5-2019

Assessing the Relevant Barriers to Climate Justice in Bolivia: An Analysis of Bolivian Climate Politics

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An Analysis of Bolivian Climate Politics

An Honors Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Environmental Studies

Bates College

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of Bachelor of Arts

By

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Lewiston, ME

March 20, 2019

Acknowledgements

This project would not have been possible without the unyielding support and expertise of Professor Sonja Pieck, who has played a crucial role in shaping and developing my work with the utmost patience and thoughtfulness. I am incredibly grateful for her faith and contributions. I would also like to thank Professor Ethan Miller, who was extremely helpful in boosting my confidence and providing direction at a critical junction. Further, I am very appreciative for the feedback provided by all Environmental Studies faculty following the initial defense panel.

I am grateful to my compatriots and mentors in Bolivia who provided critical resources and assistance throughout my work, namely Ismael Saavedra, Fernando Garcia, and Alan Forsberg. In the same vein, I want to express my gratitude to all students, teachers, and facilitators that made my abroad experience in Bolivia enjoyable and informative.

My final thanks go to my friends and family, without whom I would never have had the resilience and fortitude to complete this thesis. To the people I live with, thank you for the unending fun and hilarity that have propelled me forward. To my Mom and Dad, thank you for being supportive, flattering, and helpful throughout this entire process. Without you, I would not have any of the opportunities that allowed me to come to a position to write this thesis. To my brother Charlie, thank you for your support despite academic obligations, I am always grateful for your maturity and insights. To Hannah, thank you for always being there and for providing emotional and technical support throughout the duration of this project no matter what obstacles have come in the way. To Gen Lysen and my other friends at the Maine Peoples Alliance, thank you for listening to my complaints and providing support through arduous processes. Finally, thanks to the Bates community as a whole for providing an environment conducive to intellectual investigation and latitude.

Without all of you, this could not have happened! Thank you!!

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Abstract

The current political administration in Bolivia has become one of the most prominent actors in the global climate justice movement that seeks to establish equality and reduce vulnerability in an era of anthropogenic climate change. An overwhelming resistance to ineffective neoliberal policies implemented by global governance institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and 1990s delivered a new administration headed by Evo Morales, Bolivia's first indigenous president since its inception as a nation state in 1825. Evo brought with him promises for radical progressive change centered around decolonization, economic redistribution, renewal and affirmation of Bolivian indigenous values, and a departure from the global capitalist system that historically has subjugated Bolivia's people and natural resources to extreme exploitation. His commitments are reflected in the aims of climate justice, a movement that has recently taken hold amongst groups that recognize the harsh realities of climate change and the disproportionate impacts that will inevitably occur due to preexisting social inequality. However, despite Evo's proclaimed objectives, the Bolivian government remains heavily dependent on resource extraction to fuel its initiatives, and has continued to engage in the very capitalistic practices that Evo has condemned for bringing his country ruin. In the following thesis, I flesh out this contradiction and address the barriers Bolivia faces to pursuing climate justice through an analysis of domestic and foreign factors at play.

Preface

I would like to start this thesis with an overview of my experiences in Bolivia that led to my interest in the South American country and its efforts toward climate justice. During the fall of 2017, I embarked on an International Honors Program through the School of International Training entitled "Climate Change: The Politics of Food, Water, and Energy." The program took me to Vietnam, Morocco, and Bolivia in order to investigate the climatic factors at play and the sociopolitical responses enacted in each context by civil society, academics, and government officials. The countries were selected by the program using a set of criteria that assessed each country's climate vulnerability and the approaches utilized by each to counteract detrimental climate effects. All three countries are deemed highly vulnerable to impending climate changes due largely to environmental setting, but Bolivia presents a unique response to the climate crisis based in indigenous cosmology and defiance to the Western order. Our program culminated in Bolivia, where we had the opportunity to visit governmental sites in La Paz, witness the ancient Tiwanaku ruins, spend time with an Aymara community on the shores of Lake Titicaca, and reside with a Bolivian host family in Cochabamba. Through course readings, site visits, community interactions, and engagement with Bolivian activists, academics, and government officials, I was able to gain intimate insights into Bolivian life and politics under president Evo Morales. The people I met in Bolivia are still incredibly close to my heart, and in many instances, have contributed immensely to this project. I was inspired by the people I met and the climate approaches I was introduced to, and in writing this thesis, I hope to honor their contributions to my learning.

Upon returning to Bates, I came to realize that my academic background in Global Environmental Politics left me well situated to investigate the politics of climate justice in Bolivia. By using my academic regimen in tandem with my experiences in Bolivia, I have developed a thesis that I feel best reflects my time in school while also contributing to the existing literature.

Introduction

> There exists an ongoing debate about the financial crisis, climate change and democracy. We cannot forget the food and energy crises. I applaud the addresses, which focus on the origins of the crisis. However, the majority of the speeches only speak of effects, never the cause. I came here today to speak plainly with you all. The origin of this crisis is the exaggerated accumulation of capital in far too few hands. It is the permanent removal of natural resources and the commercialization of Mother Earth. The origins come from the system and an economic model of Capitalism. If we don't share the truth of this crisis with one another nor the international community, we will disseminate a lie to our people who expect more from their presidents, governments and these kinds of forums (Morales 2008).

So spoke Evo Morales, Bolivia's first indigenous president, while addressing the 64th General Assembly of the United Nations in 2008. Though he had been president for less than three years at the time of the address, he had already emerged on the global stage as a radical champion of social justice and climate resilience. Time and time again, Morales utilized his platform to chide the international community for their complicity in environmentally degrading practices, urging leaders worldwide to acknowledge their role in perpetuating climate change and income inequality. His views were endorsed by a majority of Bolivian residents, as shown by his overwhelming electoral victory in 2005. Morales and his party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), garnered the highest proportion of the national vote since Bolivia's return to democracy in the early 1980s, reflecting Bolivia's commitment to indigenous values and ideals (Postero 2017, 1).

Morales's election was the result of concentrated indigenous activism that had erupted under previous administrations in response to increasing privatization and commodification of common resources such as water and gas. The formerly colonized country had long been under the jurisdiction of white mestizo elites, but under the duress of extreme poverty and social inequality, residents coalesced around indigeneity to

mobilize a long-oppressed social base. As 62 percent of the adult population self-identified as indigenous in the 2001 census, Morales offered the first proportionate political representation in Bolivia's history as a nation state (Postero 2017, 10). The victory for indigenous Bolivians was not merely a symbolic one, however. Morales came into office with a campaign platform that injected indigenous values into a political arena that had formerly reflected the views of white mestizo elites. With the MAS comprising a relative majority of parliament seats, Morales was able to actualize the demands of indigenous activist groups by creating a new constitution in 2009, establishing Bolivia as a "communitarian, plurinational state" with the primary focus of the state being to "constitute a just and harmonious society, cemented in decolonization, without discrimination or exploitation, with full social justice, to consolidate plurinational identities" (Contitute Assembly 2009; Postero 2017, 2). The new constitution articulates indigenous values revolving around environmental protection, social equality, communal practices, access to education, and opposition to "capitalistic practices" of commodification and privatization (Constitutional Assembly 2009). These tenets are embodied in the motto "vivir bien," or "living well," which has become the slogan of the indigenous activist groups in South America (Postero 2017, 65-66). With this legislation, Bolivia came to represent a voice of the Global South diametrically opposed to the Western development paradigm.

Bolivia's push for indigenous recognition is not a new global phenomenon, but it has been one of the most successful movements in terms of implementing indigenous policy on a national scale (Mander 2005, 9). With the Morales government still in place, Bolivia heads an increasingly visible global indigenous coalition seeking to lessen the

negative consequences of globalization and extractavist practices for the 350 million remaining indigenous people across the globe (Mander 2005, 3). The damage wrought upon indigenous communities as a result of colonialism and ensuing social, economic, and environmental oppression is well documented, but while globalization stemming from colonial structures has subjugated indigenous people to oppressive conditions, it has also provided a platform for coalition building and knowledge sharing amongst disparate indigenous groups. Morales has utilized that platform by vocalizing and projecting formerly silenced indigenous cosmologies and practices that run counter to the economic world order.

A distinct commonality between various indigenous groups is the intimate knowledge of the land developed through continued dependence on surrounding natural features for sustenance (Berkes 1999; Canessa 2012; Macas 2005; Mohawk 2005; Tauli-Corpuz 2005). While such generalization can be damaging if applied indiscriminately across all indigenous groups, it serves as a framework through which to understand the tension between global economic thinking and indigenous practices. UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, writes about the ways in which indigenous worldviews stem from usufruct land-use systems and communal forms of living that allowed societies to flourish within contained ecosystems. Environmental sustainability was essential to ensuring that the land on which indigenous communities resided remained habitable and nourishing prior to the advent of export-oriented production. For these reasons, the individualism and privatization that accompany the current global economic system are antithetical to indigenous ways of life (Tauli-Corpuz 2005, 15).

In light of the dire warnings recently published in the 2017 report "Global Warming of 1.5 ºC" conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), consideration of alternative modes of production and global sustenance become ever more imperative (IPCC 2018). Extractivist practices and unchecked production are clearly not sustainable modes of living, but the global economy has yet to halt a precipitous decline into climate instability. As populations around the globe begin to feel the pressures of climate change, the discourse of climate mitigation has moved rapidly from future projections to harsh contemporary realities. The leisure to discuss climate change mitigation has been overshadowed in many vulnerable areas by the urgent need to implement climate change adaptations before lives are destroyed. As in most instances of vulnerability, the disenfranchised face elevated risks, while the privileged are insulated by economic latitude. Jean Palutikof, director of the National Climate Change Adaptation Research facility, calls adaptation the "poor cousin of the climate change challenge," noting its prevalence in subaltern discourse as hegemonic world powers discuss climate mitigation at an arm's length while continuing to engage in deleterious trends of consumption (Palutikof 2009, 3). As these trends continue, it is important to analyze the objectives of an indigenous led nation such as Bolivia.

The indigenous driven messaging that has emanated from the Bolivian administration since 2006 emphasizes the importance of *climate justice*- a response to climate change that incorporates adaptation and mitigation while actively seeking to reduce inequalities exacerbated by climate pressures. Climate justice was borne of global justice movements throughout the 1980's and 1990's that sought to address apparent and increasing inequalities perpetuated by the powerful players in the global marketplace

(Bond 2012, 17). First labeled in 1999, climate justice emerged as a movement articulating the disproportionate impacts of climate change according to pre-existing vulnerabilities created by historical inequalities (Widdick 2018). The concept highlights the struggles of marginalized groups and demands reparations for climate injustices wrought by wealthy, high-emitting countries. The lineage of climate justice contains many actors, most of which represent the Global South, but Bolivia has been especially prominent due to Evo's vociferous admonitions of Western practices, the new constitution that reflects anti-colonial, pro-earth sentiments, and the organization of a climate conference that would ultimately solidify the identity of the climate justice movement.

The climate justice approach was championed in the 2010 event organized by Morales called "The World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth." Morales organized the event to express his distaste for the mechanisms used by the global community to reduce climate change through tenuous emissions reduction commitments and the commodification of carbon. After Conference of Parties (COP) 15 in Copenhagen in December of 2009 produced uninspiring results, Morales invited indigenous groups, government representatives, and social activist movements from 140 countries to Cochabamba, Bolivia for the World People's Conference in order to develop more systemic and holistic climate solutions (Postero 2017, 91). Morales's opening statement left no doubts as to his intentions:

> We are here because in Copenhagen, the so-called developed countries failed in their obligation to provide substantial commitments to reduce greenhouse gases. We have two paths: either Pachamama or death. Either capitalism lives or Mother Earth lives. Of course, brothers and sisters, we are here for life, for humanity, and for the rights of Mother Earth. Long live the rights of Mother Earth! Death to capitalism! (Postero 2017, 91).

Morales's harsh critiques of capitalism extend even to climate change solutions, and his rhetoric amplifies the paradigm differences between Bolivia's indigenous people and the industrialized world. Bolivian Ambassador Pablo Solon articulated Bolivia's commitment to climate justice after the World People's Conference by saying: "we believe the issue is much bigger than just commitments and targets, and that those considering human rights breaches are correct" (World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2011). The World People's Agreement that was created at the Conference assumed a similar tone. The Agreement begins with a critique of capitalism, stating that "under capitalism, Mother Earth is converted into a source of raw materials, and human beings into consumers and a means of production, into people that are seen as valuable only for what they own, and not for what they are" (World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010). The document also notes that the logic of competition, progress, and limitless growth has been imposed upon all by the capitalist world economy, and suggests that the resulting concentration of capital has led directly to climate change and its injurious effects. The nexus of the argument is encapsulated in the pointed sentence: "[Capitalism] is an imperialist system of colonization of the planet" (World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010) (See full text of the World People's Agreement in Appendix I).

Morales endorses the principles developed at the World People's Summit that will guide the creation of a more egalitarian economic system, presented in the following form within the text of the World People's Agreement:

- harmony and balance among all and with all things;

- complementarity, solidarity, and equality;
- collective well-being and the satisfaction of the basic necessities of all;
- people in harmony with nature;
- recognition of human beings for what they are, not what they own;
- elimination of all forms of colonialism, imperialism and interventionism;
- peace among the peoples and with Mother Earth; (World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010)

This list embodies the aims of climate justice and seeks to ensure the well-being of all above corporate interest and economic benefit.

However, as the Morales administration has developed, discrepancies have surfaced between the president's international messaging and his domestic policies (Aguirre and Cooper 2010). While Morales lectures the world on the continued commodification of nature, his administration has remained dependent upon natural resource extraction. Social anthropologist John-Andrew McNeish argues that despite the country's progressive indigenous government, Bolivia is just as likely as Peru or Ecuador to prioritize national industry over indigenous rights (McNeish 2013). Such a claim is substantiated by Morales's response to indigenous activist groups protesting a development project to build a highway through the Isoboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) (See Chapter 3), a biodiverse tropical preserve in the Bolivia lowlands that is home to sixty-three indigenous communities (Postero 2017, 122). "La Chaparina," the police raid outside of Yucumo in September of 2011, has become notorious for its brutality against indigenous protesters. The Morales-directed raid exposed the administration's paradoxical contradictions surrounding liberal forms of development (McNeish 2013).

Political scientist Jeffery Webber argues that Bolivia's economic model under Morales is not in fact a departure from neoliberal economics, but rather can be characterized as "reconstituted neoliberalism," essentially capitalizing on free market

mechanisms under the veil of progressive socialism (Webber 2011, 177). With few structural changes to Bolivia's economic system under Morales, oil and gas extraction rose from 4.5 percent of Bolivia's gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 to 6.9 percent in 2007 (Webber 2011, 193). This trend is in keeping with Bolivia's Plan de Desarrollo Nacional 2006–2010 (National Development Plan, PDN), which was released in 2006. The PDN was rooted in the maintenance of extractive industry in Bolivia, ensuring that Bolivia would remain dependent on fossil fuels and mineral resources extending to the indefinite future (Webber 2011, 192). Latin American scholars such as Eduardo Gudynas have identified Bolivia's economic model as "progressive extractivism," a system that depends upon resource extraction and exportation for funding, yet uses those funds to reduce income inequality and boost social programs within the country (Gudynas, 2010). In order to make good on his promises to the people of Bolivia, Morales and his administration required a source of national income that would enable the employment of social programs. Morales stepped into a government that had long been reliant on natural resource extraction, and as such, has facilitated extractive practices despite his international perception as a champion of Mother Earth (Aguirre and Cooper 2010).

It appears that Morales chose the politically expedient route in continuing Bolivia's dependence on extractive industries. However, the extent to which Morales is constrained by a global system of resource extraction and commodification is worthy of investigation. Bolivia has a long legacy of resource extraction, dictated in large part by colonial power dynamics that have since manifested in neocolonial trade relationships with larger countries such as the U.S (Kohl and Farthing 2006). Those relationships are facilitated through intergovernmental organizations that influence the flow of goods and

services between countries; namely the World Bank, the World Trade organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These three institutions were all created by the international community following World War II in order to establish funds for development and to serve as a mediating force in the global economy. Political geographer Richard Peet identifies the triad as "global governance institutions" in order to convey their role in overseeing the global interactions (2009, 100). Those critical of the organizations have derided them for their hand in perpetuating global income inequality and creating conditions favorable to more powerful countries. Peet refers to the three institutions as "the unholy trinity," citing the non-democratic fashion by which they were created and the equally non-democratic mechanisms that have maintained global power dynamics in favor of countries such as the US that benefit from reduced regulation in global trade (2003, 11). Jerry Mander, American activist and author, echoes those unfavorable sentiments by calling the global governance institutions "global corporate instruments," alluding to their affiliation with powerful countries and the corporations that accumulate wealth for those countries (Mander 2005, 5).

Others, such as renowned economist Jeffrey Sachs, argue that multilateral development banks such as the World Bank have enormous upsides, with potential to stimulate sustainable development and poverty reduction through liberal market methodology (Sachs 2005). In an editorial he wrote for the Washington Post defending his credentials for World Bank President consideration, Sachs calls the World Bank "a powerhouse of ideas and a meeting ground for key actors who together can solve daunting problems of poverty, hunger, disease and environmental degradation" (Sachs 2012). The IMF and the WTO are corollary institutions with similar ambitions predicated

upon the sustenance of a liberal market economy. University of Sydney political philosophy professor Duncan Ivison argues that a humanitarian form of postcolonial liberalism is entirely plausible, and that the institutions that mediate such a system have the potential to facilitate structural changes that would enable indigenous groups to participate meaningfully in the global economy (Ivison 2002). Both Sachs and Ivison indicate that current economic inequalities did not result from a liberal world economy that champions capitalism, but rather from human mistakes in the past that failed to account for all people (Ivison 2002, 34).

It is evident that Bolivia engages with both internal and external factors that determine the actions of the Bolivian administration A thorough analysis of domestic and international influences will help to illuminate Bolivia's role in producing climate change resolutions and the inhibiting factors the country faces its pursuit of climate justice. By assessing Bolivia's contributions to the climate justice movement under Evo Morales and investigating the international factors that delimit the efficacy of Bolivia's push for global climate recognition, the barriers that are faced by Bolivia and other similarly situated countries can be identified and addressed. In performing such an analysis, I will strive to examine historical, political, economic, and environmental factors that have played a role in determining Bolivia's climate vulnerability and its ensuing efforts at climate fortification utilizing a climate justice framework. This involves looking at Evo Morales's policies and practices, determining the successes and failures of his tenure, examining the international factors that have created the contemporary economic and political world order, and seeking an understanding of the global processes that have sought climate change resolution.

This thesis investigates the relationship between the indigenous-led Bolivian government and the global economy in order to ascertain the obstacles to climate justice that have arisen since Bolivia has emerged onto the national stage as a figurehead of resistance to international economic practices. Ultimately, this work will examine Bolivia's efforts toward climate justice and the government's convoluted relationship with the global economy, identifying the major barriers to the attainment of climate justice on a domestic and international scale.

In the coming chapters, I investigate several key questions that indicate gaps in the existing literature. What role does Bolivia play in the climate justice movement? How has the Morales administration aided or hindered climate justice ambitions? To what extent do global processes affect the ability of the Morales government to realize climate justice? What barriers exist to the pursuit of climate justice, and how have they manifested in contemporary global politics? I address these questions in the following chapters through an analysis that incorporates extensive literature review, interviews with Bolivian academics, on-site observations and learnings, and investigation into the policy positions of the Bolivian administration, indigenous activist groups, and global governance institutions.

The thesis is organized in a fashion such that contemporary Bolivian politics and key themes such as climate justice, neoliberalism, and climate vulnerability are laid as a foundation prior to a discussion of broader systems with which Bolivia has historically interacted. Chapter One outlines Bolivia's more recent political history, with a particular focus on the Morales government and the indigenous actions that led to the election of Bolivia's first indigenous president. This overview includes past tensions between global

governance institution initiatives in Bolivia and responses by indigenous activists. The chapter articulates the proclaimed objectives of the MAS and the Morales administration and presents the successes and shortcomings of Morales's tenure. I highlight rhetoric of indigenous activist groups and juxtapose it against the extractive practices that fuel Bolivia's economy. Further, I analyze Morales's international rhetoric, and investigate the contradictions implicit in his stance against capitalism despite reliance on extractive industries begins to be fleshed out. Finally, I provide key definitions and origins of words and concepts used to describe the global world economy and responses to climate change that will be used in later chapters.

In Chapter Two, I provide an informative chronology of Bolivia's colonial history and its deeply rooted extractivism, extending through major events within the last few centuries. Included within this history is an overview of indigenous presence and practices pertaining to climate justice and social resilience. This history will serve as a foundation upon which to build an understanding of Bolivia's colonial legacies and political and economic structures that have arisen through a history of exploitation and oppression. Finally, in Chapter Two I offer a summation of climate related factors in Bolivia and the projections that have originated from climate studies that portend devastating effects in the near future if climate action is not taken soon.

In Chapter Three, I illuminate the structures of the global economy, focusing on the development of the Western order and the triad of global governance institutions that play a crucial role in orchestrating international relations. The history of these institutions and their subsidiaries in relation to Bolivia are considered, as are their future projects pertaining to development and climate change solutions. In this chapter, I will also

provide a deeper examination of Evo's policies and the mechanisms he has used to elevate Bolivia's economy and reduce climate vulnerability amongst his citizenry.

Chapter Four allows the trajectories of previous chapters to intertwine, applying Evo's critiques of capitalism and globalization to the Western order and its institutions and discussing the relationship between Bolivia's government and the global economy. This chapter considers global development from several vantage points, seeking to uncover the real impacts of projects employed by global governance institutions and facilitated by wealthy nations. Discussion encompasses themes of neocolonialism, international attempts at climate resolution, historical and contemporary dependency, the lineage of climate justice, and Bolivia's paradoxical climate justice positionality. Ultimately, this chapter will synthesize information from previous chapters to present the barriers that Bolivia faces in pursuing climate justice and the reasons for which Bolivia represents an ideal case study for the assessment of global climate issues.

The conclusion reiterates findings and states the results of this research. Potential for future work is outlined, and limitations of the thesis are acknowledged and assessed. Finally, the findings of the study are applied to global processes involving tensions between historically marginalized people and the global economy, with a particular focus on steps toward global climate justice despite apparent barriers.

Chapter One

The Convergence of Indigenous Resistance and Climate Justice

Bolivia's political and environmental setting along with its recent ambitions toward climate justice situate the country as an informative case study through which to understand global processes of climate change and the power dynamics at play in seeking climate resolution. This chapter will elucidate the processes of change that led to Evo's presidency, with a focus on the indigenous activism that opposed neoliberal reforms imposed upon Bolivia by global governance institutions. I will begin to uncover the policies that Morales has implemented since assuming the presidency and speak to the ways in which Evo's aims align with those of climate justice. This analysis coincides with an assessment of the neoliberal policies that were implemented throughout the 1980s and 1990s that led to widespread activism and ultimately pitted the current Bolivian administration against the US-led Western order. I will further provide an overview of climate vulnerability and the components that exacerbate climate pressures in Bolivia, pointing to the global inequalities that have precipitated disproportionate climate impacts. Ultimately, this chapter will present Bolivia's contemporary political setting and the tensions that have arisen from opposition to Western practices.

Evo Morales did not become the first indigenous president of Bolivia through sheer coincidence. Rather, he was buoyed by a legacy of indigenous activism that extends back through colonial times, but became especially visible on a global stage through resistance to globalization and neoliberalism within the past few decades. Anthropologist Nancy Postero identifies 1985 as the point at which Bolivia entered the "neoliberal era," and, consequently, the point at which indigenous groups began to organize to resist

internationally imposed neoliberal policies (Postero 2017, 28). Bolivia's return to democracy from a military dictatorship occurred in 1982, at which time Bolivians suffered from extreme poverty, particularly in indigenous populations (Postero 2017, 28). The transition to democracy was marked by international economic restructuring efforts facilitated by the IMF and the World Bank (Postero 2017, 29). These efforts came in the form of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) that sought to revitalize ailing economies through loans that were conditional upon the recipient's adherence to advised World Bank and IMF economic policies: liberalizing markets, privatizing natural resource industries, and cutting tariffs and trade restrictions (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 28). The intent of the SAPs was to stabilize the economies of failing developing states, and to some extent, the objectives in Bolivia were met. Inflation, estimated at twenty-five thousand percent in 1985, dropped to zero within months, and the IMF and World Bank lauded Bolivia as a triumph of neoliberal restructuring efforts (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 28). A Bolivian population that was constituted of only 41.3 percent urban residents in 1975 became 69 percent urbanized by the early 2000s, and the profit-driven individualism that characterizes capitalist economies set in to a previously communal culture (Webber 2011, 15-16). Though economic indicators pointed to the success of SAPs early after their implementation, the results of the very same policies would prove to be overwhelmingly ineffective at poverty reduction and economic growth.

