

Bates College

**SCARAB**

---

All Faculty Scholarship

Departments and Programs

---

2015

## **The Scholar and the State: Evangelos Kofos on the International Recognition of the Republic of Macedonia**

Loring M. Danforth

Follow this and additional works at: [https://scarab.bates.edu/faculty\\_publications](https://scarab.bates.edu/faculty_publications)

---

**The Scholar and the State:  
Evangelos Kofos on the  
International Recognition of the Republic of Macedonia**

**Loring M. Danforth**

Bates College

Lewiston, Maine

In this essay I offer an anthropological critique of Evangelos Kofos' work on the Macedonian conflict, the "global cultural war" (Featherstone 1990:10) between Greeks and Macedonians over the name by which the Republic of Macedonia should be internationally recognized. Kofos has consistently been the most serious, scholarly, articulate, and prolific advocate of the Greek position on Macedonia. He, like many other Greek scholars, diplomats, and politicians, argues that "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" does not have the right to use the name "Macedonia" because Alexander the Great and the Ancient Macedonians were Greek and because throughout history the name "Macedonia" had been an integral part of Greek history and culture.

After exploring the relationship between scholarship and politics and the possibility of complete objectivity in academic research, I consider the issue of positionality as it affects both Kofos' work on the Macedonian conflict and my own. Then I examine in detail various aspects of Kofos' proposed solutions for what has been called "the name issue." I suggest that he and other Greek nationalists are guilty of "privileging the double standard" in their writing on Macedonia, and I explore arguments over just who is attempting to monopolize the name "Macedonia." Then I consider a variety of proposals Kofos and others have offered for possible names by which the Republic of Macedonia should be recognized: names including prefixes, suffixes, or qualifiers, on the one hand, and names that could only be used in the Macedonian language and not in English or other languages of international diplomacy, on the other. Finally I conclude with an anthropologically informed evaluation of the Greek position on the conflict and a suggestion for an appropriate solution - a solution that transcends the limits of a narrow ethnic nationalism and adopts a more pluralistic and multicultural perspective.

### **Scholarship and Politics**

Many discussions about the relationship between scholarship and politics take the form of debates between those who believe that a completely apolitical and objective perspective is possible and those who advocate a "post-modern relativism," in which there is no such thing as "objective truth" and "any version of the past is as good as any other." I reject this oversimplified dichotomy and suggest that while we are all "positioned subjects," some versions of history are in fact more accurate than others. With James Clifford I believe that recent developments in the social sciences have "dislodge[d] the ground from which persons and groups securely represent others" and that "there is no longer any place of overview (mountaintop) from which to map human ways of life, no Archimedean point from which to represent the world" (1986:22). Recognizing our positionality does not involve abandoning the goal - the responsibility - of producing as accurate accounts of other cultures as we can. As Clifford has pointed out, if anthropologists did "espouse so trivial and self-refuting a relativism, they would not [go] to the trouble of writing detailed, committed, critical studies" (1986:24).

In *Orientalism* Edward Said also raises important questions about the relationship between scholarship and politics. “What is the role of the intellectual?” he asks. “Is he there to validate the culture and state of which he is a part?” Said offers only a partial answer to these questions when he concludes that his work on Orientalism “calls in question not only the possibility of non-political scholarship but also the advisability of too close a relationship between the scholar and the state” (1979:326). Clifford Geertz, in his well-known essay, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” pointedly expresses a similar view: “I have never been impressed by the argument that, as complete objectivity is impossible in these matters (as, of course, it is), one might as well let one’s sentiments run loose. As Robert Solow has remarked, that is like saying that as a perfectly aseptic environment is impossible, one might as well conduct surgery in a sewer” (1973:30).

