

Bates College

**SCARAB**

---

Honors Theses

Capstone Projects

---

5-2022

## Understanding the Historical Roots and Implications of Today's Housing Policy: Contradictions and Possible Neighborhood Trajectories in Lewiston, Maine's Growing Our Tree Streets Choice Transformation Plan

Eleanor Beckerman  
ebeckerm@bates.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scarab.bates.edu/honorsthesis>

---

### Recommended Citation

Beckerman, Eleanor, "Understanding the Historical Roots and Implications of Today's Housing Policy: Contradictions and Possible Neighborhood Trajectories in Lewiston, Maine's Growing Our Tree Streets Choice Transformation Plan" (2022). *Honors Theses*. 391.  
<https://scarab.bates.edu/honorsthesis/391>

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Capstone Projects at SCARAB. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of SCARAB. For more information, please contact [batesscarab@bates.edu](mailto:batesscarab@bates.edu).

Understanding the Historical Roots and Implications of Today's Housing Policy:  
Contradictions and Possible Neighborhood Trajectories in Lewiston, Maine's

*Growing Our Tree Streets* Choice Transformation Plan

An Honors Thesis

Presented to  
The Faculty of the Program in Environmental Studies  
Bates College

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
Degree of Bachelor of Arts

By  
Eleanor (Elly) Beckerman  
Lewiston, Maine  
March 30, 2022

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very grateful for the many, many people who had a hand in shaping this project, my academic trajectory, my Bates experience, and the person I am today. I will surely not be able to thank you all, but my gratitude to you all is endless.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Francis Eanes. Francis, I am endlessly thankful for your careful and measured hand in shaping this project and your always-thoughtful feedback. I know you had significant changes occurring in your life throughout this year, and I am so appreciative that you stuck this out with me until the end. I am thankful to the Departments of Environmental Studies, History, and Chinese, as well as my teachers at the Conserve School and School Without Walls for helping to shape me into the scholar I am today. I would also like to thank Professors Sonja Pieck and Andrew Baker specifically. I feel very lucky to have been able to take courses with you, and your wisdom and insights the past four years have had a profound effect on me. I also must thank Professor Baker, as well as Professor Ethan Miller and Dr. Lydia Savage for their participation on my panel. I am deeply thankful to Hermione Zhou and my father, who both read and edited the entirety of this thesis, and to my mother for her assistance with various chapters.

Thank you to Abby, Reilly, Katie, Tamsin, and all my other friends and Cold Front teammates for your constant love, support, and friendship throughout these four years. Thank you to Harris, and to my family. I love you all more than you will ever know. Additionally, thank you to Tom, Andee, and Jill for looking out for me at Bates and beyond. Thinking about the American housing system is, to put it mildly, a massive downer, and you all give me hope for a brighter future.

## ABSTRACT

In Fiscal Year 2020, the City of Lewiston received a \$30 million Choice Neighborhood Implementation Grant from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The grant will fund revitalization efforts in the downtown Tree Streets neighborhood based on the *Growing Our Tree Streets Plan*. It primarily focuses on several housing initiatives, including the development of new and replacement housing, lead abatement, and increasing ownership and community control. Given Lewiston's past and the issues facing the Tree Streets today (e.g., high poverty, un/underemployment, food insecurity, etc.), which reflect widespread national issues (particularly in deindustrialized communities), the City acts as a case study for disinvestment and reinvestment in local communities. This thesis seeks to contextualize Lewiston's Choice Plan within historical trends of national housing policy and a dominant neoliberal housing paradigm. In this pursuit, I ask: In what ways does Lewiston's *Growing Our Tree Streets* Choice Transformation Plan conform to or depart from historical housing trends, particularly contemporary neoliberal precedent? What contradictions arise within the plans' strategies and partners? Through a survey of 150 years of national housing policy history and an analysis of Lewiston's plan, I explore possible community outcomes resulting from Choice reinvestment. This thesis argues that despite the many radical intentions expressed in Lewiston's plan, the broader neoliberal housing paradigm imposes constraints on realizing a truly radical community vision. This analysis takes a place-based examination of the broader question – what visions of housing does society articulate and value, and how does this impact accessibility to safe, healthy, affordable communities?

*Keywords:* Affordable Housing, Gentrification, Community Reinvestment, Choice Neighborhoods

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Acknowledgements .....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>Abstract.....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Table of Contents .....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>List of Acronyms .....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter I: Theoretical Framework.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1. Issues Arising in Traditional Housing Narratives.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2. Framing an Alternative Approach to Housing History .....</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1 <i>Ideal Class Types</i> .....	10
2.2 <i>Contradictions in Urban Planning</i> .....	11
2.3 <i>The (Re)Creation of Urban Space</i> .....	14
2.4 <i>Historical Housing Policy Traditions</i> .....	19
<b>3. Industrial Urbanism.....</b>	<b>20</b>
Overview .....	20
Historical Analysis .....	22
3.1 <i>Progressive Reformism</i> .....	25
3.2 <i>City Beautiful</i> .....	27
3.3 <i>City Practical</i> .....	29
3.4 <i>The Great Depression and New Deal</i> .....	32
3.5 <i>World War II and Suburbanization</i> .....	38
3.6 <i>The Civil Rights Movement</i> .....	43
3.7 <i>The War on Poverty</i> .....	47
3.8 <i>The Decline of Industrial Urbanism</i> .....	49
<b>4. Neoliberal Urbanism .....</b>	<b>51</b>
Overview .....	51
Historical Analysis .....	53
4.1 <i>The War on Poverty</i> .....	54
4.2 <i>The Neoliberal Response to Fair Housing</i> .....	57
4.3 <i>Nixon’s Housing Program Freeze and its Aftermath</i> .....	59
4.4 <i>Reaganomics and Housing</i> .....	65
4.5 <i>1980s Housing Crises: The Savings and Loan Crisis and Section 8 HUD Scandal</i> .....	69
4.6 <i>Directions of Housing in the 1990s</i> .....	72
4.7 <i>2008 Housing Crisis and Choice Neighborhoods</i> .....	81
4.8 <i>The Covid-19 Pandemic and Housing Today</i> .....	91
<b>5. Radical Urbanism.....</b>	<b>99</b>
Overview .....	99
Historical Analysis .....	101
5.1 <i>The Paris Commune</i> .....	101
5.2 <i>Red Vienna 1918-1934</i> .....	103
5.3 <i>American Municipal Socialism</i> .....	105
5.4 <i>The Finnish Homebuilding Association; New Communities, Inc.; and Cooper Square</i> .....	107
5.5 <i>A Right to Housing in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century</i> .....	113
5.6 <i>Radical Urbanism Going Forward</i> .....	114
<b>Chapter II: Results .....</b>	<b>116</b>
<b>Study Area.....</b>	<b>117</b>

<b>The Plan</b> .....	<b>118</b>
Goal 1: Lead-Free.....	119
Goal 4: Homes.....	120
Goal 5: Ownership.....	122
<b>Analysis</b> .....	<b>131</b>
Increasing Neighborhood Desirability versus Right to Return/Remain.....	132
Attracting Privately Directed Investments versus Increased Community Control.....	136
Explicit Funding versus General Support.....	139
<b>Chapter III: Discussion</b> .....	<b>143</b>
Echoes of Neoliberalism in the Transformation Plan.....	148
Departures from Neoliberalism.....	151
Assumptions in the Neoliberal Housing Paradigm.....	152
Broader Societal Critiques Arising from Housing Systems.....	154
<b>Works Cited</b> .....	<b>156</b>
<b>Appendix A</b> .....	<b>176</b>

## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

**AMI** – Area Median Income

**BMIR** – Below Market Interest Rate

**CDBG** – Community Development Block Grant

**CDFI** – Community Development Financial Institution

**CHDO** – Community Housing Development Organization

**FHA** – Federal Housing Administration

**FMR** – Fair Market Rent

**FNMA** – Federal National Mortgage Association

**FSLIC** – Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation

**GSE** – Government Sponsored Enterprise

**HOLC** – Home Owner’s Loan Corporation

**HOPE** – Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere/Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere

**HUD** – Department of Housing and Urban Development

**LACH** – Lewiston Auburn Community Housing

**LHA** – Lewiston Housing Authority

**LIHTC** – Low-Income Housing Tax Credit

**NLRB** – National Labor Relations Board

**PHAs** – Public Housing Authorities

**Section 8 NC/RC** – Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation

## INTRODUCTION

Lewiston, Maine grew and was shaped by the mill economy, but as the mills were shuttered – with the last mill closing in 2001 – thousands of jobs were lost. In the decade between 1990 and 2000, as the final mills shut their doors, 5,000 people, an eighth of the population, left Lewiston (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 25). It would be difficult to overstate the ways the mills shaped Lewiston. They brought investments and grew the population. The physical landscape of the city was changed as canals were dug to provide power to the mills. In large and small ways, they comprised the economic backbone of the region: around 1950, after paying their employees for a week in \$2 bills, the Bates Manufacturing Company asked local businesses to report where they were used, and the bills “popped up *everywhere*” (Skelton 2021).

Without romanticizing the mill era, given its brutalities, the decades of industrial decline – and certainly the mills’ absence – have left profound marks on Lewiston, its people, and surrounding communities. In Lewiston’s downtown Tree Streets neighborhood, many of deindustrialization’s social ills are manifest. Levels of unemployment and underemployment are high, and average incomes are around \$20,000 – barely more than a third of the median Maine income. Less than half of residents are food secure, and 96 percent are renters (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b). Aging, unhealthy, and unsafe housing in the Tree Streets may be the most visible and pernicious remnant of Lewiston’s industrial past. The dangerously high levels of lead and structurally unsound buildings make rental costs particularly outrageous for neighborhood residents.

Despite the real and continuing scars of deindustrialization, the Tree Streets is a vibrant demonstration of community resilience and possibility. It is rich in human and community resources not easily monetarily quantified. Its residents, many of whom are recently arrived



central and east African refugees with limited English literacy skills, collectively speak more than 36 languages and dialects. The neighborhood contains numerous community and backyard gardens (and a wealth of farming knowledge), a community credit union, a housing cooperative, informal and semi-formal networks of mutual aid, and many community-based organizations. There is a rich history of community activism, including mobilization to successfully resist a 2004 “urban renewal” proposal by the City of Lewiston which would have razed more than 800 housing units to make room for a four-lane boulevard connecting the suburbs to downtown.

To address pertinent and persistent issues in the neighborhood and more fully recognize its real assets, the city has most recently turned to the Choice Neighborhood Initiative (“Choice”) run by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Choice provides grants to communities to aid neighborhood redevelopment and reinvestment efforts. Through this program, the city was the recipient of a \$1.3 million planning grant in 2017 and a \$30 million implementation grant in 2020. Much of the city’s plan, and the national Choice program, centers around correcting issues of housing in the neighborhood to aid in broader revitalization efforts.

Because of its industrial past, current challenges, and involvement in Choice, Lewiston offers a window into broader national issues around disinvestment and reinvestment in local communities. Manufacturing jobs have decreased across the U.S., particularly in New England and the Midwest, where such jobs were the economic engines of communities (Cobb 1984; Harris 2020). Aging housing stocks, and related health issues with lead and radon, are also national issues. These too are most common in regions that have experienced a steep manufacturing decline (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2021). Such conditions, in Lewiston and beyond, are the result of cycles of disinvestment on the part of both private capital and the government.

In response to the local challenges resulting from disinvestment, the U.S. government, through HUD, has proposed reinvestment solutions primarily targeting housing and utilizing private capital investment. At its core, however, Choice (and the HUD mandate more broadly) is shot through with a number of critical constraints, perhaps most notably its reliance on a narrow set of neoliberal policy tools to treat the symptoms of deindustrialization (i.e. poor housing conditions and neighborhood disinvestment) rather than addressing the political-economic roots of these problems in any meaningful way. At the same time, as this thesis will show, Choice seems designed to gentrify neighborhoods like the Tree Streets, raising the very real prospect of displacing the very residents most in need of its transformative potential.

While HUD's reinvestment solutions have targeted housing using private capital for many years, the pandemic has laid bare the many challenges Americans face in accessing safe and affordable housing and has brought reinvigorated attention to national housing issues. Many in the U.S. have been unable to afford rent and other basic living expenses during the pandemic due to loss of income (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2021; U.S. Census Bureau 2022). Simultaneously, there has been a rapid rise in home buying and home prices, straining an already tight market (Dowell 2021; Duca and Murphy 2021). Similar disparities were highlighted by the foreclosure and financial crisis of 2008 (Schwartz 2015). These crises have reenergized debates about housing – how it is provided, who benefits, and how to ensure a more equal and equitable system, and highlight why this research and others examining the provisioning of housing in America is necessary.

Through a review of 150 years of U.S. housing policy and an examination of Lewiston's *Growing Our Tree Streets* Choice Transformation Plan, this thesis seeks to highlight contradictions arising within the dominant neoliberal housing paradigm. Lewiston's envisioned

transformations, for all their community input and radical intentions, are constrained by a housing paradigm that prioritizes the desires of private capital over community needs. These issues are emblematic of those occurring in cities nationally, and as such, Lewiston can act as a case study of the ways in which broader housing policy may constrain more radical solutions to urban issues.

With this aim, this thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter I introduces a theoretical framework for understanding housing policy. This begins with an analysis of issues with traditional housing narratives and then lays out an alternative framework to understand housing policy, both historically and today. The chapter then applies this framework to three urban planning and policy traditions spanning 150 years of history to contextualize the current housing paradigm and alternate conceptualizations of housing. Chapter II analyzes Lewiston's *Growing Our Tree Streets* Choice Transformation Plan. It first reviews strategies and partners pertinent to housing, then looks to the expected financial and social returns on investment of various stakeholders. Chapter II concludes with the evaluation of contradictions arising within the plan and analyzes what these contradictions could mean for current residents' right to return or remain in their homes and neighborhoods. Finally, Chapter III discusses the ways that Lewiston's current plan adheres to or departs from the current dominant housing paradigm. This chapter closes with a brief reflection on how the dominant housing paradigm structures society, and what a departure from it would entail.

## **CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The later chapters of this thesis evaluate and analyze the *Growing Our Tree Streets* Choice Transformation Plan in Lewiston, Maine. Chapter II first looks at the plan's partners and implementation mechanisms to discuss contradictions arising in the plan. Chapter III then discusses more broadly how this plan conforms to or departs from the dominant housing paradigm. This evaluation and analysis require the establishment of a theoretical and historical framework on which to draw. This chapter will detail theoretical frameworks used to analyze housing policy and its historical trajectory and provide a history of housing policy in the United States. After providing background and critique on the ways housing narratives are commonly analyzed this chapter presents an alternative materialist framework for considering housing policy. Then this materialist lens is used to consider the history of urban housing traditions in the U.S. beginning in the mid-1800s. This history is split into three urban traditions ascendant at different times throughout the period: industrial urbanism, neoliberal urbanism, and radical urbanism, which differ in their power structures and the purpose of housing they envision and enact. This provides the historical and political-economic context, as well as the theoretical background, that this thesis uses to examine Lewiston's Choice housing strategies.