Neoliberalism and Indigeneity

Neoliberalism and indigeneity are critical to shaping an understanding of the political and economic dynamics in Bolivia. In academic discourse surrounding Bolivia,

the two are presented as polar opposites along an economic spectrum, with neoliberalism representing the antithesis to indigenous ideals (Kohl and Farthing 2006; Postero 2017; McNeish 2013). While this is true in many instances, it is important to flesh out the existing relationship in order to better appreciate the nuances that complicate a presupposed binary.

Neoliberalism has its roots in the classical liberal political economy outlined most prominently by preeminent economist and philosopher Adam Smith in the 18th century (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 15). According to liberal economic theory, one of the greatest threats to individual freedom is the state, and as individual freedom is enshrined as the ultimate goal of a free society, neoliberalism seeks to reduce social spending and state intervention by transferring the responsibility of economic well-being to the private sector (Feigenbaum and Henig 1994). Economists Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman are renowned for their work in outlining neoliberal theory (Jones 2012). Both are proponents of liberal markets, which they refer to as "free," "competitive," or "capitalist" (Friedman 1962; Hayek 1944). In Hayek's acclaimed work *Road to Serfdom*, the economist argues that governmental intervention represents one of the greatest threats to individual autonomy, and points to competitive markets as the driver of social progress and freedom (Hayek 1944). Friedman echoes his predecessor's claims by asserting that competitive capitalism, which undergirds neoliberal theory, is "a system of economic freedom and a necessary condition for political freedom," emphasizing the connection between free markets and free societies (Friedman 1962, 4). Both authors orient their work toward Western civilization, most embodied by the economic and political history of the United States. More recently, political scientist Francis Fukuyama emerged into the

spotlight through his work *The End of History and the Last Man,* which argues that free market capitalism and the liberalization of markets globally will lead to the ultimate socio-economic configuration of the world order, positing neoliberalism as the most efficient and productive economic model the world has ever seen (Fukuyama 1992).

Indigeneity introduces a new lens to modern economic thought. Though there is no universally accepted definition of "indigenous," a UN report written by Martínez Cobo prior to the establishment of a Decade for Indigenous People (1995-2004) is often cited as one of the first and most significant definitions of indigenous (Canessa 2008). In the report, Cobo defines indigenous people as follows: "Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them" (Cobo 1986). This definition has been found to be problematic in some senses as it necessitates continuity with pre-colonial societies, which may not encompass the entirety of indigenous people globally. Responding to these criticisms, the International Labor Organization (ILO) of the United Nations created a more inclusive definition, which applies to "peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations," emphasizing that "self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion" for the determination of indigeneity (ILO 1989). Anthropologist Andrew Canessa also makes the important distinction that "one can clearly not have a sense of indigeneity without an invasion or occupation at some point in

time," emphasizing that indigeneity is about history and power (Canessa 2008, 207). These definitions lend themselves to the understanding of the tensions that exist between indigenous people and the current economic world order, as such an order has been dependent upon the invasion of indigenous territory and the separation of modern society and indigenous lifestyles. A history of invasion and exploitation has resulted in widespread marginalization of indigenous people. According to World Bank statistics, indigenous people comprise 15 percent of the world's extreme poor despite only representing 5 percent of the total earth's population (Hall and Gandolfo 2016). Wealth discrepancies are even more drastic in rural areas, where indigenous people represent one-third of the poor population (Hall and Gandolfo 2016).

The book *Paradigm Wars: Indigenous Peoples' Resistance to Globalization* compiled by Jerry Mander and Victoria Tauli-Corpuz offers a collection of insights into the position of indigenous people relative to a globalizing world. Tauli-Corpuz points to globalization and the free-market methodology that drives its processes as a form of neocolonialism that relegates indigenous people across the globe to the status of "obstacles" in the eyes of "industrialized peoples" (Tauli-Corpuz 2005, 14). By her assessment, not only are neoliberal practices incentivizing the commodification and subsequent removal of indigenous peoples' lands and resources, they are also entirely misaligned with indigenous ideals. Export-oriented trade, heavy resource extraction, individualism, and privatization stand opposed to indigenous cultures worldwide that are largely based in small-scale sustainability, communal practices, and usufruct land usage (Berkes 1999; Canessa 2012; Macas 2005; Mohawk 2005; Tauli-Corpuz 2005).

Evo's indigeneity presents a new dynamic to the indigenous-neoliberal binary. Born to an Aymara family of subsistence farmers, Evo has incorporated Andean indigenous values into the highest office in the country, and in doing so, has redefined Bolivian indigeneity by blurring the distinction between prevailing contemporary society and indigenous culture. Canessa argues that indigeneity "provides [Evo's] government with the legitimacy to rule and a platform from which to protect the nation against cultural and economic globalization," asserting that indigeneity has become the foundation of a "new nationalism" (Canessa 2012, 204). This new nationalism utilizes Andean indigenous values, but has altered them to be more conducive to national policy. In doing so, Evo has exacerbated the contrast between the global economy and the values he has brought to the table, issuing his common refrain "Death to capitalism!" to emphasize his distaste for a system that, in his view, brought his country economic ruin (Postero 2017, 91). However, Bolivian political scientist Fernando Garcia notes that Evo's perception of capitalism is very essentializing, reducing an entire economic system to a cold mechanism of neocolonialism and oppression. Further, Evo remains engaged in an economy that is largely capitalist in nature, especially in regards to international policy (Garcia Pers. Comm. 2018). Thus, one must acknowledge the multifaceted nature of Bolivia's relationship with the international community in order to understand Evo's positionality.

Andean Indigenous Values

I have shown several distinct commonalities amongst indigenous people around the world, but Bolivia's circumstances warrant a deeper investigation into the Andean indigenous practices and values from which the current administration draws. The 2009 constitution articulates a broad range of values arising from indigenous practices, including but not limited to "respect and equality for all, on principles of sovereignty, dignity, interdependence, solidarity, harmony, and equity in the distribution and redistribution of the social wealth, where the search for a good life predominates; based on respect for the economic, social, juridical, political and cultural pluralism of the inhabitants of this land; and on collective coexistence with access to water, work, education, health and housing for all" (Constitute Project 2009). These themes nucleate around the concept of "buen vivir," or the good life, a concept first institutionalized in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution before being echoed by Bolivia. Buen vivir is a Spanish interpretation of common indigenous sentiments such as the Quechua "sumak kawsay" (good life), the Aymara "suma qamana" (good life), and the Guarani nandereko (harmonious living) (Mercado 2017). According to the Pachamama Alliance, an organization that seeks to promote sustainable practices through indigenous teachings, the good life is ascertained through engagement with traditional cosmologies that revolve around equitable resource distribution, sustainable means of production, respect for non-human life forms, and a worldview that focuses not on development but rather on fulfillment of respective needs through non-market practices (Mercado 2017). Much of today's indigenous cosmology is presented in terms of its contrasting nature with capitalism and the Western development paradigm, and in Bolivia, we see that rhetoric used to depart from Western practices that contribute to environmental degradation and the subjugation of indigenous people.

Figure 1: The Wiphala flag, representing the indigenous peoples of the Andean region, was established as the dual flag of Bolivia in 2009. Here, it flies over a view of Lake Titicaca taken from the vantage of an Aymara community in northern Bolivia (Photo taken by the author).

Andean cosmology differs from those held by other historic indigenous groups in the Americas. While small-scale sustainability remains a consistent theme throughout indigenous cultures, Andean organizational structures and spiritual beliefs are markedly different than their indigenous counterparts. Anthropologist R. Tom Zuidema writes that Andean beliefs have not historically centered around the notion of the Heavens or the Underworld as did the Aztecs and the Mayas. Rather, "Andean people preferred to work out their

cosmologies pragmatically through their political organizations," using the two primary tools of kinship and astronomy to guide their social organization (Zuidema 1992, 17). Prior to colonization, incredibly complex calendars developed through astronomical observation determined annual festivities, while ayllu kinship networks facilitated the flow of goods and services throughout society. The ayllu organizational system allowed for the expression of Andean values of equitable distribution and respect for Pachamama in daily life (Saavedra Pers. Comm. 2018). CONAMAQ, one of the foremost indigenous rights groups in Bolivia, identifies the strengthening of the ayllu system as one of their primary objectives, as the system has been in some ways responsible for the preservation of Aymara and Quechua culture throughout centuries of exploitative colonization (See Chapter 2). The other primary aim of the organization is to advance women's rights in society, as patriarchal systems were imposed upon Andean communities by colonizers and do not reflect indigenous beliefs of complementarity between people and genders (Cuevas 2018).

Ultimately, Andean indigenous groups have long expressed their beliefs of equitable distribution and respect for "Pachamama" (Mother Earth) through daily practices that revolve around communal access and sustainability. Aymara Shaman Calixto Quispe articulated to me the way in which the coca leaf connects indigenous people to the earth and to their ancestors, lamenting the fact that coca production in Bolivia has been reduced by US drug enforcement policies despite nearly all of the cocaine produced from the coca leaf being consumed in the US (Quispe Pers. Comm. 2017). He indicated that such difficulties are indicative of a larger system of indigenous marginalization that has featured diametrically opposed worldviews pitting free market capitalism and globalization against small-scale communal practices. In today's day any age, it is evident that capitalist systems continue to win out.

Figure 2: A view of Lake Titicaca through ancient Andean ruins (Photo by the author).

Evo's Ascension

The 1980s are commonly referred to as the "lost decade" in Latin America due to the complete state of disarray in which the majority of South American governments found themselves (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 54). Interestingly, this very same decade is referred to by the same derisive title amongst scholars of African development, indicating that the economic crises faced by formerly colonized, developing countries were not rooted in domestic mismanagement, but rather in a poorly designed process of international development. A global market crisis left Latin American countries reeling, with inflation rates shooting skyward and a rash of countries defaulting on massive debts. In Bolivia, inflation reached an astonishing 11,805 percent in 1985, and it was evident that changes needed to be made quickly (Hellinger 2015, 172). The international solution, orchestrated by the United States, was to implement neoliberal reforms aligned with the Washington Consensus, a series of policy recommendations created by World Bank economist John Williamson. The Washington Consensus describes trends towards market liberalization in international development policy, and according to contributor to the *Journal of Economic Growth* William Easterly, was responsible for failures in poverty reduction and economic revitalization throughout the late 1980s and 1990s (Easterly 2001; Kohl and Farthing 2006, 20-21). The Washington Consensus is constituted of ten policy prescriptions that were meant to guide developing countries to economic stability through liberal market mechanisms, identified by Williamson as follows:

1. fiscal discipline with deficits of less than two percent
2. a change in public expenditure priorities that reduces subsidies for special interests
3. tax reform that includes cutting marginal tax rates, especially on overseas investments

4. financial liberalization, with market-determined interest rates, or, minimally, the abolition of subsidized interest rates for special interests
5. unified exchange rates
6. trade liberalization and the replacement of trade restrictions by tariffs, not to exceed 10 percent, or at worst 20 percent
7. increase of foreign direct investment through abolishing investment barriers in order to 'level the playing field'
8. privatization of state enterprises
9. deregulation and abolition of regulatory barriers to entry to all industries
10. guarantees of secure property rights (Williamson 1993).

The IMF and the World Bank were able to implement such prescriptions through SAPs- conditional loans that pushed Bolivia and other developing countries to adopt neoliberal policies, cutting social programs and increasing resource extraction and exportation while doing so (York 2005, 188). Author John Kofas elaborates upon the foreign policy practices of the IMF and the World Bank in his article entitled "The Politics of Austerity: The IMF and US Foreign Policy in Bolivia" (Kofas 1995). Through an analysis of unreleased IMF documents, Kofas discovered that "there was no doubt on the part of the stabilization planners that their policy would augment the economic interests of certain domestic and foreign groups and impose a lower standard of living on the rest of society" (1995, 213-214). He finds that the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (one of five facets of the World Bank) were used as foreign policy tools of the United States, which applied "extraordinary economic pressure to force a new policy orientation on the part of its southern neighbors" when Latin American countries pursued initiatives that sought economic nationalism (Kofas 1995, 215). The study by Rainer Thiele entitled "The Social Impact of Structural Adjustment in Bolivia" shows that the SAPs implemented by the IMF and the World Bank did not in fact achieve economic stabilization or poverty reduction, but rather

increased the rural-urban income gap and had negligible effects on urban poverty reduction (Thiele 2003, 304).

Bolivia's source of resistance to international control prior to the institution of neoliberal policies in the 1980s originated primarily from unions in the mining industries. The Federation of Bolivian Miners' Union (FSTMB) orchestrated the battle to restore democracy through the 1970s, leading the Bolivian Workers Central (COB) in their efforts to implement progressive workers' rights under a military dictatorship (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 8). By 1985, the World Bank and IMF had begun implementing their structural adjustment procedures to initiate a "New Economic Policy" focusing on the liberalization of Bolivia's industries (Olivera 2004, 7). A key component of these efforts was the move to close and privatize tin mines across the country that had been losing profit, resulting in the firing of thousands of miners. This action, as Postero argues, served to silence "the most combative section of civil society," paving the way for further implementation of neoliberal economic policy (Postero 2017, 29). In 1985, under President Victor Paz Estenssoro, the "New Economic Policy" was launched, beginning with Presidential Decree 21060. The Decree sought to diminish the state's role in the economy, introducing neoliberal language that "had the explicit intention of regaining the support that the IMF, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and United States withdrew during the UDP [Democratic and Popular Union] government (1982-85)" (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 65-66). Overseeing the first round of neoliberal reforms, then Bolivian economic planning minister Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, known widely in Bolivia as "Goni," encouraged international investment in Bolivian oil, partially privatizing the industry and cutting royalties and taxes on the new oil fields from

50 percent to 18 percent. When Goni assumed the presidency in 1993, his extraction-oriented policies became a foundation of the administration's economic revitalization efforts. His goals were described by an "Energy Triangle," a three-step process that involved privatizing the oil sector, de-regulating hydrocarbon extraction, and creating the country's first "major pipeline" that would deliver oil to Brazil (Hindery and Hecht 2013, 27). The last objective allowed for the entrance of Enron, a massive American energy corporation. Enron would not be the last major US corporation to enter Bolivia during the neoliberal era, but it was one of many foreign prospectors that would ultimately lead to the termination of neoliberal administrations.

Benjamin Kohl argues that "Bolivia has served as an important testing ground for international development economists who point to the country as a textbook case of economic liberalization" (Kohl 2002). However, the neoliberal policies implemented in Bolivia did not achieve their proclaimed effects. Poverty was not reduced, the prices of basic utilities increased, and strikes erupted throughout the country despite neoliberal attempts at fracturing unions and repressing civil society. The Bolivian government lost 255 million dollars in 1997 alone due to privatization, and during that same year, the price of gas increased by 25 percent nationwide (Kohl 2002, 460). Privatization of oil companies caused further government shortages despite consistent increases in extraction rates, and job cuts in the transportation oil industries led many Bolivians to search for part-time manual labor or emigrate to Argentina in search of better opportunities (Kohl 2002, 459). Between 1995 and 1997, domestic water and electricity prices rose by 50 percent, which lead to more outcries amongst the populous (Kohl 2002, 460).

Even as SAPs failed to bring about poverty reduction and increased the prices of basic goods and services, the World Bank and IMF continued to push measures to privatize Bolivian industries. In 1997, the cities of El Alto and La Paz were targeted for water privatization by an external corporation, Aguas del Illimani, a company in which the World Bank held 8 percent of shares (York 2005, 188). Two years later, the Bolivian government passed Law 2029 under World Bank recommendation. The law was designed to privatize water and sanitation across the country, and its constituent clauses drastically reconfigured water rights in Bolivia, particularly for indigenous people. Communal water holdings became illegal, rainwater collection was prohibited, and local townships were barred from collecting water taxes or determining where wells would be built (Olivera 2004, 8-9). Instead, only contracted companies could distribute water, which fundamentally disrupted water-use practices that had been in place since the Incas inhabited the Andes. In Cochabamba, Bolivia's third largest city, only half of the population was connected to the water system in 1999, with most other individuals and families reliant upon cooperative water houses that were made illegal by Law 2029. Perhaps the most disruptive aspect of Law 2029 was the forty-year concession awarded to the company Aguas del Tunari, a subsidiary of the US Bechtel Corporation, for control of Cochabamba's water and sanitation system. Almost immediately upon entry, Aguas del Tunari doubled water prices in the city, initiating protests on a scale that had not been seen in contemporary Bolivia. So powerful was the resistance, Bechtel was forced to remove Aguas del Tunari from Bolivia, and proceeded to sue the Bolivian government for lost profits in a suit that was later withdrawn due to public pressure (York 2005, 188).

Indigenous activist efforts came to a head during these Cochabamba "water wars" of 2000, at which point the country was "suddenly catapulted on to the world stage as an inspiration for opponents of neoliberal globalization as it proved that popular resistance to restructuring is possible" (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 14-15). Amidst the international tensions, indigenous-led activist groups such as Coordinadora Defensa del Agua y la Vida (the Coalition in Defense of Water and Life) and Qullasuyu Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu (National Council of Ayllus and Markas- CONAMAQ) rose to prominence (Fabricant 2013). These groups promoted an ideology rooted in indigeneity that sought not to return Bolivia to a pre-industrial era, but rather to "use parts of prehistory to re-establish the links between humans and nature that have been ruptured by extractive industries" (Fabricant 2013, 170). The emergence of combative indigenous groups during the water wars created a foundation for the resistance that would ultimately overthrow successive neoliberal administrations and symbolically end Bolivia's neoliberal era.

Following the presidency of Goni, former military dictator Hugo Banzer won a strongly contested election in 1997 with a mere 22.3 percent of the national vote (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 150). His policies were largely an extension of Goni's economic initiatives, and his tenure was defined by social unrest and protest against water privatization. Under political and personal health duress, Banzer stepped down in 2001, leaving the seat open for contestation in 2002. In this election, Evo Morales came in as a surprising second to former president Goni, giving hope to indigenous populations yet maintaining a neoliberal leader. However, Goni grew rapidly unpopular due to his compliance with the initiatives of global institutions. In 2003, the IMF demanded that

Bolivia reduce its national deficit from 8.5 to 5.5 percent of GDP if it wished to continue receiving debt relief, and in response, Goni leveraged a 12.5 percent flat income tax which invariably led to protest (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 172). Shortly thereafter, Evo Morales and senator-elect of the MAS Filemón Escóbar led the charge to reverse the gas and oil privatization that had taken place over the previous years. Enraged by a 2003 government study that showed major corporations such as BP and Amoco enjoying the world's lowest exploration and operating costs in Bolivia, the indigenous and labor organizations that were mobilized during the water wars took to the streets again to demand the nationalization of Bolivia's gas reserves. Goni's response was militaristic, and the ensuing deaths of three indigenous Bolivians at a road blockade outside of La Paz due to a protest-related confrontation spurred an escalation of resistance, particularly among the indigenous Aymara community from which the lives had been tragically lost. By mid-October of 2003, over 70 people had been killed due to conflict, and Goni was forced to flee the country (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 174-175).

The next two years saw interim presidents warding off continued protests until the 2005 election allowed Bolivians to democratically express their demands. In 2005, rising star Evo Morales and his party won in a landslide victory, fulfilling the plethora of objectives that had been built in opposition to a neoliberal agenda since the 1980s (Postero 2017).

Evo Morales and Climate Justice

It was under these circumstances that Evo Morales assumed his role as president. The previous 5 years had been defined by protest and defiance in the face of international

interest, and Bolivians were looking forward to an era of prosperity driven by nationalized industry and the injection of indigenous cosmologies into national policy. By 2004, Bolivia carried an international debt of over $4.3 billion, seventy percent of which had been accumulated between 1985 and 1999 (Olivera 2004, 15). Unions had been fractured, over sixty-seven percent of the population was living in poverty, and job instability defined the working class with underemployment reaching fifty-three percent of the economically active population (Webber 2011, 16, 23). Further, natural resources were being removed from the country at a rapid rate, and Bolivia was not reaping proportionate economic benefits. Through the 1990s, Bolivia received 18 percent of revenue generated from gas, while international corporations gathered the remaining 82 percent (Hindery and Hecht 2013, 28). By the time Evo took office, 70.2 percent of Bolivia's debt was external, with 90 percent of that total owed to multilateral lending institutions (Webber 2011, 33). Bolivians were seeking an alternative to the neoliberal policies that had enabled foreign exploitation and failed to produce expected advances, and they found that alternative in the form of the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement for Socialism, MAS). Originally perceived as a "political instrument" of unions and their allies, the MAS employed tactics that effectively encompassed both indigenous and labor ideologies. Kohl and Farthing identify three primary ideological tendencies that drive the MAS party: indiginest, Marxist, and popular nationalist- all of which were embodied in the form of Evo Morales (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 14-15).

Evo rose to popularity as a cocalero- a coca leaf grower who took to organizing in opposition to the United States' efforts to eradicate the plant as a part of the war on drugs initiative that took off in the 1970s (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 157). By 2002, Evo had

become one of only four cocalero or indigenous members of the 130-member Bolivian congress, a difficult position for a man with revolutionary ambitions. A prominent leader in the gas wars, Evo was deemed partially responsible for the violence that arose from the indigenous uprisings, and was removed from Congress by 104 of his fellow members in January of 2002 (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 171). Though this effort was orchestrated to dissipate the increasing resistance facing the neoliberal administration, it had virtually the opposite effect. In the following election, Evo and fellow indigenous leader Felipe Quispe gained ground through the MAS in the Senate and Congress, with the party winning 8 and 27 of the delegation's seats, respectively (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 171). By the time the 2005 elections came around, momentum was clearly behind Morales and his party, and his overwhelming victory served as a major pronouncement for indigenous people in the Global South.

It must be noted that Evo faced unprecedented expectations upon gaining the presidency. His campaign platform was virtually based on revolutionary changes to the entire pre-existing governmental structure, and his constituents were looking for an answer to centuries of colonial oppression. As Kohl and Farthing aptly state, "even a president of good-will cannot fix 20 years of neoliberal policies overlaid on 500 years of social exclusion" (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 2). However, these were Evo's envisaged ambitions, and his first tasks were to follow through on the ongoing demands to nationalize the gas industry and create a new national constitution that more accurately reflected the indigenous tenets that guide the majority of Bolivian residents. Evo made good on these demands, though not without resistance from non-indigenous factions of Congress. Though the new constitution was one of Evo's first initiatives, it wasn't until

2009 that the finalized version managed to pass into law (Postero 2017, 10). Along with establishing a series of rights for "indigenous originary and peasant peoples," the new constitution expressly endorsed the "buen vivir" ideology that encompasses a broad range of indigenous virtues relating to equality and, perhaps most importantly in regards to climate change, respect for "Pachamama," or Mother Earth (Constitutional Assembly 2009). It is here that Evo's ideologies parallel those that define climate justice, a movement toward equality in the face of climate crises that appeared on the global scene in 1999 (Widdick 2018).

It is no coincidence that Bolivia has been subject to international interest regarding natural resource extraction. Kohl and Farthing cite that Bolivia is home to the second largest natural gas reserve in South America, one of the world's leading iron ore mines, two of the largest silver mines on earth, and half of the known deposits of lithium globally (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 5). These circumstances leave Bolivia vulnerable to fall victim to the "resource curse," a term coined by economist Richard Auty (1994) to describe the plight of resource-wealthy countries that suffer from unequal trade relationships derived from colonial power dynamics. Given these circumstances, combined with elevated rates of poverty and centuries of marginalization fueled by racism, Evo's rise to power provided a conduit for the expression of a dire need to achieve equality relative to the rest of the developed world. This need was being echoed elsewhere through the rhetoric of climate justice- a movement to address the disproportionate impacts of climate change on disenfranchised populations.

Climate justice is a term that was coined by the NGO CorpWatch in a 1999 report entitled "Greenhouse Gangsters vs Climate Justice" (Widdick 2018). The concept rapidly

gained traction amongst international climate and human rights groups, and was eventually developed into a doctrine through the 2002 international declaration "Bali Principles of Climate Justice," which used language from the 1991 "Environmental Justice Principles" created by the People of Color Environmental Justice Leadership Summit to outline the components of climate justice (Bali Earth Summit 2002). The Bali Principles are remarkably similar to aspects of both the 2009 Bolivian Constitution and the 2010 World People's Agreement, which indicates a trend toward justice in global climate discussions.

The 6th of the 27 enumerated Bali Principles states "Climate Justice opposes the role of transnational corporations in shaping unsustainable production and consumption patterns and lifestyles, as well as their role in unduly influencing national and international decision-making" (Bali Earth Summit 2002). That the 2002 document identifies transnational corporations as a key inhibitor to the goals of climate justice speaks volumes to the presence climate justice has in Evo's rhetoric. Other principles call for a moratorium on new resource extraction projects and demand that transnational corporations and their facilitators be held responsible for the "climate debt" they have accrued through years of reckless emissions and environmentally degrading practices (Bali Earth Summit 2002). These demands are reminiscent of Evo's calls for "restorative justice" and an "International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal" that are articulated in the World People's Agreement (World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010). In fact, the word "justice" appears 22 times in the Evo-initiated document, emphasizing the commitment of the Morales government to righting the historical wrongs perpetrated against the Bolivian people.

Author Patrick Bond described the World People's Conference as the most "portentous" event that has yet contributed to the lineage of the movement, and contends that the Conference served as a "confirmation of a climate justice identity," accentuating the prominence of indigenous-inspired Bolivian messaging within the climate justice movement (Bond 2012, 187).

True to his campaign messaging, Evo was able to effectively nationalize the oil industry in Bolivia, fully reversing the percentage of value retained by the Bolivian state in its oil industry from 18 percent to 82 percent (Hindery and Hecht 2013, 28). For the first time, Bolivia ran a surplus, which reached 5 percent of GDP in 2008 and has initiated sustained GDP growth (Postero 2017, 98). Under the Morales administration, Bolivia has enacted social redistribution the likes of which had not been seen in the contemporary state. From 2004-2014, the Bolivian economy grew at an average rate of 4.9 percent, and the percentage of Bolivians living in poverty was reduced by a full 30 percent (World Bank: Overview 2018). Per capita income rose from $1,010 in 2005 to $2,922 in 2013, and extreme poverty rates dropped from 38 percent to 18.8 percent in that same period (Postero 2017, 99). Though Evo's "reconstituted neoliberalism" fell short of a full economic overhaul, there is an argument to be made for Evo's commitment to climate justice through progressive extractivism (See Chapter 3). Bolivia has not been weaned off resource extraction, but it has made major steps toward ensuring that its population is less vulnerable to impending climate changes. Literacy rates have improved under Evo's leadership, schools have been established in underserved populations, hospitals have been built with excesses earned through export revenue, and Bolivian

people have maintained their support for Evo, propelling him to a presidential term that may last until 2025 (Saavedra Pers. Comm. 2018).

Ismael Saavedra, Director of the School of International Studies (SIT) in Bolivia, asserted in a personal interview in 2018 that while Evo's continued dependence on extractive industries is clearly contradictory, his popularity has been maintained due to the social equality measures that have been effectively implemented in the past years (Saavedra Pers. Comm. 2018). Even in the face of controversy such as the TIPNIS development project, Evo has been able to balance indigenous values with neoliberal practices, and has been rewarded with successive elections. However, the sustainability of such an approach remains in question. Bolivia's rebellious population has been placated by social redistribution, yet further structural changes must be made if the ultimate goals of the World People's Agreement are to be met. Evo has made strides toward climate justice, but his government remains virtually handcuffed by a history of extractivism that has proven to be inextricably tied to Bolivia's economic success. More worrisome still, the practices of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF have not proven to be conducive to the goals of climate justice. Even as the failures of SAPs in Bolivia became overwhelmingly evident, the rhetoric of the entities employing those strategies has not been satisfactorily reconfigured. Peet argues that new attempts at structural intervention by the IMF and the World Bank "have simply repackaged the structural adjustment policies of the past into the new poverty reduction programs," thereby maintaining a neoliberal hegemony that continues to disadvantage developing countries (2009, 100).

Climate Vulnerability

Climate vulnerability is an important concept to understand moving forward. Vulnerability is created through myriad avenues, and is generally context specific. In the case of Bolivia, climate vulnerability can be best understood through a synthesis of impending climate changes and historic oppressions that come together to create hierarchies of vulnerability delineated by respective abilities to insulate from damaging climate changes. Those with lower vulnerabilities are those that have the means to evade threatening climatic factors, while those with higher vulnerability are less able to extricate themselves from precarious climate situations. In their 2004 book entitled "At Risk," authors Ben Wisner, Piers Blaike, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis argue that vulnerability is not a matter of arbitrary environmental circumstance, but rather a direct product of "social, political and economic environments" that accentuate risk factors (Wisner et al 2004, 4). Thus, natural disasters emanating from anthropogenic climate change are not in fact "natural," but are rather reflective of pre-existing vulnerability. Natural hazards exist, but their ability to exert societal damage is dependent on the resilience of any given community.

Author Junot Diaz uses the 2010 earthquake in Haiti to exemplify this point. Diaz refers to the massive earthquake as true "apocalypse" from the perspective of the Haitian citizenry. He then presents an etymological argument drawing from the Greek word "*apocalypsis,* meaning to uncover or unveil," using this foundation to assert that "'[disasters] expose the underlying power structures, the injustices, the patterns of corruption and the unacknowledged inequalities"' present in any given society (Diaz 2011, 1). Disasters thus expose facets of society that are otherwise masked by the veil of

normality, showing in stark terms the extent to which communities can adapt to and recover from natural hazards. In the case of Haiti, 250,000 people were killed and 1 million left homeless from the 1 minute long quake (Diaz 2011, 1). Though an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale would be devastating anywhere, Haiti was particularly ravaged due to the country's historic impoverishment and lack of infrastructure. In 2009, Haiti's per capita annual income was 1,045 USD, ranking 179th of 192 nations (IMF 2018). Systemic economic suppression combined with natural hazards make for a vulnerable society with little adaptive capacity. In the face of continually accelerating climate changes, those countries that do not have the resources to defend against natural hazards will inevitably face disproportionate climate effects.

Bolivia is deemed highly vulnerable to climate change for a number of factors. A history of oppression, particularly amongst the indigenous people that constitute 62 percent of the country's population, has led to unfavorable conditions for millions of Bolivians. An overview of poverty statistics prior to Evo's election lends insights into the conditions faced by Bolivians following neoliberal reform and points to the inequality derived from centuries of discriminatory practices. Björn-Sören Gigler's 2009 study through the Georgetown University Center for Latin American Studies provides crucial data relating to indigenous inequality in the early 21st century. The study includes only data collected prior to 2005, which will lay a foundation upon which to assess Evo's reforms. Before Morales assumed the presidency in 2005, 60 percent of the total population lived below the poverty line and 38 percent were determined to be extremely impoverished (Postero 2017, 99). Statistics show that poverty in Bolivia is categorically associated with race, with 73.5 percent of indigenous Bolivians living below the poverty

line in 2002 as opposed to less than 50 percent of non-indigenous people (Gigler 2009, 7-8). A geographical analysis of population centers situates such statistics within a more holistic context. In 2002, 78 percent of rural Bolivia was constituted of indigenous communities, while 66 percent of cities were composed of mestizo and criollo residents (Gigler 2009, 6). Unsurprisingly, the poverty discrepancy was even more substantial in rural areas, where 83 percent of communities were impoverished and 67 percent of residents lived in extreme poverty, contrasted to respective rates of 54 and 26 percent in urban areas (Gigler 2009, 8). The following figure shows the distinct correlation between indigenous populations and poverty, and also lends insight into the distribution of indigenous peoples throughout Bolivia.



Figure 3: Bolivia according to indigenous population density (left) and rates of poverty (right) (Gigler, 6,9).

As can be seen in *Figure 3*, the areas with the highest rates of extreme poverty are strongly correlated with the highest proportion of indigenous residency. The highlands,

where 42 percent of Bolivia's population lives, has a poverty incidence of 70 percent, followed by the valleys with an incidence of 69 percent, and finally by the plains with an incidence of 54 percent (Gigler 2009, 9). True to theme, the two departments with the highest rates of poverty, Potosi and Chuquisaca, also happen to be those with the highest percentage of indigenous residency (66 and 74 percent respectively), while those with the lowest rates of poverty, Santa Cruz and Tarija, have the lowest percentage of indigenous residency (32 and 16 percent respectively) (Gigler 2009, 9).

Perhaps as concerning as general poverty trends is the economic inequality that existed prior to Evo's presidency. Bolivia entered the 21st century with one of the highest rates of economic inequality in the world, with the bottom 20 percent of households holding a share of only 4 percent of the nation's income and the top 20 percent of the population holding a share of 62 percent of national income (Gigler 2009, 12). Yet again, race is heavily implicated in these statistics. As two-thirds of indigenous people fall within the lowest 50 percent of national earners, economic inequality exerts a disproportionate impact on indigenous people (Gigler 2009, 12-13). A 2000 study by Chiswick et al confirms this trend, finding that monolingual Spanish speakers in Bolivia earn 25 percent more than those who speak indigenous languages (Chiswick et al 2000). These statistics clearly show that while Bolivia is economically vulnerable in many aspects, indigenous Bolivians face the most vulnerability due to historical marginalization.

Climate vulnerability is exacerbated by climatic conditions that are highly susceptible to drastic changes given slight climate disruptions. In the coming chapter, we will see that Bolivia is situated in a precarious setting due to the nature of the country's

geography. A series of fragile habitats comprises a climate system within which over one-third of the labor force works in agriculture (Seiler et al 2012). The 2014 IPCC report entitled “Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability” notes that highland subsistence farming on the altiplano, where a majority of small-scale farmers are Aymara, will face some of the most disruptive climate pressures of any food production system in Central and South America due to increasing rates of desertification and water loss due to glacial melting (IPCC 2014, 32). This is especially concerning given high endemic poverty rates among indigenous groups in the altiplano, most of whom rely on subsistence farming for survival. Forty seven percent of Bolivia’s total agricultural GDP comes from small-scale farmers on the altiplano and surrounding valleys, while industrialized farming in the lowlands accounts for the remaining fifty three percent (Alcala 2010, 4). Agriculture is not the only industry that will be impacted, but it is one that provides crucial life support to rural communities that are highly indigenous.

The Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (NDGAI) created a climate change vulnerability index ranking all countries on earth in accordance with relative levels of vulnerability to climate change. Each country receives an ND-GAIN score, which is reflective of the quality of 6 life-supporting sectors: food, water, health, ecosystem service, human habitat, and infrastructure. The highest ranking as of 2017 came in at 76.1 (Norway), while the lowest ranking came in at 20.3 (Somalia) (NDGAI 2019). The study also divided countries into categories according to relative wealth, assigning each nation to either “low,” “lower middle,” “upper middle,” or “upper.” The correlation between wealth and vulnerability is stunning. The 27 least vulnerable nations are all classified as “upper” in terms of wealth, and the first “lower middle” classification does not come

until number 40. No “low” country cracks the top 82 least vulnerable nations, and none of the 28 most vulnerable countries exceed a “lower middle” classification (NDGAI 2019). These findings present strong evidence for the argument that vulnerability is not based solely on climatic factors, but is rather closely aligned with global economic inequality. Bolivia finds itself ranked 127th least vulnerable out of 181 countries with an ND-GAIN score of 40.3, while the United States comes in at 15th with less than 10 points removing it from first place (NDGAI 2019). These rankings show the extent to which income disparity plays a role in elevating vulnerability, with the wealthiest nations tending to find avenues by which to protect themselves from climate variation as the poorest nations struggle find resilience. Wisner et al note that vulnerability is compounded by exposure to environmental risk, but make the important distinction that disasters “are a complex mixture of natural hazards and human action” that link vulnerability to “broader patterns in society” (2004, 5). Disasters can be a major impediment to development and often are compounded by repeated shocks that would not generally affect more insulated societies. Ultimately, vulnerability is constructed through human mechanisms that elevate risks for people with less access to resources.

In the coming chapters, we will see the ways in which the Morales administration has addressed systemic inequality stemming from racial prejudice. His efforts at poverty reduction and the alleviation of income inequality have advanced indigenous equality in Bolivia, and in doing so, have curtailed vulnerabilities associated with social disparities. I will also work to explicate the relationship between the United States and Bolivia by exploring the ways in which vulnerability affects climate solution strategies, showing that

economically insulated nations do not have the same incentive to seek climate change resolution.

As climate change escalates, it becomes more and more evident that the impacts are disproportionately affecting those that have the least financial and social mobility, and that global inequality serves only to exacerbate climate effects. Subaltern voices have become more prominent on a global stage, and in Bolivia, a beacon of indigenous resistance, these voices are demanding climate justice. What remains to be seen is the extent to which international structures can serve to amplify climate justice initiatives, or the extent to which those systems continue to impede upward mobilization and resultant climate resilience. This requires an overview of the international sphere and the countries and institutions that most influence climate discussions. Have multilateral lending institutions learned from their past mistakes in development, or are similar approaches being taken despite a rocky history? How has Evo sought to reduce vulnerability in Bolivia? What role does Bolivia play in advancing climate justice? What barriers does Bolivia continue to face in its climate related endeavors? Through a thorough analysis of the current practices of international organizations, combined with a critical review of Bolivia's climate-oriented initiatives, answers to these questions can be fashioned.

Chapter 2

Bolivian Colonial History and Climate Developments

Bolivia is a region imbued with indigenous history that extends far before the establishment of the contemporary nation state. That history is reflected in many aspects of Bolivian life today, and has been integral in shaping the sociopolitical dynamics at hand. Thus, it is important to interrogate the developments that have led to the current political context in Bolivia, with a particular focus on the colonial interactions that have shaped the country's political and economic systems. Bolivia's history is long and convoluted, and as such, a complete chronology will not be necessary to establish an adequate base from which to analyze current contexts. Rather, this chapter will identify key features and themes of Bolivian history that have influenced the contemporary state and its recent efforts toward climate justice. Additionally, I address climate change and the dangers it portends, with attention directed to the nuances of Bolivia's climate systems and the climate risks faced by Bolivian people. By establishing historical and climatic contexts for Bolivia, a better understanding of the contemporary Bolivian government and its climate justice platform can be fostered.

Pre-Colonial History

Bolivia presents a peculiar geographical context that would not logically seem to be conducive to human settlement. Two-thirds of the country's land area is occupied by dense tropical rainforest that until recently has been largely inaccessible to humans due to its remote placement and lack of accessible land. The other one-third of the country is

taken up by the Andes Mountains, one of the most inhospitable mountain ranges on earth due to elevational factors.



Figure 4: A map of Bolivia according to climatic conditions (University of Texas Libraries 2019).

At first glance, Bolivia presents a major logistical challenge to the development of enduring human society, and yet people have resided in the region for millenia. In fact, Bolivia's prehistoric societies lay claim to some of the most revolutionary cultural and technological developments that had been seen up to that point in history. This baffling paradox is demystified by the presence of the Bolivian highlands, know by Spanish-speakers as the *altiplano.* The massive elliptical plain is situated between the Occidental and Cordillera branches of the Andes range, extending 500 miles southward from Lake Titicaca in northern Bolivia with an average elevation of 13,000 feet. Of the 50,000

square miles that constitute the altiplano, two-thirds resides within the borders of contemporary Bolivia (Klein 2011, 6). Human history in the region nucleated around the altiplano and its associated valley system. Here, the domestication of the staple products of Andean civilization took place, from potatoes and other root vegetables to quinoa to cameloid livestock. Though the land was arable, the elevation presented further challenges. Diurnal temperature changes of up to 100° Fahrenheit posed a significant barrier to humans and crops alike, but like all other adversarial elements in the region, this was overcome through stunning innovation that has allowed for the extensive lineage of indigenous culture in Bolivia (Forsberg Pers. Comm. 2018).

Around 800 B.C., the Chavin population brought unprecedented changes to the Andean region, establishing for the first time a common culture throughout the altiplano. During this time, the production of textiles, pottery, and rare metals proliferated, marking the start to an era of rapid urbanization and cultural advancement. It was during this period that the mineral wealth of the region was truly discovered, a feature that would ultimately lead to intensive colonial exploitation in years to come. By 100 A.D., the Chavin had disappeared, replaced by several disaggregated societies with distinct cultural practices (Klein 2011, 11). The more successful societies were located around Lake Titicaca, and used the massive water source strategically. The Tiwanaku were one such society, and their innovative capacity allowed them to spread across the altiplano, developing one of the most technologically advanced prehistoric societies in the world. They created monuments with stone blocks larger than the most recent Apollo spaceship, developed calendars and accurate astronomy models, identified cardinal directions and

built their structures in alignment with them, and devised agricultural systems that utilized the thermal capacity of water to protect their crops against nightly frosts.

Figure 5: A Tiwanaku calendar sculpture located at the Tiwanaku ruins just south of Lake Titicaca on the altiplano (Photo taken by the author).

Archeological studies of the Tiwanaku society serve both to illuminate the ways in which the altiplano has been utilized and to provide a case study for the progression of society in prehistoric Bolivia. Perhaps even more useful in terms of contemporary influence is the study of the Tiwanaku's decline. After a full millenium of productivity evidenced by effective agricultural techniques and impressive architecture, the Tiwanaku fell victim to climate change. A climate-induced interruption in the El Niño-La Niña cycle (see page 56) caused a century-long drought that effectively wiped out the entire population and reduced the water level in Lake Titicaca by several meters, as shown by late-Tiwanaku structures that were found below the water (Kolata 1993, 287). The shift in architecture from open, aesthetic structures to fortified utilitarian castles closer to the lake align with

Christian Parenti's theory of counterinsurgency presented in his acclaimed book *Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence.* In this work, Parenti acknowledges the potential of a new "Dark Ages" in which climate change drives violence induced by a scarcity of resources and volatile climatic conditions (Parenti 2011, 15). He predicts that those with pre-existing power and resources will move toward defensive tactics, which will then leave the disenfranchised to fight amongst themselves for what is left. The collapse of the Tiwanaku does not necessarily prove theories of counterinsurgency to be universally correct, but it does provide a tragic example of the effect climate disruption can have on an established agriculture-based civilization in the Andes mountains.

After the decline of the Tiwanaku around 1200 A.D., Aymara kingdoms arose across the altiplano. From the end of the 12th century until Spanish conquest in the 16th century, the Aymara dominated the highlands. Again, the most powerful states were centered around Lake Titicaca, and through aggressive tactics that mirror the final stages of Tiwanaku development, the Aymara asserted themselves as the premier civilization in the region. Their buildings were fortified and defensive, and they introduced more intensive cameloid herding practices as well as agricultural techniques still utilized today that incorporate verticality to ensure that respective crops grow most effectively in appropriate climates (see *Figure 7*). With the Aymara also came the first written history of Bolivia, which has allowed scholars to more accurately determine the practices and cultures that preceded Spanish invasion (Klein 2011, 15). The continuity of this oral and written history also supports the understanding of current indigenous practices, as the Aymara identity still constitutes a large portion of Bolivia's indigenous people. The

Aymara are also responsible for the conception of the *ayllu*- a familial social organization system with communal landholdings from which communal indigenous practices in Bolivia today are in part derived. The ayllu system aided in the creation of the "vertical integration of microecological systems" which was "based on the production of different crops and bound into a nonmarket economy through elaborate systems of kinship, exchange, and labor obligations" and "was fundamental in maintaining a powerful and economically vital society on the altiplano" (Klein 2011, 15). Vertically integrated agriculture and communal resource holdings continue to be integral facets of indigenous life in rural Bolivia, which is a testament to the efficacy of the practices and their endurance through centuries of colonialism.

During the 15th century, the Aymara kingdoms faced pressure from expansionist Quechua-speaking groups north of Lake Titicaca near Cuzco. By 1470, Aymara societies had lost much of their autonomy due to ineffective organization techniques derived from a history of inter-societal tensions on the altiplano. The Quechua-Cuzco groups, who became known as the Inca, quickly established themselves on the altiplano and subjected the Aymara groups to taxation. However, despite Inca occupation, the Aymara maintained their societal fabric, retaining cultural leaders and utilizing their consistent surpluses to pay tribute to the Incas. Aymara revolts against the Inca occurred throughout the end of the 15th century, but the Inca were ultimately successful in dominating the entirety of the altiplano, which became known as *Kollasuyo*- one of the four provinces the Inca inhabited (Klein 2011, 20). By the early 16th century, the Inca had established a series of roads, warehouses, and urban centers across the altiplano, and were well into the process of creating one of the most powerful non-European political entities in the world.

The conception of the ayllu was not lost within the Inca structure; in fact, a "mosaic of political structures, religions, and languages" existed within the Inca empire, which points to a structural system that was less domineering than it was inclusive (Klein 2011, 19). Further evidence to this point comes with the non-market mechanism by which goods and services were distributed. Klein notes that even the Spanish recognized a social and economic equality that emerged from such a process, with adequate compensation and rest given to workers despite the compulsory nature of the work. Ayllus, or kinship networks, established interfamilial access to multiple ecological zones, which in turn bolstered the durability of the Incas' agricultural system. The ayllu is a spiritual, economic, and labor system that "shares work obligations and redistributes a surplus among its constituent families according to an ideology of reciprocity" (Boelens et al 1998, 211). Such a structure was a key reason for the efficiency of the Incan social organization, and also played a major role in maintaining cultural norms, values, and practices throughout ensuing centuries of rapacious colonialism. By the time of the arrival of the Spanish in the mid-16th century, the Inca had 3 million people operating under their command, nearly half of the population of Spain at the time (Klein 2011, 22). With a massive organizational structure that rested primarily on the backs of taxable peasantry sitting atop vast mineral and land resources, the Spanish quickly realized that the altiplano was ripe for exploitation.

Colonial History

In the 16th century, Spain was one of the most powerful nations in the world. Its extensive control over much of the Americas combined with a strong Mediterranean trade

relationship facilitated by an expansive naval force placed Spain in an unparalleled position in terms of colonial potential. The altiplano and the complexly organized people that lived upon it became a primary target for resource exportation, as the structures established by the Inca could be repurposed to constitute a resource extraction machine that disproportionately benefited the Spanish overseas. Thus, the Spanish first engaged in an increased "Quechuanization" of the region, hoping to take advantage of the Inca's power in order to extort labor and taxation from the Inca constituency (Klein 2011, 18). Initially effective, Klein notes that while the Inca were known for their "administrative and organizational ability, so the genius of the Spaniards would ultimately reside in their ability to integrate the powerful European drive of private enterprise into the context of formal government structures" (Klein 2011, 25). However, as interactions with the Spanish continued, the relationship became untenable for indigenous Bolivians. The imposition of extractive systems left indigenous people with few choices: either supply goods to the Spanish market, sell labor for wages, or starve (Klein, 37). To make matters worse, European diseases began to decimate indigenous populations, further relegating indigenous people to lower rungs in the new colonial structure.

Increased extraction and the hardening of Spanish rule fomented anti-colonial sentiments that drove the formation of resistant groups throughout the Andean region. Much of this was attributable to the policies of Peruvian Viceroy Francisco Toledo who, from 1572-1576, was charged with standardizing a system of governance across Bolivia, then known as Upper Peru. Toledo increased mining productivity and entrenched Western development ideals in the organizational structure of Bolivia by explicitly orienting the focus of the Spanish to an export economy. In doing so, Toledo further

reduced the agency of Andean indigenous groups, utilizing them purely for their labor efficacy and knowledge of regional mineral deposits. In the period following Toledo, indigenous rebellions erupted throughout the region, most of them organized through ayllu structures that had persisted despite Spanish rule (Klein 2011, 37). With these rebellions began the legacy of indigenous resistance that has persisted to the present day.

Through the 1600s rare mineral mines were established throughout the Andean region that focused the labor of the indigenous population into specific economic centers, the two largest being in Potosi and Oruro. Spanish populations continued to grow throughout the 17th century, and the eastern lowland frontier was developed and expanded, encroaching on the territory of several disparate indigenous groups located within the rainforest. As metropolitan centers were established, the indigenous population was increasingly pauperized and forced into unsafe, unjust working conditions. A depression in the silver economy lasting from the late 17th century to the early 18th caused some internal conflict among Spaniards and led to a contraction in population of urban centers that had been established near major mining developments. As has generally been the case, indigenous populations experienced growth and decline inversely proportional to Spanish population trends. The corresponding growth of indigenous populations during the silver depression allowed for stronger forms of resistance, which manifested in indigenous rebellions that attempted to take advantage of the “civil wars” between Spaniards that were proliferating throughout the region (Klein 2011, 58). The resulting indigenous consolidation reinforced ayllu structures and allowed for the maintenance of traditional practices through the century-long silver depression. Indigenous coca production began to accelerate in the mountainous regions surrounding

La Paz, and indigenous people utilized resulting surpluses to trade with counterparts in the lowlands. Though full economic agency was never restored to indigenous groups, it is noteworthy that continued resistance to foreign rule and deeply entrenched practices and ayllu structures allowed for the persistence of indigenous cultures despite intensive colonization for many centuries.

Spain resolved economic difficulties in the late 18th century by granting the emerging metropolis of Buenos Aires control over resources extracted from Potosi. A more regional control allowed for renewed subjugation of indigenous laborers, yet simultaneously distanced Spain from its colonies. Rebellions at this time were common, though most were localized and oriented toward alleviation of regional taxes or unjust working conditions. It wasn't until the Tupac Amaru rebellion from 1780-1782 that a legitimate independence movement was started. The rebellion was multi-class and broad-reaching, and initiated a series of revolts that ultimately led to the founding of the Bolivian Republic in 1825 by renowned Venezuelan military leader Simon Bolivar (Klein 2011, 74).

Though Bolivia was now free from Spanish control, the country was by no means situated to achieve economic or social independence. The resource wealth that had been discovered in Bolivia compounded by the colonial extraction mechanisms that had been in place for hundreds of years invited continued exploitation from foreign entrepreneurs. Extractive relationships forged in the early colonial era have left residual trade practices that continue to disadvantage Bolivia in favor of investors abroad, a testament to the successive evolution of colonialism that persist through many centuries.

Post-Colonial History

Bolivia's independence from Spain did not equate to liberation for its indigenous people. The country's independence came about in 1825 under Bolivar, but the indigenous majority was virtually unaffected by the change in leadership. The Spanish were simply replaced by the criollo and mestizo elites that had played a hand in perpetuating class divisions throughout the colonial era. Indigenous people were largely viewed as subhuman and were treated as such. In fact, anti-Indian rhetoric was ramped up to the point where, in 1864, President Melgarejo pronounced "all Indian communities" extinct and proceeded to sell off large tracts of indigenous land to the highest bidder (Canessa 2012, 202). Directly following this action came the Republican Law of Communities (1866) and the Law of Disentailment (1874), which sought to quell ongoing indigenous rebellions and further disenfranchise the indigenous majority (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 35). Political instability has largely defined Bolivia's history since the inception of the independent nation, with the country holding the infamous world record for most coups d'etat since 1825 (an astonishing 150) (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 37). This tumultuous history features a series of governments led by criollo and mestizo military leaders, none of which allowed for the integration of indigenous people into national governance. Finally, after decades of political chaos, a revolution in 1952 thrust the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) into power and established Bolivia as a democratic nation. Voting rights were expanded to all Bolivian citizens over 21, which increased the electorate by five-fold. Though indigenous Bolivians were given the right to vote, they were also given the designated classification of *campesino*- or rural farmer. The creation of this social category appeased some persisting indigenous demands, but

simultaneously allowed the government to continue indigenous suppression by seeking to eliminate the "backwardness" associated with indigenous culture (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 48). By applying modernist theory adopted from Europe, the new government could effectively work toward the creation of a mestizo nation by eliminating indigenous identity. Despite continuous efforts to repress indigenous identities, indigenous people constitute nearly two-thirds of Bolivia's population. Today, 25 percent of Bolivia's indigenous population identifies as Aymara, compared to 31 percent Quechua. Lowland indigenous groups account for only 6.1 percent of country's total population, but are distributed between 32 indigenous groups with rich cultural histories (Gigler 2009, 5). In the coming chapters, we will see the ways in which continued indigenous activism prevented that from happening and enabled the installment of the first indigenous president.

Kohl and Farthing identify three thematic elements of Bolivia's history that are foundational facets of colonial legacies in South America. They are as follows: "the appropriation of the country's wealth by national and international elites, ongoing resistance by the indigenous majority and tensions between the region and centre" (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 34). That these elements are not unique to the Bolivian experience is shown by the widespread trends in colonial practices and points to the creation of the "Third World" through European imperialism, indicating that resulting social and economic issues that have arisen in those countries are generally attributable to outside systems and forces as opposed to internal mismanagement (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 34). Further, the statement highlights the major themes in Bolivia's history that have situated the country to lead a climate justice charge against the established Western order.

Climate Change in Bolivia

Bolivia presents a remarkably diverse climate composition that ranges from tropical rainforest to alpine grasslands (Seiler et al 2012). This diversity is due to two primary factors: the massive "flying river" emanating from the Amazon Rainforest and the climatic barrier posed by the towering Andes Mountains (Forsberg 2015). Surprisingly, the large majority of moisture found in Bolivia comes from the Atlantic Ocean due to prevailing easterly trade winds that traverse the continent. These winds, combined with the barrier presented by the Andes Mountains, prevent climatic interaction between the majority of Bolivia's land area and the Pacific. Often referred to as "the lungs of the planet," the Amazon Rainforest effectively pumps ocean moisture into the interior of the continent, with each of the 600 billion trees found in the massive forest acting as a "solar powered evaporation machine" (Forsberg 2015). The larger trees can release up to 1000 liters of water per day as vapor, and the prevailing winds channel this vapor into literal flying rivers that deliver up to 20 billions tons of water daily to the interior of the continent (Forsberg 2015). This remarkable process allows the lowlands of Bolivia to be one of the rainiest regions on the continent and provides the highlands with the capacity to support massive reservoirs of water in glaciers and the impressive Lake Titicaca. That the driest desert in the world, the Atacama, resides just west of the Andes is a testament both to the enormity of the Andes and the shocking climatic diversity present in the region (Forsberg Pers. Comm. 2017).

Climate change is perhaps most disruptive in regards to climate systems, which generally depend upon consistent conditions throughout a broad region. One such system

that is of particular importance to Bolivia is the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a Pacific climate pattern with El Niño representing the warm phase and La Niña representing the cool phase. The ENSO system is largely responsible for determining the amount of rainfall Bolivia receives. Though precipitation in the Andes comes from the Atlantic, wind patterns over the Pacific caused by fluctuating water temperatures determine the extent to which easterly trade winds over the Amazon can effectively deliver moisture to the Bolivian highlands. During the El Niño phase, warm westerly winds counteract the effect of the easterly trade winds, leading to drought in the altiplano and surrounding regions (Vuille 2013, 1-2). It is thought that an interruption in the ENSO cycle is largely responsible for the collapse of the Tiwanaku in the 11th century, when a devastating 100 year drought disbanded the prehistoric civilization. Increasing global temperatures pose a serious risk to the maintenance of ENSO climate patterns, which are dependent upon temperature-driven oceanic circulation. Breaking this circulation system would lead to unpredictability in weather patterns and potential for prolonged drought, which could severely reduce the habitability of the altiplano.

Beyond their capacity as a pure wall of stone, the Andes serve as a compact model for various latitudinal global climates. Elevation can serve as a proxy for latitude, as each unit of elevation gain produces climatic changes equivalent to those experienced if one were to travel toward either pole from the equator. This concept is made clear through *Figure 6.*



Figure 6: Depicting the climatological relationship between altitude and latitude (Forsberg 2017).

Thus, though Bolivia is one of the smaller countries in South America, it contains nearly every fathomable climate found on earth. Indigenous people in Bolivia have long known this to be true, and have adapted their agricultural practices to ensure that various crops are growing in their most compatible climates. *Figure 7* presents a model of vegetation according to elevation.

While elevational climate differences have been effectively utilized to establish vertically integrated agriculture schemes, climate volatility has the potential to substantially disrupt agriculture in the highlands. Microclimates can be differentiated by a matter of feet in the Andes, as climates transition rapidly according to elevation. While many miles may separate latitudinal climatic environments, elevational climate changes in the Andes occur in rapid succession. As such, temperature increases will shift ecological zones that have been present for millennia in Bolivia, presenting a formidable

risk to Bolivia's highland farmers and the people and economies that depend upon their production.



Figure 7: Showing the crops that grow most appropriately at respective elevations throughout the Andes (Sklenář 2006).

Bolivia's myriad climates depend upon several natural systems that are in dire risk of fracture due to projected climate changes. While Bolivia serves as an exemplary model for global climate processes, its intricate environment has the potential to be devastated by rising temperatures and volatile climate conditions. Scientists M.B. Bush, J. A. Hanselman and W. D . Gosling indicate that even a 1-2°C rise in temperature, which the IPCC has deemed very likely, would be enough to turn the altiplano from a productive grassland to an infertile highland desert (2010, 3223; IPCC 2018). To make matters worse, given a 4°C increase in global temperatures, which the IPCC has identified as the low end of a "business as usual" scenario by 2100, the altiplano would

experience regional temperature changes of 7-10°C, which would fundamentally and irreversibly alter the ecological components of the landscape (Hoffmann and Requena 2012; IPCC 2018). With over ⅓ of Bolivia's labor force working in the agricultural sector, the country has been identified as extremely vulnerable to climate change (Seiler et al 2012). Even now, Bolivians are feeling the effects of a warming world. The Chacaltaya glacier, once known for hosting the highest ski resort in the world, completely disappeared in 2009. Fully half of the surface area of the 376 glaciers found throughout the Cordillera Real range has disappeared since 1975, and rates of decline are rapidly increasing. These worrying statistics are compounded by the fact that glaciers play a key role in buffering against precipitation changes, as they contribute to groundwater baseflow through annual melting. Without any safeguard against inevitable precipitation variance, Bolivia may quickly be facing an agricultural crisis (Vuille 2013, 5-6).

The most recent IPCC report paints a dismal scene for the future of the planet if drastic changes aren't made soon. Scientists have asserted that global warming has reached between 0.8-1.2°C, and state that "rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society" must be pursued if we are to stay under the 1.5°C threshold (IPCC 2018). If this is true, it seems inevitable that Bolivia's highlands will experience massive ecological changes at a rate that will be difficult to manage without proper resources. Bolivia's most vulnerable, particularly those in the agricultural sector, are at extreme risk in the coming years. Already, indigenous farmers are reporting difficulties in maintaining traditional weather forecasting practices due to increased climate variability, and have suffered massive losses in crops due to unpredictable climatic conditions (DeAngelis 2013). Water sources for La Paz and other highland cities are rapidly

diminishing as glaciers lose volume, lowland agricultural regions such as Chapare are experiencing irregular flooding, and continued deforestation in the Amazon is contributing to the fracture of Bolivian climate cycles (DeAngelis 2013). In fact, as Bolivia is not a high-emitting country, 80 percent of Bolivia's carbon emissions are attributable to deforestation of the rainforest, which serves as a massive carbon sink for the region (Forsberg 2015). In this time of climate crisis, Bolivians will need to fortify their livelihoods if they are to survive impending disaster.

The IPCC's 2014 report shows that highland Bolivia, a region demographically dominated by indigenous, small-scale farmers, will be one of the most impacted food-producing regions in all of Central and South America due to climate pressures (IPCC 2014, 46). The report goes on to note that the resilience of the region has been further reduced by market integration of smallholder indigenous farmers, as such practices have proven to impact the ability of indigenous farmers to orient their objectives toward sustenance over commodification (IPCC 2014, 634). The precariousness of Bolivia's climate systems threatens even larger impacts within the coming decades if a "business as usual" trajectory continues to be taken. These impacts will disproportionately affect populations with less financial and material resources, which in Bolivia tend to be indigenous communities due to a history of colonial-induced marginalization.

I have now established a foundation from which an analysis of contemporary Bolivian politics and its convergence with international systems can be built. While much of the information presented in this chapter has been synoptic, it is imperative that historical themes, trends, and events be used to construct a supportive framework for

contemporary analysis in order that current events are not misattributed to unrelated factors. Further, the structures upon which Bolivia's political and economic systems rest did not arise from a vacuum, but rather were generated through distinct historical processes that, in large part, involved the subjugation of indigenous peoples and cultures by Western entities. This economic, political, and social oppression has created a vulnerability that will only be exacerbated by the climate changes projected by climate scientists. The origin of the climate crisis is not a subject of this thesis, but the pressing reality that effective solutions have yet to be implemented must be addressed. Going forward, I will use global climate science and Bolivia's history to inform a discussion of climate justice and the continued tensions between the policy approaches of Bolivia and the Western world.

Chapter 3

Regional Trends and Domestic Policies in Bolivia

We have seen that Bolivia has been subjected to numerous difficulties throughout its beleaguered past. We have also seen that Bolivia's recent efforts toward cultural and economic independence are monumental, as in many ways they represent the culmination of centuries of indigenous resistance in the face of global powers. What has yet to be seen, however, is the effect of ongoing neocolonial practices and the extent to which Bolivia's current administration has advanced the aims of climate justice. In the coming chapter, I will investigate thematic elements of neocolonialism in the past century and use that historicity to inform an analysis of contemporary Bolivian practices. Through this lens, I can investigate Bolivia's new administration and contrast their stated objectives with their actual policy measures. I hope to highlight the international and domestic influences that have shaped the actions of the current Bolivian administration, and in doing so, establish a foundation for a discussion about the relevant barriers to climate justice in the following chapter.

The US Rise To Power Following WWII

In order to gain a better understanding of the global economy, it is helpful to trace the lineage of major historic events that have led to contemporary political configurations. Richard Peet identifies the advent of globalization- "an intense interchange of people, ideas, capital, and technology across international space"- as occurring during the Pax Britannica, which extended approximately from 1875 to 1914 (2009, 37). During this time, European economics and political ideals dominated the

international scene. Such ideals were imposed upon the non-industrialized world and entrenched through imperial networks that allowed world trade to rise by an average of 34 percent in each of the five decades preceding WWI (Peet 2009, 37). The first World War shattered British superiority and gave way to an inter-war period that saw the first inklings of international economic cooperation amongst developed countries. Banks rather than governments began dictating international economic affairs, and Wall Street became an international economic hub. The Great Depression then tanked the global economy, and World War II would yet again alter the status quo (Peet 2009, 39).

WWII was a shattering event for the global order. A mere two decades after World War I, a war that left nearly 20 million European soldiers and civilians dead, WWII deepened wounds and further weakened a European-led world order (Mougel 2011). Unsurprisingly, Latin American nations were not involved in the conflict, but the resulting shift in global power dynamics would have resounding effects on policy implementation in the Global South. The United States emerged from isolationism to become a leading world power following WWII, and that rise was marked by the creation of two key institutions that would shape the international landscape thenceforth: the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions were created at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944, a meeting of 44 nations that aimed to create a framework for post-war peace (Peet 2009, 36). The meeting was led by the USA and the UK, both of which had a vested interest in structuring the new global economy. The intent of Bretton Woods was to induce widespread peace through international economic cooperation based on a world market that would be regulated by global institutions that incorporated input from all member states. Three institutions were envisaged by the conference: the

IMF, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Trade Organization (ITO). The IBRD would later become a facet of the World Bank, and the ITO would become the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before eventually transitioning to the WTO in 1995 (Peet 2009, 36).

Peet's most compelling contribution is his discussion of the non-democratic means by which global governance institutions were founded and the equally non-democratic way in which they are now run. At the time of the Bretton Woods Conference, the United States was expanding into a power gap abandoned by European states suffering from the aftermath of WWII. The US economy had not fared as poorly during the war as those in Europe, and its separate sphere of influence in the Western hemisphere allowed the country to step into a position of international leadership (Peet 2009, 46). Economist Joan Spero bolsters Peet's argument, noting that the United States viewed its failure in leadership as a primary cause of world war, and sought to establish itself as a global hegemon in order to ensure peace through liberal economic mechanisms (Spero 2013). The United States and the United Kingdom, then the two world's leading political and economic powers, drew up a plan for global economic management through "bilateral negotiation" (Spero 2013). Thus, decision making power was concentrated in the hands of a small number of powerful states that were not challenged by countries that came to be considered "third world" after WWII. Instead, those countries, including most of African and Latin America, were "fully integrated into a world economy they neither managed nor controlled" (Peet 2009, 47). Mid-20th century academic Michael Heilperin, a vociferous supporter of US economic policy who called the United States' ascension to the world's leading economic powers "one of the greatest epics of all times," agrees that

the successes of the Bretton Woods Conference in creating a new world order were largely due to the exclusion of most global states and the centralization of decision making in the hands of the powerful (Heilperin 1952, 213). Resultant voting shares in the institutions created reflect the imbalances present at their inception, as voting power is determined by economic shares. While this may seem to be an equitable means of distribution, it directly favors the nations that have the most economic power. As we have seen, those nations are those that have long benefited from colonial enterprise in the Global South.



Figure 8: The Brandt Line developed in the 1980s compared to countries making less than US $10,700 per capita annually. Recent industrialization has made exceptions to the rule, but the economic divide between the Global North and Global South remains apparent (Royal Geographic Society 2017).

The Global North-Global South divide was made clear in the 1980's through the creation of the Brandt Line, which delineated the boundary between more and less developed countries. *Figure 8* shows the clear boundary that exists, with colonial powers Europe and North America sitting atop formerly colonized nations in terms of wealth and

geography. Today, the boundary is less easily defined, but it is still apparent that an imbalance exists that favors the Global North. Such an imbalance is reflected in the operations of global governance institutions, which disproportionately serve the will of powerful states in the north.

The United States and Europe continue to dominate control of the IMF and the World Bank. Governance is based on economic shares, which means that large states have the most influence over international decisions in the Western order. Though the United States' voting share in the IMF is down from 30 percent to 17, the US continues to exert deciding power. Because 85 percent consensus is needed to decide an action, a no vote from the US effectively nullifies any given IMF initiative (Ikenberry 2008, 33). Ann-Louise Colgan writes that "the World Bank and the IMF were important instruments of Western powers during the Cold War in both economic and political terms," citing their promotion of "an economic agenda that sought to preserve Western dominance in the global economy" (Colgan 2002). The control of the organizations substantiates Colgan's claims of Western dominance. As of 2002, as revolution raged in Bolivia, the Group of 7 (US, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan) held over 40 percent of the votes on both institutions' Board of Directors. The US alone held 16.45 percent of vote shares for the World Bank, and 17 percent of vote shares for the IMF (Colgan 2002). Those numbers have not changed substantially to this day, with the United States holding 15.98 percent of vote shares in the World Bank as compared to Bolivia's 0.14 percent (World Bank 2019). The discrepancies are even more drastic in the IMF, where the United States now represents 16.52 percent of total voting power while Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Peru, Chile and Bolivia combine at 1.59 percent (IMF 2019).

Bolivia is not the only place that has experienced adverse effects from economic policies enacted by the World Bank and IMF. A study by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) following the implementation of SAPs in Argentina found that the IMF was consistently wrong in its forecasting of growth given prescription to IMF policies. So egregious were the miscalculations, authors Rosnick and Weisbrot concluded that "the IMF's large and repeated errors in projecting GDP growth in Argentina since 1999 strongly suggest that these errors were politically driven" (Rosnick and Weisbrot 2007, 2). What's more, despite the IMF's alleged commitment to poverty reduction, the countries that face the worst levels of poverty have not benefited from IMF initiatives. In 1996, the IMF launched its Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) program that sought to confront debt problems faced by the world's poorest countries in order that they may reallocate funds to supporting their populations. However, the 41 countries that the IMF categorized as HIPCs saw no change in the trajectory of increasing indebtedness, with total debt amongst the HIPCs rising from 60 billion dollars in 1980, to 105 billion in 1985, to 190 billion in 1990, and eventually 205 billion in 2000 (Peet 2009, 109). Such a poor track record leaves little faith in future endeavors, particularly when compounded by WTO policies that have served as lubricant for continued repression of poor countries through liberal market mechanisms.

The WTO was the central antagonist in the global justice movements that paralleled Bolivia's push for decolonization and indigenous representation. Founded in 1995, the WTO became a more formal, institutionalized version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that had been modeled from the ITO established at Bretton Woods. GATT was designed to reduce barriers to trade by

liberalizing markets and reducing tariffs, thus making it easier for the market to control the flow of goods and services. Peet writes that the USA "wanted an organization that would free up trade in the specific interest of large, exporting corporations, but with a market-oriented, deregulated international economy more generally in mind" (Peet 2009, 180). The organization began to flounder in the 1970's following a global market recession, but was re-energized through the neoliberal reforms implemented in the 1980s. A global push for neoliberalism, facilitated by the United States through the IMF and the World Bank, called for a more powerful trade organization that would allow for the deregulation called for by the Washington Consensus. Thus, in 1995, GATT was strengthened and formalized to become the WTO. Though the WTO employs a more equitable one country one vote leadership system, Peet notes that such a vote has never in fact been take. Rather, decisions are made by consensus, and the United States has made sure to influence that process by passing a Congressional stipulation that mandates US departure from the WTO if three or more decisions are made against US interest within a calendar year (Peet 2009, 190).

Sociology professor Jackie Smith writes that many WTO deliberations in its early years were decided behind closed doors in the "Green Room" amongst what was then termed "the Quad"- a coalition comprising the US, the European Union, Canada, and Japan. These Western states pushed their agenda in these deliberations and then came forth with proposals for the rest of the member states, many of which were enforced through "secret agreements" made to countries that were "most vulnerable to pressure from the powerful quad states" (Smith 2001, 3). The WTO is designed to be a "neutral" institution, but the global justice movement made clear that the institution serves the

interests of the wealthy few at the expense of the rest. In 1999, 30,000 protestors were met with tear gas and rubber bullets in Seattle outside of the venue welcoming 5,000 attendees of the WTO's Third Ministerial Conference, marking the largest of 3 consecutive protests against WTO annual conferences (Smith 2003, 1). Following the protest, Jerry Mander and 60 other academics and economists at the International Forum on Globalization put forth a document outlining the argument against the WTO. The key points include that "the WTO has presided over the greatest transfer in history of real economic and political power from nation-states to global corporations," that the "WTO has come to rival the IMF as one of the most powerful, secretive, anti-democratic bodies and threatens to soon become the world's first bona fide, unelected global government," that the "tribunals have consistently ruled against the environment and the interests of Southern, undeveloped nations," and finally that the "goal of the WTO is to expand the freedoms of corporations to act beyond the reach of any national regulations and to diminish the rights of national governments to regulate commerce on behalf of human beings or nature" (Peet 2009, 236-237). The simultaneity of the WTO protests, the global justice movement, Bolivia's push for economic independence, and Latin America's rejection of neoliberalism indicates a broader system of Northern exceptionalism that does not work for the majority of global citizens.

International affairs specialist John Ikenberry is particularly reverent of the United States' initiation of the Western order following WWII. He lauds the US for implementing a global capitalist system with low barriers to entrance and potentially high benefits accrued through market mechanisms. He writes that the US "did not simply establish itself as the leading world power after World War II," but "led the creation of

universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together" (Ikenberry 2008, 24). Historically unique, the rules and institutions of the US led Western order "are rooted in, and thus reinforced by, the evolving global forces of democracy and capitalism" (Ikenberry 2008, 28). Initiatives jump started at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 opened borders, freed trade, and allowed for the entrance of many up and coming states. Ultimately, Ikenberry posits, "the road to global power… runs through the Western order and its multilateral economic institutions" (2008, 32). With a 2014 GDP of 17 trillion dollars, the United States now represents over 20 percent of the entire global economy, a testament to the degree to which the US has asserted itself as a global power (World Development Indicators 2014).

This is all well and good for countries with the means to effectively engage in a global capitalist market- namely those, such as China, with burgeoning industry and hegemonic ambitions. For countries with deeply entrenched legacies of extractive colonialism, the Western order is not so appealing. Even Ikenberry concedes that an international order dominated by a powerful state "is based on a mix of coercion and consent," a mixture that inevitably disadvantages those with less pre-existing leverage (2008, 28). For Bolivia, a country that has been systematically exploited for natural resources for upwards of 500 years, engagement with the Western order is both obligatory and sapping. Historically the poorest nation in South America, Bolivia suffers from a resource curse that capitalizes on centuries of resource extraction facilitated by disparities in Bolivia's power relative to colonial states. Failures to eradicate poverty in Bolivia prior to the current administration indicate that international efforts have not in

fact been intended to aid the country, but rather to preserve its status as a virtual milk-cow for the Western world. The lineage of United States intervention in Latin America is not one of reciprocity, but one of bullying and opportunism.

Beyond maintaining the pathways of dependency and oppression between the Global North and Global South, global governance institutions have been some of the key contributors to industries that have created the climate change crisis. The World Bank currently lends 1 billion dollars annually to oil and gas projects in developing countries, a larger sum than the Bank's allocated 993 million dollars toward climate change solutions (Elliot 2017; World Bank: Data 2018). One to two percent of the World Bank's 280 billion dollar portfolio is accounted for by oil and gas projects, which is a substantial sum for such an influential body (Elliot 2017). The World Bank's practices stand in stark contrast to Bolivia's trajectory under Evo. As the Morales administration organized the World People's Conference in 2010, World Bank annual fossil fuel investments were on the rise from 1.6 billion dollars in 2007 to 6.3 billion dollars in 2010 (Bond 2012, 24). That same year, the Bank issued its largest ever project loan to the Medupi coal-fired power plant in South Africa, providing the fourth largest coal plant in the world 3.75 billion dollars (Bond 2012, 147-148). While lending for fossil fuel projects has decreased in recent years, the Bank's history does not inspire confidence in its ability to facilitate climate change initiatives. The organization recently announced that it would desist financing of upstream oil and gas after 2019, but the extent to which this commitment represents structural change is in question (Elliot 2017).

Friends of the Earth, an international environmental organization, released a statement on the results of COP16 in Cancun, which they contend "reflects the same

negative outcome of the Copenhagen Accord in December, 2009" (Friends of the Earth 2010). The same statement highlighted a sentiment issued by Grace Garcia, a representative of Friends of the Earth Costa Rica, who was quoted as saying "only a gang of lunatics would think it is a good idea to invite the World Bank to receive climate funds, with their long-standing track-record of financing the world's dirtiest projects and imposition of death-sentencing conditionalities on our peoples" (Friends of the Earth 2010). The Bolivian team at the Cancun COP, led by representative Pablo Solon, were similarly disenchanted by the conference, and released a statement marking eight key problems arising from the international meeting. One of these concerns was that the World Bank was made the trustee of the newly established Green Climate Fund, a move that has been "strongly opposed by many civil society groups due to the undemocratic makeup of the Bank and its poor environmental record" (Buxton 2010). Ultimately, the triad of global governance institutions have long served as operatives for the United States policy interests, and in the age of climate change, those interests appear to be oriented toward the maintenance of the Western order.

Kohl and Farthing are not hesitant to assert that in Bolivia the "legacy of colonialism has created one of the most extreme cases of economic dependency in Latin America," and it is clear that such dependencies are fostered by the US through neocolonial mechanisms (Kohl and Farthing 2006, 34). We have seen that global governance institutions formulated by the United States continue to disproportionately advantage the US in international affairs, but the reach of the Western hegemon extends beyond institutional methods. In the coming section, I will show the ways in which the

United States has historically exerted influence in Latin America in order to keep extraction arteries open and pulsing.

Regional Neocolonial Trends

Bolivia is not the only Latin American nation that has been subjected to contemporary resource exploitation along pathways initially created through intensive colonialism. Rather, trade relationships in Latin America have been shaped by international interests that have been most predominantly influenced in the past century by the United States' endeavors toward hemispheric hegemony. Interestingly, the United States' efforts toward regional hegemony coincide with Latin American independence movements that erupted throughout the first half of the 19th century. The lineage of US foreign policy toward Latin America nucleates around the Monroe Doctrine, a proclamation issued by the US government in 1823 (two years prior to Bolivia's independence) that requested European nations desist further colonization or recolonization in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine was fortified in the early 20th century by the Roosevelt Corollary, a document produced by the Roosevelt administration that threatened the implementation of military force in Latin America in an "exercise [of] international police power" in "'flagrant cases of such wrongdoings or impotence'" (Roosevelt 1905). The wrongdoings and impotence Roosevelt referred to consisted of any failure by Latin American nations to fulfill their obligations to international creditors, but such wrongdoings were assessed liberally, and the Corollary was ultimately used as justification for subsequent intervention in Caribbean nations through the late 1920s (Office of the Historian 2019).

As military dictatorships and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes vied for political control in the mid-20th century, the United States pressed to maintain oversight of Latin America. Under the veil of pro-democracy and stability campaigns, the US sought to quell leftist uprising and prevent the spread of communism emanating from revolutionary Cuba. Director of US State Department Policy Planning staff George Kennan, known for his communist containment policies during the Cold War, articulated the aims of the United States in Latin America in direct terms. In his influential work entitled *The Year 501,* Noam Chomsky refers to Kennan as "clear-sighted," citing his explicitly stated directive of '"protection of our raw materials"' in reference to US objectives in South America (1993, 46). The use of the word "our" in Kennan's statement implies US ownership of Latin American resources and confirms thematic elements of manifest destiny that permeate the history of US policy positions toward the Global South. Kennan doubled down on this position when, in 1948, he asserted through the US Department Policy Planning staff that '"we should cease to to talk about vague and...unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization,'" choosing instead to focus on attempts to "maintain the 'position of disparity' that separates our enormous wealth from the poverty of others' (Chomsky 1993, 46). Not only did this clear aim underscore sentiments of American superiority, it also starkly illuminated the objectified role Latin America played in the eyes of United States diplomats.

The US built upon their hemispheric hegemony in the 1970s through Operation Condor, a "covert inter-American program of political repression" that enacted the will of the United States through unsavory methods such as torture, assassination, and kidnapping (McSherry 2005, 28). Though the United States has never been publicly

linked to Condor operations, there is overwhelming evidence pointing toward not only their involvement, but their leadership. The 1959 Cuban Revolution spurred the implementation of widespread covert military operations that sought to undermine communist-inspired subversion. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents from that era are heavily classified, but the information that has reached the public confirms that the United States saw Condor as a legitimate "counterterrorism" effort (McSherry 2005, 28). It is evident that the United States worked to create military intelligence units and train them in "psychological warfare, guerilla tactics, interrogation," and other mechanisms of subversion (McSherry 2005, 29). Interestingly, the US took tips from the French, who used similar tactics in their attempts to extinguish anti-colonial efforts in Algeria and Vietnam (McSherry 2005, 30). That colonial methods of oppression were emulated by the United States should come as no surprise; the US may not have had a hand in the earliest endeavors of Latin American colonialism, but their actions following independence movements in the region are neocolonial in nature, as they have built upon a foundation laid by European conquest.

Operation Condor affected many countries in Latin America, and Bolivia was no exception. The most notable blow to the country was the assassination of former nationalist president Juan Jose Torres in 1976, 5 years after his departure from office. Torres was targeted due to his socialist views and his adoption of leftist policies that attempted to nationalize industry and extricate Bolivia from a pattern of foreign exploitation. Condor targeted less prominent figures as well, holding hundreds of Bolivians in Orletti Motors, a torture facility that was designed to extract information about leftist movements from suspected South American operatives (McSherry 2005, 37).

Ultimately, Operation Condor served to ensure that the countries that offered the most natural resources remained free from the clutches of leftist movements that would internalize economies and prevent access to raw materials.

As Condor wreaked havoc throughout South America, the United States began developing a plan to guide developing countries out of economic instability. The plan rested on modernization theory- the notion that all countries must progress through a process of development that mirrors Europe's progression from feudalism to capitalism (Rostow 1959). Modernization theory holds that poverty and underdevelopment can be attributed to social values, and as such, tradition is something to be overcome rather than integrated (Hellinger 2015, 157). Thus, underdevelopment is something that has characterized all societies at some point in time, and the answer to that underdevelopment is the implementation of market-based solutions that will elevate countries to a position of material wealth that can then be used to raise living standards. The manifestation of this theory as it pertains to South America was the Washington Consensus, an effort by the United States to liberalize markets and drive down inflation rates. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the World Bank and the IMF were used to implement austerity measures that coercively subscribed Latin American countries to policies that aligned with the aims of the Washington Consensus. However, influence of the United States in the implementation of neoliberal policies in Latin America extends beyond the employment of global governance institutions. Milton Friedman, professor at the University of Chicago and a forefather of neoliberalism, taught a group of Chilean students that would become known as the "Chicago Boys." The Chicago boys played a key role in supporting the military coup that implemented a right-wing militaristic government in Chile, and

immediately implemented neoliberal policies following the overthrow of President Allende in 1973 (Letelier 1976). The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence confirmed that the US provided financial backing for the coup, and had tasked the Chicago Boys with creating a 300-page economic blueprint for the coup just prior to the overthrow (Letelier 1976). Milton Friedman actually made multiple visits to Chile in order to oversee the implementation of the neoliberal reforms that he called "shock treatment" for the Chilean economy, and was quoted as saying the approach was "the only medicine. Absolutely. There is no other. There is no other long-term solution" (Letelier 1976). The reforms implemented in Chile would then be transcribed onto economies throughout Latin America, directly following Friedman's ideals.

Predictably, Bolivia was not the only country that rebuked the ineffective neoliberal policies. In fact, resistance to neoliberalism resulted in an aggregate phenomenon called the "Pink Tide," marked by the election of Chávez in Venezuela in 1998, around the time that the water wars erupted in Bolivia (Hellinger 2015, 23). The simultaneity of these events and the common experiences of the South American nations provide further evidence of a broader system of outside influences that similarly affected the region, pointing to the machinations of colonialism and resulting neocolonial practices.

The historical trajectory of US policy positions toward Latin America is clearly defined by persistent efforts to maintain regional hegemony and the material benefits that come from economic control over a resource-wealthy region. From the Monroe Doctrine to the Roosevelt Corollary to Kennan's severe containment policies to Operation Condor to the neoliberal era, the United States has pushed to ensure that extractive processes and

pathways created by colonialism continue to be exploited for US benefit. Bolivia, a country historically riddled with turmoil and revolt, has been particularly disadvantaged. Materially poor and resource rich, Bolivia has only recently come to a position of international resistance through indigenous driven demands for justice. These strides have been more effective than any other in Latin America at reducing the influence of neocolonial repressors. Evo Morales has not held back in his critique of United States, and in two clear instances has acted to reduce direct US involvement in governmental proceedings. The first instance came just after his election when, in 2008, Evo expelled the US ambassador to Bolivia and several agents of the US Drug Enforcement Agency. As a former cocalero, it is not surprising that Evo stood opposed to US drug policy, but the removal of the ambassador spoke to a larger effort to extricate Bolivia from US influence. Evo took the offensive again in 2013 by expelling the US Agency for International Development (USAid) for their efforts to undermine his administration, saying "the United States does not lack the institutions that continue to conspire" (Associated Press in La Paz 2013). Evo's expulsion of the United States embassy was not merely a show of bravado, but a condemnation of the USA's historic behavior toward Bolivia.

Evo has also worked to reduce interactions with both the IMF and the World Bank, recognizing their influence in perpetuating colonial inequalities. From 2005 to 2014, Bolivia reduced its public debt to the World Bank from 37 percent GDP to 9 percent GDP, and has spoken out against IMF recommendations that continue to push privatization (Singham 2015). Despite these efforts, Bolivia received 300 million dollars in project loans from the World Bank in 2018, a large uptick from the 96 million the

country received in 2014 (World Bank 2018). Though it would appear that Bolivia is reopening its mind to internationally-guided development, journalist Nate Singham argues that Bolivia has taken control over the allocation and distribution of the funds received (Singham 2015). According to Fundación Jubileo, a Bolivian institution founded to extend the aims of the 2000s era Jubilee Movement, Bolivia is no longer subjected to conditional loans, but is rather has "executive and administrative control" over the funding it receives (Singham 2015). Further, a large bulk of the new funding comes in the form of disaster and climate risk management, which aligns with Evo's aims toward climate justice. In fact, the 200 million dollar loan received in 2014 for risk management after the early-2014 floods that left 50 dead and 411,500 affected was the largest loan ever signed with the World Bank (Singham 2015). This loan does not indicate a position reversal on behalf of the Morales administration, but rather a renegotiation of the way in which Bolivia will proceed to interact with the international community. In citing decolonization as a primary goal of the Plurinational State of Bolivia and in vociferously admonishing the designs of capitalism, Evo is calling to attention the mechanisms by which the United States has sought to maintain hemispheric hegemony and continue to repress voices of revolution.

To gain further insight on Bolivia's push for climate justice, we must investigate internal as well as external factors. The TIPNIS controversy remains the most prominent domestic event that would indicate contradictions in Evo's messaging. By delving into the dynamics of the infamous project, the forces at play will be made clear.

TIPNIS

The Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS) road construction controversy is the most explicitly contradictory action taken by the Morales administration. The unwarranted use of force against lowland indigenous activists and the persistence with which Evo pursued the project despite protest led many to wonder if Evo's support of indigenous people was merely a performative tactic to achieve political success during a social moment that championed the indigenous activist. Further, it brought into question inter-indigenous prejudice, highlighting the distinction between the highland and lowland indigenous groups. Ismael Saavedra argues that the militaristic response to protest against the road construction was merely a remnant of previous administrations, and that it is not clear whether orders to contain protest came from Evo's administration (Saavedra Pers. Comm. 2018). Others, such as Nancy Postero, argue that "because the MAS government continued its commitment to extracting natural resources, it reinforced the racialized practices linked to it" (Postero 2017, 118). McNeish argues along a similar vein, asserting that while the "country's mineral and hydrocarbon wealth has been nationalized and a new constitution and regime of social policy exists" that has effectively "resulted in the formalization and expansion of political and social rights, particularly for indigenous peoples," there has nevertheless been "a significant expansion of infrastructure and extractive industries … taking place that threatens the basis of their livelihoods and hard-won autonomy" (McNeish 2013, 222-223). Despite variation in the attribution of the causes for the 2011 police raid against protesters, all sources point to a system of resource extraction that long preceded the Morales administration. While Evo and the MAS have continued and in some cases advanced Bolivia's reliance on extractive

industries, the conditions under which they have done so have been indisputably more equitable for Bolivian people (See page 84). This is not to excuse violent actions taken under Evo's watch, nor to condone the continuance of extractive practices, but rather to question the extent to which the Morales administration is at fault for such transgressions. In order to gain a better understanding, we must delve deeper.

The development project through the TIPNIS protected region had dubious beginnings as it appears that the 63 Moxeño, Yuracaré, and Chimane communities that reside in the protected region were not informed of the road construction before it began. Though this would seem to fly in the face of Evo's social aims, the Morales administration took an "intransigent stance" when confronted by further domestic protest and outrage about the treatment of the activists (Postero 2017, 123). Despite Evo having projected an image of resistance to international influences, it appears that the TIPNIS project would align with the aims of a continental development project called Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), which aims to open trade corridors throughout the region in an effort to access and more easily transport available fossil fuels (Postero 2017, 127). The project was pushed by a coalition of South American governments, but its funding came from multilateral development banks and World Bank subsidiaries such as the Andean Development Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) (International Rivers 2008). It is also clear that the project dovetails with fossil fuel related initiatives that have been undertaken between Bolivia and Brazil in the past. Evo rescinded the contract to build the road in 2011, but not after substantial damage had been

done both to the TIPNIS region and to Evo's reputation as a champion of indigenous peoples (BBC 2011).

Interestingly, this is not the first time we have seen a project such as this employed in South America. The World Bank pushed a similar development project in Brazil during the early 1980s. From 1981-1983, Brazil received $443.4 from the multilateral institution to build the 1,500 kilometer Polonoroeste road that connected Brazil's burgeoning industrial center with the northwest tropical rainforest (Tauli-Corpuz 2006, 50). A region the size of France was affected by the project, nearly all of it rainforest inhabited by forty tribal groups with approximately 10,000 indigenous Brazilians. The project turned out to be disastrous in both environmental and humanitarian terms. Half a million settlers arrived to the region to establish cocoa and coffee plantations, and their arrival was not quiet. Deforestation increased from 1.7 percent in 1978 to 16.1 percent in 1991, influenza and measles epidemics ravaged indigenous populations, and up to 250,000 people in the region contracted malaria. The resulting health crisis led the World Bank to pump in another $99 million to spray 3,000 tons of DDT to combat the mosquito borne disease (Tauli-Corpuz 2006, 50). Projects such as these clearly disadvantage indigenous populations, but the effects of the Polonoroeste road were even more broad-reaching. It was evident that the financiers of the project did not have adequate knowledge of the land nor of the blowback that resulted from their mislead endeavors. Driven by developmental notions that promised progress and financial benefit, the World Bank failed to consult the people that would be most affected by the project. In doing so, the indigenous residents of the northwest tropical

rainforest were dehumanized and cast to the side in favor of an initiative that would contribute to severe and irreversible ecological and humanitarian harm.

While the Polonoroeste is not TIPNIS, the parallels between the two projects are eerily apparent. In both cases, road construction began without consent of the indigenous residents, the projects have been financed by multilateral development banks, and the ultimate objective of the projects has been to increase access to natural resources in previously undeveloped rainforests. Perhaps more concerning is the fact that Brazil seems to have forgotten the damage wrought by the Polonoroeste road, or otherwise has chosen to ignore the disastrous precedent for the sake of economic gain. That the BNDES and Inter-American Development Bank, subsidiaries of the World Bank created in alignment with the post-WWII economic restructuring efforts, are financing this new project is also highly concerning. While the World Bank does not directly have a hand in the construction of the road through TIPNIS, the ideological remnants of the Polonoroeste project have clearly been recycled by the regional offshoot banks.

External funding sources for the TIPNIS road project do not excuse the complicity of the Morales administration, but they do provide international context for what would otherwise seem to be a domestic conflict. The construction of the road has stopped, but the development project remains emblematic of the contradictions that exist within the Morales-led government. Prominent Aymara leader Rafael Quispe stated that, through the TIPNIS police raid, "'the government has revealed its true identity. The indigenous mask has fallen off, and its neoliberal face is revealed'" (Postero 2017, 127). Postero largely agrees with this sentiment, identifying the central paradox of the state as the "tension between the desire to overturn colonialism and all of its legacies and the use

of liberal state mechanisms to do so" (Postero 2017, 14). Ahead, I will investigate Evo's policies to gain a better understanding of the contradictions that exist within his platform.

Morales Administration Policies

It has been made clear to this point that the Morales administration has experienced its share of successes and pitfalls. What cannot be mistaken is the degree to which the Morales administration has improved the Bolivian economy and reduced poverty rates. Though Bolivia is historically the poorest country in South America, the country closed out the 2018 fiscal year with one of the highest growth rates across all of Latin America. With an average GDP growth rate of 4.9 percent between 2006 and 2017, Bolivia has successfully elevated 3 million citizens out of poverty under Evo (Telesur 2018).



Figure 9: Bolivian GDP from 1960-2017. Note the tremendous jump in GDP from 2005 (9.549 billion dollars) to 2017 (37.509 billion dollars) (World Bank Indicators 2019).



Figure 10: Gross national income per capita from 1960-2017. Again, note the steep upward trend under Morales, from 1,030 dollars/year in 2005 to 3,130 dollars/year in 2017 (World Bank Indicators 2019).

Even the IMF has acknowledged that Bolivia's past 15 years have been a monumental success, releasing a statement congratulating the country on "strong growth and poverty reduction" under the Morales administration (Telesur 2018). In a telling response, Bolivian vice president Alvaro Garcia Linera said that the IMF "is an external source that checks our data and is proving that we are growing more than last year, but we have never paid attention to its recommendations nor are we going to pay attention to it, because our economic model is different from the economic model they are driving" (Telesur 2018). Such an obstinate approach is consistent with the messaging that has emanated from the Morales administration, which has vilified the Western order and the employment of capitalist systems that perpetuate anthropogenic climate change. However, the question still remains: how can Bolivia oppose capitalism and advance the aims of climate justice while engaging in market mechanisms that continue to promote extractive industries?

The answer is not an easy one. The most useful framework is perhaps the progressive extractivism model presented by Eduardo Gudynas, the same system that Webber refers to as reconstituted neoliberalism (See Chapter 1). Evo's pursuit of development projects such as TIPNIS and continued reliance on fossil fuels, lithium, and rare metal ores stands in stark contrast to his international anti-capitalist, pro-earth messaging, but his domestic policies have been astronomically effective in terms of poverty reduction and economic growth based in nationalization. Article 9 of Bolivia's new constitution addresses this policy approach succinctly, identifying one of the primary aims of the state being "to promote and guarantee the responsible and planned use of natural resources, and to stimulate their industrialization through the development and strengthening of the productive base in its different dimensions and levels, as well as to preserve the environment for the welfare of present and future generations" (Constituent Assembly 2009). Bolivians demand the right to industrialize their economy in order to free themselves from a position on the bottom of a global wealth hierarchy, but to do so requires the maintenance of extractive industries. These measures have come alongside gradually rising carbon emissions, but Bolivia's contribution to global totals is virtually irrelevant compared to more industrial countries. In 2017, the United States was responsible for emitting 5,270 metric tons of carbon, representing approximately 15 percent of global totals. Bolivia, the 85th largest emitter in the world, was responsible for 21 metric tons of carbon, contributing to less than 1 percent of total emissions (Global Carbon Atlas 2017). The disparity in historical emissions is much larger, as Bolivia has only recently begun industrializing.



Figure 11: Bolivia's historic climate emissions from 1960-2014, measured in metric tons per capita. Under Morales, emissions have risen from 1.622 metric tons to 1.932 metric tons (World Bank Indicators 2019.

A look at Bolivia's primary industries reflects the extent to which Bolivia remains strapped by foreign demand for fossil fuels and mined resources. In 2014, 54 percent of Bolivia's export revenue came from hydrocarbons, primarily in the form of natural gas and oil (Energy Information Association 2015). Other substantial exports include zinc ore, gold, other precious metal ores, raw tin, and a variety of agricultural products. Of all exports, only 18.9 percent are not mined or drilled natural resources (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2019). Overall, 90 percent of Bolivia's exports are raw materials, showing that the country has not emerged from a colonial framework of resource dependence (Smith 2018). These statistics point not only to Bolivia's resource wealth, but also to the repression of industrialization that comes with a history defined by extraction for the benefit of those abroad.

Further insights arise from an overview of Bolivia's primary trading partners. In 1990, during the heyday of the neoliberal era, Bolivia exported 27 percent of all goods to the United States, topped only by the 31 percent to Argentina. Of the remaining 42 percent, 20 percent of exports were directed to countries in Europe, showing the extent to which Bolivia's resources were consumed by colonial powers (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2019). Under the Morales administration, Bolivia has diversified its trading partners and substantially diminished exports to both Europe and the United States, allocating them only 11.4 and 6.7 percent of exports, respectively. Nonetheless, the United States remains one of the top five consumers of Bolivian goods (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2019). Further, though Evo increased hydrocarbon revenue as a percentage of GDP from 9.8 to 35 percent between 2005 and 2013 through nationalization efforts, he has reduced the amount of exported hydrocarbons as a percentage of total exports through diversification of exported products (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2019). Nonetheless, in holding with Bolivia's National Development Plan, the Bolivian government increased hydrocarbon gas production from 33 million cubic meters in 2005 to 56 million cubic meters in 2013 (Singham 2015). The 2016-2020 National Economic and Social Development Plan likewise highlights hydrocarbon exploration and further industrialization of natural gas in the coming years (World Bank 2018). Though extraction rates have increased under Morales, it is important to note that such increases are largely a result of the exploration initiatives incentivized by neoliberal reforms through the 1990s. Privatization of the oil industry led to drastically increased extraction rates, with natural gas extraction rates rising by over 200 percent between 1999 and 2000 alone (Kohl 2002, 459). Thus, Evo's economic plan

virtually maintains extraction patterns yet has vastly increased revenue from nationalization. In 2005, revenue from fossil fuels came to 0.6 billion dollars, but by 2014, that number increased by more than sevenfold to 4.5 billion dollars (Smith 2018). Bolivia is simultaneously attempting to cut dependencies by internalizing their agricultural economy, with 95 percent of Bolivia's food now coming from within the country (Smith 2018). Agricultural independence follows with Bolivia's efforts toward decolonization, but leaves the country vulnerable given impending climate pressures in the agriculture sector.

Evo has made good on MAS platform promises by investing in social programs that were stripped of funding during the neoliberal era. In his first year in office, Morales increased spending on health, education, and poverty reduction by 45 percent, an endeavor that would ultimately lead to unprecedented social renewal in Bolivia (Dover 2017). Extreme poverty rates in Bolivia now hover around 17 percent as opposed to the 38 percent rate in 2005, and income inequality has been drastically reduced (Postero 2017, 99).



Figure 12: Income growth by wealth decile from 2006-2012. As can be seen, each successive income tier has grown more than the one above it (Johnson and Lefebvre 2014).



Figure 13: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines from 200 to 2016. From 2000 to 2016, poverty rates were reduced from 66.4 percent to 39.5 percent (World Bank Indicators 2019).

Washington Post columnist Francisco Toro writes that the richest 10 percent in Bolivia earned 128 times more than the poorest 10 percent prior to the Morales presidency, but now, those same groups are differentiated by just 38 fold (Toro 2017). The ramifications of these measures for rural indigenous populations has been astronomical. In 2000, the rural poverty gap, reflecting the degree to which average rural income differed from average urban income, was a soaring 65.4 percent. By 2014, that rate had dropped by more than half of the original value, coming in at 30.5 percent (World Bank 2019). Reductions in overall poverty levels and a diminishing rural poverty gaps show that Bolivia is simultaneously mitigating historic internal marginalization and addressing global inequalities that have affected the entire population.



Figure 14: Rural poverty gap in Bolivia from 2000 to 2014 (World Bank Indicators 2019).

The budget surpluses that Bolivia experienced every year between 2006 and 2014 allowed public sector debt to fall from 83 percent of GDP in 2003 to a mere 26 percent in 2014, enabling Bolivia's international reserves to be built up from 1.7 billion dollars in 2005 to 15.1 billion dollars in 2014 (Toro 2017). International reserves insulate against market downturns and reduce the need for international loans. Evo's policies have also sought to decrease gender disparities in the workplace and have succeeded in increasing women's participation in formal sector employment from 37 percent in 2008 to 46 percent in 2018 (Cuevas 2019). These efforts align with the aims of the indigenous activist group CONAMAQ that have sought to destabilize the patriarchal systems that were imposed upon indigenous societies by colonizers (Cuevas 2019).

Figure 15: International reserves as a percentage of GDP from 2003 to 2013 (Johnston and Lefebvre 2014).

These economic strides paced the employment of social programs that have increased literacy rates, improved access to healthcare, brought electricity to rural communities, and sliced poverty rates.



Figure 16:Access to electricity from 2005 to 2016. Over that period of time, national access to electricity jumped from 68.288 percent to 93.039 percent (World Bank Indicators 2019).



Figure 17: Rural access to electricity from 2006 to 2016. Under Morales, rural access to electricity has increased from 28.896 percent to 79.145 percent (World Bank Indicators 2019).

Within the first 6 years of his presidency, Evo had doubled the amount of health centers in the entire country, including the rehabilitation of 60 rural health posts. Before 2009, two thirds of Bolivian municipalities had no health posts, but by 2012, over half of the previously underserved municipalities had healthcare centers (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 111). More recently, Evo rolled out a universal healthcare plan that will cover at least 70 percent of all Bolivians, benefitting up to 5 million previously uninsured residents between the ages of 5 and 59 (Nueva 2019). This unprecedented success reflects the 300 percent increase in healthcare spending that Bolivia has undertaken since 2006. The healthcare inauguration ceremony held on March 1, 2019 was attended by Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and World Health Organization (WHO) representative Fernando Leanes, who lauded Bolivia's strides in the realm of healthcare under the Morales administration. Leanes stated "the results are extraordinary in public health and collective health. They can be seen in the reduction of infant mortality, child malnutrition, number of professionally-attended births, diseases under control and

population's healthy life years," tipping his cap to the free care provided by 3,100 first, second, and third level care facilities in Bolivia (Nueva 2019). The WHO and PAHO further praised Bolivia by congratulating the country for occupying first place in Latin America in terms of "shared prosperity," and for being the country that has most effectively reduced extreme poverty in all of Latin America (Nueva 2019). Healthcare specialist Anthony Costello notes that climate change poses substantial healthcare risks ranging from worsening air quality and changing patterns of vector borne diseases to the causalities incurred by climate induced disasters (Costello 2013). By fortifying healthcare within Bolivia, Evo has made major strides in elevating climate resilience nationwide.

Bolivia has also been effective in its establishment of other socially funded services outside of healthcare. The most significant are the Renta Dignidad, a pension fund that reached over 750,000 Bolivians over the age of 60 as of 2014, and the Bono Juancito Pinto, an education reform initiative that provides funding for all Bolivian children through the eighth grade (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 101-102). The "Yes I Can" literacy campaign established in 2006 has paralleled the Bono Juancito Pinto initiative in efforts to eradicate high illiteracy rates. In 2000, Bolivia suffered from the highest illiteracy rates in South America, particularly in rural areas where illiteracy reached up to 40 percent (Kohl and Farthing 2014, 105). The program effectively reduced illiteracy rates from 13.28 percent in 2001 to 3.8 percent by 2014 (Abreu and Silva 2016). The illiteracy rate continues to fall, hitting an historical low of 2.9 percent in 2016. The push for literacy has also incorporated 36 indigenous languages, aligned with Evo's efforts to chip away at all remnants of colonial infrastructure (Walker 2016). Also notable is the Juana Azurduy subsidy established in 2008 which grants pregnant and nursing women

consistent funding and has contributed to the halving of maternal mortality rates between 2006 and 2010 (Kohl and Farthing, 2014, 102).

Reducing Climate Vulnerability

Evo's social policies have had a profound effect on climate vulnerability. As can be seen in the following graph produced by the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, Bolivia's ND-GAIN score (inversely reflective of climate change vulnerability) has risen substantially under Evo's leadership, with a sharp spike occurring immediately after Evo assumed office in 2006.



Figure 18: ND-GAIN country Index score from 1995 to 2017 for Bolivia. Notice the distinct spike in resilience immediately following Evo's election in 2005 (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative 2019)

The parallelisms between Evo's socioeconomic advancements and a reduction in climate vulnerability despite ever advancing rates of climate change show the extent to which social fortification plays a role in defending against climate change. Advancing education systems allows the populous to develop climate smart practices and defend against unjust mechanisms of exploitation that have led to climate vulnerability. Overhauling an underserved healthcare system reduces casualties associated with climate change and produces a society that is better equipped to face drastic climatic shifts.

Reducing income inequality ensures that the poorest sectors of society will not face wildly disproportionate climate impacts as the wealthy seek to insulate themselves from damage. Further, reducing income inequality and lowering the rural poverty gap has played a major role in diminishing indigenous marginalization and attacking the systems that have institutionally oppressed the indigenous majority. Ultimately, Evo has produced a more equitable Bolivia, which in turn has advanced climate justice within Bolivia's borders. In the coming chapter, I will work to uncover the role Bolivia plays in advancing climate justice on an international scale through a more detailed investigation into global political and economic process paired with the lineage of climate justice.

Chapter 4

Bolivia's Climate Paradox

Bolivia exemplifies the complex dynamics of climate change and resulting resolution mechanisms. Highly vulnerable to climate change, a history rife with colonialism and social unrest, and a relatively new indigenous driven government that is bucking the Western order, Bolivia has emerged as an exciting and potentially confusing global actor. Factors such as Evo's fiery rhetoric, the development of a new indigenous oriented environmentally conscious national constitution, and the creation of a World People's Agreement that amplifies the voices of subaltern people across the globe are enough to send climate activists clamoring for worldwide emulation. On the other hand, unscrupulous methods and extractive practices enacted by the Morales administration raise questions about Bolivia's commitment to combating global processes of oppression and pollution. In the coming chapter, I elucidate the role Bolivia plays in the climate justice movement and the barriers that the country faces in achieving its projected vision. By situating Bolivia's efforts within the broader context of climate change solutions, and by contrasting Bolivia's approach with that of the international community, I will point to the ways in which Bolivia represents a new climate paradigm. Additionally, I will place Bolivia and the rhetoric that has emanated from the Morales administration within the canon of climate justice, and in doing so, address the manifestations of climate justice since the movement's inception. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I will bring together the narrative that I have developed throughout this thesis to discuss the barriers Bolivia faces and the broader implications of Bolivia's position.

Climate Justice

Climate justice has its foundations in the 1980s and 1990s environmental justice movement that first explicitly connected environmental degradation with social inequities. From there, the call for climate justice began echoing through progressive movements in South America that comprised the Pink Tide, combatting neoliberal policies with leftist ideals. The call for justice came most prominently from Ecuador, where the environmental group Acción Ecológica promoted a justice-based approach to environmental regulation prior to the Kyoto Protocol (Bond 2012, 187). The Jubilee movement that took place through the 1990s demanded the cancellation of debt owed by 35 of the poorest nations to global powers, and garnered 24 million signatures across 62 nations (Advocacy International 2019). Coinciding with this initiative was the global justice movement, a series of coordinated activism efforts that sought to combat corporate globalization, culminating in the infamous 1999 WTO protest in Seattle (Smith 2001).

After the coining of the term "climate justice" in the 1999 CorpWatch document "Greenhouse Gangsters vs Climate Justice," climate justice took hold on an international scale (Widdick 2018). The 2002 Bali Principles of Climate Justice developed by an international coalition of environmental groups then provided a template for ongoing climate justice efforts, and inspired the formation of the Durban Group for Climate Justice, a group of environmentalists and corporate critics that produced "The Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading," a document detailing the inadequacies of carbon trading as a method to combat climate change (Bond 2012, 187; Widdick 2018). This lineage of climate justice activism spurred the formation of the most pivotal climate justice

organization that has been founded to date, Climate Justice Now! The organization is a network of social groups and movements across the globe seeking to find just avenues for climate change combattance. Climate Justice Now! was founded at the 2007 Bali COP to fight for "social, ecological, and gender justice" on behalf of affected communities (Widdick 2018). Their operating principles focus on five key precepts as follows:

- leaving fossil fuels in the ground and investing instead in appropriate energy-efficiency and safe, clean and community-led renewable energy;
- radically reducing wasteful consumption, first and foremost in the North, but also by Southern elites;
- huge financial transfers from North to South, based on the repayment of climate debts and subject to democratic control. The costs of adaptation and mitigation should be paid for by redirecting military budgets, innovative taxes and debt cancellation;
- rights-based resource conservation that enforces Indigenous land rights and promotes peoples' sovereignty over energy, forests, land and water;
- sustainable family farming and fishing, and peoples' food sovereignty (Climate Justice Now! 2012).

As can be seen above, the demand for climate justice is framed in terms of tensions between the Global North and Global South, with a prominent focus on the dynamic present between indigenous and colonizing people. These tensions undergird systems of climate injustice, and the Bolivian government under Evo Morales has been at the fore of recognizing and acting upon such imbalanced power dynamics.

Climate justice has since become part of climate platforms for many NGOs and grassroots organizations such as 350.org, the Mary Robinson Foundation, Grassroots International, the NAACP, Greenpeace International, and others. The articulations of climate justice from each of these groups revolve around two prominent factors: holding corporations and emitters accountable, and reducing consumption in the Global North so that those in the Global South may find the means to reduce vulnerability and rise out of

poverty. While the 2010 World People's Conference may not have initiated this movement, it certainly served as a global megaphone through which the grievances of 140 nations could be heard and echoed by organizations and countries around the world. The World People's Conference was a momentous step in the climate justice movement. The voices of grassroots activists were amplified in the wake of the conference, empowered by a defiant stance against climate stagnation and global imbalances. The conference spearheaded movements throughout the world, many of which prominently featured indigenous activists. The Navajo have played a major role in stopping coal mining projects in New Mexico, REDOIL (Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands), an Alaskan indigenous coalition, has countered projects by Shell and other oil companies, indigenous communities along the Klamath River in Oregon have reversed industrial hydropower projects, and native communities have been at the fore of fighting against the implementation of oil pipelines in the Midwest (Bond 2012, 188-190). The World People's Conference in Cochabamba did not start a swell of indigenous activism; indigenous people have been pointing out false solutions and combating environmental damage for decades. The conference did, however, provide the largest platform to date that has been available for subaltern people to project climate justice demands. While those demands have not fallen on deaf ears, they have certainly been heard by reluctant ones.

The set of demands put forth by the Bolivian government and the World People's Agreement have not been agreeable to the Western world. The text of the conference incriminates US practices, noting that while developed countries reduced their emissions by 11.2 percent between 1990 and 2007, the United States increased their emissions by

16.8 percent over that same period (World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010). The document further claims to "categorically reject" the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, calling it "illegitimate" due to the voluntary and individual reduction commitments that will not bring sufficient reductions in greenhouse gases (World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth 2010). Patrick Bond (2012, 198) identifies ten particular demands that have arisen from Bolivia that are incompatible with Western practices and norms:

- 50 per cent reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 2017;
- stabilising temperature rises to 1°C and 300 parts per million;
- acknowledging the climate debt owed by developing countries;
- full respect for human rights and the inherent rights of indigenous people;
- universal declaration of rights of Mother Earth to ensure harmony with nature;
- establishment of an International Court of Climate Justice;
- rejection of carbon markets and commodification of nature and forests through the REDD programme;
- promotion of measures that change the consumption patterns of developed countries;
- end of intellectual property rights for technologies useful for mitigating climate change; and
- payment of 6 per cent of developed countries' GDP to addressing climate change.

As can be seen, this agenda aggressively pursues climate justice and makes demands that far overstep the boundaries that have been set by the Western order. Thus far, most of the goals set at the Conference have not been met due to pushback from developed countries. Greenhouse gases have not seen remotely close to a 50 percent reduction, atmospheric carbon has skyrocketed to over 410 parts per million, there is no International Court of Climate Justice, and developed countries have certainly not been willing to allocate 6 percent of their GDP to climate change mitigation (Kahn 2017). Global North rejection of the demands developed at the World People's Conference is not surprising, for the

Conference did not fall within the structures created by Western elites to address matters of global economy and international affairs. The United States has taken a step beyond ignorance, however. Threatened by the coalition formed in Cochabamba, the United States withdrew several million dollars of aid funding to Bolivia and Ecuador due to the countries' opposition to the Copenhagen Accord (Bond 2012, 90).

At the following COP in Cancún, Bolivia was similarly snubbed. Bolivian Ambassador to the UN Pablo Salon writes that the resolutions developed at the World People's Conference were entirely ignored at the conference, with discussion instead focused on stripping away any emission reductions commitments remaining from the Kyoto Protocol. Further, after having been given two hours to read the text of the Cancún Agreement, the document was passed despite Bolivia's requests for extended discussion and ultimate dissent (Solon 2010). Solon called the result a "false agreement" and stated that despite US financial punishments through cuts to climate funding, "we are not beholden to the World Bank, as so many of us in the south once were. We can act freely and do what is right" (Solon 2010). Bolivia's independence from the Western order and its institutions allows the country to be forward in its dissent, yet has not proven to change the course set by the United States.

A second (though lesser attended) World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth held in Bolivia in 2015 continued to push for the approach highlighted at the preceding conference, but yet again failed to gain recognition from the United States. The Conference came just before COP21 in Paris in the hopes of highlighting the voices of the Global South, but the Paris COP proved to be just as disappointing as those previous. The Paris Agreement produced at COP21 abandoned any

previously held notions about an international equitable burden-sharing arrangement to control and reduce carbon emissions, an idea that arose from the Kyoto Protocol. In doing so, the Agreement "effectively sidelined equity and environmental justice considerations as a guiding principal for multilateral cooperation" (Clémençon 2016). Shortly thereafter, US President Donald Trump made removal from the already lenient Paris Agreement a priority for his administration, confirming the US position toward climate change resolution.

We have seen this strong-handed approach before, and it will not be the last time the climate justice movement is opposed by those that stand to lose less from climate change. Fortunately, there are not only those that continue to fight global injustice, but also those that report on the inequalities that lead to mass climate vulnerability. Patrick Bond has contributed to the climate justice lineage by producing one of the most comprehensive works on climate justice and associated political processes to date, entitled *Politics of Climate Justice: Paralysis Above, Movement Below.* The work is the most preeminent within the relatively nascent literary canon of climate justice, and has inspired a litany of climate justice books from 2012-2019, including those by Mary Robinson, Henry Shue, Wen Stevenson, and even a textbook by Dominic Roser and Christian Seidel.

International Solutions to Climate Change

The global response to climate change has been overwhelmingly ineffective. 2018 saw a record high in carbon emissions, rising by 2.7 percent from the previous year (Global Carbon Project 2018). The world's top emitters, the United States, China, and

India, increased carbon output by 2.5, 4.7, and 6.5 percent, respectively, and global carbon emissions hit a sickening 37.1 billion tons (Global Carbon Project 2018). The IPCC "Global Warming of 1.5°C" 2018 report confirmed worries that climate change is accelerating and will be impacting millions of people by the middle of the century (IPCC 2018). Seventeen of the eighteen hottest years in history have taken place in the 21st century, and an estimated 325 million people are seriously affected by climate change every year, including 315,000 that are killed by human-induced climate changes (UNFCCC 2017). All this, despite the 25 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (COP) that have been held specifically to address climate change since 1995, along with several international greenhouse gas reduction agreements starting with the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The inability of the international community to come to pragmatic and effective solutions to a such a massive global threat can in large part be attributed to the very same structures that have shaped the international sphere since the second World War.

The United Nations, another postwar institution conceptualized and founded in the United States, has been at the fore of climate change mitigation talks. The UNFCCC has provided a platform for countries to come together to discuss change, but the COP has reflected the power imbalances that exist among member nations. The primary approach that has been undertaken by the international conferences has been one that Patrick Bond has termed "climate-crisis capitalism" (2012, 2). Elites attending the COP have pushed this methodology by insisting that market mechanisms will ensure emissions reduction through carbon trading and the commodification of carbon sinks such as forests. Carbon trading was a core strategy of the Kyoto Protocol, lauded as the climate

solution that would allow for continued business growth coupled with incentives to pursue less polluting energy alternatives. The European Union's Emission Trading System (ETS) was implemented in 2005, but quickly fell victim to market volatility and structural issues. The carbon market experienced an immediate dip in 2006 after it was discovered that too many emissions permits had been issued, and then suffered a monumental collapse as a result of the 2008 global financial crisis (Bond 2012, 41). Though estimates placed an effective price to support alternative energy programs at 50 euros per ton of carbon, the price per ton entering 2008 was only 30 euros, and by 2009, it had dropped to less than 10 euros (Bond 2012, 42, 25). By 2017, the price of carbon reached an all-time low of 4.40 euros, and though the market has rebounded in the past year, the price of carbon has never been high enough to truly incentivize a reduction in emissions (Cuff 2018). Carbon markets haven't fared any better in the United States, where in 2010, the Chicago market was forced to close entirely due to market failure (Bond 2012, 36). The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a more recent market-oriented solution implemented in the northeast United States, has been successful at reducing greenhouse gases on a smaller scale, but has done so through mandatory prescription to RGGI policies for member states and has not been effective in initiating a nationwide drive for emission reduction (RGGI 2018).

The allure of the carbon market came with its potential as the next bubble- a multi-trillion dollar market bursting onto the scene. Before the 2009 Copenhagen COP, it was estimated that the carbon market would produce $3 trillion in trade and potentially trillions more in the derivatives business by 2020 (Bond 2012, 72). Thus, carbon markets are most appealing to those who stand to benefit from investing, namely stakeholders in

firms that manage carbon exchange. Journalist Matt Taibbi published an article just prior to the Copenhagen COP entitled “The Great American Bubble Machine” that pointed to the influence of financial goliath Goldman Sachs in creating lucrative markets through political and economic manipulation. In 2009, the bank spent 3.5 million dollars in climate change lobbying in order to implement a carbon trading market in the United States. A further 4.45 million dollars was given to Democratic campaigns in the previous election cycle. These contributions make sense in light of the fact that Goldman Sachs owned a ten percent stake in the doomed Chicago Climate Exchange. By Taibbi’s assessment, Goldman Sachs effectively created a new market bubble in the same manner that it created bubbles in housing, tech, and oil extending back to the Great Depression (Taibbi 2010).

Though the UN has driven climate justice talks, other global governance institutions have not remained behind the scenes. The World Bank has been one of the most ardent supporters of carbon commodification, seeking neoliberal solutions to climate change that have yet to come to fruition. Yet again, it appears that the World Bank’s incentive is not to provide universal solutions, but rather to maintain the Western order from which the institution was conceived. This is indicated through the Bank’s actions and policies, but has also come to the surface explicitly in several instances. One of the more infamous examples was the memo signed by then World Bank chief economist Larry Summers in 1991, which read: “‘the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste on the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that… African countries are vastly underpolluted’” (Bond 2012, 55). Such irrational and harmful intent is superficially discouraging, but also lends insights into the economic

policy that serves as a vehicle for unsavory motives. Bond identifies the neoliberal response to climate change as one that seeks to "shift," "stall," and "steal" rather than substantively address excess carbon emissions (Bond 2012, 55-56). Carbon markets allow for the shifting of responsibility for carbon reduction from the Global North to the Global South, enabling the United States and other powerful nations to perpetuate their hegemony into the realm of climate change (Bond 2012, 74). Increased emissions reduction responsibility in turn depresses industrialization and furthers the disparity between wealthy and poor nations. Ultimately, if climate change solutions are oriented toward market mechanisms, the largest emitters can continue to exert disproportionate power through the channels established by neocolonial trade relationships.

Market mechanisms are not the only reason for a global failure to address climate change. US intransigence has played a major role in delaying adequate solutions, both domestically as the globe's second top emitter and internationally as a major player in climate change discussions. The country that has been most responsible for shaping the post-WWII international scene is not only one of the world's top two emitters, it has made explicit efforts to remove itself from climate change resolution negotiations. Trump's recent departure from the Paris Agreements compounds an already miserable track record of noncompliance with international climate mitigation efforts. The Bush administration was the first to hijack progress toward climate resolution by removing the United States from binding elements of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 (Kahn 551, 2003). Over the next few years, Washington began pushing for climate agreements that were "pledge and review" oriented rather than binding, which they then presented at the 2009 COP in Copenhagen (Bond 2012, 6). Shortly thereafter, a GOP surge in the 2010

midterm elections brought an unprecedented amount of climate denialists into office, further stymieing motion toward effective climate solutions.

The fossil fuel industry has played a major role in financing candidates with positions conducive to their aims, spending over 50 million dollars in lobbying expenses every year since 1998. Fossil fuel lobbying in the United States peaked in 2009 at an astonishing 175.4 million dollars, the same year Washington pushed for relaxed carbon reduction commitments in Copenhagen. The fossil fuel industry has spent over 100 million dollars in lobbying annually since 2008, with 2018 coming in at 124.5 million dollars (Center for Responsive Politics 2018). The fossil fuel industry cannot be blamed entirely for climate solution stagnation, but it has certainly oiled the machinery utilized by the United States to maintain control over a climate discussions.

The United States already uses bullying tactics on an international level to reduce carbon regulation and enable the continued use of free and unrestricted markets. Even more suspicious are the tactics that have been undertaken behind the scenes to silence climate demands. The most notable instance, besides perhaps the millions of aid dollars retracted from Bolivia and Ecuador following the 2009 COP, is the overt manipulation the United States exerted upon the Maldives, an island nation highly susceptible to climate change. Before Copenhagen, the Maldives emerged as a champion of the Global South's efforts to curb Global North emissions by holding an underwater cabinet meeting with officials bedecked in scuba gear to signal the immediacy of the climate crisis for island nations. Sensing a threat, United States officials contacted the Maldives US ambassador indicating that "tangible assistance" would be given to the country if they were to realize the "advantages to be gained by compliance" with US climate policy

(Bond 2012, 91). These were not just words- US deputy climate change envoy Jonathan Pershing arranged a 50 million dollar aid package to be sent to the Maldives in exchange for their cooperation at the upcoming COP (Bond 2012, 91). Such an explicit attempt at climate solution subterfuge lays barren the US position on climate change and reinforces the North-South duality that the United States has so carefully constructed and maintained.

Bolivia's Climate Justice

Bolivia has articulated a version of climate justice that, perhaps more than any other, has resonated throughout the Global South. Bond identifies the Bolivian government-sponsored People's World Conference on the Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth as the most "portentous" political event that has yet contributed to the climate justice movement (Bond 2012, 187). He goes on to say that the conference served as a "confirmation of a climate justice identity," where representatives from 140 countries came together to acknowledge a pressing and ever-growing issue (Bond 2012, 187). Though the second World People's Conference was less publicized than the first, Bolivia's continued push for climate justice in the face of politically orchestrated climate stagnation is a testament to Bolivia's leadership in the climate justice movement. Further, Bolivia's seventeenth constitution since its founding has championed the rights of the indigenous population for the first time since colonization ensued, and has enshrined the rights of Mother Earth along with commitments to strive toward decolonization and seek equality and complementarity amongst people. These factors present a monumental global precedent, and have established Bolivia's administration as one of the most

progressive in the world in regards to climate change resistance. Further, Evo's admonition of a global capitalist system and the institutions and countries that perpetuate colonial interactions has provided a rallying point around which the Global South and allies in the Global North have coalesced. Sentiments such as the following have defined the external view of the Morales administration:

> As long as we do not change the capitalist system for a system based on complementarity, solidarity, and harmony among peoples and nature, the measures we adopt will be palliatives that will have a limited and precarious character. For us, what has failed is the model of "living better" [vivir mejor], of unlimited development, of industrialization without borders, of modernity that disregards history, of increasing accumulation of goods at the expense of others and nature. That is why we propose the idea of "living well" [Vivir Bien], in harmony with other human beings and with our Mother Earth. (Hindery and Hecht, 2013).

"Vivir bien" has become a rallying cry in Bolivia under the Morales administration, as it encapsulates a worldview that rebukes colonialism, affirms indigenous practices, and focuses on non-market mechanisms by which to maintain equality and live fully. It does not, however, align with the extractive practices with which Bolivia has continued to engage.

Under the Morales administration, Bolivia has increased dependence on natural resources, but has nationalized extractive industries to promote social welfare amongst its people, as we saw in Chapter 3. Not only have poverty rates been alleviated and GDP accelerated, the gap that exists between the white/mestizo elite and indigenous people has been lessened both in economic and political terms. Bolivia's efforts toward climate justice are nevertheless paradoxical. At its foundation, climate justice expresses a dire need to reduce carbon emissions and ameliorate the threat posed by climate change. Though Evo has perpetuated extractive practices, he has simultaneously reduced climate

vulnerability in Bolivia by buttressing the most vulnerable populations and providing a platform upon which previously silenced voices may express their needs and concerns. It is here that the following Kohl and Farthing's sentiments are most applicable: "even a president of good-will cannot fix twenty years of neoliberal policies overlaid on 500 years of social exclusion" (2006, 2). For a country situated as Bolivia is, extractive practices and climate justice need not be mutually exclusive.

There is no question that investment in fossil fuels and the pursuit of development projects that seek to open pathways for further resource exploitation do not align with any of the previously mentioned iterations of climate justice. The climate justice lineage has sought to free the world from fossil fuel dependence and find alternative mechanisms by which to live. However, climate justice has simultaneously issued an imperative to support and protect the most climate vulnerable populations, which, in most cases, are those that have been extensively colonized and stripped of the means to absorb drastic changes in the climate. Not only has the Morales administration recognized extreme disparities and vulnerabilities, it has acted to ensure that foreign interests no longer determine who will receive the short end of the stick during the coming years and decades. Further, Evo has contributed to the lineage of climate justice in distinct and impactful ways, and has brought attention to a world order dictated by powerful nations and the trappings of neocolonialism. In many ways, Bolivia has manifested and expressed climate justice in the only way possible given the constraints the nation has faced for centuries.

This is not to excuse ecologically damaging practices, nor to condone behaviors exhibited by the Morales administration that have proven to favor growth and economic

gain over humanity. Rather, I mean to bring attention to the systems with which Bolivia is engaged and the heavily weighted power dynamics that have disadvantaged the country for years. I have developed a narrative that situates Bolivia within a Western order that has distinctly favored the will of the hemispheric hegemon, the United States. The global governance institutions and the ideologies they serve have perpetuated global processes that favor US interests. Such interests have been protected through force, austerity measures, political manipulation, and capitalization upon colonial trading pathways. It is no coincidence that Bolivia has some of the largest resource wealth in South America and yet is the poorest country on the continent. Likewise, that Bolivia's population is majority indigenous is strongly correlated with the country's historic impoverishment. These factors make Bolivia a primary target for resource exploitation on the backs of indigenous people, and Western powers have taken advantage of such positionality for centuries. By targeting the most marginalized people sitting atop a wealth of fossil fuel and mineral resources, the West has established Bolivia as resource trough for their exploitation.

Another point that I find crucial to this discussion is the perception of Bolivia and other such countries by the Global North, and particularly by the United States. Efforts to quell leftist movements throughout the 20th century indicate explicit attempts to contain anti-imperial movements, but the subliminal messaging that has led to negative perceptions of Latin American countries has been perhaps equally as damaging. Criticisms of the Morales government in the face of unprecedented social and economic growth serve the aims of the United States and other Western powers. By placing blame on the Bolivian government for internal issues rather than acknowledging a historic

pattern of foreign exploitation, the US can effectively deflect responsibility and perpetuate unbalanced power dynamics. This is not to say that critiques of the Morales government are not warranted, but rather that criminalizing Evo for his extractive practices without an analysis of the broader systems with which Bolivia is entangled shifts attention away from historic dependencies that Bolivia is still struggling to disengage from. Further, to assume that dependence on extractive industries negates efforts toward climate justice is to ignore the role Bolivia has played in advancing climate justice as a movement, particularly in the Global South. Bond writes that the World People's Conference hosted by Evo "set in motion a much more serious transnational climate justice approach, based not on the illusion that the UN will address the climate crisis anytime soon, but instead on more serious, pragmatic strategies" (2012, 203). These strategies have yet to reduce global carbon emissions, but they have provided a climate buffer for Bolivian residents through the fortification of social support systems.

Bolivia thus presents a form of climate justice that relies on progressive extractivism as a basic framework. This is atypical and seemingly contradictory, but it is not a model derived from the will of the Bolivian people or government. Rather, it is a means by which to address apparent global inequalities while simultaneously combating the negative effects of climate change. As we saw in Chapter 2, Bolivia has long been subject to resource exploitation that has developed into a primary industry, an industry that now plays an important role in funding social projects within Bolivia. The climate justice movement and the global justice activism that preceded it have fought for the rights of Global South countries to engage in development, a process that has been repressed by the Global North in order to maintain dependencies that facilitate resource

extraction and political control (See Chapter 3). This is not to say that climate justice advocates for increased consumption and industrialization across the globe, but rather that colonial legacies create vulnerabilities that can only be alleviated through the fracturing of dependencies. Bolivia has begun hacking away at the ties that bind them to the United States, nationalizing industry and forcing US representatives from the table. Though the United States remains one of Bolivia's largest trading partners, we have seen that Bolivia has diversified its export economy and has elevated living standards for its populous while doing so. To suggest that Bolivia needs to cut ties with extractive industries if it wishes to advance the climate justice agenda is to unjustly place blame upon a nation that has fortified its society in the only way possible given historic economic constraints.

This thesis is not meant to be a holistic indictment of capitalism, and I have not shown that capitalism and the economic philosophies that undergird the system are universally detrimental. Rather, I have shown that economic policies based in neoliberalism have been used to continually advantage the Global North over the Global South, using Bolivia as a pertinent case study. More importantly, capitalistic policies have accentuated global discrepancies and entrenched colonial imbalances in favor of historically dominant powers. Canadian political philosopher C.B MacPherson makes a key observation in his analysis of historic employments of liberal markets. He notes that all liberal democracies that have implemented market economies have done so *before* all citizens within the country enjoyed equal rights before the law (Hellinger 2015, 24). In doing so, these countries have inherently advantaged those that were privileged prior to the implementation of a market economy, the United States being a primary example.

Capitalism has been used as a mechanism by which to cement hierarchical power balances and increase discrepancies between the wealthy and the poor. This analysis applies to international processes as well, and generally features the suppression of subaltern peoples in the name of economic growth on behalf of the Global North.

Renowned colonial historian Ania Loomba writes in her groundbreaking work *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* that colonialism can be defined as "the conquest and control of other people's lands and goods" (2005, 8). However, she notes that given this definition, no form of colonialism prior to European conquest managed to alter the entire globe as profoundly as modern colonialism. Loomba attributes the widespread, penetrating nature of modern colonialism to the establishment of capitalism alongside Western conquest. She writes that capitalism when paired with colonial enterprise "produced the economic imbalance that was necessary for the growth of capitalism industry," arguing that "colonialism was the midwife that assisted at the birth of European capitalism, or that without colonial expansion the transition to capitalism could not have taken place in Europe" (Loomba 2005, 9-10). Today, "unequal relations of colonial rule are reinscribed in the contemporary imbalances between 'first' and 'third' world nations," with liberal market mechanisms facilitating the maintenance of power disparities (Loomba 2005, 12). Bolivians have recognized this for some time, and have long been fomenting resistance to persistent neocolonial relationships and the accompanying economic systems that stand at such odds with Bolivian indigenous values. The Morales administration has actualized indigenous defiance, and has acted to extricate Bolivia from the clutches of neocolonialism by citing the primary objective of

the new Plurinational State of Bolivia as decolonization and by speaking out against global forces of oppression.

Barriers to Climate Justice in Bolivia

Like the rest of the world, Bolivia is facing impending climate changes that will test the social fabric of society and wreak havoc on established ways of living. Unlike much of the world, Bolivia has issued a doctrine that consists of imperatives driven by the understanding that there are extreme global imbalances and that vulnerable populations are most endangered by climate change. Evo has called for an end to colonial power dynamics, and has unabashedly slammed international governance for ineffective tactics that benefit the privileged. He has condemned a capitalist colonial mechanism of global oppression, and through his organization of the World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, openly rebuked the liberal market ideations that have backed failed efforts at climate mitigation. At the same time, Evo has engaged in extractive practices that have fueled Bolivia's economy for centuries, and has thusly contributed to the global crisis that stems from carbon emissions and environmental degradation. Here lies the central paradox of this thesis: the Morales administration has presented a clear stance against capitalism, colonialism, and environmental damage, and yet continues to contribute to atmospheric carbon levels using market mechanisms. What, then, are the barriers preventing Bolivia from fulfilling its projected cosmology?

We may start with the criticisms leveraged against the Morales administration, namely that Evo has used indigeneity performatively to capitalize upon the swell of

indigenous activism that brought him and his party to power while continuing to engage in neoliberal, extractive practices in the background. Canessa argues that Evo has promoted a new nationalism based in indigeneity and resistance to globalization, and has used that nationalism to advance his agenda (Canessa 2012, 204). Canessa does not imply that Evo has surreptitiously drained the country of resources behind a facade of indigenous advocacy, but rather that he has used his positionality to engender widespread support. Others, such as Aymara leader Rafael Quispe, are more disparaging in their criticism. Quispe called out Evo for continuing the very practices that he was elected to defend against, and has denounced his used of indigeneity to capitalize on popular support. Postero shares some of these critical views, pointing to the performative and symbolic acts that Evo continually undertakes to reaffirm his indigenous background. These acts include rituals at the ancient Tiwanaku ruins, rallies at sites of historic oppression, and the invocation of indigenous revolutionaries such as Tupac Katari. Postero identifies these acts as affirming "potent fictions" that serve to "draw the public into a redemptive narrative" in order to fortify the the lineage of indigenous protest that led to Evo's election (2017, 37). Further, the redemptive narrative provides a veil behind which the Morales administration can pursue extractive objectives without public scrutiny.

Fernando Garcia nuances the criticism of Morales by speaking to the way that Evo uses rhetoric to distort public perceptions of capitalism. By essentializing capitalism to a tool of oppressors and a force of injustice, he effectively vilifies the economic world order while distracting from the market mechanisms used to extract and export natural resources (Garcia Pers. Comm. 2018). Through the contrasting of Bolivia with the

Western order on an international stage and the maintenance of an atmosphere of change in Bolivia, Evo has retained indigenous support while simultaneously enacting counterintuitive economic policies in regards to extraction. Only in instances such as TIPNIS are the underlying neoliberal motives of the Morales administration revealed. Thus, critics of Evo postulate that Morales simply took advantage of a revolutionary context to propel himself to power, and has since sustained Bolivia through the same means that previous administrations assumed. While there is some evidence behind this theory, I find more holes than supports. Evo may have capitalized upon the momentum initiated through activism in response to neoliberal policies, but, as I have shown in Chapter 3, he has made substantive changes in Bolivia that have advanced the aims of climate justice, reduced poverty and wealth disparities, and institutionalized freedoms for indigenous people that have not been enjoyed for centuries. Deception has at times played a role in Evo's practices, but he has been vocal about the economic inequalities perpetuated by unequal power dynamics between the Global North and Global South, and has recognized the dependencies created through the workings of colonialism. Handcuffed by an economy reliant upon extraction for the benefit of foreign entities, Evo has pushed to advance the aims of climate justice through redistributive economics and institutional changes that have resonated throughout the Global South. The barriers Bolivia faces in pursuing climate justice are thus not attributable to domestic malpractice, but rather arise from systemic imbalances created and perpetuated by the Western order.

The Western order, led by the hegemonic US, has developed a global marketplace that rests on a foundation of colonialism. The lineage of US interactions with Latin America fortifies this conception, with clear trends toward commodification of resources

over human rights. In Chapter 2, we saw the colonial legacy in Bolivia created a co-opted indigenous organizational structure that was then used as a resource extraction machine that operated upon indigenous labor. The resultant formation of criollo and mestizo economic centers nurtured class disparities within Bolivia, which were then accentuated upon independence. Indigenous protests have been a consistent theme in Bolivian history, but they have been continually repressed by those that wish to benefit from their lands and resources. Throughout a national history defined by military uprisings and social unrest, the United States has capitalized on Bolivia's coerced adherence to international trade practices, and has made efforts to disrupt attempts at fracturing a parasitic dependency. These efforts have come in the form of direct military intervention, promotion of regional development plans, austerity measures, and economic punishments for deviating from the US policy agenda. Now, with Bolivia situated in the most powerful position it has enjoyed for centuries, demands for justice reverberate more strongly and are met with more resistance.

Climate change solutions threaten the United States' ability to exert international influence and continue reliance upon fossil fuels as a primary industry. Today, despite dire warnings from the scientific community, the United States gets 81 percent of its energy through oil, coal, and natural gas (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2019). In 2017, US oil demands constituted 19 percent of global domestic oil demand despite the country containing only 5 percent of the world's population, and calculations place US energy consumption at 17 percent of the world's total (Center for Sustainable Systems 2018). That same year, a study by IBISWorld determined that oil and gas revenues globally reached 2 trillion dollars annually, accounting for between 2

and 3 percent of the global economy (IBISWorld 2017). The United States does not only utilize the fossil fuel industry for energy sourcing, but also as a means by which to operate and maintain a world order that has centered around US inspired market ideals. Fossil fuel interests dictate US foreign policy in many instances, and have been at the core of several modern international disputes. Climate change mitigation efforts pose a direct threat to the existence of one of the world's biggest markets, and the world's largest contributor to that market has made every effort to ensure that climate policy will not snatch away the reins.

If climate mitigation is an inconvenience to the Western order, then climate justice is an all out assault on Western norms and practices, particularly when it emanates from the Global South. Evo has made it clear that Western economic policies and neocolonial practices are antithetical to Bolivian ways of life, and has demanded that Bolivia be freed from toxic relationships with its colonizers. Such demands have been repressed in Latin America throughout the 20th century, but Evo has announced that he will not bend to the will of the United States or other foreign interests regardless of the punishments that have been leveraged against him for his actions. The climate justice movement goes further than suggesting that high emitting countries change their practices; it has demanded that those countries pay reparations for the harm they have caused and move forward in a way that centralizes oppressed and vulnerable groups, and Bolivia is leading the charge. The United States and other powers of the Global North have long benefited from the discrepancies that exist between them and formerly colonized nations and have acted to ensure that such discrepancies remain in place. Demands oriented around climate justice push back against the systems that maintain

poverty and dependency in the Global South, and in doing so, begin to tear away at imperial hegemonic structures.

The expression of climate justice has been systematically inhibited by a Western order that remains fixated on fossil fuels and capitalistic practices. The United States has spearheaded repression efforts against the southern nations in the Western hemisphere and continues to control climate discussions through punitive economic measures and obstinate negotiation tactics fueled by business interests. The global governance institutions that were borne of hegemonic ambitions and capitalistic ideations continue to fund projects antithetical to climate justice efforts, and while Bolivia has sought to remove itself from the structural vices imposed by such institutions, they remain strapped by development imperatives maintained by the Western order. Even now, despite acknowledgements that Bolivia has made tremendous strides under Evo's social redistributive economic system, the World Bank has stated that it is "important to join forces with the private sector to continue developing the country's potential in the energy sector" (World Bank: Overview 2018). Such intent does not reflect a change in ideology in accordance with Bolivia's efforts, which reinforces the notion that the Western order will continue to push forth using mechanisms that have historically damaged the earth and the people that reside upon it.

Not only have the demands arising from both the World People's Conferences fallen on deaf ears, the organizers of the conferences that the United States viewed as subversive were directly punished through funding retractions. US intransigence continues to stymie work toward climate change resolution, as evidenced by lack of cooperation with the international community and the manipulation of climate talks to

prevent binding emissions reduction commitments and the repayment of climate debts. This is further shown by the rejection of climate demands made by the Global South and the failure of COPs to acknowledge climate justice initiatives. Historical inequality is amplified in the face of climate change, which is a process that we have seen exposes vulnerabilities and exacerbates discrepancies between the wealthy and the poor. Those inequalities fall along the lines of colonial domination and continue to advantage those that have benefitted from the consumptive practices that have led to the climate crisis. Evo Morales has given a voice to an historically marginalized group of people that are now using that platform to demand reparations for past and current injustices perpetrated upon them by a neocolonial market system facilitated by neoliberal ideology. These demands are not a simple tit for tat- they are pleas for assurance that the future will not be one such as that painted by Christopher Parenti, with the wealthiest countries defending their resources as the rest of the world scrambles for basic necessities. Bolivia is highly vulnerable to climate change, and as such, the demands issuing from the country are becoming ever more desperate.

Bolivia presents an ideal case study through which to understand global climate processes. As the poorest nation in South America with a long history of extractive colonialism, Bolivia exemplifies the pernicious effects of colonialism and resultant economic structures. Further, the geographical setting of Bolivia provides a model by which to analyze climate processes, displaying in a small region a wide array of ecological settings that will be impacted separately and as a part of a larger climate system. Most portentously, Bolivia's newest administration has provided representation for an indigenous majority that has not enjoyed political relevance in centuries, and the

Morales administration has used that platform to initiate reforms that seek to break the cycles of neocolonialism and initiate a global movement toward climate justice. In doing so, Evo has brought to attention the wrongs perpetrated on the Global South by the Global North, and has condemned the use of "free markets" as a proxy for neocolonialism. He has further demanded that such wrongs be repaid, and has argued that the Global South is not responsible for ongoing environmental degradation, but that demands from former colonial powers necessitate reliance on destructive industries across the globe. Bolivia's prominence in the climate justice movement speaks volumes to the country's ability to initiate change despite suffering from extreme historical impoverishment. However, that the primary aims of the World People's agreement were not achieved signals that Bolivia is not in a position to overtake global climate discussions, nor are the 140 countries that sent delegates to the Conference. Subaltern voices are categorically rejected in climate discussions due to the threats they pose to Global North industry and consumption. As Bolivian representative Pablo Solon stated in a press release following COP16 in Cancun, "proposals by powerful countries like the US were sacrosanct, while ours were disposable. Compromise was always at the expense of the victims, rather than the culprits of climate change" (Buxton 2010). Bolivia has broken through the barrier laid by Western institutions by erupting onto the global stage as a champion of climate justice, but the degree to which Bolivia and other similarly situated countries have the ability to initiate global change is severely limited by the actions of global powers such as the United States.

I argue that Bolivia exemplifies the impossibility of climate justice fulfillment within the context of the Western order. With negligible voting power in international

institutions and an economy riddled with dependencies despite movement toward nationalization, Bolivia has little sway in matters of global reform. Domestic activism, particularly by indigenous people, has combated Bolivia's systemic disenfranchisement for centuries, but only under the Morales administration has that activism had the opportunity to spill over into the international realm. While the fight for domestic stability and economic fortification is not over in Bolivia, the employment of Evo's social projects has propelled Bolivia to a relative position of power from which it can project messaging antagonistic to Western economic practices. Despite these strides, Bolivia, along with the rest of the Global South, remains at the whim of the world's largest emitters. Carbon emissions continue to rise as the scientific community, led by the IPCC, projects drastic climate futures that will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable populations. Due to economic insulation, the world's largest emitters also happen to be the least vulnerable to the climate changes they cause, providing a counter-incentive for emissions reduction. Meanwhile, formerly colonized nations struggle to gain a foothold in terms of economic and social relevance on the global stage, entangled in domestic issues arising from neocolonial pressures that prevent larger scale climate resistance.

Evo Morales's prominence in the climate justice movement is precisely because the civil society uprisings that bore him to the presidency had sights on global reform that would break the chains of dependency that have long repressed Bolivia. They incriminated the neoliberal practices that were imposed upon Bolivia by foreign powers and sought international action that would alleviate domestic issues caused by intervention. Evo has made good on his promises to elevate Bolivia from colonial-induced poverty, and in doing so, has reduced climate vulnerability in Bolivia and

progressed the aims of climate justice on an international level. The ability of indigenous activists to implement a representative government despite centuries of marginalization has initiated a power transfer that features resistance to the processes that have kept Bolivia from achieving justice. This is a unique situation, particularly given Bolivia's impoverished status relative to other South American nations and the country's high percentage of indigenous residents.

While Bolivia's achievements are impressive, they have not induced the momentous change needed to protect the globe's most vulnerable and reverse the effects of climate change. Indeed, no one country could effectuate such a change, particularly if they are situated similarly to Bolivia. Bolivia's continued dependence on extractive industries exemplifies this point. Without the economic means to both support its citizenry and detach from environmentally damaging industries, resource wealthy countries with a history of colonialism have no choice but to continue extracting resources for the benefit of wealthier nations. Bolivia may have emerged from adverse conditions with policies aligned with climate justice principles, but that does not imply that the nation has overcome centuries of economic and social oppression. This case study indicates that the barriers to climate justice are incredibly high, and that the attainment of climate justice ideals will not be possible within the framework set by the Western order. With Trump at the helm, climate denialism continues to course through the veins of US institutions and policies even as hundreds of thousands of climate casualties pile up in vulnerable countries. It is essential that voices demanding climate justice be heard in an era of anthropogenic climate change that threatens the livelihood of humanity, starting at the lowest economic rung. Bolivia has made incredible strides

toward climate justice by reducing internal vulnerability and projecting indigenous-driven climate demands, but the forces of repression must be challenged more forcefully if justice is to be attained. As Evo Morales declared to a global audience at COP16:

> "It's easy for people in an air-conditioned room to continue with the policies of destruction of Mother Earth. We need instead to put ourselves in the shoes of families in Bolivia and worldwide that lack water and food and suffer misery and hunger. People here in Cancun have no idea what it is like to be a victim of climate change" -Evo Morales (Bond 2012, 7-8)

Conclusion

I have endeavored to show through literary, political, and economic analysis that Bolivia faces barriers to climate justice that have arisen from a colonial history of extractivism and ensuing international configurations that favor the ambitions of global hegemons such as the United States. The narrative I have developed situates the current Bolivian administration within historic and global contexts that have featured power imbalances disadvantaging Bolivia relative to the Global North and inhibiting the expression of indigenous-driven demands for justice. Civil society uprisings in response to detrimental neoliberal policies imposed by global governance institutions bore Evo Morales to the presidency, and he has since used that platform to amplify indigenous-driven messaging that calls for justice in an era of anthropogenic climate change. The activism that brought Evo to prominence did not merely seek an end to the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, but also sought to disrupt a lineage of oppression derived from colonial enterprise that has since manifested in the marginalization of indigenous people and large wealth discrepancies between the Global North and Global South. Morales has made good on his promises to nationalize Bolivia's industries and elevate the social welfare of Bolivian citizens through a system of progressive extractivism, and in doing so, has reduced domestic climate vulnerability through social reinforcement. His reforms have been particularly impactful for historically impoverished indigenous groups, as his redistribution policies have greatly reduced income inequality and extreme poverty.

Operating within the confines of an historically extractive nation, the Morales administration has utilized the only mechanism available to elevate its people out of poverty and acute climate vulnerability. By nationalizing extractive industries and utilizing surplus government funds, Evo has implemented a broad range of social policies that have leveled the playing field within Bolivia while simultaneously propelling the country to a position of international relevance in global negotiations. Through the mitigation of domestic inequality, Evo has increased Bolivia's climate resilience capacity and advanced the aims of climate justice, which seek to reduce climate vulnerability based in inequality. On an international scale, Bolivia has been at the forefront of the climate justice charge, vocalizing formerly suppressed ideations that challenge the mechanisms of power in climate discussions and international relations. Ultimately, Bolivia has fractured parasitic dependencies rooted in neocolonialism and has utilized its recent economic independence to lead the fight for climate justice.

Bolivia represents a didactic case study through which climate change politics can be interrogated. As a country highly vulnerable to climate change, Bolivia is calling for climate solutions to happen with immediacy and equity. If such solutions are not implemented, Bolivia will undoubtedly face disproportionate climate impacts due to their precarious environmental setting and lack of insulating wealth. This is not only true of Bolivia, but of many countries in the Global South that do not have the means by which to defend against climate change. Bolivia represents a member state of the Global South that has extricated itself from the Western order, and has used that positionality to attack the systems of oppression maintained by global governance institutions and powerful nations in the Global North. As Pablo Solon pointed out, there are many nations that

remain beholden to the Western order and its institutions, a circumstance that will only lead to disproportionate climate change impacts. Bolivia is attempting to initiate major structural changes in the balance of global power in order to protect the world's most vulnerable citizens, but the constraints placed upon such a movement are massive in scope.

In Chapter 1, I provided context for Bolivia's contemporary administration and introduced key themes of neoliberalism, indigeneity, climate justice, and climate vulnerability. I showed that indigenous worldviews championed by Evo are antithetical to the Western economic paradigm, and established Bolivia as a protagonist in the climate justice movement. I also provided a nuanced overview of the more recent political events that led to Evo's election, underscoring the vitriolic relationship between Bolivia and global governance institutions that has since led to Bolivia's economic independence. Additionally, I spoke to the ways in which economic and social inequality exacerbate vulnerability, and pointed to vulnerability as a human construction overlaid by environmental factors. This allowed me to uncover in later chapters the extent to which Evo has advanced the aims of climate justice by reducing vulnerability through social redistribution.

I then provided a history of Bolivia in Chapter 2 that illuminated the colonial mechanisms of extraction and oppression that have left residual scars in Bolivia's society. By examining a lineage of indigenous resistance to colonial powers, I emphasized the deeply entrenched tensions between colonial and indigenous ideologies that have led to a tumultuous past. Further, in conveying the historic relationship between Bolivia and colonial powers, I showed just how momentous Evo's election was in providing the first

adequate indigenous representation for over 500 years. I then provided an overview of climatic factors affecting Bolivia in order to show the precarious nature of Bolivia's ecosystems and the degree to which climate change will affect Bolivian people.

In Chapter 3, I built upon work in previous chapters by diving into international politics, using context from Chapters 1 and 2 to situate Bolivia within a world order that has prominently featured US hegemony. By exhibiting the relationship between the US, Bolivia, and international governance, I was able to show the repressive mechanisms historically used to prevent Bolivia from attaining economic independence. An analysis of Bolivia's industries and policies under Morales then showed Bolivia's continued dependencies alongside the incredible strides in social welfare since Evo assumed office. I investigated the controversial TIPNIS project in order to uncover the remnants of neocolonial structures that continue to influence Bolivia's development trajectory, and then spoke to the ways in which Evo has effectively reduced climate vulnerability in Bolivia.

Finally, I used Chapter 4 to elaborate upon global climate processes and connect climate change politics to the international interactions I had previously investigated. By bringing together the arguments I built in previous chapters, I showed that Bolivia faces barriers to the pursuit of climate justice that have been erected by a global economic system that has perpetuated inequality derived from colonial structures. I note Bolivia's international climate justice advocacy, and point to the ways in which Bolivia has attempted to initiate justice-based climate reforms. US intransigence in climate discussions is highlighted and connected to broader systems of power that continue to benefit the wealthy at the expense of the poor. In the end, I show that Bolivia is an

exemplary case study through which to understand global climate change dynamics, and indicate that Bolivia exhibits the impossibility of climate justice within the current global framework.

I would like to address the challenges I faced in writing this thesis along with a discussion of my barriers to access and the implications of my positionality. I am a white male with no language outside of English, which inherently reduces my legitimacy and ability to speak on behalf of Bolivian residents, especially those of marginalized identities. Rather than seeking to circumvent this obstacle, which could have resulted in damaging misrepresentations of Bolivian people, I have attempted to approach the topic within a framework that highlights my experiences and academic learning while drawing from resources that, to the best of my knowledge, accurately reflect the views of Bolivian officials and residents alike. I do not intend to speak on behalf of Bolivian people, nor do I presume myself to be a representative of any Bolivian communities that I have referenced in this work. Instead, my intentions have been to illuminate Bolivia's position relative to a world order that I have been able to analyze through economic and political examination in order to appreciate the role Bolivia has played, and continues to play, in the climate justice movement. I have used sources that have been recommended or provided to me by Bolivian academics that I have been connected with through the School of International Training, and I have interviewed Bolivian residents that have played major roles in Bolivian social movements to gain a better perspective on Bolivian politics. Though language does present a barrier to accessing work produced by Latin American academics, I have effectively utilized online translation platforms to interpret relevant resources. Further, by positioning Bolivia within an international context, I have

been able to delve into literature produced by English-speaking authors that has adequately supplemented my research.

My research does not represent a fully comprehensive review of Bolivian climate justice, and there is ample opportunity for further investigation. Future work could speak to several facets of Bolivian politics and climate justice efforts that I did not discuss. Included amongst these topics could be Evo's recent moves to maintain leadership despite the expiration of his term limits. I do not interrogate these efforts as my focus is not on the democratic processes within Bolivia, but internal legal struggles regarding Evo's tenure could impact his ability to enact climate justice reforms or continue the swell of indigenous-oriented policy measures. Additionally, there is work to be done in investigating the positions of other countries in the Global South that have been similarly impacted by the machinations of neocolonialism. Further, a more in-depth analysis of impending climate changes in Bolivia could better uncover the populations and industries that will be most impacted in the coming years. Finally, a thorough analysis of Global South or subaltern grassroots movements opposing the Western order and its institutions could provide a foundation for solidarity and coalition building amongst global citizens.

Bolivia exemplifies a climate justice leader that has built upon centuries of activism in the face of colonial enterprise to demand justice in a vastly unequal world. The activism that led to Evo's presidency continues to spill over into the international realm, but it is contained by structures that have deeply embedded roots. Through my work, it has become evident that the US-led Western order does not allow for the realization of climate justice, and that global power imbalances maintained by neocolonial mechanisms relegate poor countries to positions of climate vulnerability.

Bolivia and the rest of the Global South are not responsible for anthropogenic climate change, but they will be disproportionately impacted due to vulnerabilities constructed and maintained by an unjust global economy. Pursuing climate justice is imperative if we wish to protect the world's most vulnerable populations, but those same populations do not have the means to advocate for themselves, and thus are left by the wayside as top emitters continue to push for environmentally degrading processes. Bolivia has proven to be a committed advocate for climate justice, but their efforts must be amplified through global solidarity if the aims of climate justice are to be met in time.

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Appendix I

Full text of the 2010 World People's Agreement:

Today, our Mother Earth is wounded and the future of humanity is in danger.

If global warming increases by more than 2 degrees Celsius, a situation that the "Copenhagen Accord" could lead to, there is a 50% probability that the damages caused to our Mother Earth will be completely irreversible. Between 20% and 30% of species would be in danger of disappearing. Large extensions of forest would be affected, droughts and floods would affect different regions of the planet, deserts would expand, and the melting of the polar ice caps and the glaciers in the Andes and Himalayas would worsen. Many island states would disappear, and Africa would suffer an increase in temperature of more than 3 degrees Celsius. Likewise, the production of food would diminish in the world, causing catastrophic impact on the survival of inhabitants from vast regions in the planet, and the number of people in the world suffering from hunger would increase dramatically, a figure that already exceeds 1.02 billion people.The corporations and governments of the so-called "developed" countries, in complicity with a segment of the scientific community, have led us to discuss climate change as a problem limited to the rise in temperature without questioning the cause, which is the capitalist system.

We confront the terminal crisis of a civilizing model that is patriarchal and based on the submission and destruction of human beings and nature that accelerated since the industrial revolution.

The capitalist system has imposed on us a logic of competition, progress and limitless growth. This regime of production and consumption seeks profit without limits, separating human beings from nature and imposing a logic of domination upon nature, transforming everything into commodities: water, earth, the human genome, ancestral cultures, biodiversity, justice, ethics, the rights of peoples, and life itself.

Under capitalism, Mother Earth is converted into a source of raw materials, and human beings into consumers and a means of production, into people that are seen as valuable only for what they own, and not for what they are.

Capitalism requires a powerful military industry for its processes of accumulation and imposition of control over territories and natural resources, suppressing the resistance of the peoples. It is an imperialist system of colonization of the planet.

Humanity confronts a great dilemma: to continue on the path of capitalism, depredation, and death, or to choose the path of harmony with nature and respect for life.

It is imperative that we forge a new system that restores harmony with nature and among human beings. And in order for there to be balance with nature, there must first be equity among human beings. We propose to the peoples of the world the recovery,

revalorization, and strengthening of the knowledge, wisdom, and ancestral practices of Indigenous Peoples, which are affirmed in the thought and practices of "Living Well," recognizing Mother Earth as a living being with which we have an indivisible, interdependent, complementary and spiritual relationship. To face climate change, we must recognize Mother Earth as the source of life and forge a new system based on the principles of:

- harmony and balance among all and with all things;
- complementarity, solidarity, and equality;
- collective well-being and the satisfaction of the basic necessities of all;
- people in harmony with nature;
- recognition of human beings for what they are, not what they own;
- elimination of all forms of colonialism, imperialism and interventionism;
- peace among the peoples and with Mother Earth;

The model we support is not a model of limitless and destructive development. All countries need to produce the goods and services necessary to satisfy the fundamental needs of their populations, but by no means can they continue to follow the path of development that has led the richest countries to have an ecological footprint five times bigger than what the planet is able to support. Currently, the regenerative capacity of the planet has been already exceeded by more than 30 percent. If this pace of over-exploitation of our Mother Earth continues, we will need two planets by the year 2030. In an interdependent system in which human beings are only one component, it is not possible to recognize rights only to the human part without provoking an imbalance in the system as a whole. To guarantee human rights and to restore harmony with nature, it is necessary to effectively recognize and apply the rights of Mother Earth. For this purpose, we propose the attached project for the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth, in which it's recorded that:

- The right to live and to exist;
- The right to be respected;
- The right to regenerate its bio-capacity and to continue it's vital cycles and processes free of human alteration;
- The right to maintain their identity and integrity as differentiated beings, self-regulated and interrelated;
- The right to water as the source of life;
- The right to clean air;
- The right to comprehensive health;
- The right to be free of contamination and pollution, free of toxic and radioactive waste;
- The right to be free of alterations or modifications of it's genetic structure in a manner that threatens it's integrity or vital and healthy functioning;
- The right to prompt and full restoration for violations to the rights acknowledged in this Declaration caused by human activities.

The “shared vision” seeks to stabilize the concentrations of greenhouse gases to make effective the Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which states that “the stabilization of greenhouse gases concentrations in the atmosphere to a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic inferences for the climate system.” Our vision is based on the principle of historical common but differentiated responsibilities, to demand the developed countries to commit with quantifiable goals of emission reduction that will allow to return the concentrations of greenhouse gases to 300 ppm, therefore the increase in the average world temperature to a maximum of one degree Celsius.

Emphasizing the need for urgent action to achieve this vision, and with the support of peoples, movements and countries, developed countries should commit to ambitious targets for reducing emissions that permit the achievement of short-term objectives, while maintaining our vision in favor of balance in the Earth’s climate system, in agreement with the ultimate objective of the Convention.

The “shared vision for long-term cooperative action” in climate change negotiations should not be reduced to defining the limit on temperature increases and the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, but must also incorporate in a balanced and integral manner measures regarding capacity building, production and consumption patterns, and other essential factors such as the acknowledging of the Rights of Mother Earth to establish harmony with nature.

Developed countries, as the main cause of climate change, in assuming their historical responsibility, must recognize and honor their climate debt in all of its dimensions as the basis for a just, effective, and scientific solution to climate change. In this context, we demand that developed countries:

- Restore to developing countries the atmospheric space that is occupied by their greenhouse gas emissions. This implies the decolonization of the atmosphere through the reduction and absorption of their emissions;

- Assume the costs and technology transfer needs of developing countries arising from the loss of development opportunities due to living in a restricted atmospheric space;

- Assume responsibility for the hundreds of millions of people that will be forced to migrate due to the climate change caused by these countries, and eliminate their restrictive immigration policies, offering migrants a decent life with full human rights guarantees in their countries;

- Assume adaptation debt related to the impacts of climate change on developing countries by providing the means to prevent, minimize, and deal with damages arising from their excessive emissions;

- Honor these debts as part of a broader debt to Mother Earth by adopting and implementing the United Nations Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth.

The focus must not be only on financial compensation, but also on restorative justice, understood as the restitution of integrity to our Mother Earth and all its beings.

We deplore attempts by countries to annul the Kyoto Protocol, which is the sole legally binding instrument specific to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by developed countries.

We inform the world that, despite their obligation to reduce emissions, developed countries have increased their emissions by 11.2% in the period from 1990 to 2007.

During that same period, due to unbridled consumption, the United States of America has increased its greenhouse gas emissions by 16.8%, reaching an average of 20 to 23 tons of CO2 per-person. This represents 9 times more than that of the average inhabitant of the "Third World," and 20 times more than that of the average inhabitant of Sub-Saharan Africa.

We categorically reject the illegitimate "Copenhagen Accord" that allows developed countries to offer insufficient reductions in greenhouse gases based in voluntary and individual commitments, violating the environmental integrity of Mother Earth and leading us toward an increase in global temperatures of around 4°C.

The next Conference on Climate Change to be held at the end of 2010 in Mexico should approve an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol for the second commitment period from 2013 to 2017 under which developed countries must agree to significant domestic emissions reductions of at least 50% based on 1990 levels, excluding carbon markets or other offset mechanisms that mask the failure of actual reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.

We require first of all the establishment of a goal for the group of developed countries to achieve the assignment of individual commitments for each developed country under the framework of complementary efforts among each one, maintaining in this way Kyoto Protocol as the route to emissions reductions.

The United States, as the only Annex 1 country on Earth that did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, has a significant responsibility toward all peoples of the world to ratify this document and commit itself to respecting and complying with emissions reduction targets on a scale appropriate to the total size of its economy.

We the peoples have the equal right to be protected from the adverse effects of climate change and reject the notion of adaptation to climate change as understood as a resignation to impacts provoked by the historical emissions of developed countries, which themselves must adapt their modes of life and consumption in the face of this global emergency. We see it as imperative to confront the adverse effects of climate change, and consider adaptation to be a process rather than an imposition, as well as a tool that can serve to help offset those effects, demonstrating that it is possible to achieve harmony with nature under a different model for living.

It is necessary to construct an Adaptation Fund exclusively for addressing climate change as part of a financial mechanism that is managed in a sovereign, transparent, and equitable manner for all States. This Fund should assess the impacts and costs of climate change in developing countries and needs deriving from these impacts, and monitor support on the part of developed countries. It should also include a mechanism for compensation for current and future damages, loss of opportunities due to extreme and gradual climactic events, and additional costs that could present themselves if our planet surpasses ecological thresholds, such as those impacts that present obstacles to "Living Well."

The "Copenhagen Accord" imposed on developing countries by a few States, beyond simply offering insufficient resources, attempts as well to divide and create confrontation between peoples and to extort developing countries by placing conditions on access to adaptation and mitigation resources. We also assert as unacceptable the attempt in processes of international negotiation to classify developing countries for their vulnerability to climate change, generating disputes, inequalities and segregation among them.

The immense challenge humanity faces of stopping global warming and cooling the planet can only be achieved through a profound shift in agricultural practices toward the sustainable model of production used by indigenous and rural farming peoples, as well as other ancestral models and practices that contribute to solving the problem of agriculture and food sovereignty. This is understood as the right of peoples to control their own seeds, lands, water, and food production, thereby guaranteeing, through forms of production that are in harmony with Mother Earth and appropriate to local cultural contexts, access to sufficient, varied and nutritious foods in complementarity with Mother Earth and deepening the autonomous (participatory, communal and shared) production of every nation and people.

Climate change is now producing profound impacts on agriculture and the ways of life of indigenous peoples and farmers throughout the world, and these impacts will worsen in the future.

Agribusiness, through its social, economic, and cultural model of global capitalist production and its logic of producing food for the market and not to fulfill the right to proper nutrition, is one of the principal causes of climate change. Its technological, commercial, and political approach only serves to deepen the climate change crisis and increase hunger in the world. For this reason, we reject Free Trade Agreements and Association Agreements and all forms of the application of Intellectual Property Rights to life, current technological packages (agrochemicals, genetic modification) and those that offer false solutions (biofuels, geo-engineering, nanotechnology, etc.) that only exacerbate the current crisis.

We similarly denounce the way in which the capitalist model imposes mega-infrastructure projects and invades territories with extractive projects, water privatization, and militarized territories, expelling indigenous peoples from their lands, inhibiting food sovereignty and deepening socio-environmental crisis.

We demand recognition of the right of all peoples, living beings, and Mother Earth to have access to water, and we support the proposal of the Government of Bolivia to recognize water as a Fundamental Human Right.

The definition of forests used in the negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which includes plantations, is unacceptable. Monoculture plantations are not forests. Therefore, we require a definition for negotiation purposes that recognizes the native forests, jungles and the diverse ecosystems on Earth.

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples must be fully recognized, implemented and integrated in climate change negotiations. The best strategy and action to avoid deforestation and degradation and protect native forests and jungles is to recognize and guarantee collective rights to lands and territories, especially considering that most of the forests are located within the territories of indigenous peoples and nations and other traditional communities.

We condemn market mechanisms such as REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) and its versions + and + +, which are violating the sovereignty of peoples and their right to prior free and informed consent as well as the sovereignty of national States, the customs of Peoples, and the Rights of Nature.

Polluting countries have an obligation to carry out direct transfers of the economic and technological resources needed to pay for the restoration and maintenance of forests in favor of the peoples and indigenous ancestral organic structures. Compensation must be direct and in addition to the sources of funding promised by developed countries outside of the carbon market, and never serve as carbon offsets. We demand that countries stop actions on local forests based on market mechanisms and propose non-existent and conditional results. We call on governments to create a global program to restore native forests and jungles, managed and administered by the peoples, implementing forest seeds, fruit trees, and native flora. Governments should eliminate forest concessions and support the conservation of petroleum deposits in the ground and urgently stop the exploitation of hydrocarbons in forestlands.

We call upon States to recognize, respect and guarantee the effective implementation of international human rights standards and the rights of indigenous peoples, including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples under ILO Convention 169, among other relevant instruments in the negotiations, policies and measures used to meet the challenges posed by climate change. In particular, we call upon States to give legal recognition to claims over territories, lands and natural resources to enable and strengthen our traditional ways of life and contribute effectively to solving climate change.

We demand the full and effective implementation of the right to consultation, participation and prior, free and informed consent of indigenous peoples in all negotiation processes, and in the design and implementation of measures related to climate change.

Environmental degradation and climate change are currently reaching critical levels, and one of the main consequences of this is domestic and international migration. According to projections, there were already about 25 million climate migrants by 1995. Current estimates are around 50 million, and projections suggest that between 200 million and 1 billion people will become displaced by situations resulting from climate change by the year 2050.

Developed countries should assume responsibility for climate migrants, welcoming them into their territories and recognizing their fundamental rights through the signing of international conventions that provide for the definition of climate migrant and require all States to abide by abide by determinations.

Establish an International Tribunal of Conscience to denounce, make visible, document, judge and punish violations of the rights of migrants, refugees and displaced persons within countries of origin, transit and destination, clearly identifying the responsibilities of States, companies and other agents.

Current funding directed toward developing countries for climate change and the proposal of the Copenhagen Accord are insignificant. In addition to Official Development Assistance and public sources, developed countries must commit to a new annual funding of at least 6% of GDP to tackle climate change in developing countries. This is viable considering that a similar amount is spent on national defense, and that 5 times more have been put forth to rescue failing banks and speculators, which raises serious questions about global priorities and political will. This funding should be direct and free of conditions, and should not interfere with the national sovereignty or self-determination of the most affected communities and groups.

In view of the inefficiency of the current mechanism, a new funding mechanism should be established at the 2010 Climate Change Conference in Mexico, functioning under the authority of the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and held accountable to it, with significant representation of developing countries, to ensure compliance with the funding commitments of Annex 1 countries.

It has been stated that developed countries significantly increased their emissions in the period from 1990 to 2007, despite having stated that the reduction would be substantially supported by market mechanisms.

The carbon market has become a lucrative business, commodifying our Mother Earth. It is therefore not an alternative for tackle climate change, as it loots and ravages the land, water, and even life itself.

The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that the market is incapable of regulating the financial system, which is fragile and uncertain due to speculation and the emergence of intermediary brokers. Therefore, it would be totally irresponsible to leave in their hands the care and protection of human existence and of our Mother Earth.

We consider inadmissible that current negotiations propose the creation of new mechanisms that extend and promote the carbon market, for existing mechanisms have not resolved the problem of climate change nor led to real and direct actions to reduce greenhouse gases. It is necessary to demand fulfillment of the commitments assumed by developed countries under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change regarding development and technology transfer, and to reject the "technology showcase" proposed by developed countries that only markets technology. It is essential to establish guidelines in order to create a multilateral and multidisciplinary mechanism for participatory control, management, and evaluation of the exchange of technologies. These technologies must be useful, clean and socially sound. Likewise, it is fundamental to establish a fund for the financing and inventory of technologies that are appropriate and free of intellectual property rights. Patents, in particular, should move from the hands of private monopolies to the public domain in order to promote accessibility and low costs.

Knowledge is universal, and should for no reason be the object of private property or private use, nor should its application in the form of technology. Developed countries have a responsibility to share their technology with developing countries, to build research centers in developing countries for the creation of technologies and innovations, and defend and promote their development and application for "living well." The world must recover and re-learn ancestral principles and approaches from native peoples to stop the destruction of the planet, as well as promote ancestral practices, knowledge and spirituality to recuperate the capacity for "living well" in harmony with Mother Earth.

Considering the lack of political will on the part of developed countries to effectively comply with commitments and obligations assumed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, and given the lack of a legal international organism to guard against and sanction climate and environmental crimes that violate the Rights of Mother Earth and humanity, we demand the creation of an International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal that has the legal capacity to prevent, judge and penalize States, industries and people that by commission or omission contaminate and provoke climate change.

Supporting States that present claims at the International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal against developed countries that fail to comply with commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol including commitments to reduce greenhouse gases.

We urge peoples to propose and promote deep reform within the United Nations, so that all member States comply with the decisions of the International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal.

The future of humanity is in danger, and we cannot allow a group of leaders from developed countries to decide for all countries as they tried unsuccessfully to do at the Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen. This decision concerns us all. Thus, it is essential to carry out a global referendum or popular consultation on climate change in which all are consulted regarding the following issues; the level of emission reductions

on the part of developed countries and transnational corporations, financing to be offered by developed countries, the creation of an International Climate Justice Tribunal, the need for a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth, and the need to change the current capitalist system. The process of a global referendum or popular consultation will depend on process of preparation that ensures the successful development of the same.

In order to coordinate our international action and implement the results of this "Accord of the Peoples," we call for the building of a Global People's Movement for Mother Earth, which should be based on the principles of complementarity and respect for the diversity of origin and visions among its members, constituting a broad and democratic space for coordination and joint worldwide actions.

To this end, we adopt the attached global plan of action so that in Mexico, the developed countries listed in Annex 1 respect the existing legal framework and reduce their greenhouse gases emissions by 50%, and that the different proposals contained in this Agreement are adopted.

Finally, we agree to undertake a Second World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in 2011 as part of this process of building the Global People's Movement for Mother Earth and reacting to the outcomes of the Climate Change Conference to be held at the end of this year in Cancun, Mexico.