Many scholars who acknowledge their positionality have followed the advice of Antonio Gramsci, who argues that “the starting point of critical elaboration is . . . ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces without leaving an inventory. Therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory” (Gramsci 1971:324, as cited in Said 1973:25). Before presenting my critique of the work of Evangelos Kofos on the Macedonian conflict, I offer, in this spirit, a Gramscian inventory of both my positionality and that of Dr. Kofos, as it is relevant to our work on Macedonia. I focus here on three aspects of our respective positions: our national identities, our personal histories, and our professional or institutional affiliations, all of which can impose serious constraints on the ability of scholars to do accurate and balanced work. Ultimately, of course, the accuracy and balance of a scholar’s work can only be judged by the work itself.

An American of English ancestry, I was trained as a cultural anthropologist in the United States. I had no exposure to Balkan politics until I began research for my PhD in the 1970s. My introduction to the Macedonian conflict took place at a highly politicized “academic” conference in Melbourne, Australia, that was organized by the Australian Institute of Macedonian Studies, an organization whose explicit goals were “to promote Greek positions” on the Macedonian issue (*Makedoniki Zoi*, January 1987: 53). I have been employed for over thirty years by Bates College, a small liberal arts college in the United States, where I am fortunate to enjoy a great degree of academic freedom. Bates College has absolutely no position on the dispute between Greece and the Macedonia over the name by which the Republic of Macedonia should be internationally recognized.

My position on the Macedonian conflict generally, and the “name issue” in particular, is clear and straightforward. I believe that the Republic of Macedonia has the right to be internationally recognized by its constitutional name. I recognize the seriousness of Greek concerns for the territorial integrity of the Greek state, given the violent twentieth century history of Greek Macedonia, and I oppose calls for a “United Macedonia” and references to parts of Macedonia as “temporarily under Greek occupation.” I agree, however, with a European Community arbitration committee, which in 1992 ruled that the use of the name “Macedonia” does *not* imply territorial claims against Greece. More generally, I agree with virtually all members of the international scholarly community that the existence of both a Macedonian nation and a Macedonian language are obvious, self-evident, and incontrovertible facts. Finally, together with the United States State Department, the European Court of Human Rights, Amnesty

International and Human Rights Watch, I affirm the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece (that is, the existence of a group of people who have a Macedonian, not a Greek, ethnic identity).<sup>i</sup>

Evangelos Kofos was born near Edessa in Greek Macedonia in the 1930s. He identifies himself as a “native of Macedonia” (Kofos 2010) and writes that he was “initially introduced to Macedonian history through childhood stories” (1993:vii). His intense personal involvement in the Macedonian conflict is also suggested by the comparison he has made between the appropriation of the Greek name “Macedonia” by the “Slavs” and the behavior of a robber who “came into my house and stole my most precious jewels – my history, my culture, my identity” (*Boston Globe*, January 5, 1993:9).

After the Greek Civil War, Kofos graduated from Anatolia College in Thessaloniki and then studied international relations and history in the United States and England. From 1963 through 1995, he was employed as a Special Consultant on Balkan Affairs by the Foreign Ministry of the Greek government. In this capacity he served as an advocate for the Greek government’s position on the Macedonian conflict. As a Greek diplomat, he also represented the Greek government at international conferences where aspects of the Macedonian issue were discussed. For example, he represented Greece at the 1990 meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, where Greek violations of the human rights of the Macedonian minority of northern Greece were the subject of controversial discussions. While Bates College does not provide “a perfectly aseptic environment” in which to write about the Macedonian conflict, doing so while employed by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs is, in my opinion, the scholarly equivalent of “conducting surgery in a sewer.”

More recently Kofos has served as Senior Advisor on Balkan Affairs for the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, known as ELIAMEP, its Greek acronym. Originally founded in 1988 as the Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP is a policy-oriented research institute that has been described as “the academic side of the Greek Foreign Ministry.” It is supported financially by the Greek Ministry of National Defense and the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as by various EU institutions, international foundations, and private companies.<sup>ii</sup>

Supporters of the Greek position on the Macedonian conflict have referred to Kofos as “a distinguished diplomat and historian” and as the leading voice “in Greek diplomacy and contemporary historiography on the Macedonian Issue.”<sup>iii</sup> A critic of the Greek position on the issue has referred to him as a member of “the army of historians mobilized by the modern Greek state” to defend the Greek position on the Macedonian Issue through the ideological use of history.<sup>iv</sup> In my opinion, Kofos is a scholar whose work is clearly the product of “too close a relationship between the scholar and the state.” His writing on the Macedonian Issue is an example of nationalist historiography in its most dangerous form, which serves to give academic legitimacy to the Greek government’s position in “the global cultural war” over the name “Macedonia.”

### **“Privileging the Double Standard” in Nationalist Historiography<sup>v</sup>**

“Privileging the double standard” is the act of applying principles to one’s own position that are different from the principles one applies to the positions of others in a

manner that clearly serves one's own political interests. It is a strategy frequently adopted by scholars who operate within a specific nationalist ideology and serve as its advocates, in contrast to those who stand outside the nationalist ideology in question and attempt to understand it from a more neutral or disinterested perspective. It should be obvious that good scholarship must avoid "privileging the double standard" at all costs.

In Greek nationalist scholarship, examples of "privileging the double standard" abound. For example, in a review of a Human Rights Watch report on the Greek minority in Turkey for the *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, John Kozyris praised the "well-known and respected human rights organization" for presenting "chapter and verse" on the anti-Greek policies and practices of the Turkish government (1994:145). Two years later, however, when Human Rights Watch published a similar report on the Macedonian minority in Greece, Kozyris adopted a very different tone in a review for the very same journal. *This* report, he wrote, unlike the first, lacked the necessary "care . . . and sensitivity to the national security concerns" of the Greek government; that its research "was done poorly;" and that its lack of attention to both facts and context seriously "undermine[d] its claim of neutrality." Finally, he concludes, its conclusions and recommendations "should be taken with many grains of salt" (1996:358 and 360). In another example of "privileging the double standard," the Greek government forcefully asserts its right to express concern for the Greek minority in Albania, but when the Macedonian government expresses similar concern for the Macedonian minority in Greece, the Greek government accuses it equally forcefully of improperly meddling in Greece's internal affairs.

Throughout his career Evangelos Kofos has effectively "privileged the double standard" in order to give academic legitimacy to the Greek position on the Macedonian conflict. His major publication on the subject remains *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*, originally published in 1964 by the Institute of Balkan Studies, a research center located in Thessaloniki that operates under the supervision of, and receives financial support from, the Ministry of Culture of the Greek government.<sup>vi</sup> Early in his book, Kofos observes that in the case of Macedonia "propaganda has been elevated to the rank of scholarship" and history has been "twisted and recast a hundred times in order to justify individual national views" (1993:1), and he specifically warns readers to exercise caution when evaluating works on Macedonia by Yugoslav and Bulgarian authors (1993:59). Kofos is right of course: the work of Yugoslav and Bulgarian writers on Macedonia *does* raise the possibility that the relationship between these scholars and the states involved in the Macedonian conflict may, in fact, be too close. It is equally clear, however, that in work by Greek scholars, including that of Kofos himself, history has also been "twisted," this time in order to legitimate the views of the Greek state. Kofos, of course, "privileging the double standard," fails to warn us of *this* danger, the danger presented by his own work.

Kofos' bias in favor of the Greek position on the Macedonian conflict is also obvious in the book's glossary where he defines "Macedonians" (Macedonians without quotation marks) as "the name of a Hellenic people," while he defines " 'Macedonians' " (Macedonians in quotation marks) as "the name given by the Yugoslavs to the Slav inhabitants of upper Macedonia, in the attempt to invest them with a new national identity" (1993:xvi). With this use of quotation marks, Kofos attempts to delegitimize, and ultimately deny, Macedonian (as opposed to Greek) claims to a Macedonian identity.

Finally, in an essay that was included in the second edition of *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia* (published in 1993), Kofos implies that a Macedonian national identity is somehow “imagined” (in the sense of “artificial” or “false”), while Greek national identity is “real” (330). This is a clear misuse of Benedict Anderson’s work on “imagined communities” (1983) to serve the goals of Greek nationalist historiography. Kofos fails to acknowledge that all national identities – Macedonian and Greek alike – are constructed through complex political and historical processes. Kofos’ description of the construction of a Macedonian national identity as a “surgical type operation for the mutation of the indigenous Slavonic inhabitants and their transformation into ethnic ‘Macedonians.’ ” (292) and to Macedonians as “misguided” people (319) with “inadequately formed perceptions of identity” (327) is offensive and has no place in scholarly writing. I suspect that Kofos and many other Greeks would strenuously object to the description of Greeks as “misguided” people with “inadequately formed perceptions of identity.” This is an example of “privileging the double standard” at its worst.

### **Monopolization of the Name “Macedonia”**

Since 1991, when the Republic of Macedonia declared its independence from the former Yugoslavia, a central theme of Evangelos Kofos’ work on the Macedonian conflict has been the claim that the Republic of Macedonia seeks to monopolize the name “Macedonia” and therefore deprive Greece of its own completely legitimate right to use of the term. In a 1999 essay entitled “Greek Policy Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition,” published in James Pettifer’s *The New Macedonian Question* (1999), Kofos presents an analysis of the Greek government’s evolving policy on the “name issue.”<sup>vii</sup> Here he charges with no documentation that Kiro Gligorov, the first president of the independent Republic of Macedonia, has insisted “on the monopolization of the Macedonian name” (1999:255). This charge is false.

No official of the Macedonian government, to the best of my knowledge, has ever attempted to deny Greece’s right to identify its northern province as “Macedonia.” As the authors of a report published by the Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis,” a research center in Skopje, point out, “[T]alk of the Republic of Macedonia somehow monopolizing the term ‘Macedonian’ is groundless. The Republic of Macedonia has *never* sought to use the term exclusively or to deny Greek-Macedonians from self-identifying as such.” They go on to point out that “two types of ‘Macedonians’ can co-exist, without confusion or clash, i.e. ‘ethnic Macedonians’ and ‘Greek-Macedonians.’ Both terms are terms of self-identification and are mutually exclusive.”

In fact, I would argue, it is Greece, not the Republic of Macedonia, that has sought to monopolize the use of the name “Macedonia.” In a revised version of his 1999 essay, newly titled “Greece’s Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy over FYROM’s Independence and Recognition,”<sup>viii</sup> Kofos examines the slogan “Macedonia is Greek” that “became the battle cry of the Greeks demonstrating all over the world against the recognition of the new state bearing the name of Macedonia.” Kofos claims that the intention of the slogan was “on the one hand, to set the record straight of the Hellenic connection of Ancient Macedonia, and in so doing to defend a people’s collective right to its heritage, and, on the other hand, to voice in no uncertain terms a determination that the

re-emergence of wartime irredentist yearnings for the annexation of Greek Macedonia would not be tolerated.” He goes on to state that, “the demonstrating Greeks sought to make it clear . . . that Macedonia i.e. the Greek province of Macedonia, was an unalienable component of the Greek state.” He concludes that it would therefore “be historically preposterous for a Slavic country to assume the Macedonian name as the official designation of a new independent state entity” (3).

According to Kofos’ reading of the situation, this “misleading” slogan was *misinterpreted* by outside observers as an expression of Greek nationalism and as an effort by Greeks to monopolize the name “Macedonia.” I suggest, to the contrary, that this slogan is perfectly clear, that it has not been misinterpreted in the slightest, and that it does, in fact, constitute unambiguous evidence that Greece is trying to monopolize the name “Macedonia.” Kofos’ own language contains evidence of an attempt to monopolize the term. In the passage cited above, he uses the unmodified term “Macedonia” to refer to the region of “Greek Macedonia.” What is more, in a 2005 interview Kofos stated that he and other Greek-Macedonians “are proud that we are Macedonians” and that “We consider a Macedonian anyone who is from Greek Macedonia.”<sup>ix</sup> These passages clearly indicate that Kofos believes that Greeks and only Greeks have the right to use the unmodified or unmarked term “Macedonian.”

A 2001 International Crisis Group report, entitled “Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It,” confirms, despite the protestations of Kofos and other Greeks to the contrary, that it is Greece, not Macedonia, that seeks to monopolize the name “Macedonia:”

The Greek position implies a *superior* – often *exclusive* – right to the contemporary appellation as well as the ancient heritage of Macedonia. . . . The historical region of Macedonia indeed forms an important part of the Greek identity. But however important ancient Macedonia may be to Greeks, there is an objective difference: Greece does not depend on the name Macedonia as the exclusive signifier of the Greek identity (16).

### **The Name Issue: Prefixes, Suffixes, and Qualifiers**

Evangelos Kofos has argued that in order to avoid monopolizing the name “Macedonia,” the Republic of Macedonia should only be internationally recognized under a compound name that includes a prefix, suffix, qualifying adjective, or some modifying phrase that serves to limit the scope of the symbolic and territorial claims that are supposedly implied by the Republic’s name. Only in this way, according to Kofos and other proponents of the Greek position, can Greece defend its own claim to Macedonia and to Macedonian culture and history more generally. In his 2005 essay, “The Unresolved ‘Difference over the Name:’ A Greek Perspective,” Kofos wrote that “Greece could accept a name for FYROM . . . on condition that it related exclusively to the geographical area over which FYROM has sovereignty” (212). In a presentation at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Rose-Roth Seminar in Skopje on October 20, 2010, Kofos insisted that the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia must be one that uses “the Macedonian name . . . with a prefix which will describe or identify clearly the region over which this country exercises legal jurisdiction.”<sup>x</sup>

The essence of Kofos' objection to the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia is that it is "identical with the name of the wider geographic region 'Macedonia'" (Kofos 2009) and therefore lays claim to all that is encompassed in the unmarked use of the term – Alexander the Great, the ancient Macedonians, and even the territory of Greek Macedonia itself. The Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis" in Skopje has pointed out that Kofos' claim is literally false: "The constitutional name of the country is not simply 'Macedonia' – it is the '*Republic of Macedonia*.' There is a clear political qualifier ('*Republic of*') preceding the noun 'Macedonia'" (April 2009).

This "political" qualifier, however, does not allay Greek concerns. Advocates of the Greek position have insisted on a geographic, ethnic, or temporal qualifier to limit the scope of the Macedonian claims. Greek diplomats and commentators have offered a variety of names that would meet these criteria: Northern Macedonia, Central Macedonia, Upper Macedonia, Vardar Macedonia, Slav-Macedonia, New Macedonia, and Macedonia – Skopje. In another clear case of "privileging the double standard," these suggestions for modifying or restricting the name of the Republic of Macedonia have not been accompanied by expressions of a willingness to modify or restrict the name of the Greek province that has long been known by the name "Macedonia." Again Greece is demanding that the Republic of Macedonia make concessions that Greece itself is unwilling to make.

### **English Language Rights to the Name "Macedonia"**

Evangelos Kofos and other proponents of the Greek position on the Macedonian conflict have also adopted another strategy to prevent the Republic of Macedonia from being recognized under its constitutional name and to deny the right of Macedonians to identify themselves as Macedonians. Kofos has suggested that Macedonians should only be allowed to identify themselves with terms in their own language (which is referred to as "Slavic" and not "Macedonian"). According to this position, the Republic of Macedonia could only be referred to as "Republika na Makedonija," and Macedonians could only be referred to as "Makedonci" (Kofos 2006, 2009, and 2010).

In an interview that appeared in the Macedonian newspaper Dnevnik (2006), Kofos stated somewhat presumptuously: "The name Republika na Makedonija - Skopje defines you exactly" (*sas prosdiorizei*). When the interviewer asked "Why the Republic of Macedonia in Macedonian and not in English?" Kofos replied: "Because that is your constitutional name. . . . It doesn't need to be translated." When the reporter remained unpersuaded, Kofos said: "You must also see the other side." This is precisely what Kofos himself is unable to do.

At the 2010 Rose-Roth Seminar, Kofos repeated his suggestion that the Republic of Macedonia be referred to as "Republika na Makedonija," but he referred to "Hellenic Macedonia" in English, rather than to "Elliniki Makedonia" in Greek. Later in his presentation, however, he did state that "in international languages, to avoid confusion, they [the names of both countries] will be used in untransliterated form – for example, "Vardarska Makedonija," "Elliniki Makedonia." While I suspect he meant "untranslated," rather than "untransliterated," English, French, and German newspapers are no more likely to write these names in their Macedonian and Greek forms than they

are to write them in the Cyrillic and Greek alphabets. Kofos suggestion is impractical in the extreme.

In his 2009 essay Kofos proposed that Macedonians only be allowed to identify themselves, as well as their state, in their own language. He writes: “Their name, *Makedonski*, by which they identify themselves in their language, should be respected in all languages, including the Greek. A similar arrangement *might* (emphasis added) apply to the use of *Makedones* for Greek Macedonians.” Kofos’ use of the word “might” suggests his unwillingness to commit himself to a position that requires Greeks to make the same concessions that he expects Macedonians to make.

Kofos recognizes that “whoever succeeds to impose on foreign languages its own version of “Macedonian” acquires international monopoly for its use (sic)” (2009:4). He is, therefore, attempting to deny the Republic of Macedonia rights to the name “Macedonia” in English and in other languages of international affairs and preserve them exclusively for Greece. Expecting international diplomats and journalists writing in English to call Macedonians “*Makedonci*” is as impractical as expecting them to call Greeks “*Ellines*” or Germans “*Deutsche*.”

If Kofos expects Macedonians to renounce the English language rights to the name “Macedonians,” while Greece retains them, he is again guilty of “privileging the double standard.” If, however, he expects both Macedonians *and* Greeks to renounce the English rights to the name and to use only the terms “*Makedonci*” and “*Makedones*” respectively, this would be fair and balanced, but, as I have suggested, it would be extremely impractical. In my opinion, a much more practical and equally fair and balanced solution to the problem, would be for both Macedonians *and* Greeks to enjoy full rights to the terms “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” in English and in other languages of international diplomacy.

## **Two “Macedonias” and Two Kinds of “Macedonians”**

The negotiations between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia that have been taking place under the auspices of the United Nations for over 15 years have long since reached a stalemate. Many observers in Greece and elsewhere recognize that with the passage of time more and more states will recognize the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name and that eventually acceptance of the name will become a *fait accompli*. As Kofos himself observed, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) will eventually “become plain ‘Macedonia’ in the international mass media as well as in informal discussions with Americans and European Community associates” and “the power of the mass media [will] eventually bulldoze the one-word Macedonian name into common parlance” (2005: 153 and 156).<sup>xi</sup>

From an international legal perspective, the issue is perfectly clear. The Greek demand that the Republic of Macedonia change its name has no support whatsoever in international law. As the International Crisis Group noted in its 2001 report on “Macedonia’s Name,” in 1991, when Macedonia was seeking recognition from what was then the European Community, an EC arbitration commission ruled in its Advisory Opinion that “the Republic of Macedonia has . . . renounced all territorial claims of any kind in unambiguous statements binding in international law; [therefore], the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ cannot . . . imply any territorial claims against another state.’

Whatever the legitimacy of the Hellenic claim to the legacy of Alexander, history and cultural heritage do not grant a copyright on place names.” After a careful consideration of the entire “name issue,” the International Crisis Group succinctly concluded: “As a matter of law the Greek claim fails” (16). The authors of a well-respected text on international law agree: “There appears to be no basis in international law or practice for Greece’s position” (Henkin, Pugh, Schacter, and Smit 1993:253).

From an anthropological perspective in which symbols can have more than one meaning, names more than one referent, the issue is equally clear. The names “Macedonia” and “Macedonians” can mean two things. There are two “Macedonias.” One is an independent country – the Republic of Macedonia; the other is a region in Greece – Greek Macedonia. Both the New York Times and Time Magazine have adopted this solution without any difficulties in maps of the region that they published shortly after the Republic of Macedonia declared its independence. (See Maps 1 and 2.) I was surprised to see that Kofos himself seemed to adopt this very solution in 2009, when he referred almost casually to: “*both* Macedonias: the independent state, i.e. ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,’ and the EU region of ‘Greek Macedonia,’ of the Hellenic Republic” (2009:3 emphasis in the original). This solution seems eminently practical, fair, and balanced.

Similarly there are two kinds of “Macedonians.” There are “Macedonians” who have a Macedonian (not a Greek) national identity; that is, they are Macedonians, not Greeks (and not Serbs or Bulgarians either). There are other “Macedonians” who have a Greek (not a Macedonian) national identity, but who also have a “Macedonian” ethnic or regional identity. That is, they are Greeks who have a Macedonian (not a Thracian, Peloponnesian, or Cretan) ethnic or regional identity. They are Greeks and Macedonians. These people often refer to themselves as “Greek-Macedonians.”

At the level of national categories, the terms “Macedonians” and “Greeks” contrast. It is at the “lower” level in a taxonomy of terms of identity, i.e. at the ethnic or regional level, where Greeks lay claim to a Macedonian identity. This identity is a subset of the category “Greek;” it does not contrast with it. That is why, in the discourse of international diplomacy level, where national identities expressed in single terms are the order of the day, Macedonians and Greeks are the appropriate terms to designate members of these two nations.

I agree with Spyros Sofos when he writes that a final solution to the name conflict must include:

“clear assurance that none of the parties considers the region of historical Macedonia their exclusive national homeland and a recognition that the two societies are sharing a region with a rich and diverse heritage, which peoples with diverse faiths, languages and identities have been calling ‘home’ throughout its long history” (2009: 6).

The solution to the Macedonian conflict proposed by Evangelos Kofos and other advocates of the Greek position is an expression of the principle of ethnic nationalism, according to which names, symbols, histories, and cultures are the exclusive possession of one and only one nation. The solution I advocate – that there are two “Macedonias” and two kinds of “Macedonians” - is an expression of more multicultural and pluralist

principles, according to which cultures, histories, symbols and even names are no longer the exclusive possession of any single nation, but are instead shared among wider communities of people who are constantly imagining and reimagining themselves in new and different ways.

## Bibliography

Clifford, James

- 1986 "Introduction: Partial Truths." In James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds. *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1-26.

Danforth, Loring M.

- 1995 *The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 2001 "'We Are Macedonians! We Are Not Greeks!': The Macedonian Minority of Northern Greece." In Jean S. Forward, ed. *Endangered Peoples of Europe: Struggles to Survive and Thrive*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 85-99.
- 2003 "Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Conflict." In Joseph Roisman, ed. *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*. Leiden: Brill. 347-364.
- 2010 "Ancient Macedonia, Alexander the Great, and the Star or Sun of Vergina: National Symbols and the Conflict between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia." In Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington, eds. *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*. Oxford: Blackwell. 572-598.

Featherstone, Mike

- 1990 *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity*. London: Sage.

Geertz, Clifford

- 1973 "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture." In *The Interpretation of Culture*. New York: Basic Books. 3-30.

Gramsci, Antonio

- 1971 *The Prison Notebooks: Selections*. New York: International Publishers.

Henkin, L. eds.

- 1993 *International Law: Case Materials*. St. Paul, MN.

Institute for Democracy "Societas Civilis"

- 2009 "Flawed Arguments and Omitted Truths: A Commentary on the 'Eliamep Thesis' on the 'Name Issue.'" Available at <http://www.macedoniantruth.org/forum/showthread.php?t=1183>

International Crisis Group

- 2001 *Macedonia's Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It*. Balkans Report No. 122. Skopje/Brussels. December 10, 2001.