### **1. Issues Arising in Traditional Housing Narratives**

Conventional histories of urban planning and public housing – examples being Kenneth Jackson's *Crabgrass Frontier*, Mel Scott's *American City Planning*, and John Rep's *The Making of Urban America* – generally follow a common narrative arc. They first establish that housing conditions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were bad in cities, with crowded living environments that lacked proper sanitation. In response, progressive reformers sought to pass legislation and pressed for better living conditions on religious and moral grounds.

Following the Great Depression, the government became involved in financially aiding homeowners and began a public housing program. Growth in housing from these efforts slowed during WWII but grew significantly in the war's aftermath as liberal ideals and economic prosperity swept through the country. The suburbs grew and flourished during this time, while inner cities became plagued by poverty and crime. Johnson's War on Poverty in the 1960s aimed to address some of these issues, but ultimately Reagan-era neoliberalism became a more dominant way of thinking about provisioning housing and social services. Throughout the last several decades of the 1900s, there were continuing divides between cities and suburbs in racial and class demographics and rates of crime. In more recent years, many cities have begun to undergo processes of revitalization – sometimes called urban renewal, sometimes called gentrification – which has resulted in reinvestment in cities and lower rates of poverty and crime.

While these mainstream narratives are not necessarily incorrect, they and others adopt a largely idealist view of history, which is limiting. Reps' *The Making of Urban America* (1965) and Scott's *American City Planning Since 1890* (1971) mainly focus on the ideological motivations of those designing urban areas more broadly, although they make some references to those advocating for and creating housing policy. Similarly, Jackson's *Crabgrass Frontier*, which traces the creation of the suburbs, centers how particular suburban ideals and aesthetics drove low-density and racially segregated sprawl. Although Jackson (1987) acknowledges the material forces driving pro-suburban ideology, this is in passing, and he finds it more important to focus on the results of policies drawing on these various ideologies. Idealist narratives are not just confined to scholarly work. An idealist narrative is espoused by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in their online housing timeline. It can also be seen in the public housing history timeline published by the National Low Income Housing Coalition, one of the

country's largest non-profits addressing housing insecurity. While it is certainly important to understand the ideological traditions behind any given policy, and while these ideological understandings are not necessarily wrong, these narratives often ignore the material conditions within which such ideologies evolve and are implemented.

Peter Marcuse (1995) expands the critique of this idealist lens by laying out three fundamentally flawed idealist paradigms through which these histories are often understood. Marcuse lays out these paradigms in an analysis of what is incorrect about conventional understandings of public housing history. However, his analysis can be expanded to a more general concept of conventional housing policy history, as outlined above, to highlight common fallacies. Awareness of these fallacies also helps to inform critiques of specific housing policies, both historic and contemporary. These three paradigms are:

1. The benevolent state paradigm, where “a benevolent government tries to shape a housing program so as to meet the most severe housing needs of its members, learning (or trying to learn) from the mistakes of the past.” (Marcuse 1995, 241);
2. The meddling state paradigm, where “a faceless government attempts, out of a perverted ideological bias, to tamper with a free private market in housing, with a series of disastrous results, each stage as futile as the preceding because the fundamental error persists.” (Marcuse 1995, 241); and
3. A pluralist paradigm, where “either housing reformers, sincerely concerned to solve the housing problem, confront a host of special interests in the real estate industry and try to push through good programs, or in which a multitude of conflicting interests jostle with each other about housing programs and produce somewhat at random periodic changes in the shape of housing policies.” (Marcuse 1995, 241-242)

Marcuse primarily critiques these paradigms for relying on the incorrect assumption that there is a continuous and coherent housing policy that consistently aims to primarily address issues of housing. This assumption allows those adopting one of these idealist paradigms to pass on any structural analysis of the forces that produce urban space. In reality, there are several forces policymakers and urban planners contend with, and concern for the ill-housed is rarely at the

forefront of housing decisions. Nor is housing policy a singular or static force. It exists not just in the minds of policymakers, but in response to on-the-ground conditions shaping policymakers' choices. Responding to these ideas, Marcuse (1995, 242) writes "public housing programs have in fact been the product of widely differing forces, ranging from fear of social unrest to the desire to abate unemployment to concerns for the ill-housed to the search for profits in the real estate or allied industries to the needs for redevelopment to racism and anti-racism to political considerations of constituency stabilization (among other forces); that a large, not random, pattern can be discerned from the interaction of these forces." This is true not just of public housing programs but of housing policy more broadly. The analysis below expands on the myriad forces that animate housing policy, as well as the conditions that drive them.

Another pitfall encountered by many housing narratives stems from their narrowly defined foci or from subscribing strictly to one of the three paradigms outlined above. Housing policy is historically and politically contingent, and many analyses, in their singular historical or political focus, miss various nuances, minor and significant. As Richard Foglesong (1986) remarks in *Planning the Capitalist City: The Colonial Era to the 1920s*, this is true for the two basic histories of American urban planning, both of which he criticizes for taking an idealist view of urban planning. Foglesong (1986, 9) comments that because John Reys' *The Making of Urban America* and Mel Scott's *American City Planning Since 1890* "fail to relate the history of planning to the organizing structure of American society [...] [they] do not provide an adequate explanation of the development of planning." In more recent years, Richard Rothstein's *The Color of Law* has gained national prominence for its explanation of the ways the United States systemically shaped an explicitly and fundamentally racist national housing policy. While correct in his historical analysis and core argument that the federal government played a key role

in the creation and reproduction of racially segregated neighborhoods, Rothstein leaves the question of *why* the government engaged in these practices left unanswered (Nelson 2021). That is, Rothstein fails to fully reveal and interrogate the material conditions and political-economic forces underlying the development and ideology of de jure segregation. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor (2019, 10) critiques Rothstein's work: "While it is true, as Richard Rothstein [...] argued, that the federal government played a critical role in extending the logic and practices of residential segregation with the invention of its housing practices in the 1930s, government agents did not act in a vacuum, nor did they act alone," going on to explain the tremendous power and influence of the real estate market. Without this deeper reading, an understandable conclusion to address de jure racism is to correct racist policy. While that is certainly a step in the right direction, without understanding and curtailing the broader forces that use racism as a tool for labor exploitation and capital accumulation, society will continue to experience the detrimental effects of previous racist policy, and effects from new iterations of such policy.

## **2. Framing an Alternative Approach to Housing History**

If there are conclusions to be drawn from histories of housing policy and urban planning, as I believe there are, the focus should be on the various configurations of the state, capital, and labor in the urban traditions outlined below, and the policies that have resulted from the way these idealized classes interact with each other. As such, this thesis will primarily utilize a materialist lens, historically grounded in the various social and economic realities of the day. This will contrast with those idealist narratives critiqued above. Taking a materialist stance provides an explanation for the actions of groups that is attributable not just to their beliefs but understands that choices are made in response to the political-economic contradictions of the time (Harvey 2013a; Foglesong 1986). This materialist stance will draw on the structural



emphasis of Marxist urban theory. It will deal primarily with the ideal types of state, capital, and labor, although there will be some nuances acknowledged within these groups. There are of course limitations to this lens, and Marxist urban theory cannot explain all decisions, all places, and all times. Per a critique from post-colonial urban theory, Marxist urban theory is particularly bad at understanding the nuances and topographies of various local actors (Rugkhaman 2014). However, by flattening and abstracting these histories to some extent, not only is it manageable to analyze a century and a half of urban housing policy and material conditions, but it is also possible to pull legible trends and urban traditions from that overall history. The latter two chapters of this thesis will then focus on Lewiston, and through a place-based case study, further interrogate the nuances arising within the City's Choice housing plans.

### *2.1 Ideal Class Types*

In structural Marxist theory, configurations of the state, capital, and labor take different forms. Structural Marxists describe an inherently unstable system under capitalism (Harvey, 2001, 2013a). This system is plagued by contradictions and internal rifts between various groups of capitalists, as a result of their highly individualistic perspectives, but also within the labor class, as a result of actions by capitalists (either independently or in collusion with the state). The state, when understood as all levels of national, state, local and municipal government, as well as urban planners, also introduces the possibility of internal rifts and differential motivations. Throughout much of the mainstream history outlined in the sections below (particularly industrial and neoliberal urbanism), the state's primary concern is maintaining balance and reproducing contemporary structures of power. This puts the interests of capital in a primary position. Capital, or capitalists, is the class that holds the means of production. For the purpose of analyzing U.S. housing history, capital has two main subtypes, which tend to have

contradictory interests. The first is industrial capital, which seeks to profit from manufacturing, extractive industry, and other related fields. Their means of production are factories, mines, quarries, water treatment plants, oil wells, oil refineries, and more. Industrial capital is primarily reliant, especially historically, on the physical labor of the labor class to produce profit from these resources. The second applicable capital subtype is real estate capital, which creates profit by building, buying, and renting land and properties. Banking and investment capital act as a partner in these pursuits, particularly during the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century up through today. Real estate capital does not rely as heavily on the actual physical or mental labor of the labor class to create and accumulate capital. Rather, it primarily does so by exploiting the wages of the labor class. The broad labor class is defined as those who do not own the means of production and therefore sell their labor to make a living. This class is heavily stratified, with very different wages and skills for different types of jobs. For example, a university professor and a factory worker would both be included in this broad category. There are many divisions within the labor class along professional, racial, ethnic, and other lines. These divisions are not fixed and shift over time but are often exploited by the capitalist class or the state for capitalist or state interests. The interests of different groups within the labor class will vary depending on the job, time, and place, but common interests are in safe working environments, fair wages, and safe, healthy, and affordable communities to live in.

## *2.2 Contradictions in Urban Planning*

This materialist version of capitalist urban housing history is defined by two main contradictions, the first being the *property contradiction*. The property contradiction “describes the unhappy tension between capitalists’ desire for certain types of planning interventions, and their antipathy towards anything that restricts their operations” (Stein 2019, 30). Capitalists’

interest in socializing control of land comes from the need to cope with negative externalities that arise from the commodification of land; to create environmental amenities needed for the reproduction of labor's role in the system; to maintain the physical infrastructure necessary for production; and to ensure the efficient spatial coordination of these infrastructures and amenities to enable efficient circulation of people and goods (Foglesong 1986, 20-21). Essentially, capitalists desire state intervention that allows them to increase or retain profits while lowering costs but are also deeply protective of their private property rights, which are critical to maintaining control over their businesses. They often reject planning action as "governmental overreach." The property contradiction is further complicated by the different desires of various capitalist groups – industrial capital, real estate capital – described above. For example, industrial capitalists desire state intervention to ensure the construction of affordable housing near factories for their workers. They also want rents to be kept low, so wages can remain low as well. In contrast, real estate capitalists are most interested in making money from rents. As such, they would like to charge high rents, and to do so may push for zoning that puts industry further from housing and for laws imposing environmental restrictions. Additionally, they may reject the construction of affordable housing.

The second contradiction that defines the capitalist system in America is the *capitalist-democracy contradiction*. This contradiction arises in the attempts of a liberal democratic government to address the property contradiction. The capitalist-democracy contradiction describes the pressure that arises when "[i]n a nominatively democratic capitalist republic, the state and its planners have to perform a delicate balancing act: planners must proceed with enough openness and transparency to maintain public legitimacy, while ensuring that capital retains ultimate control over the process's parameters" (Stein 2019, 31). Essentially, planners

and the state are tasked with maintaining state control and validity in the eyes of the public while ensuring that decisions made align with the interests of various capitalist classes. For example, the implementation of public works projects, zoning changes, new development, or a new master plan for a city may all challenge a city's ability to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry while implementing a project where the outcome is predetermined. In this situation, the state may try to maintain balance within the capitalist democracy contradiction by engaging in participatory planning (by way of planning commissions, comment periods, community focus groups, etc.) to maintain a façade of democratic processes within urban land-use decisions. Generally, the state ultimately makes decisions that align with the interests of the relevant capitalist groups involved. In the rare case in which the state does not, it makes no fundamental change to the capitalist system or reorders the prioritization of the ideal types of capital and labor.

These contradictions both inspire and arise around and within various state actions throughout American history. These contradictions emerge from a central conflict between the “social character of the land” – or in simpler terms, its value as a collective public resource – and private ownership and control of land (Foglesong 1986, 22). The property contradiction rises internally within capitalism. Which capitalist interests are seen and supported in the resolution of the property-contradiction is connected to broader worldwide trends in labor, manufacturing, and the creation of wealth. In contrast to the property contradiction, the capitalist-democracy contradiction results from the interactions between political and economic structures in a democratic-capitalist society. The state will consistently intervene in the property contradiction, by way of urban planning or other actions that maintain democratic legitimacy, in attempts to

balance, maintain, and reproduce the social character of land and private property rights in an inherently unstable, contradictory system.

### 2.3 *The (Re)Creation of Urban Space*

In his theory on the making of cities, David Harvey (2013a, 5) writes that cities have always arisen “through the geographical and social concentration of a surplus product.” For example, this concentration could be of (and necessarily included) food surpluses. Control over surplus products coalesced in the hands of specific groups and individuals, and their ability to leverage this surplus product equated to power. Reflecting on growth in ancient cities, Smith and Lobo (2019, 5) write: “This power allows the leaders to extract wealth out of the hinterland and distribute it in the [city]. Migrants come to the city because of the demand created by the concentration of wealth, desire to influence leadership, the transfers given by leadership to quell local unrest, and the safety of the capital.” Put more simply, the concentration of resources encourages urbanization for myriad reasons. From this base truth, Harvey (2013a, 5) posits that to claim the right to the city is to “claim some kind of shaping power of the processes of urbanization.” Different groups of actors will envision a city best fit to their own needs quite differently; ultimately the city – which is not some predetermined natural entity – will reflect whoever is best able to make their claim. “The financiers and developers can claim it, and have every right to do so. But then so can the homeless and the *sans-papiers*. We inevitably have to confront the question of whose rights are being identified, while recognizing, as Marx puts it in *Capital*, that ‘between equal rights force decides’” (Harvey 2013a, xv).

The question of how urban spaces are created and remade by these three typified actors then has no static or inherent answer. What might a system primarily controlled by capital look like? Such a system would look relatively akin to dominant paradigms, current and historic, in

the U.S., which are detailed in the history below. It would be shaped by the property and capitalist-democracy contradictions. As a political-economic system, capitalism is characterized by the unending creation of profit. Capitalists must compete with other capitalists to survive in this system, consistently growing their profits to accumulate more surplus value than their competitors. To do this, capitalists must constantly reinvest as least a fraction of their profits to ensure continued growth. This growth may come from increases in the total quantity of product produced, or from the more efficient production of product. Without making these necessary reinvestments, capitalists are in danger of falling behind, unable to maintain their place in a competitive market. Capitalism is also reliant on space to pour this surplus product into; urbanization plays a role by creating a consumer of the surplus product that is produced, adding to the capitalists' wealth. Harvey (2013a, 5) explains this by saying "capitalism needs urbanization to absorb the surplus product it perpetually produces." In a society where real estate is the dominant form of capital, such as Stein (2019) posits we live in in the U.S., capitalist reinvestment is in the real estate itself. Increased urbanization or urban revitalization then adds direct value to capitals' wealth. Here begins a cycle between the accumulation of capital and the growth of cities, where urbanization is a key process in creating an ever-expanding consumer base (Harvey 2013a, 5).

This system is impossible to sustain without intervention by the state. There are a significant number of barriers to such constant growth – limited natural resources, land capacity restrictions, finding new markets for products – as well as the conflicts that arise between different types of capital. Thus, capital needs the state to maintain balance in the system, spur the creation or opening of new markets, maintain control of labor, and more. As Stein (2019, 26) has noted, "[t]he history of capitalism clearly shows that market economies require planning.

[...] They rely on massive legal, logistical, infrastructural, and technological capacities all of which must not only be imagined and developed by likewise maintained and reproduced.” This is where current urban planning structures become relevant. Although planning sometimes has the effect of impeding markets, and often individual planners come to the job with good and even radical intentions, if the state is, as Marx and Engels (1933) describe it, “the executive committee of the bourgeoisie,” then planning will remain caught in the property-democracy contradiction and continue the maintenance, defense, and expansion of capitalism (Stein 2019, 27).

However, it is not inherent that capital will hold such a primary place of control in the process of urbanization and the production of urban space. Another radical option, *the right to the city*, articulated by Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey, describes urbanization reproduced based on the interests, desires, and actions of the labor class within it. Lefebvre (1996, 158), translated by Kofman and Labas, writes “[t]he *right to the city* cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed *right to urban life*.” Lefebvre writes about the *right to the city* in opposition to what he saw as the *crisis of the city* in 1960s France. Lefebvre saw this crisis as the growth of a homogenous culture of suburbanization for the middle-income earners and the creation of a monoculture in the apartments of the working class. The danger in this was the lack of excitement or heterogeneity within the cycles of labor, bureaucracy, or the actions of daily life. In response to the civil unrest in May of 1968 (the May 68 movement) which rebelled against American and western imperialism, consumerism, and capitalism, and the discrimination, marginalization, and general alienation these forces wrought, and through observed parallels to

the Paris Commune in 1871 (Schmid 2011, 42-43), Lefebvre writes about this idea of the right to the city:

“In these difficult conditions, at the heart of a society which cannot completely oppose them and yet obstructs them, rights which define [...] civilization find their way. These rights which are not well recognized, progressively become customary before being inscribed into formal codes. They would change reality if they entered into social practice: right to work, to training and education, to health, housing, leisure, to life. Among these rights in the making features the *right to the city*, not to the ancient city, but to urban life, to renewed centrality to places of encounter and exchange, to life rhythms and time uses, enabling the full and complete *usage* of these moments and places, etc.” (Lefebvre 1996, 178)

This right to urban life necessitates that the city – as a place of encounters, prioritizing use value, and presence in current space and time – be paramount, a reordering of societal values that can only be brought about by the working class (Lefebvre 1996, 158). This is the right to a city created through the daily labor of its citizens and the preservation of the complex and unsanitized social dynamics of its residents, which Jane Jacobs (1962) has claimed make the city what it is (Lefebvre 1996).

What actual rights *the right to the city* conveys upon its citizens has been widely interpreted by various scholars to apply to issues of gentrification, housing, immigration, citizenship, social exclusion, and more (Attoh 2011). It is useful to consider the right to the city through the lens of generational rights as outlined by Jeremy Waldron. Waldron (1993) defines first-generation rights as traditional liberties associated with democratic citizenship in the western democratic tradition – free speech, a fair trial, voting, religious liberty, etc. Second-generation rights include socio-economic entitlements – housing, food, fair wages, etc. Third-generation rights are rights attached to individuals and groups in the protection of communal goods – minority language rights, the integrity of a culture, and the right to distribute intangible goods like values of peace or environmentalism (Attoh 2011). In the definition above Lefebvre



outlines several (second-generation) rights that we in America today might consider the domain of social programs – the right to work, an education or job training, housing, and healthcare. Created in the context of May 68, these are expectations of what a government must provide its citizens. Out of this exercise of first-generation rights – the right of free speech, the right to protest – grew an idea of a third-generation right – the right to a collectively held city, which would be experienced through the enjoyment by individual citizens of second-generation rights – the right to housing, a fair wage, a job. Other scholars also reaffirm that the right to the city falls into this category of third-generation rights. David Harvey (2013a, 4-5) argues the right to the city is a *collective* right to change and reinvent the city according to our desires by holding the power over processes of urbanization, and that to claim the right to the city is to also claim the power to shape urbanization. When city planners and the state act on behalf of capital, and there is not democratized decision making in urban planning and policy, the internal social dynamics that make a city what it is are disrupted and the rights of some citizens to the city will inevitably be infringed upon (Harvey 2013a; Jacobs 1962).

The relationship between these three ideal class types and the creation of urban spaces goes both ways. Urban spaces are not only influenced by the state, capital, and labor; cities also play a role in creating and shaping these three classes. Available resources and zoning often determine the types of capital that can and will thrive. Physical spaces and urban form can impose impediments to, or create spaces for, labor to come together and find common ground or consensus. If labor so chooses, they can articulate this consensus through voting or protest, which can have real political ramifications on the dominant ideologies in power at different levels of government (Harvey 2013b).

## *2.4 Historical Housing Policy Traditions*

The remainder of this chapter unpacks the historical roots of the traditions shaping housing policy today. It begins this framing of urban housing policy history at the end of the Civil War and Reconstruction and the beginning of the Gilded Age in the late 1800s. Of course, relationships between forms of production and urban spaces start well before this point, going back centuries. Indeed, cities have existed throughout the world for far, far longer than the settler-colonial nation of the United States of America. Throughout history, there have been many significant moments in the creation, planning, and reproduction of urban environments. Many of the tensions and contradictions – including the property contradiction and the capitalist-democracy contradiction – expressed in the history below have roots prior to the mid-1800s but became increasingly pressing with increased urban development. Many early housing policies and actions were situated within the material conditions of rapidly increasing populations in urban centers and industrial jobs in the late 1800s (Haines 1994; Hirschman and Mogford 2009).

Other scholars also mark this period as distinct from earlier urban planning precedent. Richard Foglesong (1986, 25) notes such a break, writing that many of the “community-serving features of colonial town planning were vitiated by the speculative mania that gripped American cities during the rapid urbanization and industrialization of the last two-thirds of the nineteenth century.” Foglesong (1986, 25) posits that urban development after the mid-1800s sits in contrast to the “largely pre-capitalist era” it follows. To call this era “pre-capitalist” is somewhat misleading – the United States was colonized in the pursuit of wealth, and various capitalist influences contributed directly to its urban growth from its inception. Both the U.S. and colonialism more generally are inherently exploitative projects aiming to generate wealth for a select few at the expense of people – their health, their communities – and the land and its

resources. The U.S. and colonialism cannot be seen as separate from capitalism. However, Foglesong is right to separate the sorts of capitalist traditions that perpetuated urban space preceding the American industrial revolution from those that followed it.

Starting from this point in the mid-to-late-1800s, with brief mentions to other places or times, one can separate U.S. urban planning around housing policy into three different traditions – industrial urbanism, neoliberal urbanism, and radical urbanism. These urbanisms are distinct in who holds power to dictate policy and the purpose of housing they articulate, but exist on a continuum, ascendant at various times, and are intricately interconnected in their respective peaks and valleys. By tracing housing policies in the U.S. from the late 1800s to the present day, with brief mentions of other non-American movements and earlier periods, the rest of this chapter sets out to define the three urban traditions to which current housing policies adhere to varying degrees, as well as provide background to the current housing environment in the United States. Collectively, these three urban traditions will form the baseline to analyze the varying actors, strategies, and power dynamics in Lewiston’s *Growing Our Tree Streets Choice* Transformation Plan.

### **3. Industrial Urbanism**

#### Overview

The understanding of the period beginning in the mid-1800s and ending in the mid-1900s laid out in this section is based on histories of housing and urban planning by Foglesong, Shi, Marcuse, Drier, Stein, and others. Compiling many of their ideas and reflecting on the outsized role of industrial capital during this time (particularly in comparison to later neoliberal urbanism), it seems most accurate to term this period’s dominant urban philosophy *industrial urbanism*. Within the political-economic landscape of industrial urbanism, the state was the

central arbiter. The capital class (further divided into industrial and real estate capital) held relative power, and although placed in an inferior position, labor made significant strides at various points throughout the period. The state was somewhat distrustful of both classes, and so intervened in urban and housing issues to manage competing needs of capital and labor groups in ways that benefited sectors of both classes. This intervening power was afforded to the state by both classes to solve issues arising from the material conditions on the ground. Through a high degree of central planning and with reliance on internal self-sufficiency, the state both assisted capital in the accumulation of wealth and made policies that worked on behalf of certain labor to gain better conditions. State police power was used to maintain order and reproduce this regime, and targeted labor in the defense of both capital and the state, as seen through incidents like the Haymarket Riot and its precipitating strike or the urban rebellions that swept the U.S. in the 1960s.

Within the urban industrial tradition, urban space was ordered and produced based on the desires of both industrial and real estate capital. These two forms of capital have different desires within urban systems, and tensions arise from these conflicts. Industrial capitalists desired a source of cheap labor to work in their factories, and for basic societal needs or services, such as homes or schools, to be located close to centers of production. Homeownership was relatively uncommon and public housing did not yet exist for much of the beginning of this period. This created a role for real estate capital in the production of cities, and especially in housing. Many of the state's interventions in housing throughout this period balanced precarious economic or social situations that threatened the stability of the country and the structural regime.

This section covers the era from the mid-1800s to the late 1960s. It is further structured around eight sections: (3.1) Progressive Reformism; (3.2) City Beautiful; (3.3) City Practical; (3.4) the Great Depression and the New Deal; (3.5) WWII and suburbanization; (3.6) the Civil Rights Movements; (3.7) the War on Poverty; and (3.8) the decline of industrial urbanism. The final section will remark on the confluence of factors leading to the decline of industrial urbanism. The first three subsections cover sub-traditions that helped to contribute to the formation and evolution of industrial urbanism early on, helping to solidify the tradition's priorities and processes. These are a mix of grassroots and urban planning movements, generally led by and to the benefit of societal elites. The movements grew out of different material conditions and had slightly different configurations of state, capital, and labor. Mentions of housing are often absent from early planning doctrine. Housing began to be articulated in national policy as an outgrowth of post-depression and post-war economic needs (Marcuse 1980a, 154-155), which is shown in sections on the Great Depression and the New Deal to the War on Poverty. Whether or not it was explicitly articulated as such, throughout the 80 years encompassed in industrial urbanism's heyday both the creation of and destruction of housing were used as a means of control over the labor class.

### Historical Analysis

A formalized industrial urban tradition arose from two interconnected phenomena – the rapid industrialization and urbanization of America. Following the Civil War, Panic of 1873, and end of Reconstruction in 1877, the country entered a period of growth and prosperity which set a path forward for highly centrally planned cities (Barreyre 2011; Stein 2019, 17). From 1880 to 1920, the U.S. economy shifted from a rural agricultural society to an industrial economy located primarily in large urban centers (Hirschman and Mogford 2009, 897).

Although some tendencies seen in industrial urbanism began earlier, and some cities passed laws in the mid-1800s that can be directly understood through an urban industrialist lens, the increase in urban population and industrialization in the late 1800s made the industrial urban tradition much more widespread. Before 1870, manufacturing had been more limited to small firms, which were highly specialized and created goods for local markets. Technological innovation, including the development of commercial electricity allowed for the creation of larger factories in urban areas engaged in the mass production of goods. From 1880 to 1920 the number of American manufacturing jobs grew from 2.5 million to 10 million (Hirschman and Mogford 2009, 898). Job growth tracked population growth in urban areas. A quarter of the population in 1880 lived in cities, but by 1920 this was over half the population. Urban regions attracted immigrants with the promise of relatively high occupational mobility and job opportunities (Guest 2005). Immigration accounted for significant population increases; the foreign-born population almost doubled in these 40 years (Hirschman and Mogford 2009, 898).<sup>1</sup>

American socio-economic classes became more pronounced throughout the gilded age. The period was marked by massive economic inequality, with the capitalist upper class holding the vast majority of wealth, and labor classes fighting to attain a decent wage and safe living and working conditions. This widening gap came from a structural economic shift to wage labor from independent production. Whereas in earlier eras, employers may have faced an obligation to provide some guarantee of living conditions to employees, this was not guaranteed in a wage-labor system (Foglesong 1986, 62). Challenges over how to avoid wage labor and attain a living wage underwrote much of the contemporary class struggle (White 2020, 316). As wage labor made no guarantee of “secure employment, good health, decent living conditions, and freedom

---

<sup>1</sup> Counting both first- and second-generation immigrants, over a third of the total population in the 1920s belonged to communities of immigrants (Hirschman and Mogford 2009, 898).

from want,” demands were made to the government and other collective institutions for assistance (Foglesong 1986, 62). Class stratification also followed to some extent racial and cultural divisions. In 1900, native-born white and older immigrant groups, such as British, German, and (although to a lesser extent) Irish immigrants and their decedents were overrepresented in better-paying occupations. Newer immigrant groups and Black Americans were entrenched in lower-paying, more undesirable jobs like laborers, domestic workers, and service jobs (Joseph 1989, 496). There was also ethnic segregation within specific occupations throughout the last two decades of the 1800s (Joseph 1989, 496).

Inequality also fueled racist and xenophobic rhetoric, further separating labor groups by culture, race, or immigration status. New immigrants and non-white peoples were often ineligible for jobs that paid highly; when they took lower-paying jobs, racist and xenophobic groups promoted ideas that immigrants took jobs away from native-born white Americans (rhetoric that continues to persist today) (Martinot 2000, 55). Partially stemming from the increased ethnic competition in the labor market, the early 1900s saw explosive growth in labor unions. Union membership often came with racial requirements. Most early unionized peoples were white (Rosenfeld and Kleykamp 2012, 1461), helping native-born and older white immigrant groups to gain better conditions and maintain their preferred racial status. These factors resulted in increased ethnic and racial violence around work (Olzak 1989). Such violence can be seen in situations where non-white strikebreakers were brought in to break white union strikes. One such incident of violence occurred in 1917 when the Aluminum Ore Company in St. Louis brought in Black strikebreakers. A mob of white union workers randomly attacked strikebreaking-unaffiliated Black residents of the area, killing between 100 and 200 people and leaving 6,000 more homeless (Olzak, 1989; American Federation of Labor and Congress of

Industrial Organizations 2017, 65). Racial violence did not have to be precipitated by strikes, there were also general incidents of racial violence. For example, in 1908, out of tensions arising from the Springfield Riots, white and Black Chicago dockworkers began fighting, resulting in injuries to six men (Olzak 1989, 1304).

Labor stratification was exploited by capitalists in the form of racialized rhetoric and actions but was also realized in different living conditions. The urban poor often lived in run-down tenement housing. In the mid-1800s, tenement housing was characterized by “filth, dilapidation, overcrowding, degradation, dark rooms, offensive privies, lack of water, high rents, and exorbitant profits [for landlords]” (Foglesong 1986, 56). Foglesong (1986, 56) describes these conditions as a direct result of land commodification and lack of government regulation, noting the connection to workplace and wage exploitation in what housing was available to the lowest social classes. The early housing for industrial workers was often built by companies to help attract labor for their factories, especially in places where such infrastructure did not exist. However, with the influx of immigration beginning in the late 1800s there was no longer a need to offer company housing to attract workers (Belcher and Rejent 1993). As such, many workers rented from private landlords. The types of buildings low-wage workers occupied in cities, like the tenements, were often of poor quality. However, little scholarly research addresses real estate capitals’ role in the production of housing in this early period (Drier 1982).

### *3.1 Progressive Reformism*

The Progressive Era and progressive reformism arose in response to these conditions. The progressive tradition is relatively broad, both in temporal component and scope, and while there are urban socialist and democratic socialist strains within the tradition<sup>2</sup>, much of the action

---

<sup>2</sup> These will be further explored in the Municipal Socialism subsection of the Radical Urbanism section below.



was more conservative as well. As the country rapidly urbanized, cities became sites of growing concentrations of power and wealth. Elites in these spaces, often white, Anglo-Saxon, protestant, educated professionals who held some measure of wealth and religious or moral values, lead the progressive movement. Reformers looked to reorder space in ways that aligned with religious morals and racialized, xenophobic, and moralistic fears of uprisings – political, social, or towards work – by immigrant laborers, as well as fears about possible outcomes of monopolistic behavior from industry (specifically consolidated control by robber barons) (Foglesong 1986, 57; Shi 2020, 1446). Acutely aware of these threats, progressive reformers attempted to “reshape [cities] towards three simultaneous ends: to ensure the social reproduction of a rapidly growing labor force; to quell the urban rebellions that were rocking nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cities; and to boost profits” (Stein 2019, 18). To these ends, progressive reformers campaigned for housing reform, better labor conditions, to clean up slums, stop corruption, and more (LaGrand 2020, 13). While progressive reformers and those who sympathized with their causes ultimately made their way to the highest seats of government, the early movement was less centralized. Across different American cities, reformers worked for both tenement housing reform and expanded social services, which both aligned with their moral values and served to appease the lower classes.

Outside of the socialist wings of the tradition, actions by reformers rarely made fundamental changes to governing power structures. The politics of Robert Veiller, early housing reformer, commissioner of New York State’s Tenement House Department, and Director of the National Housing Organization, exemplify this type of limited reform. Veiller believed housing changes were needed to integrate the working poor into the social structures of dominant society, that charity would “only subsidize the slothful ways of the poor,” and that

increasing wages would not better housing conditions (Foglesong 1986, 73). While there were efforts to better living conditions in slums out of concerns for the welfare of their residents, Foglesong (1986, 75) posits groups were motivated as much or more by concerns of the possible externalities of slums onto broader society – the possible spread of social degeneration and immorality, as well as concerns for physical sicknesses like typhus and cholera. As such, those immigrants not considered a drain on society could be integrated into it, so long as wages were kept low for industrial capitalists and American society remained dominantly white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant.

Progressive housing reformers instituted policies that included minimal government intervention and continued reliance on the private housing market. Significantly, building codes were introduced, which promoted health and safety by providing basic construction standards (Stein 2019, 18). Stein points to New York City Tenements Laws from 1867, 1879, and 1901, which ensured infrastructure like fire escapes, air shafts, windows, and toilets in new residential construction as examples of such legislation. These laws resulted in safer housing conditions but also increased social inequity. The poorest were unable to afford the rents in these new buildings and were consequently relegated to those buildings in the worst conditions. During this time, rising land and construction costs made new development the domain of the wealthy elite (Stein 2019, 18-19). Together, these forces increased wealthy elites' capacity for profit within this system.

### *3.2 City Beautiful*

City Beautiful was another noteworthy movement that helped mainstream important tenets of industrial urbanism. Beginning in 1909, it was one of the earliest urban planning movements in the U.S. (Stein 2019, 19). It sprung from many of the same impulses that

animated progressive reformism – a desire for more ordered cities, distaste for that classified as unsanitary, a specific brand of Euro-American exceptionalism (Peterson 1976; Marcuse 1980a; Foglesong 1986), and a level of distrust for unincumbered capitalism insofar as its creation of cities (LaGrand 2020, 17). The movement focused on the creation of large-scale public infrastructure and connected architectural and urban form to art, often in a neoclassical and beaux-art style, with projects like monuments, grand boulevards, parks, and more (Peterson 1976). Implemented in both large and small cities, the creation of this sort of public infrastructure-art required a high degree of central planning and control. City Beautiful projects include Chicago’s World Fair, Central Park in New York, and the McMillian Plan for Washington DC’s National Mall. Rarely, if ever, was housing mentioned in City Beautiful plans; the movement paid little attention to housing beyond the classification of some housing as unsanitary, and thus a target for destruction (Marcuse 1980a, 158-160). Many of these projects were built on land that was occupied by low-income people, immigrants, or Black people, which was desirable because of its central location (Stein 2019, 19). Projects were generally built with public funds, but financial benefits were realized for the wealthy who were able to accrue profit from the rise in property values around a project location (Stein 2019, 20). As poorer people had been displaced to implement the projects, they had less access to the public benefits these projects provided, such as those that come with green space in parks.

The reorganization of space previously occupied by Black, immigrant, or low-income peoples, coupled with rhetoric of cleanliness and order is used very specifically in both City Beautiful and progressivism more generally. The racialization of cleanliness and sanitization – how it allows for moralistic discourse around and protection of a white body politic against a racialized other – is well documented (Kristeva 1982; Goldberg 1993; Berthold 2010; Councilor

2017). This discourse set a standard for which voices are listened to in planning debates (Stein 2019, 20), and whose housing is demolished, which enabled capital accumulation by upper-class whites at the expense of Black, immigrant, and low-income groups. Racialized language and fears were used explicitly in many cities across the U.S. in City Beautiful and progressive planning. Even in places where scholars say that such rhetoric was not employed – such as Historian James LaGrand’s (2020, 17) claims about Harrisburg, Pennsylvania – the results of City Beautiful projects were the same, disproportionately effecting Black, Jewish, immigrant, or low-income peoples.

### *3.3 City Practical*

The final noteworthy movement in the creation of industrial urbanism is City Practical. The transition from City Beautiful to Practical occurred with increasing demand for municipal government intervention in city planning to resolve urban problems. Stein (2019, 20) has classified the City Practical planning movement as “formaliz[ing] and expand[ing] the scope of planning in the U.S. in order to rationalize urban and peri-urban expansion.” The large-scale public works projects City Beautiful created were made significantly easier by the development of a bureaucracy to implement them. However, City Practical reoriented development from creating a beautiful or aesthetic city to creating more economical and efficient systems of land use for the needs of a growing business system (Foglesong 1986, 199). City Practical offered a response to the property contradiction by prioritizing economical and efficient systems of land use as a social need. Streets and transit systems were necessary for systems of private production, and the creation of these systems as publicly owned and produced assets eliminated costs and risk for capital. The creation of city planning commissions across the U.S. (Stein 2019,

20) and the emergence and mainstream implementation of city planning and management professions (Muller 1991, 65) made intervention and coordination of such resources possible.

During this period, broader American society was institutionalizing anti-immigrant rhetoric in the form of various immigration laws. Growing from concerns over labor competition and the maintenance of racial and moral purity and American superiority, this had begun with the Page Act of 1875 and Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 but expanded significantly in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Together, the Immigration Act of 1917, the 1921 Emergency Quota Act, and the Immigration Act of 1924 restricted immigration primarily to Britain, Ireland, Scandinavia, and Germany (U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Bureau of the Census 1949, 33). Zoning was an innovation in urban planning used in *City Practical*, allowing for control and segregation within urban areas. From its introduction, zoning was used in racialized ways. A contemporary proponent of zoning wrote:

“It is obvious that under the intense conditions of modern urban life with its density of population, problems of housing, difficulties of circulation, lack of locally produced sustenance, and highly specialized human activities, individual freedom of action is necessarily curtailed [...] curtailment naturally applies in some degree to property as well as persons. Natural physical limitations automatically impose some degree of limitation, but beyond that, *organized social restrictions are logically and necessarily resorted to.*” (Whitnall 1931, 3-4; emphasis added)

De jure racial exclusion through zoning in cities paralleled racially exclusionary policies on immigration. The first zoning law was introduced in California in 1885 to bar Chinese people from various areas of the city. Zoning was first implemented in New York in 1916, at least partially at the behest of high-end merchants on 5<sup>th</sup> Avenue who were concerned about Jewish garment workers in the vicinities of their stores and customers (Stein 2019, 21). Zoning was actively promoted to protect individual property from the encroachment of slums. In a 1922 zoning primer, the U.S. government wrote:

“Suppose you have just bought some land in a neighborhood of homes and built a cozy little house. There are two vacant lots to the south of you. If your town is zoned, no one can put up a large apartment house in those lots, overshadowing your home, stealing your sunshine and spoiling an investment of 20 years saving.” (Bassett et al. 1922, 2)

In this action and supporting rhetoric, the state showed preference to a class of land-owning capitalists over a poor labor class.

City Practical also marked a move to national policies, including the implementation of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA), which facilitated individual state action, and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (SCPEA), which facilitated municipal action. Both laws allowed municipalities to create master plans for their cities, which were implemented through zoning ordinances that set standards for types of land uses and size of buildings (Stein, 2019, 20). Use of zoning, planning commissions, master plans, and property controls was (and is) nominally contrary to the desires of many capitalists, both industrial and real estate. It limits their ability to shape cities unburdened by government intervention, as was generally true before the 1900s (Stein, 2019, 20). In the tradition of the City Beautiful and progressive reform movements’ distrust of capital, these strategies did place limits on capitalist’ reproduction of space (LaGrand 2020, 17). However, as Herbert Hoover’s government argued, such measures were in the interest of capitalists, as they allowed for an understanding of public reaction to proposed projects, and thus a higher likelihood of acceptance. (Stein 2019, 20-21). Also included in the zoning primer published by Hoover’s Department of Commerce is the statement: “[c]ities do not do better when they allow office buildings so tall and bulky and so closely crowded that the lower floors not only become too dark and unsatisfactory for human use but for that very reason fail to earn a fair cash return for individual investors” (Bassett et al. 1922, 1). In this, one can see the capitalist-democracy contradiction at play, as zoning and planning commissions allow the State to maintain an air of democratic legitimacy in decision making

while streamlining processes of capital accumulation within their control. While some measures may have had benefits for certain members of the labor class – not having to live and work on the dark crowded floors of buildings deemed “unsatisfactory for human use” – the ultimate concern is with economic productivity and efficient capital gain.

These planning movements, taken together, helped stage policies enacted by housing reformers and New Deal Democrats. These policy decisions were often made in response to economic conditions, either post-war or post-depression. The government’s first large-scale intervention into housing occurred during World War I. Because of government restrictions, high building costs, and movement of capital to other activities, private home construction essentially ceased. Simultaneously, the concentration of labor in war-production centers caused massive housing shortages (Riley 1958, 856). The federal government intervened and constructed new housing in those cities. Construction was overseen by two bodies, the United States Housing Corporation of the Department of Labor, and the Housing Division of the Shipping Board. Homes built during this time set improved standards for small home design and community development through housing programs, indicative of the possible power of government intervention in the provisioning of housing, but construction returned to the domain of the private market upon the end of the war (Riley 1958, 856).

### *3.4 The Great Depression and New Deal*

The next significant historical event to inspire planning and housing policy changes was the Great Depression. The economic needs of this era led to the adoption of a public housing program and greater accessibility to homeownership for individuals. This accessibility created a greatly expanded market for single-family housing to the benefit of real estate capital. The Great Depression strained many aspects – both financial and social – of Americans’ daily lives (e.g.,

employment, housing, etc.). Before the Great Depression, financing for home purchases was both scant and expensive. Many borrowers had to obtain second or third mortgages to make buying possible, as lenders were often unwilling to cover more than 60 percent of a property's value (Schwartz 2015, 69). While most people continued to rent, homeownership rates had risen in the years leading up to the depression. The non-farm homeownership rate was 36.9 percent in 1890, had risen to 40.9 percent by 1920, and 46 percent by 1930 (Snowden 2013, 54). There was a residential housing boom following WWI (White 2009, 6-7), which peaked in a bubble from 1925 to 1926, although the following dip is generally obscured by the Great Depression (Wheelock 2008, 137). The price downturn in 1926 led to a rise in the foreclosure rate. Although analysis of the Great Depression often focuses on family farm foreclosures, non-farm homeowners and renters also felt the effects (Wheelock 2008).

When the depression began, housing prices dropped sharply, comparable with the decline in consumer prices, while residential mortgage debt continued to grow (Wheelock 2008, 138). Unemployment was high overall but varied across race and gender (Sundstorm 1992, 417).<sup>3</sup> Overall, between 1929 and 1932, personal disposable income fell 41 percent, and non-farm residential wealth fell 25.7 percent (Wheelock 2008, 138). Rising mortgage debt, coupled with household income and property value declines, was a problem for homeowners, who had no way to repay their debts. Two and a half years into the depression, over half of home mortgages were in default and more than 1,000 mortgages were foreclosed on daily (Schwartz 2015, 69-70).

From the earliest days of the depression, the unemployed and dispossessed began to rise up in protest. Piven and Cloward (1979) note organized "mob looting" of food from New York

---

<sup>3</sup> In a 1931 survey of unemployment in ten industrial cities – Manhattan, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Cleveland, Chicago, Detroit, St. Louis, Birmingham, New Orleans, and Houston – white men were unemployed at a rate of 27.2 percent, Black men at 40.5 percent, white women at 16.8 percent, and Black women at 43.4 percent (Sundstorm 1992, 417).



City to Henryetta, Oklahoma. Cities across the U.S. experienced rent riots. These were often led by Black people and other low-income people of color who were already at a distinct disadvantage in American society and were laid off at higher rates. The state response was often violent (Piven and Cloward 1979, 49-55), but labor action was effective – Boyer and Morais (1972, 261) claim rent riots and active resists of evictions allowed 77,000 evicted families to remain in their homes in New York City alone. Evictions in other cities were halted as well and government officials were forced to distribute rent relief payments. People protested under communist and socialist banners, such as “‘Work or Wages’ and ‘Fight—Don’t Starve’” (Piven and Cloward 1979, 50), a direct rebuttal to capitalism. