic community posed a serious threat to the Yankee Protestant elite who controlled the city’s political functions. While the Irish failed to achieve much political headway

52 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, they did slowly emerge as a powerful political force who ruled the city’s waterfront and often won key political battles against Portland’s Yankee elite.\(^{55}\)

The continued arrival of Irish, Italian, and Eastern European immigrants into Portland during the start of the twentieth century greatly alarmed the leaders of Portland’s city government. In 1913, a committee was created in order to tackle the “immigrant-contaminated commercial culture of the modern city.” The group was headed by an Episcopal priest whose goal it was to combat against the cultural threats posed by Portland’s newcomers. This sense of an increased threat only continued with the advent of World War I, which served to exacerbate the community’s backlash toward the immigrant population in much the same way as what was occurring in Lewiston and at the national level. While the Great War “considerably slowed the tide of European immigration,” to many, Portland’s working-class immigrants “challenged the Longfellowian image of the city as a sparkling, healthy, seaside vacationland” and in particular posed a threat to the major political actors in the city.\(^{56}\)

3.B Backlash to Immigration

While some members of the political elite did support the immigrant population in rhetoric, the actual municipal policy of the city reflected a more exclusionary viewpoint. This is suggested by how, in the early-twentieth century, the Portland police “still disproportionately arrested the Irish” highlighting a certain amount of racial profiling and viewing immigrants as a security threat.\(^{57}\) The perceived “moral and social decay” of the twentieth century, “with the

\(^{55}\) Bauman, *Gateway to Vacationland*, 86.
\(^{56}\) Ibid., 144.
\(^{57}\) Ibid., 145.
dawn flappers and speakeasies,” the Red Scare, and majors strikes in both the coal and steel industries all contributed to a sense in Portland that the city was losing its identity and was being poisoned by outsiders, in this case the immigrant population. This general unease, as was similar throughout the nation, allowed for the rise of the Ku Klux Klan. The group, just as they did in Lewiston, highlighted a rise of nativism in the country and an increased opposition to the immigrants within the cities’ boundaries.

Speaking to another packed crowd in Portland, F. Eugene Farnsworth gave a speech much like the one he gave in Lewiston and directly attacked the city’s Franco-American and Irish-Catholic communities. The Klan in Portland could count 2,700 members in its ranks, and while only in existence and empowered for a few years, they achieved significant political success. Most important was their changing of the city’s “weak mayor, bicameral legislative system for a five-person unicameral council elected by voters at large (not by ward.)” Of particular concern to the Klan members in political positions was the dangerous effect immigrants were having on electing “morally impaired” representatives into city government. Concentrations of immigrants in certain areas of Portland gave them increased political voice in elections under the old system, and as immigrants continued to flow in and become citizens their power only grew. By changing the election process and using city-wide voting and not wards electing their own representatives, the Klan achieved its goal of lessening the influence that immigrants had on Portland’s governance. While Portland has since changed in how the city’s population is represented, the Klan’s success suggests a conscious effort to disenfranchise the immigrant population at this time.

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59 Bauman, *Gateway to Vacationland*, 147.
60 Ibid.
3.C Portland’s Economic Woes and Future Investment

As the twentieth century progressed, Portland began to experience a downturn in its economic prospects. It “lost its designation as Montreal’s winter port,” an integral part to its economy, and the Great Depression hit industry within the city hard. While World War II offered a temporary fix to Portland’s economic problems, the success was ephemeral, and the boost given to the city through the construction of ships and the hundreds of sailors spending their money evaporated as soon as the war ended. The city’s commercial port, having lost the ability to ship Canadian grain, developed into a hub for oil; an industry that required many fewer laborers for its smooth operation. The following twenty years were filled with mixed plans of urban rejuvenation and a downtown that had become more blighted by the exodus of middle class families to the suburbs. The 1960 census found that the loss of industry in Portland and the slowing down of the economy had contributed to the fact that many from the “Yankee class” had left for the burgeoning suburbs in the years following the war. Due to this exodus, “Portlanders of immigrant stock [at that time made up] more than 30 percent of the city’s population.”

After years of economic downturn, the city saw its luck change by the mid-1960s. These years brought rapid social and political change across the country, and, in Portland specifically, signaled the end to the “historic Yankee grip on the city’s political culture.” Portland, once a “staunchly fiscally conservative Republican” city also began to change during this time as a more liberal City Council came into power supported by Maine Senator Edmund Muskie and his

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1. Robinson, A Concise History of Portland, Maine, 89.
2. Bauman, Gateway to Vacationland, 171.
3. Ibid., 174.
policies. The Portland City Council began to change its makeup and by the mid-1960 was comprised of both an Armenian-American and a Irish-American who had risen through the political ranks as many Yankees left for the suburbs. The “broad social and political currents of the 1960s” and the exodus to the suburbs created a “new social and political fermentation” within the city. Republican leaders, who were once opposed to accepting federal dollars, were replaced with different leaders who were more willing to work with “local pro-growth entrepreneurs and Washington bureaucrats alike.” During this time the city was made a recipient of the federal Model Cities Program. Further chapters examine the importance of this event in more depth.

Both federal and state money was poured into the city to help redevelop with the goal of becoming a “well-clad service [industry] provider.” With smart investments, good planning and concentrated focus at moving the economy away from the traditional industry focused around the waterfront and toward expanding other markets. Unlike Lewiston where city officials had tried to woo back more a more industrial-focused economy after the closing of the mills, Portland, with the decrease of its power as a port or a railroad hub, embarked on a mission to expand and revamp its reputation as being the “gateway to Vacationland.” Portions of Portland’s harbor were redesigned and refurbished with the explicit intention of creating a more welcoming environment destination for cruise ships in the Atlantic. The city also changed waterfront zoning to allow for non-marine businesses to open shop near the docks, creating more opportunities for entrepreneurs and offices and slowly decreasing the fishing industry’s presence.

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64 Ibid., 207.
65 Ibid., 200.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
69 Bauman, Gateway to Vacationland, 233.
These many thought-out and well-planned changes to Portland positioned it to slowly move away from relying on an industrial, maritime economy, and the city began to be defined by the New-England charm of its downtown and its burgeoning finance, law, and service sectors. Further chapters examine the repercussion of Portland’s economic development in more depth and how it plays a role in how municipal politicians frame immigration debates.

By 1987, Portland had transformed itself into a modern city geared toward tourists. A redesigned Old Port district, an international airport, and a revamped highway system allowed Portland to regain its status as a popular destination. The city found itself positioned itself to attract a younger, more educated crowd as it highlighted the development of its finance, real estate, and service economy. An influx of members of the educated creative class has potentially influenced how Portland and its politicians respond to the arrival of immigrants in its midst.

3.D Recent Immigration to Portland and Subsequent Reactions

While immigration to Portland did slow during the decades immediately following World War II, rates of immigration increased in the 1970s and 1980s, drawing “from Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and the former Soviet Union” through major federally funded refugee resettlement programs.70 Unlike its neighbor to the north, Portland became a major site for immigrant arrivals at an earlier time. This suggests earlier rising levels of diversity in the city and a higher familiarity in dealing with immigration-related issues. More recent immigration in the twenty-first century has included persons “from Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and other African countries.”71 The majority of these refugees have come to Portland due to Catholic

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71 Ibid.
Charities Maine an established non-profit organization that works to settle displaced persons. During these most recent waves over the past 30 years, the immigrant community in Portland has been defined by refugees coming from war torn areas of the globe. Data suggest that in the years from 1981 to 2003, over 10,000 refugees have arrived from a total of 23 different countries. These newcomers have also had the important effect of diversifying the population of Portland, and 8% of the city’s population is foreign-born, compared to the state average of 3%. The influx of more recent immigrants has also lowered the city’s average age to 35.7 years, compared to the state average of 38.6. These numbers suggest a younger, more diverse populace in the city. The boom in immigration has had an immense cultural and economic impact on the city, and Portland’s municipal government and its citizens have responded differently from Lewiston’s in terms of its reactions toward newcomers. Recent African immigrants to the city have been drawn by the state’s General Assistance program, but also by the “city’s reputation as a safe and welcoming community.”

This reputation is fueled by the fact the Portland has social workers on staff who are specially trained to deal with immigrants who are fleeing violence and oppression in their home countries. The city’s image is also aided by the important non-governmental organizations in the area. Institutions such as the Immigrant Legal Advocacy Project and Catholic Charities have aided Portland in creating a welcoming environment for recent immigrants. In another example of Portland’s more inclusive recent environment toward immigrants, in 2016, Pious Ali, an African-born Muslim was elected to Portland’s City Council. With the election of Ali, a “Ghana-

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born school board member,” to City Council, the voters of Portland delivered a resounding blow to the anti-immigrant rhetoric and potential policy being described by Donald Trump on the campaign trail for president.  

This is also suggested by the protests that occurred in June of 2018, in response to the Trump Administration’s proposed immigration policy changes, and over 200 people gathered in downtown Portland to make their voices heard. Portland’s municipal government’s more inclusive policy and rhetoric toward immigrants is also supported by the very recent debate within City Hall as to whether or not non-citizens should be allowed to vote in municipalities elections. This policy would include those who are legally present within the U.S., like asylum seekers or refugees. Regardless of the success of the policy, it suggests a city with political actors that are a part of a largely inclusive political culture and a city that professes pro-immigrant standpoints.

### Conclusion

While this chapter does offer a broad overview of histories of Lewiston and Portland, it also crucially sets the foundation to understand the more detailed case studies in the following chapters. This chapter has offered brief histories of both cities, described the different waves of immigration into each and the subsequent reactions by the community, and also paid specific attention to the economic circumstances of both cities. By including this narrative of both cities,
this chapter has highlighted both historical factors and recent events that prove important in understanding how the two areas have taken different paths in terms of their politicians’ rhetoric and policy toward newer immigrant arrivals and the immigration question more broadly. The chapter has painted a picture of Lewiston and Portland’s shared historical experience of anti-immigrant rhetoric and how the two cities have since diverged. A deep understanding of the nuanced history of Lewiston and Portland is necessary to the full comprehension of the situation in the two cities over the past 25 years. This chapter has summarized the immigrant histories of Portland and Lewiston in order to provide context for the following case studies.

This chapter has also highlighted an important explanation laid out in the secondary literature: that a city with higher levels of economic anxiety and an immigrant population that is both racially different and also large in comparison to the existing population will see increased anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. The historical effects of diversification have had the effect of making Portland more adept and familiar with people coming from a myriad of different cultures. The city has had a slow but steady flow of racially different immigration to the city since the conflict in Vietnam. While the more recent influx of African immigration to the city has redefined the landscape and presented new issues and opportunities, Portland has had a longer history with dealing with immigration issues than Lewiston. Writing in 2003, Vaishali Mamgain and Karen Collins note that Portland, in the 22 years prior to their article’s publication, experienced arrivals of immigrants from countries around the globe.78

By contrast, Lewiston remained mainly culturally homogenous before the arrival of Somalis in 2001. The 2000 Census noted that of the 36,690 residents of the city, 16,000 claimed French Canadian ancestry and only 1,500 identified as non-white.79 The secondary scholarship

79 Ibid.
suggests that politicians and people in a city are more likely to support anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric if the immigrant, “other,” population is larger and thus more visible when compared to the native residents of area. This supports the claim that Portland, with an historically larger existent immigrant population and a thus a more visible non-white community, has politicians and a voting population that is more supportive of pro-immigrant rhetoric.

This chapter is also important in the way it traces the economic histories of both cities. While the cities share similar immigration histories and anti-immigrant pasts, specifically during the twentieth-century, their more recent different economic developments present themselves as potential explanations for differences in municipal political actors’ policy and rhetoric. Chapter One made the distinction that while the economic model is an imperfect explanation of the arousal of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric on the national scale, scholarship on a local level suggests that it may play into political actor’s decisions on the municipal level, when it is combined with a perceived racial threat. By detailing the economic history of Lewiston and Portland, this chapter has sought to suggest how the two cities development, specifically over the past 25 years, has differed in certain ways. In showing the movement in Lewiston toward light-industry and the healthcare sector/service sector and Portland’s establishment as a major tourist, financial, and business destination, Chapter Two has highlighted ways in which the testable explanations derived in Chapter One can be applied to the case studies.

Chapter Two has shown that cities with similar backgrounds in terms of waves of immigration and economic histories can diverge greatly with regard to their municipal politicians’ policy and rhetoric toward new populations. Chapter Three begins this deeper dive into the factors that explain this divergence by examining the history of the Model Cities Program in Lewiston and Portland.
Chapter Three - Model Cities Program

This chapter highlights and explains the important economic divergence that occurred in Portland and Lewiston after both cities lost their respective major industries. While the two cities have recently experienced or are experiencing economic renaissances in their own right, this chapter suggests that certain critical events in the history of Portland and Lewiston were integral in shaping them into the areas they are today; in the terminology of historical institutionalist approaches, this chapter identifies a “critical juncture” that put the economic trajectories – and thus the levels of economic anxiety that may affect or even inspire anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric – of these two cities on different paths.

Building on the historical discussion in Chapter Two, Chapter Three situates the reader within the decisions made by city officials, the urban planning designed for potential revitalization efforts, and the presence and magnitude of outside injections of resources. By describing these timelines and detailing the repercussions of events in conjunction with the testable explanations derived from the secondary literature on economic threat and its relationship to anti-immigration rhetoric and policy, this chapter examines how economic factors played a role in the development and saliency of municipal politicians’ rhetoric toward immigrants.

This chapter employs a theoretical framework derived from the scholarship on path dependency and the critical junctures that induce change in institutions. As Paul Pierson writes in his book *Politics in Time*, “outcomes at a critical juncture induce path-dependent processes.”\(^1\) Pierson states that path dependence is the idea that “specific patterns of timing and sequence

matter” in how institutions, and in this case cities, develop. Moreover, it refers to the “causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence.”

Path dependence theory attempts to highlight how “history matters” in the development of political institutions and, with regard to the topic of this thesis, how the rhetoric and professed policies of certain elected officials in Portland and Lewiston has differed over the years and come to be the way it is today. However, path dependence theory is not simply a claim that “history matters.” Perhaps more importantly, as Jacob Hacker posits, “timing and sequence” of certain events remain integral to the concept as well. These crucial events – events that may be “seemingly trivial” in the moment – create pathways that politicians and other elite political actors may follow, which can make subsequent choices or paths more difficult to take. In the context of Lewiston and Portland, the theoretical framework of path dependency further suggests that these specific moments, such as the differing implementations of the Model Cities Program, created “distinctive historical route[s]” for both cities. With differing levels of capital injections and support from City Hall, the events occurring in the time span examined in this chapter suggest that the two cities in questions were set on very different paths toward economic development.

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2 Ibid., 252.
4 This thesis breaks away with the prevailing scholarship that sees Model Cities as a failure. The secondary literature notes that the program, as a whole, never received the same amount of funding it was originally planned to, and it never fully confronted the racial problems it was meant to counteract. While it may have failed to reconcile the repercussions of the race riots of the 1960s in Philadelphia, Detroit, and Newark, in smaller cities, such as Portland, the program did see success. This thesis posits that Model Cities in Portland was a success thanks to how the city “wove [the program] into the very fabric of its brick and mortar revitalization program.” The program in Lewiston, while less extensive than Portland’s, was also noted for its effective use of its resources, given its position. For more information see John Bauman’s article “Model Cities, Housing, and Renewal Policy in Portland, Maine: 1965-1974.” in *Maine History.*
Pierson makes the case that certain events can lead to “divergent outcomes” even when cases in questions have “initially similar conditions.” Building on the work done by Pierson, this chapter also uses the theoretical framework put forth by Giovanni Capoccia in his writing on critical junctures. Similar to Pierson, Capoccia defines critical junctures as “short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest.” Using this framework, Capoccia contends that events, which may be “exogenous to the institution of interest,” can lead to periods during which “radical institutional change may occur.” He also contends that “contemporaneous” events have the power to change political institutions in years following. Capoccia’s scholarship suggests, and is supported by the previously examined secondary literature, that changes in the economies of a city can have a large effect on its political atmosphere. Pierson also contends that “large consequences” may result from “relatively ‘small’ or contingent events.” He notes in his work that this goes directly against the prevailing notions among the social sciences that only “large” events can have “large” outcomes.

These ideas are important in order to understand the economic anxiety that may persist in Lewiston and Portland and to comprehend how that anxiety may provide a foundation for indifference, if not open hostility, toward immigrant communities. While both cities have similar institutional structures and similar stories of economic success followed by ruin, the rhetoric said by officials who have been repeatedly been elected to high offices, especially the office of the

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3 Ibid., 151.
4 Ibid., 154.
6 Ibid.
mayor, in both cities is different. In other words, in comparison, certain Lewiston public officials have embraced a rhetoric that is far more critical of immigration than their counterparts in Portland. This chapter uses the theoretical concepts set forth by Capoccia and Pierson to argue that certain contemporaneous events in the cities’ histories had large and lasting effects on their political development, that these distinct pathways have contributed to higher levels of economic anxiety and instability in Lewiston, and that such economic circumstances may be an inspiration of elected actors’ anti-immigrant positions.

Portland and Lewiston shared periods of intense economic prosperity, anti-immigrant sentiment, and lulls in their economies; however, city officials, over time, have occupied distinct positions and offered very different rhetoric about immigrant communities. Anti-immigrant rhetoric is far more prominent in Lewiston than in Portland. This chapter contends that the economic development history and vitality of the two cities can help to account for this divergence in municipal politics. It highlights that the different funding and implementation of the Model Cities Program in each city was a critical juncture that explains the differing development and treatment of immigrants by certain municipal politicians.

Chapter Three is divided into four sections. The first begins by offering a brief overview of the Model Cities Program in the United States. By tracing its genesis and its central tenets, this section describes the benefits to the program and how it was designed to help rejuvenate cities across the country. An understanding of the program’s function and goals helps to make better sense of the following examinations of the Lewiston and Portland case studies.

The second and third sections delve into a brief history of both cities leading up to the introduction of the Model Cities program. They then describe, in detail, the programs in Lewiston and Portland. Through the use of city government documents, interviews, and other
parts of the secondary literature this section paints a picture of each city’s respective program. It seeks to examine important differences between the implementation and success of the programs. By looking at different levels of funding, different organizational structures, and different physical successes, this section highlights how Model Cities in Lewiston and Portland represents a critical juncture in the cities’ economic development and political climate.

The final section of this chapter examines data from recent economic development reports and U.S. Department of Labor and Census to create an accurate depiction of the economic fortunes of the two cities from the first major arrivals of African immigrants in the 1990s to the present day. Focusing on testable explanations derived from the secondary literature, this chapter contends that decisions in the economic development histories of Maine’s two largest metropolitan areas have had lasting repercussions on how municipal politicians frame their rhetoric and policy toward immigrant communities.

Chapter Three builds on the scholarship discussed in Chapter One by applying certain of the defined testable explanations to the cities in question. Of particular salience to the case studies of Portland and Lewiston is the explanation that if there is an economic downturn in an area, then we can expect an increased chance of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. This explanation is closely tied to the idea that if more motivators of economic fear are present, such as the belief that an immigrant population is using more than their fair-share of public services, then anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric may increase. This chapter seeks to use both the historical economic development of Lewiston and Portland and data on median household income and median house prices to test the hypotheses.

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1. History of the Model Cities Program

In 1960, the then-presidential candidate John F. Kennedy addressed the country in a speech saying that over 17 million residents of the United States went to bed hungry each night. This sparked a sudden realization of the “extensive destitution in the richest nation on earth” and elicited a widespread outpouring of support to address inequalities in the country and “[to] provide greater opportunities for America’s poorest citizens, and [to] rebuild crumbling cities.”

Capitalizing on the sentiments inspired by Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson made the tackling of such issues a priority during his time in office. He called for an “unconditional war on poverty” and decided to specifically focus on urban areas across the country as locales that would be the recipients of new programs and funding.

This focus on combating urban poverty and enabling regeneration helped to spur the passage of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act was passed in 1966 as part of Johnson’s Great Society initiative. This act created the Model Cities Program and outlined what chosen cities would have to accomplish. It mandated more collaboration between “local bureaucracies and human service agencies; the development of new and improved community development practices; enhanced infrastructure and development systems; better housing, employment, and educational opportunities; reduced welfare tolls; lower crime rates; [and] greater participatory democracy.” These areas of focus were to be worked on over the course of a five year process of implementation. These goals were ambitious in design and were certainly not seen to completion in every city that was chosen for the program. After its passage,

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14 Ibid., 174.
15 Ibid., 175.
cities were required to submit proposals to the newly created Department of Housing and Urban Development for approval, and in 1969 the first programs began operation.\textsuperscript{16}

The program originally had as its goal to fund “approximately 70 cities” across the country; however, this number was increased to 150 by the programs’ start in 1969.\textsuperscript{17} Important was the designation of a “model neighborhood” within each chosen city. This area was designated the focal point for the program’s actions and the Model Cities committee in each city was tasked with addressing the “social, economic, or physical problems” facing the chosen zone.\textsuperscript{18}

The Model Cities Program also had a distinct connection to Maine. The state’s Senator Edmund Muskie played a large role in the creation and development of the program. Building on his strong record of bipartisan work on environmental issues, Johnson had Muskie save the bill as it was floundering in Congress. With Muskie’s guidance and support, the bill was streamlined and given “added language to strengthen metropolitan planning and review, emphasize local initiative, and ensure citizen participation” in local governments.\textsuperscript{19}

With the election of Richard Nixon in 1968 to the presidency, some of the original parts of the Model Cities Program were dismantled and its successes in major cities was broadly considered a failure. It failed to address issues of “urban unrest” and racial tension in these larger metropolises; however, in some smaller cities, it did succeed in creating greater citizen participation in local government and engendering stronger communities overall.\textsuperscript{20} While it did

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\begin{itemize}
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid, 733.
\item Ibid.
\end{itemize}
not achieve every single one of its aforementioned greater goals, in smaller cities such as Portland, the program engaged the population, revitalized the downtown, and contributed to an already “vigorous historic preservation movement.”\textsuperscript{21} Portland itself emerged as a city reborn and was an exemplary model of using the federal funding from the Model Cities Program to change its downtown and the community overall.

2. Portland’s Post-War Decline

The crest of Portland prominently displays a phoenix rising from the ashes, with the Latin word “RESURGAM,” meaning “I shall rise again,” boldly standing out at the top. While these additions are most commonly thought of as reference to Portland’s miraculous recovery from the multiple devastating fires in the nineteenth century, the phrase also works well as a metaphor for how the city has recovered and entered a new renaissance since its post-World War II economic downturn. This chapter seeks to dispel the notion that Portland has always been the bucolic and somewhat “hipster” city it is known as today. In tracing the choices made by developers and City Hall during this time period, this chapter suggests that conscious and planned decisions in decades prior resulted in the city that is so heralded today.

As previously discussed in Chapter Two, World War II brought a temporary boom back to the city that had recently lost its designation as Montreal’s winter port. However, a decline slowly occurred in the years following the war’s end. This section seeks to understand how a city in a state of economic decline with a downtown that had been described as a “rogues gallery of

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
scoundrels and characters” became to be recognizable as one of the most livable cities in the
United States.22

Decline in Portland was slow; during the years directly following the war the downtown
remained a bustling center of commerce and shopping. However, a slow migration by middle-
class families to the “modern planned housing subdivisions in Deering, Falmouth, Yarmouth,
Cumberland, and South Portland” began to draw away the vitality from Portland’s main
downtown thoroughfares.23 This exodus, coupled with little to no investment in the city’s
waterfront areas, housing, and major infrastructure, created a city that was lacking in the energy
it had once enjoyed.24 As detailed in Chapter Two, the latter years of the twentieth century in
Portland brought with it drastic changes in the city’s politics and the course of the city’s
economic development.25

2.B Portland’s Revitalization

The period from 1964 to 1985 proved particularly important for Portland’s economic
renewal. In these years the city experienced an influx of federal money and a coalition of both
political, social, and business leaders who bonded together with a vision for the city’s
revitalization. This section contends that these factors had a large impact on Portland’s
development as a city and had important repercussions down-the-line as the city began to
welcome more and more immigrants to its midst. Utilizing the scholarship on economic anxiety

22 Seth Koenig, “Portland was once a sketchier town. Here's why some people miss that era,” Bangor Daily
23 John F. Bauman, Gateway to Vacationland: the making of Portland, Maine (Amherst: University of
24 Ezra Moser, “Re-imaging Portland, Maine: Urban Renaissance and a Refugee Community” (undergraduate
25 Ibid., 199.
and its influences on how a community and its politicians frame immigration, it posits that events occurring in Portland during the late 1960s and early 1970s made it a more hospitable and welcoming place to newcomers even in the twenty-first century as immigration has become a hot-button issue within the United States.

Beginning in 1964, Portland’s municipal government and its Chamber of Commerce joined forces to hire the “renowned Viennese-born architect planner” Victor Gruen and his New York-based consulting firm to devise a plan to recraft the city’s downtown into a vibrant area.26 Gruen’s designs were focused around devising a city wherein “socially disconnected people...could share a common social, cultural, and recreational experience while shopping.”27 Key to Gruen’s plans was the building of a ring road encircling the city and the creation of an integrated traffic plan with key parking garages situated throughout. In 1967, the city embarked on widening Franklin Street, a main thoroughfare, to provide “unobstructed access to downtown.”28 Gruen’s plan also laid the groundwork for what was to become the vibrant Old Port shopping district that is well-known today. His central ideas espoused a commitment to the “Downtown as Mall,” in direct opposition to the post-World War II boom in the construction of strip malls and massive shopping complexes that so plagued the country’s Main Street economies.29

Portland also began to focus on the demolition and rebranding of areas the city deemed “obsolescent, overcrowded, and unsightly.”30 The Bayside neighborhood was an excellent example for how the city government began to meticulously and consciously plan the city. The

26 Ibid., 202.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 206.
30 Bauman, Gateway to Vacationland, 213.
1951 creation of the Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Authority (SCRAP) began the process of slowly shifting areas of the city away from its working class roots.\textsuperscript{31} In the 1960s, under the auspices of SCRAP, the City of Portland demolished 245 units in Bayside Park and an additional 289 units in Bayside.\textsuperscript{32} Using Gruen’s plan as a guiding light and as justification for their actions, the city razed structures to provide for economic development. These destructions reduced key affordable housing located in the city but did provide for important zones of development in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{33}

The decision to raze the units in the Bayside area and to construct the Franklin Street arterial were not met without opposition and were indicative of a pointed plan of “rampant neighborhood destruction.”\textsuperscript{34} The Bayside neighborhood was historically working class and was filled with a variety of different structures, including many ubiquitous New England Triple Deckers – a symbol of the working class. As Portland experienced its war-time boom, Bayside became the crowded with people seeking work in the shipyards and it became known as a “decaying section” of the city. The neighborhood was repeatedly associated with a moral deterioration occurring within the city’ boundaries\textsuperscript{35}

Bayside represented the antithesis of the new, modern image of Portland held by many in city government. Lacking political agency and without support in city government, the residents of Bayside were left powerless as the crusade to destroy their neighborhood advanced and their pleas fell on deaf ears. By embarking on this plan, Portland’s city government’s actions razed a large section of the city’s affordable housing, preferring instead to focus their efforts on

\textsuperscript{31} Bauman, “A Saga of Renewal in a Maine City,” 345.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 348.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 350.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., 331.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 340.
attracting a new, creative class to support Gruen’s vision of an economically diverse, cosmopolitan downtown.

The main points of Gruen’s plan formed the foundation of Portland’s application to President Lyndon B. Johnson and Senator Edmund Muskie’s Model Cities Program. The underlying key to Portland’s success was a commitment to adaptability and enhancement of the city with an eye always turned toward honoring the area’s “historical fabric.” The early strides made by SCRAP and the Gruen plan laid the groundwork for Portland’s economic development – a process that was further kick-started by the Model Cities Program.

2.C Portland’s Model Cities Program

In 1967, Portland received an initial grant of over a million dollars to begin a process of urban renewal through the federal government’s Model Cities Program. The program had as its goal to revitalize a specific area in downtown Portland that its leaders called “Portland West.” This area, reaching from the West End to Munjoy Hill neighborhood, became the city’s primary focus – its model neighborhood. This swath of land on the Falmouth Peninsula included important sections of waterfront real estate as well as “rich, early nineteenth-century Federal and Greek Revival-style architecture.” The diverse and historic architectural makeup of this area would later play an important role in the area’s revitalization, as further chapters show the area’s cultural importance in the city’s economic development. Portland’s Model City’s proposal area was unique, as it included both low-income neighborhoods and also wealthier ones surrounding the Western Promenade. The plan also had within its bounds the Maine Medical Center. This

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“Bauman, Gateway to Vacationland, 206.
Ibid., 209.
inclusion helped medical issues facing the city to be put at the forefront of discussion as people involved in the hospital were directly keyed into the Model Cities initiative.  

The Model Cities legislation, hashed out by Senator Edmund Muskie and other members of Congress, provided for “novel and imaginative housing and renewal programs and...that surveys of historic resources and efforts at historic preservation” would be intensely considered before any demolition was to occur.  

This emphasis placed on new housing projects and urban renewal proved particularly important for Portland as its wealth of architectural heritage would make it a desirable location for tourism and business development in later years. The Model Cities Program injected money into downtown, and its funding, in conjunction with the newly passed National Preservation Act of 1966 worked to maintain buildings that might have otherwise been razed.  

As noted by John Bauman in his work on Portland’s Model Cities Program, the city was unique in the way it made “Model Cities a part of its downtown renewal.” Building on the vision set forth by Victor Gruen, the city “wove Model Cities into the very fabric of its brick and mortar revitalization process.” This was accomplished in part by the use of Model Cities funds to create a new Department of Housing and Urban Development in the city. By tying in the program to Portland’s greater goal of downtown revitalization, city leaders made one of the program’s specific goals to use its funding to tackle developmental issues.

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40 Ibid., 207.
41 Ibid., 207.
42 Ibid., 207.
2.D Provision of Social Services

The Model Cities Program in Portland enabled the city to tap into $31 million worth of federal funds from a range of agencies to improve the lives of everyone living within its boundaries. Jadine O’Brien, the director of Portland’s Model Cities program from 1970 to 1974 noted that the plan enabled the city to put large amounts of capital into the improvement of childcare centers, health clinics, and recreation programs. By not only tackling housing and economic development, Model Cities put in place programs that sought to create a more active and well-served population. These community programs would later help integrate Portland’s burgeoning immigrant community and help to build cross-cultural bridges in line with Thomas Pettigrew’s intergroup contact theory. The creation of structured programs that would help aid the entire community at-large, Portland’s Model Cities Program made early strides in making the city more welcoming toward immigrant populations.

As suggested by the work of Pettigrew and Herbert Blumer, Model Cities and its associated educational and healthcare programs enabled cross-cultural bridges to be constructed in decades to come. These neighborhood organizations continue to be a presence in the former model neighborhood and were integral to the effective integration and support of immigrant communities that came into the city after the program’s closing. School programs that were created as a result of Model Cities are still “centers of learning” for immigrant children from “Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union.” Scholarship suggests

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“ Ibid.
that “much of Portland’s success in welcoming and integrating diverse immigrant groups is traceable to the philosophy and practices” of these programs.49

Joseph Gray, a member of Portland’s Model Cities Program, noted that this groundwork of social services laid by the initiative was, potentially, the most beneficial aspect of Model Cities to Portland for its long-term future. Through establishing “day care programs...elderly support programs...[and] a lot of health programs” the city was able to provide space for educational development, healthcare, and structured social contact among the residents of the city. This again supports the explanation set forth by Pettigrew and Blumer that the increased presence of methods for structured social contact between native residents and immigrants would engender more pro-immigrant stances in the electorate and thus the local government.

2. E Institutional Structure and Support of the Program

A distinguishing feature of the program in Portland was that its City Hall was responsible for running and implementing all aspects of the Model Cities initiative.50 While other locations had funding handed to community partners in different areas of the neighborhood by an independent body that was associated, but not directly run by, the municipal government, the Portland program was directed in a top-down manner under the auspices of City Hall. The director of Portland’s Model Cities initiative oversaw a staff that were all “employees of the city.” This transparency and effective method of management inspired cooperation between different departments within Portland’s city hall, such as the parks and recreation and health and human services department.51

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49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Gray, “Gray, Joseph oral history interview.”
The program in Portland was structured so that the Model Cities Program director would report directly to the City Manager. Consequently, the program’s institutional structure was designed so that the program director could defy “the use of simple organizational charts and neatly divided spheres of authority.” The institutional structure of Portland’s Model Cities Program also stressed the fact that the program director was the “front man” for all topics regarding its implementation and was given a “responsibility that [exceeded] his formal or line authority.” This suggests that Portland’s program director was given a great degree of latitude in the day-to-day running of the system. By stripping away layers of bureaucratic red tape and allowing the program director to directly report to the City Manager, the institutional structure of the Model Cities Program allowed for a nimble and adaptive program.

Research also suggests that the new, more progressive generation of leaders within Portland’s city government gave the Model Cities Program and its leaders greater latitude and increased support in their plans. Instead of maintaining and preaching to a certain status-quo of what the city should look like, Portland’s leaders looked forward and, rather than trying to reinvigorate the city’s historical past, preferred to adapt to the changing times.

Model Cities put in place a strong belief in citizen participation in decision making, and its funding and programs enabled local organizations, non-profit directors, and school programs room and capital to grow and flourish. From its earliest origins, the Portland Model Cities program was “based heavily on citizen participation.”

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52 City of Portland, Maine, City Council, “Section III Statement of Administrative Structure,” Application to the Department of Housing and Urban Development for a Grant to Carry Out A Comprehensive City Demonstration Plan, 1969 Part III, Sec. Three, Page 1, Located at Bowdoin College Library
53 Ibid.
54 Bauman, Gateway to Vacationland, 211.
56 Gray, “Gray, Joseph oral history interview.”
oversaw aspects of the program and the majority were residents who lived within the defined neighborhood. Additionally, multiple task forces were created concerning a variety of different issues each half comprised of city residents. By involving a wide swath of the populace, this program gave agency to citizens.

2. Program’s Repercussions

While the Model Cities Program in Portland only lasted a brief four years, it allowed for Portland’s Metropolitan Council on Housing to receive $672,000 in grants. Using this money, the council began to enforce residential housing code in the Portland West neighborhood and also allowed “owners of substandard, nineteenth-century housing to correct major interior and exterior code violations.” This updating of Portland’s buildings laid the groundwork for economic development to come.

This redevelopment of housing downtown was, arguably, the greatest success of the Model Cities Program in Portland. Prior to its genesis, “the quality of housing stock had deteriorated” within the city. Before the program, there had been a migration away from the city’s West End; however, after the injection of federal capital and the redevelopment of buildings in the chosen neighborhood the city became more “stabilized” with regard to its housing options. The Model Cities Program in Portland, in conjunction with a separate grant called the Code Enforcement Program, successfully forced landlords throughout the city to fix

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57 Ibid.
58 Bauman, Gateway to Vacationland, 211.
59 Ibid.
60 Gray, “Gray, Joseph oral history interview.”
61 Ibid.
properties and to reduce the areas of the city once considered as slums. Through a process of demolition and renovation, the city opened up important housing opportunities.62

Key to the success of this new program was the aforementioned presence of a generation of new, progressive leaders in Portland’s city government who attacked the city’s recent economic shortcomings with a “non-sentimental, non-romantic, efficiency-driven approach.”63 Regardless of the morality of their approach to certain aspects of development, this new generation of leaders were different from the former Yankee Republican hegemony and utilized a more “robust, non-partisan, grassroots leadership” style.64 Their approach to the urban revitalization suggested a commitment to moving the city forward and a pledge to helping the “civic-minded leaders in the business community.”65

Overall, the program in Portland received $7,594,429; however, when other funds from federal agencies were factored in, the city’s Model Cities Program was the beneficiary of close to $31 million. This large amount of additional federal funds represents an important difference between the program in Portland and Lewiston. While the Lewiston’s Model Cities basic funding was similar to Portland’s, no documents make reference to large amounts of outside federal funding from multiple agencies.

The Portland program not only injected a large amount of capital into the city, but it also “stripped away burdensome layers of red tape” that had long plagued plans for urban renewal in the city.66 As has been previously mentioned, the fact that Portland’s Model City director was selected by the City Council, reported to the City Manager, and was closely supervised by both

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63 Bauman, Gateway to Vacationland, 211.
64 Nicoll, “Model Cities, Senator Muskie and Creative Federalism,” 262.
65 Ibid.
bodies created a dexterous program that was able to tackle the urban renewal issues at hand. This
couple with the new progressive and activist City Council that had been elected into office in
1967 lead by Democrat Harold Loring made Portland’s Model City Program ruthlessly effective
in its efforts.

The implementation of Model Cities was an important critical juncture that explains the
diverging paths of Lewiston and Portland in terms of their municipal politicians’ professed
treatment of immigrants in the twenty-first century. While never explicitly addressing the needs
of an immigrant community, Model Cities in Portland laid an important groundwork that future
events and leaders would build upon. This injection of federal funds gave Portland its first
lifeblood to recover from its economic depression – a source of capital that was never present in
the Lewiston context. While the federal government also chose Lewiston as part of the Model
Cities Program, it was not given the same amount of funding as the program in Portland, its city
leaders lacked the progressive vision seen in Portland, and it failed to address issues of
downtown regeneration in the same way as Portland’s program.

2. G Changing Downtown

Even with the protection given through the Model Cities funding, some of Portland’s
major downtown landmarks were still at risk of being taken down. In an effort to preserve the
historical edifices being razed intermittently by the brazen city government, real estate investors
bought many of the city’s “large historic buildings at sharply decreased prices.”67 This loose
group of developers organized themselves into the Old Port Association and were able to
successfully challenge aspects of the city’s development plans and lobby for “sidewalk repairs,

street lights, tree planting, and a new parking garage” that allowed for the neighborhood to become more and more viable as a cultural, shopping, and economic hub for the city.68

This community organization remained integral to the preservation of Portland’s identity as a quaint New England city, and they were able to halt any further destruction of the area’s most significant buildings. Their original purchasing of real estate and grouping together would lay the groundwork for the tourism hub that the Old Port would become in later years. The advent of both the Historical Preservation Act of 1966 and the Model Cities Program’s commitment in Portland to downtown development aided this group in solidifying its renewal efforts of the Old Port.

After the phasing out of Model Cities, Portland became a changed city and one ready to tackle the quickly changing global economy. The influx of capital into downtown and the continued investment in business and buildings began to change the city into a “service-oriented” regional hub.69 Employment in the finance and service industries increased from 1960 to 1970 while jobs in fishing and manufacturing declined. The city was beginning to move away from its aforementioned traditional industries, and in 1971, in the midst of Model Cities, Portland embarked on an ambitious new plan entitled: Maine Way. The plan’s goal was to further transform the downtown and create a pedestrian friendly area filled with “open spaces...plazas, courts, and arcades.”70 Enacting this program, Portland city government again embarked on a path of destruction and they condoned the taking down of aged commercial real estate and the revitalization of more attractive historical buildings.71

68 Ibid.
69 Bauman, Gateway to Vacationland, 217.
70 Ibid., 218.
71 Ibid.
In 1972 alone, a total of $42,000,000 worth of new investment was injected into the downtown. This included sixty new buildings to house the many new corporations that had opened in Portland. Buildings housing Casco National Bank, Maine Savings Bank, and the new University of Maine Law School rose across the city as employment opportunities and sources of employment grew.72 In the 1980s, the amount of office space in downtown massively increased and was quickly occupied by the expanding finance, insurance, and real estate industries.73 By 1986, Portland’s downtown was labelled as “one of the hottest real estate markets in the country.”74 However, in 1988, much like the rest of New England, Portland “experienced a substantial downturn in its economy.”75 Particularly hard hit were the city’s financial and real estate sectors, and between 1988 and 1989 home values in the city only increased by 1.8%.76 However, this period of economic downturn was largely short-lived thanks to other large injections of outside capital into the city. This second injection of capital and the power of political entrepreneurs is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. The success of Model Cities in Portland set up the city to become a hub for the creative class of individuals, and in turn a city with a higher propensity to welcome immigrants and support politicians espousing pro-immigrant platforms.

3. Lewiston

As detailed in Chapter Two, the story of Lewiston is one of rapid expansion, incredible success, and then a steep nose-dive with the loss of the city’s major industry. While Portland’s

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72 Ibid., 219.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 122.
76 Ibid., 123.
history is well-documented and lauded as a great success of urban planning, federal money, innovative design, and economic renewal; Lewiston has a slightly murkier history with regard to its development. This section details the city’s economic development with special attention paid to critical junctures that explain the divergence in Lewiston’s economy compared to Portland. Lewiston, unlike Portland, was not the recipient of large amounts of federal dollars from many different Washington agencies in its early redevelopment process, and, while still a participant in the Model Cities Program, the plan’s implementation and funding was not as successful as its counterpart in Portland. And, the institutional structures created to use the funds were designed quite differently and less effectively in Lewiston than in Portland. This section examines Lewiston’s Model Cities Program and suggests how the differences between Lewiston and Portland set the cities on different paths toward economic revitalization.

Throughout Lewiston’s heyday in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, Bates Manufacturing, the proprietor of many of the city’s mills remained a dominant force in the Lewiston community. However, at a time even earlier than Portland, in the 1920s and 1930s, the city’s mills and their owners began to feel the pressure from competitors in the southern United States. The country was beginning its reliance on electricity as a source of power, and the obsolete and complex system of canals that had once so innovatively powered Lewiston’s mills became a relic of the past. This period of time also heralded the loss of major transportation services to the Lewiston metropolitan area. In 1932, train service to Brunswick was cancelled and the Androscoggin & Kennebec Street Railway that had once linked the area with a series of

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trolleys shuttered its offices downtown. In the 1950s, the Maine Central Railroad would finally cut the final passenger service to the region.\textsuperscript{78}

While the period surrounding World War II and its direct aftermath did bring some prosperity to the city through the large textile orders placed by the armed services, the city would never regain its former glory as the New England capital of textile manufacturing. Cognizant of competition from the south, in the middle of the 1950s, the Bates Manufacturing Company embarked on an ambitious and last-ditch attempt to revitalize and improve the mills. In the years directly after the war, they invested more than $11 million in technological improvements.\textsuperscript{79} This did not prove fruitful, and in 1955 the Bates Company closed the Androscoggin Mill in Lewiston, leaving close to 1,000 workers out of a job. This closure marked the first downward trend in Lewiston’s population with a similar loss of around 1,000 people.\textsuperscript{80} The closing of the Androscoggin Mill heralded the beginning to the end, and, in the coming years, all the other major mills in the area would also close their doors for good. This loss of the city’s major industry and the downfall of Maine’s once largest employer suggests the first waves of economic anxiety in an area that had for so long depended upon the mills for its vitality.

As leaders in Lewiston began to realize the ominous future ahead, development efforts became concentrated on bringing employment back to the area. In 1952, the Lewiston Development Corporation (LDC) was founded.\textsuperscript{81} This group consisted of individuals from various interested parties in Lewiston’s economy, and they quickly began to dive into the city’s economic troubles. In 1964, a subsidiary of the LDC purchased 4 of the mill buildings once

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 79.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 89.
owned by the Bates Corporation. These buildings were originally leased back to the Bates Corporation by the LDC before the mills finally closed up shop in the early 1970s.

The LDC began by focusing its efforts on enticing manufacturing businesses to open in the area. Raytheon Inc. briefly opened a plant outside of downtown, and other companies followed suit. These first attempts at revitalization did not last and they were unable to fully bring back the same steady labor once provided by the mills. However, the LDC did succeed in attracting a large printing business to the area, and they were relatively successful as acting as a “conduit for capital resources for new and expanding industry.”

Developers in the city also concentrated their efforts on the offering of retail options. Shopping centers began to pop up around the city outside of downtown, and in 1963 a large one was created on the corner of East Avenue and Sabattus Street in Lewiston. This further pushed the core commercial areas away from the once lively downtown toward the edges of the city and the burgeoning suburbs.

The 1960s were defined by this exodus from downtown, as the centers of shopping moved further and further away from the traditional hub of Lisbon Street. In 1964, Lewiston, Auburn, and many of the area’s surrounding towns published the Androscoggin Area Development Corporation Report. This plan had as its goal to “reduce the rate of unemployment in the area” and to ensure the economic prosperity of the region. This plan chose to highlight the industrial capacity of the region and focused on the development of industrial parks in the Twin Cities community. Instead of taking the tack of Portland’s developers and focusing on the

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83 Kujawa, “Local Social Relations and Urban Revitalization.”
revitalization of the downtown, Lewiston’s joint plan suggested a further commitment to the same industrial practices that had originally led to the city’s rise.

3. A Lewiston’s Model Cities Program

In 1968, Lewiston was identified as a target city for Model Cities funding and was eventually included in Edmund Muskie’s ambitious program. However, the city was never given access to the same amount of money as the program in Portland. The program in Lewiston was always “much smaller” than that of Portland and was not able to gain the same traction as its southern neighbor. Joseph Gray, a member of Portland’s Model Cities committee, noted that it was unusual for a state to have more than one program within its boundaries, potentially explaining some of the funding differences between the two cities. However, he attributed Maine’s fortunes to the fact that Edmund Muskie, a primary proponent of the initiative, was, himself, Maine-born and a graduate of Bates College. In other words, Gray contended that Muskie may have personally requested for Maine to be the recipient of more than one Model City. Lewiston’s existence as an outlier second program in a state may partially explain the overall lack of funding that went into the city’s Model Cities plan.

Unlike the Portland program that had Gruen’s Plan as a roadmap highlighting some of the main goals as urban development and the changing of the city’s downtown, Lewiston originally applied for Model Cities designation in order to receive funding for new roads and sewers. This difference in original ambition and scope between the two programs suggests that, even from the

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“Gray, “Gray, Joseph oral history interview.”
“Gray, “Gray, Joseph oral history interview.”
its start in the two cities, the Model Cities Program in Portland had its eyes set on loftier goals and projects that would permanently change the downtown.

The program lasted in Lewiston from 1968 to 1974 and was primarily focused on making improvements to the city that were not, in the end, visible to the average citizen. While the city did receive its new sewer system and was able to revamp its fire truck fleet, Lewiston did not achieve the same success that Portland had in blending the Model Cities Program with its ongoing efforts of aesthetic and physical downtown revitalization. While Portland’s program laid the preservation seeds for the genesis of the current Old Port district, Lewiston was never able to inject new economic lifeblood into the city’s plethora of mills and historic downtown during this time.

3.B Institutional Structure and Support

Critically and unlike the program in Portland, Lewiston’s Model Cities initiative was not institutionally supported in the same way as in Portland. While Portland was experiencing a new wave of city administrators and council members who had made the important transition toward more modern, progressive, and activist stances, as noted by a former member of Lewiston’s Planning Board during the Model Cities epoch, city leaders in Lewiston were still believers in the “status quo” – a status quo that did not inspire the same commitment to rapid changes as in Portland.89

While the Model Cities director in Portland was given a greater ability to act as an independent party but still be fully supported and watched over by the city’s governmental leaders, Lewiston’s program was not given the same amount of leeway. The Lewiston program

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was structured so that the Model Cities director was overseen by the Mayor himself and by the Department of Economic Development. The city’s application for funding also clearly stated that the Mayor of Lewiston was the “Chairman of the Model City Agency.” Instead of having a powerful program director who was permitted to act and speak on behalf of the agency, like Portland, the structure of Lewiston’s plan did not provide for this greater latitude. While the city did still provide for a director of the program, this person had to first report to the head of the Department of Economic Development and was still under the direct control of the Mayor of Lewiston. This suggests that Lewiston’s program was not able to function with the same agency, power, or flexibility as the Portland program.

By restricting the director’s ability to cut through layers of bureaucratic red tape, the institutional structure of the Lewiston program was another way in which the Model Cities Program within the city was not as effective as the program in Portland. Figure 3.1 below shows how the many bureaucratic hurdles needed to jump through by the Model Cities director in Lewiston and further suggests the programs inability to act. According to the flow chart present in Figure 3.1, the Model Cities director in Lewiston was required to report to multiple committees and was left with little agency. Comparatively, as laid out in the previous section of this chapter, the Portland director was given a much longer leash and greater ability to make decisions on their own.

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“Board of Mayor and Aldermen, City of Lewiston, Maine “Part V Administration,” Model Cities Program, 1968 Part V, Page 2, Located at Bowdoin College Library.
The primary plan of Lewiston’s Model City Program was to construct a “galleria” on Lisbon Street. As detailed in city plans from this era, the galleria would create an attractive shopping area in the heart of Lewiston. This was an effort to revitalize the city’s downtown and to bring back in commercial businesses that had since migrated to the city’s outer suburbs in the early 1960s. However, this plan encountered “obstruction after obstruction” during its development. Again, unlike the program in Portland, the directors of Lewiston’s Model Cities initiative were required to pass through City Hall instead of working in a symbiotic relationship with the city government. Instead of taking heed from Portland’s Gruen Plan and its commitment to being to turn its downtown into a shopping and residential area, leaders in Lewiston proved intransigent on making headway at attempts to revitalize Lisbon Street.

Maurice Goulet, a Lewiston Planning Board official during this time, stated that when the city’s Model Cities committee would bring forth a new plan “half the people [in City Hall]

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91 Ibid.
92 Goulet, “Goulet, Maurice oral history interview.”
94 Goulet, “Goulet, Maurice oral history interview.”
would go against us, and so we’d be back to square one.”

Goulet’s statements again suggest that Lewiston’s program did not have a harmonious relationship with City Hall, but rather one that was contentious and lacking a shared vision. He noted that the people he encountered in City Hall were preoccupied with a “status quo” of what Lewiston should look like. As evidenced in their attempts to re-attract manufacturing jobs to the city on the eve of the mills closing, Goulet’s comments suggest an unwillingness in Lewiston’s City Hall to adapt to the winds of change that had already blown through Portland.

Similar to the program in Portland, Lewiston’s Model Cities plan identified a Model Neighborhood in which it planned to develop and put into place many of its key programs. Lewiston’s Model Neighborhood was a swath of land comprising the “city’s principal manufacturing facilities and central business district, as well as numerous residential properties.” This area was chosen primarily due to the poor housing options within its bounds. The study noted that over a third of surveyed residents within the chosen area would choose to move out of their current dwellings if at all possible, suggesting a serious lack of economic opportunity and areas for advancement.

The discussion of Lewiston’s Model Cities program, and its contrast with the initiative in Portland suggests a strong distinction between how the two cities were able to capitalize on their respective inclusion in the federal revitalization program. First, the Lewiston project was never given the same financial resources as the program in Portland; as the latter was given much more in outside federal funds independent of the money explicitly stipulated for Model Cities. With this lack of capital, the Model Cities committee in Lewiston was unable to affect the same level

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95 Ibid.
of change as in its southern neighbor. Second, my research suggests a difference in the institutional structure of the program’s organization and in the levels of support for the two programs within the respective City Halls. Even though both programs were directed by City Hall, Portland’s program had a larger amount of support from city leaders, while members of Lewiston’s Model City committee mentioned that they were confronted with a certain intransigence from persons within city government.

This difference and the discrepancy of funding suggest that these two cities’ experiences with the Model Cities Program is a critical juncture that explains a divergence in their economic fortunes. While both began the 1970s as regions that had lost their indigenous industry, by the end of the program in 1974, Portland was a changed city, while Lewiston had yet to find its footing.

4. Data Related to Levels of Economic Anxiety

The secondary literature suggests that if an area is experiencing an economic downturn or if certain economic fear motivators are present, then there is an increased chance for politicians within that locale to adopt anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. Daniel Tichenor, in Dividing Lines, contends that restrictive or inclusive immigration policies are not dictated by the economy’s boom or bust periods. His unit of analysis, however, is the United States as a whole. This thesis examines the smaller unit of two cities in Maine and, while it does not aim to disprove Tichenor’s explanation, it does suggest another layer in the economic causation model. The content of this chapter and the following chapter examining municipal politicians’ rhetoric suggests that, on the smaller, local level, economic downturns and associated anxiety can have a large influence on the saliency of certain more restrictive or inclusive viewpoints.
While the majority of this chapter traces the historical choices and processes that explain the critical juncture between Lewiston and Portland, this section examines the economic data suggesting the numerical differences in economic fortunes between the two cities. The Model Cities programs in the two cities should not be considered as the sole catalyst for the cities differing economic outlooks. Rather, it is an important factor – even a critical one – that, over the course of time, made Portland a more viable candidate for increased economic revitalization. The analysis of data suggesting differing levels of economic anxiety does not attempt to create concrete links between the numbers and the exact events during the Model Cities timeframe; rather, it suggests, in conjunction with the discussion in Chapter Four, that these events had important repercussions in the years after their implementation.

As detailed in the preceding sections, the injections of outside capital through Model Cities funding situated Portland in more comfortable position in terms of its own economic potential. Consequently, it was better positioned economically to absorb any increased flow of immigrants in the twenty-first century. These flows of money allowed for the city to develop its infrastructure, aesthetic design, and economy in ways that Lewiston was unable to. Based on these critical differences in levels of funding and allocation of resources, we should expect the data to reflect different levels of economic well-being in the two cities.

As suggested by the aforementioned discussions of the closure of Lewiston’s mills and its municipal government’s inability to attract back major employment on the same scale, the city has been drastically affected by its slow economic decline. Currently in the city, a quarter of the children residing in Lewiston “grow up poor” and the majority of the city’s former mills stand shuttered – ever-present symbols of a bygone era.98

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Table 3.1 details the median household incomes between the two cities. While both are similar in the early 2000s, 2007 represents a turning point. Since then the disparity between the two cities has increased. In 2017, the most recently available year of data, the median household income in Portland was more than $20,000 dollars more than that of Lewiston. This graph suggests that Lewiston’s financial status explains why residents are more willing to vote for politicians that espouse anti-immigrant viewpoints in recent elections. This refers directly to the theory of scapegoating put forth by Citrin et al. that contends that economic adversity in an area can act “as a trigger for the displacement of anxiety and anger onto minority groups.”100 The influx of Somalis in 2001 into an area such as Lewiston still having not experienced an economic revival in the same manner as Portland suggests that anti-immigrant standpoints are more salient within the Lewiston context. The literature suggests that an area still experiencing adverse effects of losing its major industry in conjunction with the arrival of a new population will be more likely to support politicians that espouse anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy.

As a measure of economic vitality, Table 3.2 details the great disparity between median housing values between the two cities. While both cities have seen their home values increase, the graph suggests that Portland’s housing market is much more robust than that of Lewiston. This real estate boom supports the claim that Portland is an area experiencing lower levels of economic anxiety than that of its northern neighbor. Portland has also been able to effectively recover its housing much faster than Lewiston’s after the financial crisis in 2008. And, Portland’s recent uptick in housing prices suggests a robust economy recently, while Lewiston’s downturn potentially suggests a dip in the city’s economy.102

Conclusion

While Tables 1 and 2 firmly support the notion that residents of Lewiston have experienced greater levels of economic anxiety than those in Portland, it is important to also note...
that the secondary scholarship points to the power of media in the framing of people’s likelihood to support politicians that espouse anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy. While economic anxiety, based purely on numerical data, can create a feeling of trepidation among a population toward an immigrant other, the literature suggests that media’s framing of such issues and the reported-on rhetoric from elected officials can serve to greatly exacerbate this feeling of economic anxiety. Such rhetorical framing then must be explored. Therefore, while, Chapters and Three and Four illustrate the economic development and cultural differences between the cities, Chapter Five examines politicians’ actual rhetoric to see how such framing of issues plays out in the political arena.

Using the framework set forth by Capoccia and Pierson, this chapter has contended that certain critical junctures can help to explain the economic and subsequent political rhetoric divergence between Lewiston and Portland. Those critical junctures take the form of important, and different, injections of outside resources into the two metropolitan areas. Importantly, institutional difference in how those funds could be used, i.e., the organizational structures of city governance, coupled with differing levels of support from city leaders, affected how these resources could be put to use, thereby setting each city on a distinct path toward any plausible economic revitalization.

In other words, these separate sources of foreign capital and different commitments to the ideals put forth Model Cities allowed Portland to develop differently from Lewiston and to develop lower levels of economic anxiety, as suggested by the higher median incomes and median housing prices. With a more “comfortable” economic standing, the data suggest that citizens and politicians in Portland would be less likely to view immigrants as a threat to their economic well-being. And, this difference in economic position plausibly has consequences for
the instances of and receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric by city officials. Later chapters serve the role to delve into economic anxiety and politicians’ use of rhetoric surrounding this concept. Chapter Three has ultimately suggested that politicians in Lewiston are more likely to find success in painting immigrants as an economic threat to the well-being of their city.

This chapter’s purpose has been to provide a detailed history of the Model Cities Programs in Lewiston and Portland and to discuss decisions and developments that have made municipal politicians in the two cities either more or less likely to adopt anti or pro-immigrant policy and rhetoric. Chapter Four moves into a discussion of further events in the economic development of the two cities and how further discrepancies in outside sources of capital have created different environments of economic anxiety and perceived racial threat.
Chapter Four – Political Entrepreneurship, Further Injections of Capital, and the Creative Class

Chapter Four examines injections of capital into Lewiston and Portland during the 1990s. It looks at the two cities after the end of their Model Cities Programs and highlights additional differences in funding, economic development, and political entrepreneurship that may have reinforced the distinct paths which the critical juncture of Model Cities participation created. Furthermore, these distinct pathways may have been a crucial foundation for inspiration of and resonance with city officials’ rhetoric that either welcomes or shuns immigrant populations. Through the examination of these additional differences, this chapter contends that the distinct events in the economic development histories of Portland and Lewiston can help to explain their respective politicians’ differing rhetoric towards newcomers. Building on Chapter Three, this chapter posits that a second major injection of outside funding in Portland and the lack of such funding in Lewiston, reinforced the pathways of economic development in each city.

To restate, the central aim of this thesis remains to examine the economic development of Lewiston and Portland and highlight the repercussions of such differing levels of expansion and growth on politician’s rhetoric and professed policy toward immigrants in each respective city. As shown in Chapter One, the secondary literature suggests that if a city is experiencing an economic downturn, citizens are more likely to support anti-immigrant rhetoric from politicians. The relevant literature also posits that a city with a greater population of creative class individuals, and institutions that promote increased access to cultural capital are also less likely to support anti-immigrant rhetoric. Building on these two major explanations, this chapter delves into the injection of outside funding in Portland, and a lack thereof in Lewiston, that reinforced the already distinct economic development trajectories of the two cities.
This chapter highlights the period of time from 1990 to near the present day and how further outside injections of resources have contributed to (1) different levels of economic anxiety, (2) the presence of different classes of people, and (3) different rhetoric and professed policy from municipal politicians in Maine’s major metropolitan areas. This chapter utilizes the theoretical framework derived from the scholarship of Richard Florida, Elaine Sharp, and Mark Joslyn to suggest that a city with a greater population of creative class individuals may be more likely to elect politicians who utilize pro-immigrant policy and rhetoric.

Similar to Chapter Three, Chapter Four relies on the theoretical framework on critical junctures and path dependency. This chapter contends that the “timing and sequence” of further outside sources of capital have created pathways that the two cities have distinctly followed.¹ Paul Pierson contends that even events that are “exogenous to the institution of interest” can have lasting effects on establishments in question. This suggests that occurrences, such as the economic development of cities and the different injections of capital, can have lasting repercussions on other institutions, like the ways in which political actors develop rhetoric and campaign positions.

This chapter also utilizes the theoretical framework of political entrepreneurs to describe how Portland was able to firmly reinforce its distinct economic development pathway. Adam Sheingate contends that political entrepreneurs are “individuals whose creative acts have transformative effects on politics, policies, or institutions.”² This chapter contends that, in Portland, Intel micro-chip heiress Elizabeth Noyce, was such a political entrepreneur. Her vision,

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actions, and investment in Portland had “lasting change…on politics, policies, and institutions” and reinforced the pathway of economic development that began with the Model Cities Program in the 1970s.³

Additionally, the main theory derived from the scholarship of Richard Florida is integral to the contexts of Lewiston and Portland.⁴ His work suggests that the presence of creative class individuals in an urban environment is the primary driving force in a city’s economic development. Moving away from an earlier scholarship, which suggested that a city’s economic vitality could be traced simply to the existence of major corporations or firms within its bounds, Florida contends that individuals who earn their living “by means of creative thinking, designing, and producing” are the new drivers behind economic growth.⁵ Florida’s research “turns the standard model of regional economic development on its head,” by suggesting that “people don’t follow the jobs so much as the jobs follow the creative people.”⁶

The literature suggests that some cities are better suited to attract creative class individuals than others. Cities that simply build office space and large industrial parks waiting for companies to move in, such as in the case of Pittsburgh, are not rewarded according to the

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³ Ibid., 188.
⁴ Many scholars have identified problems with the creative class thesis and have adopted their own criticism of the work. Some have suggested that the presence of creative class individuals is the direct result of economic growth rather than the catalyst for creating it. While others still have suggested that Florida’s work is an attempt to “provide a highly-readable exercise in yuppie self-indulgence.” The critics suggest that Florida’s thesis is merely a method of giving cities an attractive, easy path toward economic revitalization. See Jeffrey Zimmerman’s article “From brew town to cool town: Neoliberalism and the creative city development strategy in Milwaukee” for more information on these critiques. While using the work of Florida, this thesis primarily focuses on the link between the creative class and associated mitigated effects of racial threat, as put forth by Elaine B. Sharp and Mark R. Joslyn in “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America.” Regardless of the creative class’ actual power in economic growth, the work of Sharp and Joslyn suggest that their presence in a city may produce lower levels of racial threat -- an integral link to the focus of this thesis.
work of Florida; rather, cities with inclusive cultures, diverse populaces and job offerings, wide ranged entertainment and recreational opportunities, and distinctive “older, urban centers” are better suited to attract such individuals and thereby experience growth. Cities with the ability to attract creative class individuals are those that have “a multitude of casual ‘third place’” establishments, such as cafes, bookstores, and other restaurants where “informal social ties can be cultivated.”

Furthermore, the secondary scholarship importantly suggests that cities with larger populations of creative class individuals experience mitigated effects of racial tension. Elaine Sharp and Mark Joslyn contend that cities with larger creative class populations may be more accepting of a racialized other. They contend that this class’ presence “creates a cultural milieu that is pervasive enough to yield racial tolerance levels among the less educated that are much like those of the better educated.” Sharp and Joslyn also state that racial threats are “clearly mitigated [in cities] where the new creative class…holds sway.” As most recent immigrants to Lewiston and Portland are racially different from the native population, this remains an integral explanation for the two cities’ divergence.

While critiques of Florida have repeatedly attempted to disprove his explanation that creative class individuals are a catalyst for economic growth, this thesis does not wade into this debate; rather, it focuses on the presence of the creative class and the institutions that attract them to a certain city as factors that play into the creation of a more welcoming city for

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2 Zimmerman, “From brew town to cool town,” 232.
3 Sharp and Joslyn, “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America,” 575.
4 Ibid., 588.
5 Ibid., 575.
6 See the narrative of immigration to Lewiston and Portland present in Chapter Two for more information on specific waves of immigration to the two cities over the past 30 years.
immigrants and an environment with greater receptivity to pro-immigrant rhetoric from elected officials. The hypotheses put forth by Florida, Sharp, and Joslyn remain important explanations for how and why municipal politicians, and cities as whole, may support or oppose anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. Their work suggests that if a city has a larger population of creative class individuals and therefore experiences mitigated effects of racial threat, its politicians will be more likely to espouse pro-immigrant rhetoric as the voting populace may be more in support of such policies.

This chapter is made up of two sections. The first part examines the second major injection of outside funding into Portland’s downtown and how this influx of capital has contributed to Portland becoming a hub for the creative class and institutions inducing increased cultural capital. It also examines the links between this development of cultural institutions and how a city may experience mitigated levels of perceived racial and economic threats. The second part highlights the economic development of Lewiston during the aforementioned timeframe and sheds light on the decisions and factors that may have contributed to the increased propensity for municipal politicians to adopt anti-immigrant positions. By highlighting different factors present in the two cities, Chapter Four deepens the explanation for the divergence in municipal political rhetoric.

1. A Second Injection of Capital into Portland in the 1990s

With the core of Portland’s historic downtown preserved because of the robust Model Cities Program and other efforts during the 1960s and 1970s, the Old Port area remained an historically influential and attractive site for commercial enterprises to open shop. In the 1970s

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a large number of privately owned “specialty shops” began to open up and many still remain and provide the retail power of this district today. However, the city did experience an economic downturn starting in the 1970s and 1980s even with the opening of new shops downtown. By 1992, it was seeing a “debilitating mix of suburban flight, economic recession and a decline in the commercial real estate market.”14 Office space vacancy was at 23 percent, and the city was in desperate need of an economic revival.

In the mid-1990s, investment began to flood into the city’s downtown from a variety of different sources. Similar to the Model Cities Program before it, the 1990s were marked by more large injections of outside resources into the Portland metropolitan area. However, instead of originating from federal funds, these sources of capital were mainly from private investors and community members. This was largely spearheaded by a woman named Elizabeth Noyce, a “Portland native and microchip heiress.”15 Having inherited large sums of money after a high profile divorce from Robert T. Noyce, a co-inventor of the Intel microchip, she made large investments into creating more attractive and enticing downtown real estate and also spent large quantities of her own money to invest in Portland’s cultural institutions.16

Noyce’s major injection of capital into downtown Portland positioned her as a political entrepreneur who through “singular acts of individual creativity” effectively revitalized the city’s downtown and reinforced its pathway of economic development.17 The scholarship on political entrepreneurs suggests that these individuals are able to transform existing institutions and are

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16 Ibid.

Her singular boost of capital into the city created an opportunity for businesses and individuals to move into the city, and Noyce’s commitment to funding both real estate and cultural institutions created a perfect storm for the city’s continued regeneration. No such major benefactor ever appeared to fund Lewiston’s renewal, and the city has felt the repercussions as such, as economic anxiety has continued to exist at a higher level than in Portland.

1. A Elizabeth Noyce’s Business Investments

Noyce’s efforts to revitalize Portland were concentrated and calculated. Beginning in 1991, Noyce, confronted with the fact that “out-of-state financial institutions were picking off Maine’s banks one by one” leaving Maine businesses at the whim of investors in far-off cities, decided to create the Maine Bank and Trust Company with an initial investment of $7.7 million. This bank quickly prospered and became an important financial force in the city. This acted as a catalyst for further investment in the city and also signaled the start to Noyce’s commitment to revitalizing the city. By capitalizing on the strong foundation left by the work done under the Model Cities Program, this section posits that Noyce’s investments turned Portland into a hub for the creative class and further mitigated potential racial threats posed by new immigration.

She began by importantly making large investments to preserve and redevelop historic downtown real estate. Noyce invested heavily in buildings on Congress Street, a central artery of the city’s historic peninsula, and at one point owned close to “10 percent of the city’s office and retail space.”19 By continually working to preserve the city’s distinct urban flavor, Noyce’s

18 Sheingate, “Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political Development,” 188.
investments preserved Portland’s city character and gave the city an advantage in attracting the creative class, as the work of Florida contends that creative individuals may gravitate toward cities with a well-preserved “older urban center.” The preservation done by Noyce, and by the Model Cities Program before her, made Portland an attractive city to this class of individuals.

In 1996, paying around $13 million, Noyce purchased “three office towers and an old five-and-dime store” on Congress Street. She had as her goal to entice businesses and enterprises back into the city’s downtown – businesses that might otherwise open in malls, or other areas outside of the city’s center. This remained similar to the original urban plan for Portland designed by Victor Gruen and his associates close to 30 years previously. With “Downtown as Mall” remaining the ethos of Noyce’s investment, the city remained well positioned for an urban revitalization.

In the months and years following Noyce’s purchase and subsequent renovation of real estate on Congress Street, vacancy rates plummeted. One building at 465 Congress Street saw its vacancy rate go from 15% to 3%, while another at 477 Congress Street saw its rates decrease from 15% to 5%. With the investment made by Noyce and by others, the overall vacancy rate in Portland plummeted by 11.9% from 1992 to 1996 and pricing per square foot increased drastically as well. Noyce’s injections of capital into the downtown secured important attractive real estate for future businesses and gave Portland further options in providing space for new businesses to open, while retaining the historic nature of the city’s downtown.

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Rimer, “Real Estate; A philanthropist invests in downtown Portland, Me., hoping to stem the flight to suburbs.”
Ibid.
Ibid.
A *New York Times* article published in 1996 covering Noyce’s investment into Portland quoted a prominent area businesswoman who made the conscious decision to move her computer consulting company from the suburbs to the downtown area. She stated that this decision was made due to the attractive, newly refurbished office space, the “Victorian lobby replete with marble, brass and mahogany details; the central location; the nearby parking garage; and the relatively crime-free neighborhood.” Once again, the making of such a decision suggests that Noyce’s investment created a climate in which businesses offering creative class positions were enticed by her efforts to create an attractive downtown. Her money spent revamping the core of Portland, created an environment where businesses were drawn to the city for its character and its well-appointed office space.

Noyce also spearheaded the effort to entice L.L. Bean to open a now-closed retail establishment on Congress Street. For much of the population, this opening of a flagship store downtown represented that the area “had finally turned a corner” with respect to its revitalization. The opening of L.L Bean also coincided with Noyce’s investment in the, also now-closed, Public Market in downtown Portland. Working off the model used by Seattle in its Pike Place Market, Noyce poured money into creating a “block and a half wide” structure to house close to 23 vendors selling their wares to the public. The space was home to stalls selling seafood, meat, and vegetables, and was home to a public performance space for local bands. This project not only created a diverse shopping location for the downtown, but it also empowered local vendors who were provided with a location to sell their goods to the public.

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24 Ibid.
26 Rimer, “Real Estate; A philanthropist invests in downtown Portland, Me., hoping to stem the flight to suburbs.”
The creation of the Public Market works again to support the case of Portland becoming a magnet city for the creative class. Key to attracting individuals in such a class is the diversity of the populace, but also the diversity of entertainment, eating, and recreational options, offering them avenues to “enjoy a mix of influences.”27 The creation of the Public Market serves as a powerful metaphor for the type of city Portland was becoming due to Noyce’s outside injections of capital, by not only revitalizing downtown office space, but by also providing for diverse and vibrant “third places,” or locations outside of work and home-life, Noyce’s efforts worked to turn the city into a magnet for the creative class.

Noyce’s total donations toward Maine charities and other institutions were valued at nearly $75 million dollars by the end of her life.28 Her “individual entrepreneurial energy,” combined with that of other investors, has created a Portland wherein “grassroots” regeneration has reigned supreme instead of large-scale local government initiatives.29 While the success of the Model Cities Program in the late 1960s and early 1970s did provide a previous critical juncture in this history of the city, Noyce’s investments in business and real estate certainly represent a second major event creating a city with lower levels of economic anxiety than that of its more northerly neighbor.

1.B Rise of Portland’s Cultural Institutions

While the previous section suggests a robust economy and business sector in Portland, this section highlights the rise of Portland’s cultural institutions. Key to Florida’s concept of how

28 Thomas, “Elizabeth B. Noyce.”
creative class individuals are drawn to a city is the concept that they are drawn to urban areas with a diverse selection of nightlife, arts and other forms of entertainment and recreation.

The investments made by Noyce not only were targeted at the economy of downtown Portland, but also at kickstarting the city’s cultural renaissance. By strategically investing in the city’s cultural institutions, Noyce and others turned Portland into a cosmopolitan destination and one where the creative class of individuals would be likely to migrate to as the diverse cultural, recreational, and entertainment options in the city grew.

This claim also builds on an important body of work suggesting that individuals with higher levels of education and with higher levels of cultural capital are more likely to be accepting of people from diverse backgrounds and be in support of immigrants.30 Research suggests that people with lower levels of education are more prone to seeing immigrants as both a cultural and economic threat. This work ties into the events in Portland as Noyce’s funding of a vibrant downtown with plentiful arts and culture made the attainment of cultural capital and increased learning more readily accessible. The presence of a robust cultural district suggests a greater accessibility to cultural capital, a mitigated perceived threat posed by immigrants, and overall increased support for pro-immigrant policies from municipal government officials.

Noyce made sizable donations to both the Portland Museum of Art, the Maine College of Art and the Maine Historical Society (all of which are located on the central Congress Street corridor). She thereby offered the seed money that would eventually result in the creation of Portland’s Arts District.31 The establishment of such an area downtown was not the brainchild of Noyce alone but rather the explicit idea of the city government. This district was originally

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decided upon by officials in City Hall who stressed the need to make the city a bastion for “cultural institutions and [an] artistic community,” the presence of which would make it an attractive location for creative class individuals according to Florida. This suggests that municipal actors in Portland were committed to creating a city engineered toward attracting the creative class.

“Through direct grants as well as property tax rebates,” the city of Portland began to attract institutions into the newly defined Arts District. The Children’s Museum of Maine opened downtown, and the city sold a commercial building on State Street at a loss to the Portland Performing Arts Center to give the institution a new home. Building on a donation from Noyce, the Maine College of Art was also able to expand by moving into a former department store in the downtown. The arrival of these institutions along with a series of smaller galleries, cafes, and boutiques solidified the development of the city’s reputation for being both “quirky [and] cultured.” While the city was able to provide financial incentives to organizations to open up shop downtown, the large-scale investment in the district by Noyce acted as a further catalyst for Portland’s development into a well-heeled, cosmopolitan society with a diverse offering of cultural institutions fostering many different viewpoints.

Portland’s institutions of higher education have functioned as ways to increase the education levels within the city. While Lewiston and its relationship with Bates College has been contentious in the past, with stereotyping rife on both sides of the divide, Portland’s main institution, the University of Southern Maine (USM), has committed itself to an “academic

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33 Ibid., 100.
quality that is affordable, flexible, and meaningful.” By focusing on offering an education that is affordable, and being a public institution, USM has been able to avoid the negative stereotyping present in Lewiston with regard to Bates students. More importantly, Lewiston has been unable to attract college graduates from its institutions of higher education to remain in the city; however, 75.6% of USM alumni remain in Maine after graduation and, of the school’s 51,000 active alumni, 14,721 reside in Cumberland County, where Portland is located.

The work of Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox suggests that people with higher levels of education are much more likely to have liberal, welcoming views toward immigrants. They posit that persons with higher levels of education are “significantly less racist and place far greater value on cultural diversity in society, and they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for their national economy as a whole.” In 2017, 28.4% of Portland’s population over the age of 25 had a bachelor’s degree or higher, while in Lewiston only 12.6% had such an advanced degree. These data support the claim that Portland is an area with greater receptivity to politicians who espouse pro-immigrant policy and rhetoric because of the higher levels of education of its population.

With Noyce’s large investments and with other injections of capital, the Old Port and the City of Portland as a whole has become an important symbol for successful economic development. The commercial redevelopment of downtown helped “spur residential reoccupation of the downtown” and created a process of gentrification felt throughout the city.

Ibid.
Portland is now known for its reputation of having an extremely well-preserved and architecturally significant downtown, anchored by the economic powerhouse that is the Old Port, and for having a vibrant selection of places where businesses, artists, and leisure classes can find locations to relax and to be exposed to a variety of different cultures and perspectives.

Noyce’s large injections of outside capital were acts of political entrepreneurship that reinforced the city’s economic development pathway that began with the Model Cities Program in the 1970s. By heavily investing in the downtown, creating more economic opportunity, and firmly endowing strong cultural institutions, Noyce heavily contributed to Portland’s economic health on the eve of the city becoming a major site for the arrival of immigrants. This historical analysis suggests that economic anxiety was lower in Portland thanks, in large part, to these external injections of resources.

2. Lewiston Today

This section highlights the economic and cultural development of Lewiston during the time-frame of 1990 to the near present day. Similar to the discussion of Portland offered above, this part of Chapter Four explores any injections of outside capital into Lewiston and how it developed in the post-Model Cities era. By looking at the decisions and events occurring in Lewiston’s history, this section contends that the ultimate lack of outside capital and dearth of cultural institutions and other third place areas in the city created an environment in which the economic anxiety and racial threat posed by major immigrant arrivals was more potent.

Beginning in the 1990s, Lewiston slowly began to change and develop following the final closure of the once-mighty mills. While Portland experienced a wave of large outside capital injections after the Model Cities Program spearheaded by the millionaire Elizabeth Noyce, Lewiston has not had such a large investment. The city has had its own smaller waves of
redevelopment, but it has not experienced the same success as Portland in large-scale economic revitalization.

As shown by Chapter Three, Portland was situated in a significantly more advantageous place after the implementation of its Model Cities program, with multiple participants lauding its work in downtown revitalization and the implementation of service provisions to its populace. Chapter Three’s content also suggests that, while successful in some regards, the program in Lewiston was not quite as fruitful and, most importantly, the city was never able to revitalize its own downtown in the same way as Portland. As suggested by the work of Pierson, this thesis contends that these events represent a first critical juncture explaining the difference in policy and rhetoric espoused by municipal politicians in the two cities. This section highlights decisions made by the city of Lewiston, the lack of a political entrepreneur, and the lack of cultural institutions needed to mitigate the effects of the arrival of a racialized other in the form of the Somali immigration to the city.

2. A Development in Lewiston

In 1992, Bates Mill No. 5, the largest building in the mill complex, was acquired by the city of Lewiston after the Bates Corporation fell behind on its real estate taxes. The city quickly formed the Lewiston Mill Redevelopment Corporation (LMRC), a society comprised of “city staff, elected officials, and private citizens.” In 1996 the LMRC hired Platz Associates, an Auburn, ME based firm to begin a design plan for the Mill No. 5 building. Platz began first by undergoing an extensive environmental cleanup plan within the building and began to market its

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“ Ibid.
spaces for development. In 2004, Platz bought the majority of the mill from the city of Lewiston and have acquired tenants such as Androscoggin Bank, TD Bank, Baxter Brewing Co., Grand Rounds, and Cross Insurance. This large reinvestment in the city’s historical infrastructure suggests a new period of economic vitality in the city, as over $70 million has been invested in the mill complex by the owners and its other occupants. The reinvestment has also created new Class A office space open to further occupants.

However, as suggested by the work of Florida, cities that merely develop cookie-cutter approaches to attracting creative class individuals are unlikely to succeed. The path taken by Lewiston mirrors the attempts at revitalization by other former cities who have since lost their major industrial employers. His work highlights the case of Pittsburgh, PA, a city that built many amenities for businesses, but was unable to attract younger, creative class individuals as it lacked a thriving scene of nightlife, restaurants, and ethnic and cultural diversity needed to entice this younger generation.

Recent plans put forth by the city identify several areas that are still in need of improvement and investment. The 2012 Riverfront Island Masterplan identified key areas needed in the continued revitalization of Lewiston. It acknowledged that while the city had made headway, it was only just exiting a period of “severe economic headwinds” that have continually bogged the city down.

City officials have identified a lack of proper housing and office infrastructure as two of the major factors preventing further growth. While Portland benefited from downtown

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.  \\
revitalization during the Model Cities period and then with the immense capital injections from Elizabeth Noyce, Lewiston has not been made the beneficiary of such generosity or periods of demolition of older, dilapidated housing areas for the creation of new forms of transport or building.

As shown in Chapter Two, Portland’s city officials created the Franklin Arterial, the main access route to the city’s downtown, by destroying many houses of low-income residents in the city’s Bayside neighborhood. A similar plan was proposed in 2004 in Lewiston to create a $4.5 million boulevard from Lincoln to Knox Streets in the downtown area. Planners contended that this would open up the city to more revitalization and increase access to the downtown, but the plan was defeated by a group of community members. Though the downfall of this plan exhibited the agency of Lewiston’s low-income residents – something that Portland’s Bayside residents ultimately lacked during the heyday of Model Cities investment – it also may have detrimentally affected the city in certain ways by not allowing for easier access to downtown businesses and office areas. Though Portland’s city planners may have destroyed many people’s homes and livelihoods with the creation of the Franklin Arterial, it did allow for an easier access to the downtown area from Interstate 295, which may have been crucial in the development of the Old Port district and the peninsula more generally.

Recent events and developments suggest that Lewiston is beginning to experience an economic renaissance. The development of former mill buildings and the continued openings of restaurants and shops in the downtown Lisbon Street area suggest a city that is beginning to regain its footing since the closure of the mills. However, as suggested by Chapter Three, levels of economic anxiety are still higher in Lewiston, as it has experienced decades of a lack of

Ibid.
revitalization. Lewiston has also importantly not seen the same development of a vibrant nightlife, arts, and culture scene in the same way as Portland. The conclusion of this thesis hypothesizes as to the direction that Lewiston is heading and suggest avenues that the city may pursue in order to continue this upward trend.

2.B Difficulty in Attracting the Creative Class to Lewiston

The secondary scholarship suggests that a city with greater access to cultural capital, in the form of museums, art galleries, and other institutions, may experience a mitigated racial threat as posed by the arrival of a racially different population, and thus a lack of support of anti-immigrant policies.46 The work of Florida and Joslyn and Sharp similarly suggest that a city with a greater number of creative class individuals, attracted to an area by the aforementioned institutions, may experience a mitigated perception of racial threat and therefore a lack of support of politicians that espouse nativist rhetoric. This section examines the presence of institutions promoting cultural capital, attracting the creative class to Lewiston, and the existence of businesses and development policies that affected the city’s inability to revitalize its downtown in the same manner as Portland.

During the 1990s, while Portland’s Old Port district was slowing becoming an economic powerhouse, Lisbon Street, Lewiston’s main shopping avenue, was still in need of further investment. As has been stated, unlike Portland, Lewiston was unable to secure the outside funding of a donor needed to inject the capital to spear the revitalization efforts of the downtown. Chapter Three also suggests that Lewiston was also significantly set-back by the fact that its

Model Cities Program was unable to change the downtown and revamp the existing historical buildings in the same way as Portland’s.

A 1995 report issued by the city acknowledged that Lewiston had made strides with regard to the diversification of its economy since the closing of the mills; however, it still highlighted the fact that its downtown was severely lacking in offering retail options, restaurants, and office space needed for revitalization.\(^47\) Importantly, this report made reference to the “negative stigma” surrounding the city’s core downtown area.\(^48\) The authors of the plan acknowledged the fact that the city was hurt economically by the aesthetic shortcomings of its downtown area.

The plan also recognized the need to redevelopment many of the “key historic buildings” in the area.\(^49\) Once again, the city lacked major outside sources of capital needed for these projects and was unable to revitalize the downtown in the manner of Portland during the same timeframe. Florida’s thesis suggests that creative class individuals are drawn to urban areas maintaining their past-industrial charm and that also offer a diverse selection of outside-of-work entertainment. The content of the 1995 plan shows that Lewiston was not in a position to attract such a class of individuals. With the arrival of the first, albeit small, wave of immigrants from Togo in 1999, the lack of downtown revitalization and the continued heightened feelings of economic anxiety suggest that perceived racial threat and support of more anti-immigrant policies would be higher in the coming years.

A 1997 Comprehensive Plan published by the city of Lewiston found that while extensive in its cultural heritage, the city importantly lacked an Arts District similar to the one

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\(^48\) Ibid.

\(^49\) Ibid.
found in Portland. The plan suggested that the city create a Cultural District in the heart of its downtown to promote the “value of arts and culture as both a content area and a process of learning.”

During this timeframe, the city identified the need for the creation of incentives “for the development of retail, residential, including artists’ studios, and other culturally related enterprises.” While the city did see the establishment of the Public Theater in the downtown area, the opening of the Franco Center and other, smaller cultural establishments, Lewiston has been unable to match Portland’s commitment and funding available to such institutions promoting an increased cultural capital.

The city does not have the same robust Arts District as present in its southern neighbor.

The presence of Bates College in Lewiston has recently been a major player in the offering of cultural capital to the area; however, as noted in the Legacy Lewiston Report published by the city in 2017, the area is lacking in its ability to retain Bates and other college graduates after the end of their time on campus.

Students surveyed in the report noted that the city lacked a diverse selection of “college-student-friendly small businesses like pubs, clubs, cafes, thrift shops, a bowling alley, a yoga studio, retail clothing stores” and others.

The vast majority of students surveyed noted that they had “no interest in staying in Lewiston after graduation” given the aforementioned lack of “third places” and the dearth of attractive job options for their interests.

Florida contends that without these institutions and opportunities, cities may be unable to attract high levels individuals employed in creative professions.

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51 Ibid.


53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

134
Community relations between the college and city itself have also only recently improved. While the college has recently stressed a symbiotic relationship with Lewiston, a 2003 study published in the Princeton Review “rated the college 18th worst [in the country] for community relations.” As the town’s fortunes slowly declined and the college’s improved, a rift occurred – Bates students were regarded as being “wealthy and elitist” and out-of-touch with the post-industrial community burdened by economic downturn. A “murder of a Bates senior by a Lewiston man and the rape of a Bates freshman by a Sabattus man” in 2002 only furthered the distrust between the college and the community it surrounds.

Recent efforts to improve this relationship with the town have proved fruitful, with the taking down of the chain-link fence that once surrounded Bates’ campus and the establishment of the Harward Center for Community Engagement. As the majority of Bates students enter creative professions after graduation, if the Lewiston-area is able to attract more to stay after graduation, over time, levels of racial threat may decrease. Additionally, the sense of distrust and resentment present among certain factions of the native-Lewiston community may also harm the college’s ability to attract residents to the speeches, art exhibitions, pieces of theatre, and presentations offering diverse viewpoints and cultural capital.

Given this lack of outside capital, the absence of a political entrepreneur, and an historic shortage of support at the municipal government level to fund programs to entice cultural institutions to the area, these events suggest that Lewiston’s lack of places and opportunities needed to attract creative class individuals to the area and its lack of cultural institutions play a

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56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.;
role in the city being more likely to support and elect politicians, particularly at the mayoral level who espouse an anti-immigrant doctrine. This is suggested by the work of Joslyn and Sharp, who contend that a city that lacks a population of creative class individuals is more likely to experience the effects of racial threat.

**Conclusion**

As laid out in the introduction, this chapter highlights how events and decisions concerning economic and cultural development in the 1990s contributed to the rise or fall of support for anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy from municipal politicians in Lewiston and Portland. Using the explanations put forth by Sheingate, Florida, Joslyn and Sharp, and Manevska and Achterberg, this chapter contends that the presence of an influential political entrepreneur, and the differing levels of creative class individuals and the associated institutions that attract them to an area, have contributed to different levels of support for anti-immigrant rhetoric in Portland and Lewiston.

This chapter importantly highlights further differences in amounts of injections of outside capital between the two cities. While Portland benefited from both a more streamlined Model Cities Program and the millions put into the city by Elizabeth Noyce, Lewiston has not been as well served. This thesis by no means discredits the hard work put into city planning efforts in Lewiston; rather it merely points out the funding differentials between the two cities and the subsequent repercussions. Portland has been allowed to develop more freely with its greater sources of capital, presence of an important political entrepreneur in the city, and the smoother running of its Model Cities Program. As this chapter elucidates, this has led to the arrival of more creative class individuals in the city.
While much has been said to critique Florida’s creative class thesis, it is also important to stress this thesis does not rely heavily on his explanation that creative class individuals engender economic growth. Instead, this thesis focuses on the elevated levels of racial tolerance in cities with larger populations of creative class persons.\textsuperscript{59} By focusing on this testable explanation, this thesis avoids many of the critiques that scholars have put forth regarding Florida’s work.

The different percentages of persons with higher levels of education in Portland as compared to Lewiston is also a key aspect of this chapter. The findings of Hainmueller and Hiscox are highly robust and importantly suggest that cities with larger populations of individuals with advanced degrees are much more likely to have pro-immigrant views themselves and support pro-immigrant politicians.

Chapter Four describes events suggesting an economic and cultural divergence between Maine’s two largest cities, and the reinforcement of the two cities’ distinct pathways of economic development. Continuing the story of immigration in Portland and Lewiston, Chapter Five examines immigration-related policy and rhetoric at the state and the local level in Maine. By looking at the normalization of right-wing rhetoric in the state, and how politicians in the examined cities have framed immigration, Chapter Five utilizes the content of the previous chapters to offer an explanation for how and why anti-immigrant rhetoric has been more supported at the municipal level in Lewiston than in Portland.

\textsuperscript{59} See Sharp and Joslyn for more on this topic.
Chapter 5 – The Normalization of Right-Wing Discourse in Maine and Its Repercussions

Donald Trump has changed the rules of the game in U.S. politics. He has continually broken down barriers of what is considered to be normal political discourse, and he has said things that would have been regarded as political suicide only a short time ago; however, his actions have shown that public opinion is no longer in line with elite beliefs espoused by news pundits, members of Congress, former presidents, and others.\(^1\) However, Paul LePage, the former Governor of Maine, has been acknowledged as “Donald Trump before Donald Trump became popular.”\(^2\) Even before Trump became prominent on a national stage, LePage was already making brash and explosive remarks toward minority groups, immigrants, and other marginalized parties.

Using the secondary literature on the normalization of right-wing rhetoric in U.S. politics and the consequent rise of nativism, this chapter examines LePage’s speeches and policy to show how such remarks became normal and accepted in Maine’s political arena. By examining his discourse, this chapter suggests that his comments have expanded the boundaries of what is permissible in Maine politics and thereby potentially contributed to the electability and continued

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\(^2\) “I was Donald Trump before Donald Trump became popular,” *New York Post*, March 5, 2016, https://nypost.com/2016/03/05/i-was-donald-trump-before-donald-trump-became-popular/. 

138
success of such Lewiston mayors as Robert Macdonald and Shane Bouchard. LePage’s comments and political discourse have allowed for “formerly taboo subjects and expressions” to enter into the state of Maine’s local political rhetoric and mayoral candidates in Lewiston have capitalized on this in order to be elected to the city’s highest office.3

Chapter Five also builds on discussion of economic development of Lewiston and Portland examined in Chapters Three and Four. As shown by these previous chapters, the distinct economic pathways of development in Lewiston and Portland have created two cities with different levels of receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric. These previous chapters have argued that Portland’s pathway alleviated economic anxiety while Lewiston’s did not. The scholarship of Jack Citrin, Donald Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong contends that if individuals in an area perceive or experience economic adversity or believe that immigrants will have “harmful effects on employment opportunities and taxes,” they may be more willing to support candidates who vilify an immigrant other.4 Using this scholarship and the content of Chapters Three and Four, this chapter posits that due to Lewiston’s higher levels of economic anxiety, lack of creative class individuals, and its dearth of cultural institutions, this has become a city in which anti-immigrant candidates are more likely to gain electoral traction. Inversely, this chapter also contends that Portland’s robust economic development and growth of its creative class population and its cultural institutions combine to become barriers against the receptivity to such anti-immigrant rhetoric, and, these factors may induce support for politicians that espouse pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy.

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This chapter relies on the scholarship of Ruth Wodak and Matt Golder to explain how right-wing candidates have gained traction in Maine. An important aspect of populist discourse is the creation of an “us vs. them” dichotomy within a candidate’s chosen political sphere. This kind of discursive construction enables some assessment of testable explanations regarding outgroup dynamics presented in Chapter One. The creation of a distinct “other” remains a critical factor in the rise of right-wing candidates. These actors define the population they represent by marking stark divisions between native residents and the “other,” or the threat that poses a large problem to the continued success of a country, or, in this case, a state and city.

Secondary scholarship indicates that by highlighting and often exaggerating divisions among certain groups, populist politicians may drum up more support for their anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy. For example, Herbert Blumer posits that if political actors expand racial conflicts or differences into “big events,” potential adverse images or the perceived negative differences will be more potent. If right wing candidates are successful in creating such fears and stark divisions, the secondary scholarship suggest that their support may increase. The literature also suggests that if right wing candidates define the people they represent as “better” or “more” virtuous than the outgroup they have defined in their rhetoric, support for their platform may increase.

This chapter is made up of three parts. The first section of this chapter looks at LePage’s speeches, interviews, and campaign platforms in order to show how he has used ingroup vs. outgroup dynamics and certain grievances to create a heightened sense of perceived threats.

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1 Wodak, “‘Driving on the Right.’”
3 Ibid.
within the state of Maine. This section relies on the aforementioned theoretical framework of Blumer’s outgroup anxiety theory in how politicians expand upon racial conflict. Then, this section looks to Matt Golder’s three primary motivators that have been shown to contribute to the rise of right-wing candidates: modernization, economic, and cultural grievances. By showing how LePage has used these tactics, this first section contends that his words and speeches have pushed formerly taboo subjects into mainstream discourse and elicited greater support for right-wing policy and rhetoric in certain cities in Maine.

The second part of this chapter highlights the policy and rhetoric of former Lewiston Mayor Robert Macdonald. It begins by examining the rhetoric of previous mayors and, in a fashion similar to the discussion of LePage, looks at the rise or fall of anti-immigrant positions within the city’s government. By examining how Macdonald was elected into office for multiple terms while confronted by liberal, Democratic, pro-immigrant challengers, this section posits that LePage’s earlier rhetoric and continued norm-breaking made Macdonald’s own anti-immigrant platforms politically viable in the economic and cultural context of Lewiston. While many facets of the community in Lewiston exhibited support for the newly-arrived immigrant population, this part of Chapter Five seeks to answer the question of how mayors who espouse anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric are able to maintain electability in such a locale.

This section of Chapter Five importantly builds on the previous discussions in Chapters Three and Four that contend, respectively, that levels of economic anxiety and racial tolerance exist at different levels between Portland and Lewiston. This section posits that (1) the normalization of right-wing rhetoric accomplished by Paul LePage, (2) Lewiston’s higher levels of perceived economic anxiety and (3) lower levels of racial tolerance, which is often associated with a dearth of creative class individuals and institutions, make candidates, such as Macdonald,
politically viable. In examining how Macdonald and other mayoral candidates have framed the immigration debate within the city, this section posits that their policy and rhetoric has remained more salient in the Lewiston context than in Portland.

The final section of this chapter moves the analysis to Portland and explores how municipal government officials have framed the debate surrounding immigration. By again employing data and research initially discussed in Chapters Three and Four, this section looks at how Portland’s city officials have responded to new influxes of immigrants and the immigration debate at large, as it becomes a polarizing issue across the country. This section works to show the stark differences between the two cities in terms of their elected politicians’ professed policy and rhetoric.

1. The Rise of Paul LePage

Paul LePage was elected to become Governor of Maine in November of 2010 after a long and contentious race during which LePage consistently butted heads with reporters and continually made brash statements. During the race for the states’ highest office, LePage was quoted saying that if elected he would immediately tell then-President Obama to “go to hell.”

Additionally, in the months prior to the election, LePage was caught on camera cursing when asked if his children had paid in-state tuition to attend college in Florida, the location of his second home. By engaging in such disputes and by running on a platform in which he pledged to insult the country’s first black president, the actions of LePage suggest a commitment to such

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right-wing tactics as laid out in the literature on ingroup vs. outgroup dynamics and on the normalization of right-wing rhetoric. Particularly his comments directed toward President Obama even before his election suggest the creation of a stark boundary between himself and the office and occupant of the country’s chief executive.

In making such statements early in his campaign, LePage began to normalize the use of tactics and verbal jousts that would, in a previous time, have made him unelectable. Given Maine’s historically independent voting base, with “more unenrolled voters than Democrats or Republicans,” the actions and comments made by LePage foreshadow events that would follow in the election of 2016. The state’s independent nature, but subsequent sway to the right, suggested a phenomenon that was about to take place on the national scale.

1. A Modernization and Economic Grievances

Golder’s work explores how economic grievances motivate support for right-wing candidates. LePage’s campaign platform, early rhetoric, and policy proposals heavily focused on the economic situation in Maine, and in his inaugural address in 2011 he stressed Maine’s need to “search for profit” and said that the state was “the hardest place in the country to start and own a business.” His speech highlighted the economic shortcomings in the state and thrust the debate into the statewide political sphere. By focusing on how Maine’s economy had been failing before his time in office, LePage effectively highlighted the sense of longstanding economic grievances at the state and local levels.

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1 Goudnough, “Energized Base Tilts Rightward in Maine.”
LePage centered much of his campaign platform on pledges to be a fiscal conservative, to balance the state’s budget, and to revitalize the state’s long suffering “manufacturing and natural resources industries.” In a state with cities and towns plagued by the loss of their major industry, as shown in Chapter Two and Three’s discussions of both Lewiston and Portland, LePage’s campaign promises and eventual platform as governor centered economic anxiety in the political discourse. In a 2013 State of the State address, LePage professed his commitment to “fishing, farming and forestry,” as the driving forces of “Maine’s economic engine.” Because of his disregard for the changed twenty-first century economy, LePage’s remarks and policy worked to exacerbate some of the grievances laid out in Golder’s scholarship – grievances that, if magnified in media and discourse, may give rise to the normalization of right-wing rhetoric.

Golder writes that giving voices to economic grievances often associated with de-industrialization are a potent way of drumming up support for right-wing platforms and for candidates that broach topics that were formerly considered taboo. People who are “unable to cope with rapid and fundamental societal change” are thus termed the “modernization losers.” Research suggests that individuals experiencing this sentiment of resentment are more likely to support right-wing candidates and disregard other more problematic statements such candidates may make.

LePage’s economic policy exacerbated these modernization grievances and further inflated feelings of resentment among populations feeling left behind. As highlighted by Chapters Three and Four, the issues at play in the city of Lewiston suggest an area with a greater

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14 Ibid.
propensity to support candidates espousing a rhetoric focused around modernization grievances, as the city has yet to fully recover from the loss of its major industry and employers. While Lewiston’s economy has undoubtedly grown since the closure of its mills and the city and state have seen recent low rates of unemployment, the content of Chapters Three and Four suggest that the city still has higher levels of economic anxiety than those in Portland.\textsuperscript{16}

The city’s historical tie to the textile industry also makes it a location in which modernization grievances may be more easily activated. Lewiston’s skyline is still dominated by the formerly bustling mill structures, and, while some have been revitalized, many still stand empty and unused. These highly visible symbols of a bygone industrial period make Lewiston an area in which modernization grievances may be felt more strongly since these buildings stand as markers to the city’s loss of its major industry, and their presence as empty shells may exacerbate the feelings of being left behind by the rapidly changing global economy in recent years. While Portland has seen a drastic change to its downtown economy in the years since the loss of its major shipping industry, Lewiston has only recently seen development return to Lisbon Street and the old mills

As suggested by Golder, if there is a feeling of being “left behind” by the “globalized and post-industrial economy,” populations may throw support by candidates who espouse a doctrine that pledges to return an area to its former glory.\textsuperscript{17} LePage’s State of the State address in 2013, while not specifically referring to Lewiston’s textile industry, evoked a commitment to such bygone industries in the state as a whole. By highlighting how the state had fallen behind in terms of its industrial prowess, LePage’s words thrust modernization grievances into the

statewide political discourse, effectively creating a base for continued support of right-wing candidates who followed in his footsteps. His commitment to revitalizing the state’s industrial base drew more people to support his platform and led more to disregard his more virulent discourse. His words highlighted how the state’s population, who formerly worked in such traditional industries, had been left behind by the growing world economy and that he represented a force that would help them regain their former glory.

LePage’s rhetoric on the need to bring back Maine’s traditional industries and his early addresses focusing on the state’s supposedly dire economic situation heightened the perceived economic and modernization grievances in the state. As suggested by the work of Golder, right-wing candidates who utilize such grievances in their discourse and professed policy may see increased support for their platforms. Further sections of this chapter examine how municipal politicians in Lewiston have benefited from the manner in which LePage thrust these discussions into the state’s political sphere.

1.B Cultural Grievances and Ingroup vs. Outgroup Dynamics

During his gubernatorial campaign, LePage promised to a crowd of fishermen in Brooksville, Maine that if elected he would personally tell then-President Obama to “go to hell.”18 By using such profane language to talk about the United States’ first black president during his campaign, LePage effectively created a stark boundary between himself and Obama and the population he professed to represent. He went on to say in the same speech that the President was “taking us to a place where my children and my grandchildren will never come

back.” As suggested by the work of Golder if right-wing candidates are able to highlight the supposed “incompatibility” of the group they profess to represent with another opposing group, support for their platform will increase.

The words and actions of LePage are also in line with Bart Cammaerts theory on the creation stark ingroup vs. outgroup demarcations. Cammaerts posits that if a candidate is able to create the myth that a native population is somehow “better” or “more virtuous” than a group of perceived outsiders, the subsequent feelings of threat may create an environment in which right-wing candidates are able to derive more support. LePage’s early comments directed at Obama suggested such an incompatibility between the people of Maine and the President of the United States. By insulting Obama and painting the president’s identity and political positions in a negative light, LePage created the feeling that the population he professed to represent in Maine was being corrupted and drawn down a dangerous path. Cammaerts’ research suggests that if a right-wing politician creates such a boundary and utilizes discourse that paints their represented population as “better” than a dangerous group of outsiders, support for their platform may increase.

In 2016, LePage remarked that “out-of-state drug dealers” were coming to Maine and impregnating “young white girl[s] before leaving.” He went on to say that “guys with the name D-Money, Smoothie, [and] Shifty” were coming into the state and wreaking havoc. These comments, with the use of clear racial profiling, created a widespread backlash across the state.

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19 Ibid.
20 Cammaerts, “The Mainstreaming of Extreme Right-Wing Populism in the Low Countries: What is to be Done?,” 10.
In saying such words, LePage contributed to furthering the divide between native residents of the state and anybody seen as outsiders, newcomers or not belonging in the state. By creating the sense that virtuous, white Maine women were being impregnated and harmed by outsiders, LePage not only invoked much older racist tropes of white women being defiled by black men, but he also further normalized the public expression of such sentiments. As suggested by the work of Megan Ming Francis, by utilizing such behavior, LePage effectively condoned the furthering of racist beliefs and actions in Maine and suggested that such discourse was permissible in the state’s political arena. These comments served to only highlight the creation of ingroup versus outgroup boundaries in Maine, and by employing such racialized names, LePage’s discourse suggested that he represented and would defend white Mainers and not those of a different race.

In February of 2016, LePage made another remark saying that asylum seekers in the state were bringing disease and the “ziki-fly” into Maine. He claimed that because of these new arrivals “conditions like hepatitis C and H.I.V. were on the rise in Maine.” He continued this trend of insulting marginalized populations by saying in August of the same year, that the “enemy right now, the overwhelming majority of people coming in, are people of color, or people of Hispanic origin.” These comments again intensified the creation of a stark divide in Maine between the native, majority white, residents, and the recent arrivals of racially different asylum seekers, refugees, and other newcomers. By exacerbating the sense of threat posed by racialized others, LePage succeeded in furthering the normalization of such dialogue in the state.

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
of Maine and making the fears of immigrants potentially more potent in certain areas. As suggested by the work of Peter Burns and James Gimpel, if the arrival of a racialized other coincides with an economic downtown in an area, support for right wing candidates who espouse anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric may increase significantly.26

LePage’s repeated focus on the dangers of the arrival of racially different populations into Maine served only to increase the perceived sense of risk. In the case of Lewiston, a city with (1) higher levels of economic anxiety, (2) increased arrivals of a racially different immigrant population since the early 2000s and (3) a lack of cultural institutions, the governor’s rhetoric set the stage for receptivity to anti-immigrant platforms and support for mayors who employed such positions.

In the 2010 election LePage garnered 43% of the votes cast in Lewiston in the three-way race – over a thousand more than his nearest challenger. In the 2014 gubernatorial race, LePage had even more success in Lewiston, receiving 50% of the vote in another three-way race. These data suggest that LePage was highly favored in Lewiston and supports the claim that candidates emulating his tactics and rhetoric would receive greater electoral support given their backing of his candidacy.27

LePage’s comments in 2016 were important in the way that they stoked the fire for anti-immigrant rhetoric leading into the 2017 mayoral election in Lewiston. Due to LePage’s comments in the Maine context, and the rise of Trump on the national stage, further sections contend that former-Mayor Shane Bouchard was able to be elected due to the factors at play.

By using such “brazen provocations” the words of LePage and other right-wing politicians have been picked up by media outlets and given prominence in the news cycle. By doing so, Thomas Greven contends that news sources give credibility to this discourse and continue to aid in the normalization of similar dialogue. Regardless of the ideological leanings of the outlets themselves, the work of Greven and others contends that the reporting on a larger scale serves to only further the efficacy of right-wing actors ability to gain support.

Through his statements, LePage created a heightened sense of fear of the “other” within the state of Maine. His provocations and racist comments highlighted the perceived threat of outsiders and created a sense of fear. This thesis contends that in doing so, LePage’s words created a space in which economic anxiety and racial threats were increased in the state as a whole. His words contributed to the normalization of right-wing rhetoric in Maine and also made the adoption of such platforms potentially more politically viable in certain cities.

As suggested by Chapters Three and Four, due to the differences in their Model Cities Program and the cultural and economic development in the 1990s, Lewiston has developed into an area that may be more inclined to support candidates who espouse anti-immigrant rhetoric. Its distinct economic pathway has led to higher levels of economic anxiety and a dearth of institutions attracting creative class individuals to the area in the same numbers as Portland. The following section of this chapter seeks to create connections between how municipal actors in Lewiston built upon the normalizing of formerly taboo subjects by LePage, the heightened perceived racial threat, and higher levels of economic anxiety to be elected to the city’s highest office.

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2. Mayoral Rhetoric and Policy in Lewiston

This section examines the rhetoric of mayors in Lewiston and seeks to elucidate links between their words and the speeches and discourse of Paul LePage. As has already been suggested in the content of Chapters Three and Four, the economic development history of Lewiston has created an environment in which the perceived risk of a racialized other and the levels of economic anxiety may be higher. This section examines how the mayors of Lewiston have used such events, in conjunction with the ascent of Paul LePage and the normalization of right-wing rhetoric, to achieve electoral success in the city’s context.

While much of the rise of anti-immigrant rhetoric in Maine can be attributed to ascent of LePage to the state’s governorship, it is important to note that Lewiston itself had a contentious relationship with the immigration debate even before LePage’s election. Shortly after the initial arrivals of Somalis into the city in 2001, then-Mayor Larry Raymond penned an infamous letter directed toward the newcomers. In his writing, Raymond noted that the Somalis already in the community should advise their compatriots against coming to Lewiston as the city was “maxed out financially physically, and emotionally.”

After the publication of this letter, there was an outpouring of support for the Somali community in Maine. Then-Governor Angus King professed his support for the newly arrived immigrants and Mayor Raymond eventually met with Somali community leaders. However, no explicit apology ever came from the mayoral office. While the letter elicited major backlash, it also suggested the higher levels of economic anxiety present in Lewiston. In a city with a limited tax base, high tax rates in general, and lacking the economic revitalization present in Portland,

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30 Ibid.
Raymond’s words touched upon a general feeling that existed within the community – a feeling that the city was still experiencing tough times and that there was simply not enough wealth to share with a new population.

In conjunction with the letter, rumors began to spread around the city that the new Somali residents were receiving “free cars, courtesy of the government, $10,000 grants, even free air-conditioners and groceries.”31 While completely false, these whispers contributed to a rising feeling of resentment toward the newly arrived population. Maine offers a welfare program called General Assistance funded by taxpayer dollars to its neediest residents. It gives out this money through a “combination of state and city funds…[and] vouchers for rent, utilities, and food.”32 In 2002, Lewiston gave out $343,000 of General Assistance funds and the money was split “almost evenly between native-born Mainers and refugees.”33 However, the existence of the program itself threw the debate of immigrants and their access to public resources to the forefront of the discussion in Lewiston.

Jeffrey Passel and Michael Fix contend that the issue of the use of public resources has become the “most hotly contested question in U.S. immigration.”34 And, Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox posit that the belief that immigrant groups are posing a burden to the financial health of a locale or are simply freely benefiting from programs in place are serious motivators for the arousal of support for anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric.35 The existence of these underlying rumors in place in Lewiston, even before the campaign and election of Paul LePage,
suggest that the city was more likely to support candidates espousing anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric as it already had the underlying currents of a city that was feeling maxed out financially by the arrival of the Somalis.

2. A Election of Larry Gilbert

Even as tensions began to flare between the native population of Lewiston and its new residents, Larry Gilbert, a vocal supporter of the newly arrived immigrants, was elected to the become mayor of the city in 2007. Gilbert notably “advocated for Somalis’ inclusion in local government and supported funding for Somali organizations” across Lewiston.36 However, it is important to note that Gilbert was elected into office before the ascent of Paul LePage to the Maine governorship. While the election and actions of Gilbert do represent an important period in the history of municipal politicians’ support for immigrants in Lewiston, the end of his time in office is arguably a larger event in the examination of why and how anti-immigrant politicians have found electoral success in the city.

During his time in office, Gilbert was an active supporter of Lewiston’s newest residents. His inauguration was officiated by a Rabbi, a Catholic priest, and a Somali elder in order to represent the many religious beliefs and communities present in Lewiston. Throughout his term he increased city funding to local immigrant organizations and penned Lewiston’s Welcoming Proclamation, which asserted that the city is a “community where all are welcomed, accepted and appreciated.”37

” Ibid., 37-38.
In July of 2011, Gilbert travelled to Washington to testify in a Senate hearing on immigration reform and spoke at length about the “new life and energy” injected into the community by their arrival. Gilbert spoke about the “positive impact” the city’s immigrant population was having on the “social fabric of [the] community and [the] local economy.”

Even though Gilbert’s time in office represented strong and vocal governmental support for the immigrant population in Lewiston, the election of 2011 was a turning point in the changing nature of the city’s municipal politicians’ immigration rhetoric and policy. This election represented another important moment in the history of Lewiston: the first election since the start of Paul LePage’s campaign and ultimate governorship. As suggested by the previous sections of this chapter, LePage’s campaign and early time in office created a political environment in which economic anxiety, racial differences, and the normalization of right-wing rhetoric became more pronounced.

2.B Election of Robert Macdonald

While Gilbert did not run in the 2011 election against Macdonald, his legacy and his strong commitment to Lewiston’s immigrant population was given a resounding defeat with the election of Macdonald in 2012. As said by Abigail Fisher Williamson in her writing on immigration and municipal government response in Lewiston, there “could hardly be a greater contrast than that between Mayor Larry Gilbert...and Mayor Robert Macdonald.” Macdonald’s election represented a turning point in the mayor’s office immigration rhetoric in Lewiston.


Ibid.

This section posits that Macdonald was able to maintain his electability due to the rise of Paul LePage in the state of Maine and the increased normalization of right-wing rhetorical devices. As previous sections have shown, LePage created an environment within the state where perceived racial threat and economic anxiety were exacerbated. Throughout his campaign and his early years in office, LePage highlighted the threats posed by the new immigrant communities and continually stressed the need to bring back Maine’s traditional industries – a message that echoed strongly between the shuttered Lewiston mills.

Chapters Three and Four have suggested that Lewiston is more susceptible to politicians’ use of economic, modernization, and cultural grievances due to its development history. This section contends that Macdonald, and his successor Shane Bouchard, were able to ride the wave created by LePage toward electoral success in Lewiston. By capitalizing on the heightened economic anxiety within the city, Macdonald was able to successfully defeat Democratic, markedly pro-immigrant challengers three times.

The 2011-2012 mayoral race in Lewiston was incredibly close with the race going to a runoff in December. However, Macdonald eventually won his first term primarily due to the fact that his Democratic challenger, Mark Paradis, died from cancer only days before the election. He ran on a platform that focused on the detrimental effects of the recent immigration to the city. In an interview with the Twin City Times, Macdonald noted that the recent “influx [was] not only diminishing a quality education for Lewiston’s property taxpayers’ children, but [caused] our schools to be labelled as failing.”¹ He also noted that it was potentially time to “replace

congeniality with aggressiveness” in the mayoral office and to fight for the people of Lewiston “with a job or a sponsor,” not those who entered the city “with [their] hand[s] out.”42

By highlighting how the new arrivals to the community were drawing on city resources and professing to be a bellicose representative of a city being taken advantage of by the newly arrived immigrant population, Macdonald was able to gain support for his campaign. These comments were particularly salient in the era of Maine politics post the election of LePage to the governorship.

As suggested by the work of Passel and Fix and Hainmueller and Hiscox if a candidate focuses on how an immigrant community is perceived or framed to be unduly drawing upon public resources – resources that some think should only be directed toward native residents – support for anti-immigrant platforms may follow. Macdonald, by making the threat to the financial health of the city posed by immigrants a central part of his campaign, may have been able to gain more support from a native population already facing a less than ideal economic situation themselves.

Macdonald’s pronunciation importantly came after LePage’s 2011 inaugural address in which he highlighted the state’s economic shortcomings and thrust the debate on how to solve the crisis into the forefront of Maine’s political sphere. By focusing on economic grievances and attacking a majority racially different immigrant population, Macdonald may also have driven more supporters to his campaign. The efficacy of such a tactic is supported by the scholarship of Burns and Gimpel who contend that if the arrival of a racialized other coincides with an economic downtown in an area, support for right wing candidates who espouse anti-immigrant

42 Ibid.
policy and rhetoric may increase significantly. Macdonald utilized this situation to his own electoral advantage.\textsuperscript{43}

Macdonald did not halt his anti-immigrant comments after his original pronunciations during his campaign; rather, in 2012, he was quoted in a BBC interview saying: “You (immigrants) that come here, you come and you accept our culture and you leave your culture at the door.”\textsuperscript{44} Macdonald was berated for his comments by many in the local media and never issued a full apology for his words.\textsuperscript{45} The mayor went on to accuse the Somali community in Lewiston of “shirking [their] duties” by not returning to their home country to fight in the brutal civil war. These comments furthered the creation of a stark divide between the Somali population and the native residents and suggested that the Somalis were somehow cowards and less virtuous than the native population in Lewiston by fleeing a brutal and bloody conflict. By calling on the newly arrived residents of Lewiston to assimilate, Macdonald eluded to the notion that their own culture was something potentially dangerous, a threat that needed to be addressed.

Rather than being rebuked by the voting public for attacking a community that had begun to bring important economic development into the city, Macdonald was elected for his second two-year term in office in 2013. Even though many had protested against his 2012 comments, Macdonald was able to maintain power in the city. In the 2013 election, Macdonald ran against former-mayor Gilbert. In this race he “decisively beat” Gilbert in an election many viewed as a “public referendum on Gilbert’s approach to welcoming immigrants.”\textsuperscript{46} This election suggested that Macdonald’s views on immigration were still salient, potent, and shared by much of the

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} Williamson, Welcoming New Americans?, 124-125.
populace in Lewiston. The election results support the claim of previous chapters: that Lewiston’s higher levels of economic anxiety and perceived racial threat may make politicians who espouse anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric more successful.

Leading up to the election in 2015, Macdonald stated that he would support a bill in Maine’s State House that asked that “a Web site be created containing names, addresses, length of time on assistance and the benefits being collected by every individual on the dole.” Macdonald himself was, due to his position as mayor of Lewiston and not as a state legislator, not able to support the bill in the next legislative session, preferring instead to wait for a sponsor. Macdonald justified his suggestion by saying that “the public has a right to know how its money is being spent.” Once again, Macdonald highlighted the strains present on the city’s welfare system. While not specifically naming the immigrant population as the target of the potential bill, he brought to light the city’s less than perfect economic vitality and directed the public’s attention to people he believed were scapegoating the city.

As suggested by the work of Passel and Fix and Hainmueller and Hiscox, if a populace believes that an “overcrowding of public services” may occur, support for anti-immigrant positions may increase. Macdonald’s continual focus on the city’s welfare system moved the issue to the forefront of the political debate in Lewiston and his actions may have contributed to the continued support for his anti-immigrant rhetoric in city elections.

Macdonald’s outburst was rewarded with a third and final election to the mayor’s office in 2015. In this election, Macdonald narrowly beat progressive activist and Bates College

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*Passel and Fix, “Myths about Immigrants,” 157; Hainmueller and Hiscox, “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration,” 79.*
graduate, Ben Chin. Macdonald ran on what some would call a “stealth campaign” platform with “no events...no campaign headquarters and no website.”⁵⁰ Instead of losing to Chin, and his massive fundraising efforts of $87,800, Macdonald won the election to his third straight term in office. His platform mainly consisted of him harkening back to his previous actions, comments, and proposals by saying that “people know what I’ve done.”⁵¹ By saying this, Macdonald focused the voting population on his previous attacks on Somali culture and Lewiston’s welfare system. Macdonald rode to victory with 53% of the vote compared to Chin’s 47%, and this election again established that anti-immigrant rhetoric was more salient in Lewiston than a pro-immigrant progressive agenda among the voting public.⁵²

While some claim Macdonald was “not as consistently hostile to the Somali immigrant population as his periodic outbursts suggest,” his time in office was marked with attacks on their culture and their use of the state and city’s welfare system.⁵³ He has supported the immigrant community in certain ways, notably praising the recent state championship winning soccer team and signing onto Lewiston’s Welcoming Proclamation put forth by Gilbert.⁵⁴ However, even though Gilbert’s term was a marked shift from the rhetoric surrounding Raymond’s letter to the Somali community, Macdonald’s repeated electoral success suggest the greater support for a candidate espousing anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy in Lewiston in the era during and post-LePage’s time in office.

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⁵¹ Ibid.
2.C Election and Resignation of Shane Bouchard

In 2017, Lewiston was again confronted with the choice between the progressive Democrat Ben Chin and Shane Bouchard, a Republican candidate endorsed by then-Governor Paul LePage and the outgoing Mayor Robert Macdonald. While Chin won the first election in November, he was unable to gain the necessary 50% plus one needed to win outright. The election went to a December runoff, where Bouchard won by 145 votes. However, the race was marred by a leak of campaign emails that “may have played a small role in swinging some votes.” These emails noted that Chin had said that he had “encountered racism on the campaign.” This news spread like rapid-fire among conservative news sources and may have contributed to Chin's ultimate defeat with some suggesting that Chin was only willing to “talk to people who [agreed] with him” and not the wider populace. As suggested by the work of Greven, the very reporting of such an issue on a larger scale by reputable news sources serves to only further the efficacy of right-wing actors’ ability to gain support and, in this case, paint a negative image of the Democratic candidate.

Bouchard campaigned on a platform advocating against the increase of city property taxes and “saying no to hosting new refugees at this time.” In his candidate profile in the Lewiston Sun Journal, Bouchard said that he would target the “economically draining social

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57 Ibid.
60 Rice, “Shane Bouchard wins Lewiston mayoral runoff election.”
services dependent groups” and that he would attempt to decrease the offering of translation services by the city government.\textsuperscript{61} By using such a platform, Bouchard showed himself to be of a similar mold to Macdonald. Instead of using the welcome dialogue of former-Mayor Gilbert or of the candidate Chin, Bouchard preferred to continue the status-quo set in place by Macdonald at the local-level and LePage at the state-level.

Importantly, the election of Bouchard came after some of LePage’s most explicitly racially charged comments. His words regarding out of state drug dealers and the dangerous diseases supposedly being brought in by the new waves of refugees and asylum seekers worked to exacerbate the sense of a racial threat within Maine and to create a stark divide between white Mainers and the recently arrived populations. By campaigning on a platform of working to limit the number of refugees entering the city, Bouchard’s subsequent election again suggested the greater potency of such anti-immigrant standpoints in Lewiston.

Bouchard’s next year in office was not marred by any of the same anti-immigrant comments as was common for his predecessor. However, in March of 2019, Bouchard was rocked by a scandal. A woman, formerly a volunteer on Chin’s 2017 campaign, admitted to leaking internal emails from the Democratic campaign to Bouchard during the race. Furthermore, she “released more than 150 texts between her and Bouchard, including one in which he told a racist joke and one in which he seemed to compare a meeting with his fellow Republicans to a Ku Klux Klan gathering.”\textsuperscript{62} Following their release, Bouchard resigned from his office on March 8, 2019.

These texts revealed the private discussions between Bouchard and the woman in question. They suggested a man who is deeply sexist, privately racist, and capable of making comments just as incendiary as either LePage or Macdonald. While these comments and texts were not part of the information available to the electorate during the 2017 mayoral election, their existence and Bouchard’s campaign platform supports the case that Lewiston is still a community where anti-immigrant rhetoric is more supported. They also suggest a city that still has a long way to go in terms of stamping out racism in local government. One text sent by Bouchard compared a local meeting of Androscoggin Country Republicans to a “clan meeting,” (a reference to the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan) again suggesting a deeply racist platform endemic at the highest levels of local government.63

Bouchard’s resignation has plunged Lewiston into an atmosphere of uncertainty, and only an upcoming mayoral election can tell what this event’s repercussions may be. Will the city continue to be a place where the electorate votes anti-immigrant candidates into office, or will a candidate in the mold of Chin or Gilbert gain access to the city’s highest office?

3. Rhetoric and Policy in Portland

As suggested in Chapters Three and Four, Portland has developed into a city with (1) lower levels of economic anxiety, (2) a greater population of creative class individuals, and (3) more diverse offerings of institutions promoting cultural capital and varied viewpoints. The secondary literature contends that a city with these factors may be more likely to vote into office and support politicians that espouse welcoming, pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy. This section

highlights such a divergence between the aforementioned rhetoric in Lewiston and that in Portland.

Portland has not always seen full support for pro-immigrant platforms in its municipal government. In 2001, in the wake of 9/11, John Griffin won an at-large seat on Portland’s City Council. During the race, Griffin was condemned for comments that other council candidates found “insulting” and “inappropriate.” He told a reporter that the “People in Portland [were] fed up with the do-gooders and the immigrants, especially the Hispanics and blacks.” While Griffin’s comments may have represented the views of some in the city, the reactions to his comments suggest that others occupying elected office in Portland did not share his views. James F. Cloutier, a member of the City Council at the time, argued that Griffin’s words were “not even remotely true” and that they were “insulting” and “inappropriate.”

The election of Griffin to City Council and his campaign discourse is an anomaly in the history of rhetoric from elected officials in Portland. In 2003, the City Council’s public safety committee voted to recommend an ordinance that would prohibit “police and other city workers from randomly asking people about their immigration status.” The proposal was a powerful message supporting the rights of the city’s immigrant community, particularly in the post-9/11 Patriot Act era, in a city with a major port and an airport where “two of the Sept. 11 terrorists started their fateful journey.”

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“Ibid.
“Ibid.
“Ibid.
condemn the Patriot Act, and, in a nonbinding resolution, voted to criticize the act for “infringing on civil liberties” and it officially denounced the “recent immigration sweeps” being carried out across the country.\(^{70}\)

In 2004, Portland’s Mayor Nathan Smith vocally condemned arrests carried out by federal immigration officials in the city. Speaking after the arrest of “at least 10 people in the Portland area on the grounds of being in the country illegally,” Smith said that the city “was more committed in ever to making its ethnic communities feel safe in Maine” despite recent actions by the federal governments.\(^{71}\) All these actions in the early 2000s solidified the City Council and Mayor’s position on immigration and showed how the city’s elected municipal officials were committed to making sure the city remained steadfast in its support of civil rights for all residents.

3. A Portland Post-LePage

While Lewiston elected Macdonald to his second two year term even after his vehement anti-immigrant tirades in 2013, in December of the same year, Portland’s city officials vocally condemned Governor LePage’s proposal to “prevent asylum seekers and some other immigrants from receiving General Assistance” support.\(^{72}\) Instead of taking Macdonald’s position and attacking the state’s welfare system, members of Portland’s City Council called the proposal “discriminatory” and the mayor at the time, Michael Brennan, affirmed the city would still


\(^{71}\) Justin Ellis, “City reaches out to immigrants; speakers try to reassure ethnic groups they can feel safe in Maine,” *Portland Press Herald*, February 7, 2004, https://search.proquest.com/docview/277230673/8125419C3FE144D2PQ/9?accountid=8505.

provide aid to those in need regardless of the governor’s actions.\textsuperscript{73} The comments from Brennan and members of the City Council again showed the pro-immigrant stance taken by Portland’s elected officials.

Soon after Lewiston elected Robert Macdonald to his third and final term in office, the Portland electorate in 2016 voted in Pious Ali, an African-born Muslim, as one of the city’s two councilors at-large.\textsuperscript{74} Ali’s ascension to Portland’s governing body was a resounding message of defeat to the anti-immigrant rhetoric occurring at the state and national level. While Lewiston had just voted into office a mayor known for attacking the city’s large, racially diverse, immigrant population, the decision by the voters in Portland supports the findings in previous chapters that the city is more supportive of pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy.

Even though Ali’s race was one between two progressive Democrats, his election represented an important symbolic message to the country: that Portland would put its full confidence behind a man not born in the United States and of a different race than the majority of the population to lead their city. While Lewiston has elected a Somali woman to the city’s school board, the city has not voted a recent immigrant into the mayor’s office or a city council seat. The decision by Portland to vote Ali into office suggests a greater commitment and willingness to allow a recent immigrant into municipal government.\textsuperscript{75}

Portland has also repeatedly fought back against the policies and comments of Paul LePage. Instead of using the new political atmosphere created by LePage to gain electoral

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.


success, municipal politicians have repeatedly attacked his comments and worked against his policies. In 2017, Portland Mayor Ethan Strimling accused LePage of “not backing up his claim that the city [was] misusing state funds by providing welfare to illegal immigrants.” Strimling claimed that the governor did not give a “shred of evidence” to support his claims.

This clash had started early in 2014, when the LePage administration “attempted to prevent asylum seekers from receiving state benefits until the federal government allows them to work.” While a judge ruled in this debate that LePage was able to withhold funds, the reactions from members of Portland’s City Council were not in support; rather, they were vehemently opposed and argued that it would not “help Portland....or the state of Maine.”

Both of these rebuttals of LePage’s policies suggest a reaction from municipal politicians in Portland that has been far different from that in Lewiston. Instead of taking a stance akin to Macdonald in Lewiston and similarly attacking the welfare system, actors in Portland stood up and professed their commitment to pro-immigrant platforms and support of programs to help the city’s newcomers. Furthermore, in August of 2018, Strimling and Ali proposed a measure that would allow “noncitizens, such as refugees and asylum seekers, the right to vote in municipal elections.” This act of giving non-citizens political agency in Portland again suggests municipal politicians’ commitment to a pro-immigrant, welcoming platform. While not yet enshrined in city or state law, this proposal supports the claim that Portland’s municipal politicians are more likely to put forth pro-immigrant rhetoric.

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However, Portland is currently experiencing its own minor crisis with regard to its immigrant population. As growing numbers of specifically refugees and asylum seekers are arriving in Portland, the city has begun to reach a breaking point as to its ability to effectively provide for these newcomers. These recent arrivals have “overwhelmed local services, including the city’s emergency shelter for homeless families.”\textsuperscript{80} Its history of being a “compassionate and welcoming community for immigrants,” as suggested by the local politicians’ rhetoric and policy, has made the city into a major destination. Still Strimling and others in City Hall have remained committed to supporting this population and have said that the “issue isn’t that too many people are coming [to Portland] – it’s that [the city doesn’t] have enough housing to put them.”\textsuperscript{81} This comment made by Strimling further reinforces the unwavering pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy coming from the city’s municipal offices and suggests that Portland will continue to do its best to welcome newcomers.

The rhetoric and policy of Portland’s municipal election officials was not swayed by the normalization of right-wing rhetoric caused by Paul LePage. The previous section has shown that LePage’s comments, and the messages put forth by both Macdonald and Bouchard found increased receptivity in Lewiston, a city with higher levels of economic anxiety and perceived racial threat. This section on Portland has highlighted how the city’s politicians have remained committed to pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy even with the normalization of right-wing rhetoric at the state and national-level. These findings support the claim that, due to its economic development path, Portland has become a city in which its elected politicians are more likely to espouse pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
Conclusion

This chapter has shown how Portland and Lewiston have developed into cities with very different levels of support for politicians espousing pro-immigrant level in their respective municipal governments. Lewiston’s higher level of anxiety, smaller population of creative class individuals, and lack of culturally-focused institutions have led to the city being more likely to vote into office, especially at the mayoral level, candidates who espouse markedly anti-immigrant platforms.

While the city charter of both cities does give the city councils more power in day-to-day decision making, this chapter heavily focuses on mayoral rhetoric and policy, particularly in the Lewiston context, due to the high public visibility of said office. The secondary scholarship contends that due to the nature of the office, mayors are “actively involved in building political support for their views and participate more extensively in local partisan activity.”82 They are also normally involved in many ceremonial duties which further increases their “public visibility.”83 Regardless of their actual power, this chapter has focused primarily on mayoral rhetoric as it may be the most accurate method of gauging the political leanings of a locale.

This chapter has also shown how the rhetoric of Paul LePage has created a political environment within the Maine where right-wing rhetoric, that would have formerly been considered taboo and uncouth, has become an accepted part of political discourse. While Portland has renounced and turned its back on LePage’s efforts to create divisions in the state, Lewiston has, in the time since LePage’s election to the governorship in 2010, only elected

83 Ibid., 439.
mayors who have made multiple anti-immigrant or racist comments. In detailing these events, this chapter has shown that Lewiston is a city with a greater receptivity to such platforms.

However, this chapter also highlights important events that may change the immigrant-related dialogue in both cities. Lewiston’s mayoral resignation crisis in 2019 and the following election may present itself as an opportunity for the city to make a different decision with regard to the occupant of its highest office. Portland, as well, has been confronted with an overcrowding of its shelters and a strain on its resources. It remains to be seen if its politicians will continue to adopt such pro-immigrant stances in the wake of such events.
Conclusion

This thesis has examined how and why the cities of Portland and Lewiston, Maine have moved in distinct directions with regard to their municipal politicians’ stance on immigration. By examining the economic development pathways of both cities, this thesis has utilized testable explanations from the secondary literature to contend that voters in Lewiston are more receptive to anti-immigrant rhetoric due to (1) the normalization of right-wing rhetoric accomplished by Paul LePage, (2) Lewiston’s higher levels of perceived economic anxiety, and (3) lower levels of racial tolerance, which research suggests is associated with a dearth of creative class individuals and institutions. By using a historical institutionalist framework emphasizing critical junctures, path dependency, and political entrepreneurship to account for the distinct economic development undertaken in Lewiston and Portland since the mid-twentieth century, this thesis has shown how the two cities have diverged into areas with different levels of receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric. In this concluding chapter, I summarize the main findings of my research, highlight areas needing further research, and offer policy suggestions.

Main Findings

Key to this thesis is the theoretical framework of critical junctures and path dependency. I argue in Chapter Three that the distinct implementation of the Model Cities Programs in Lewiston and Portland represented a critical juncture that set the cities to embark on markedly different economic development pathways. Paul Pierson makes the case that certain events can
lead to “divergent outcomes” even when cases in questions have “initially similar conditions.¹

This explanation functions well within this context as Lewiston and Portland both had similar histories of immigration, early anti-immigrant sentiment, and loss of their major industries. I argue that the Model Cities period from 1969-1974 set the cities on very different tracks for their long-term economic development.

Chapter Three highlighted this critical juncture and suggested that the difference in the organizational structures of city governance, along with different levels of support from city leaders at the time, created an environment in Portland where economic revitalization moved in smoother a manner. I maintain that this program’s differing implementation created the two distinct pathways followed by the cities in question and made changes to these paths, difficult or impossible to take.

Of utmost importance to this thesis is the claim that this critical juncture had (1) large and lasting effects on the political development of the two cities examined, (2) that these distinct pathways have contributed to higher levels of economic anxiety and instability in Lewiston, and (3) that such economic circumstances may be an inspiration of elected actors’ anti-immigrant positions. In this way, testable explanations derived from the secondary scholarship have been applied to the cases in questions and have been shown to be accurate explanations for how and why anti-immigrant rhetoric may gain traction in a specific area.

By highlighting the economic divergence between the two cities, I argue that, in line with the explanation suggested by Jack Citrin, Donald Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, when times are bad or when there is “less to go around” people are more likely to blame new immigrant groups for their problems and may be more likely to support anti-immigrant rhetoric.

and policy from local politicians.² Citrin et al. contend that “beliefs about the economic consequences of immigration have political ramifications when they serve as legitimating arguments for restrictionist policies” which supports Chapter Five’s discussion of political rhetoric in Maine.³

Furthermore, the research of Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox posits that the notion that immigrants are perceived to be posing a strain on the public services offered by a city will increase receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric. As previously shown by Chapter Three, the data and research suggest that indicators of economic anxiety are higher in Lewiston than in Portland, thus explaining the city’s election of mayors espousing anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Overall, my research has suggested that in the local context, differing levels of economic anxiety prove to be a potent motivator causing increased receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric from a city’s elected officials. This is in line with the existing literature; however, scholars of immigration do contend that perceived cultural or racial threats do remain a more potent motivator for support of anti-immigrant rhetoric.⁴ This thesis tackles that question as well within the context of the cities in question and suggests that Portland has lower levels of perceived racial threat due to its greater creative class population and its diverse range of cultural institutions.

While Lewiston has experienced higher levels of economic anxiety, it has also seen the arrival of a racially different immigrant group mainly from the African continent. Additionally, the literature contends that an arrival of a racialized other coupled with an economic downtown

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² Ibid., 877.
may create greater support for anti-immigrant positions.\textsuperscript{5} Portland’s ability to mitigate perceived racial threats posed by such new arrivals represents another important finding from this thesis, and Chapter Four has supported this claim.

Using Richard Florida’s scholarship on the creative class of individuals and the claim of Elaine Sharp and Mark Joslyn that a city with a greater population of such persons may experience mitigated levels of racial threat, I contend that the economic development pathway followed by the city, beginning during the Model Cities period and reinforced by the political entrepreneurship of Elizabeth Noyce, allowed Portland to become an area with lower levels of perceived racial threat. I argue that this is the case because of Portland’s ability to attract more creative class individuals to the city and the city’s diverse selection of so-called “third places” offering easily accessible cultural capital. As shown in Chapter Four, Portland’s development, and the integral efforts of Noyce during the 1990s, positioned the city to becoming a more pro-immigrant area as immigration increased near the turn-of-the-century.

The revitalization started during the Model Cities-era and furthered by the establishment of a diverse selection of institutions offering creative capital to Portland essentially fostered an environment more welcoming of diversity. Noyce’s donations to the Portland Museum of Art, the Maine College of Art, and the Maine Historical Society created the foundation for Portland’s Arts District and firmly established the city’s accessible attainment of cultural capital.

I have shown that Noyce positioned herself as a political entrepreneur affecting major change in Portland. As suggested by the scholarship of Adam Sheingate, Noyce is an individual whose actions had “transformative effects on politics, policies, and institutions.”\textsuperscript{6} Her singular

injection of funding into Portland reinforced the city’s economic development pathway and created an urban environment more attractive to the creative class and with greater access to cultural capital. As suggested by the secondary scholarship, these results, in turn, had large effects on the increased receptivity to pro-immigrant political rhetoric in Portland.

Importantly, Chapter Four has shown that little to no such cultural support or investment occurred in Lewiston during a similar timeframe. Furthermore, the city’s at times contentious relationship with Bates College, an influential cultural institution, suggests that the building of intercultural bridges and the accessibility of diverse opinions may be more difficult to attain in Lewiston.

Finally, this thesis has discussed the power of the normalization of right-wing rhetoric at the state level and its repercussions on the levels of support for municipal politicians espousing anti-immigrant platforms. Building on Matt Golder’s scholarship and examining how right-wing actors use modernization, cultural, and economic grievances to garner support, Chapter Five has highlighted how LePage used these grievances for his own purposes and how his words have thrust racial and economic threats into the state-wide dialogue. I contend that this norm-breaking behavior remains a dangerous tool in politics throughout the state and the country as a whole. By capitalizing on people’s grievances and through breaking norms, my research has shown how, in cities with elevated economic anxiety and lower levels of cultural capital, elected officials with explicitly anti-immigrant rhetoric can maintain their political viability.

While Lewiston did elect mayors with both pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant positions before the election of Paul LePage, Chapter Five has shown that after his campaign and time in office, the city’s receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric greatly increased. The election of Robert Macdonald in 2011, his re-elections in 2013 and 2015, and the eventual election of Shane
Bouchard in 2017, support the claim that Lewiston is a city more likely to support anti-immigrant elected officials. By examining their platforms and the racial and economic threats made more visible through LePage’s time in office, Chapter Five has highlighted how anti-immigrant rhetoric has remained more salient in Lewiston than in Portland since 2010.

Importantly, Lewiston’s elected officials have accomplished this task by emphasizing the supposed strains posed by newcomers on the city’s public services and how these new populations are somehow culturally incompatible with the city’s values. By using testable explanations highlighted in Chapter One, Chapter Five has shown how receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric remains higher in Lewiston.

**Potential Further Research**

While this thesis paints a picture of the economic development pathways of Lewiston and Portland and their repercussions on receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric from municipal elected officials, its arguments and evidence remain limited by the scope and timeframe imposed on this project. More work needs to be done to examine Lewiston’s political receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric and to assess whether that pattern can shift. Consequently, in this section, I offer areas that require further research.

Throughout the process of researching, information on Lewiston’s attempts at economic revitalization and the carrying out of its Model Cities Program remained difficult to unearth. I was repeatedly unable to find plans and meeting details needed to create a clearer picture of the influences present at the city at the time. To further understand the dynamics at hand in the city during the program’s implementation from 1969-1974 and during the years following, I would suggest a closer examination of the City of Lewiston’s archives. However, as I learned during my discussion with Lincoln Jeffers, head of the city’s Economic Development Office, much of
this potential information remains buried in City Hall archives which remain relatively disorganized. Jeffers also suggested that due to recent turnover in certain office positions, locating specific papers may prove to be a large challenge. Regardless, in continuing this project’s research, I would suggest a closer examination of these documents. This would include a closer look at the Model Cities Program proposals submitted by both cities and a detailed historical analysis of the politicians in power during this timeframe.

This research process has also highlighted further questions requiring more investigation. Specifically, how will Maine’s designation as a state where the death rate has overtaken the birth rate influence how its citizens, and importantly business owners, view these immigrant communities? As noted by Maine’s state economist, “these demographics are putting the state in a precarious position going forward.” With Maine being confronted with problems of having barely enough working-age people to fill such necessary positions as firefighters, Postal Service workers, and police officers, it remains to be seen whether municipal officials in cities, such as Lewiston, will open their arms and promote the economic benefits of immigration. Further research is needed in defining and highlighting when an economic imperative may override factors causing support for anti-immigrant rhetoric. A recent report from the Maine Department of Labor notes that the “work force is shrinking just as demand for certain jobs, particularly in health care, is increasing and leading to shortages that will ripple across the state.” This suggests that the entire state may be confronted with difficult decisions in the near future: will elected

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3 Ibid.
officials forego potential platforms for the good of their city’s economic vitality, or will they detrimentally affect Maine’s economy by utilizing anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy?

**Policy Suggestions**

As shown in Chapter Five, both Lewiston and Portland have the potential to redefine the political discourse on immigration in both cities. Lewiston, after the resignation of Shane Bouchard, will be faced with an upcoming election and, potentially, the chance to redefine the city’s receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric. Portland, after having become known nation-wide as a welcoming home for immigrants, is faced with the problem of overcrowding. Will elected officials continue to remain open and welcoming in their rhetoric and policy, or will the crowding of public serves create an increased chance for anti-immigrant platforms to arise?

In order to continue to create cross-cultural bridges and highlight the benefits brought by immigration, I suggest that politicians, in Lewiston specifically, should “support immigrant organizations rather than relying on individual intermediaries.” Abigail Fisher Williams contends that by directly supporting “meaningful interethnic contact,” municipal politicians can more effectively promote “societal acceptance.”

To accomplish this task in Lewiston, future mayors who recognize the benefits of immigration should, by employing their high visibility, plan events and opportunities for intermingling of native populations and newcomers. In doing so, they may be able to speed up the process of immigrant integration. Lewiston is not lacking in potential organizations with whom future mayors could partner. With the presence of the Immigrant Legal Advocacy Project,

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11 Ibid.
Maine Immigrant and Refugee Services, and the Immigrant Resource Center of Maine all located within the city, through partnerships and vocal support, future mayors could use their high visibility to make strong statements of support.

With regard to Lewiston’s economic development and its potential to attract creative class individuals, I suggest a mass re-design of the still-empty mill structures. By offering low rent artists space, housing, or by creating a space highlighting the city’s rich, beneficial immigrant history, Lewiston may be able to increase cultural capital, further economic development, and make an environment that is more attractive to young graduates of Bates and other area colleges. Indeed, as the costs of housing increase in Portland, Lewiston may be able to capitalize on a situation where Portland is becoming increasingly inaccessible to the core populations that make up Florida’s creative class.

I do recognize the financial constraints and wishful thinking apparent in these proposals. I do not want Lewiston to lose touch with its heritage, history, and unique culture; rather, I believe that through effective political support and municipal planning, the city can be become a model for the integration of a newly arrived immigrant group and a beacon for how immigration has built and continues to add to this country.
Works Cited