Kofos, Evangelos

- 1964 *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*. Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies.
- 1993 *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia: Civil Conflict, Politics of Mutation, National Identity*. New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas.
- 1999 “Greek policy Considerations over FYROM Independence.” In James Pettifer, ed. *The New Macedonian Question*. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 226-262.
- 1999 “Greece's Macedonian Adventure: The Controversy over FYROM's Independence and Recognition.” In Van Coufoudakis, Harry J. Psomiades, and Andre Gerolymatos eds. *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*. New York: The Center for Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Queens College of the City University of New York, and Pella Publishing Company. 361-394.
- 2009 “The Current Macedonian Issue between Athens and Skopje: Is there an Option for a Breakthrough?” Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. Available at <http://www.eliamep.gr/en/european-integration/publications-european-integration/the-current-macedonian-issue-between-athens-and-skopje-is-there-an-option-for-a-breakthrough/>
- 2005 “The Unresolved ‘Difference over the Name’: A Greek Perspective.” In Evangelos Kofos and ??? Vlasidis, eds. *Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy Symbiosis, 1995-2002*. Available at: <http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/InterimAgreement/index.html>
- 2010 “Prospects for Resolving the Name Issue.” Presentation at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Rose-Roth Seminar. Skopje October 20, 2010. Available at: <http://modern-macedonian-history.blogspot.com/2010/10/prospects-for-resolving-name-issue.html>
- Kozyris, P. John
- 1994 Review of Helsinki Watch, *Denying Human Rights and Ethnic Identity: The Greeks of Turkey*. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*. 12 (1):145-6.
- 1996 Review of *The Macedonians of Greece: Denying Ethnic Identity*. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*. 14 (1): 358-361.
- Pettifer, James, ed.
- 1999 *The New Macedonian Question*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Said, Edward
- 1979 *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage.
- Sofos, Spyros
- 2009 “The Greek-Macedonian Dispute –Time to Return to the Drawing Board?” *Transconflict*. Available at: <http://www.transconflict.com/2010/03/the-greek-macedonian-dispute-%E2%80%93time-to-return-to-the-drawing-board/>

---

<sup>i</sup> For a more complete statement of my views on the Macedonian conflict, see Danforth (1995, 2001, 2003, and 2010).

<sup>ii</sup> See <http://www.eliamep.gr/en/eliamep/funding/funding/>

---

<sup>iii</sup> For such comments see: [http://akritas-history-of-makedonia.blogspot.com/2010/11/blog-post\\_15.html#comment-form](http://akritas-history-of-makedonia.blogspot.com/2010/11/blog-post_15.html#comment-form)

<sup>iv</sup> Pavlos Filipov Voskopoulos, personal communication.

<sup>v</sup> I am indebted to Keith Brown for the phrase “privileging the double standard,” and for many other valuable contributions to my thinking on the Macedonian conflict.

<sup>vi</sup> <http://www.imxa.gr/index.htm>

<sup>vii</sup> Revised versions of this essay have appeared in Coufoudakis, Psomiades, and Gerolymatos (1999) and on a web site entitled “Macedonian Heritage” which is maintained by scholars from Thessaloniki. See <http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/VirtualLibrary/index.html>

<sup>viii</sup> Available on line at a web site entitled “Macedonian Heritage” which is maintained by scholars in Thessaloniki. See <http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/VirtualLibrary/index.html>

<sup>ix</sup> This interview appeared in Dnevnik on March 18, 2006. It is available at: <http://star.dnevnik.com.mk/?pBroj=2940&stID=69465>

<sup>x</sup> The Rose-Roth Seminars, conducted since 1990 in cooperation with the parliaments of Central and Eastern European countries, generally address regional security issues in the Balkans and the South Caucasus. Kofos presentation is available at: <http://modern-macedonian-history.blogspot.com/2010/10/prospects-for-resolving-name-issue.html>

<sup>xi</sup> By January, 2011, over 90 countries had recognized the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name. When the United States did so on November 3, 2004, a State Department spokesman explained the decision saying: “We have now decided to refer to Macedonia officially as the Republic of Macedonia. By recognizing Macedonia's chosen constitutional name, we wish to underscore the U.S. commitment to a permanent, multiethnic, democratic Macedonian state within its existing borders” (Available at [www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/November/20041105143623XLrenneF0.6919367.html](http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/November/20041105143623XLrenneF0.6919367.html)).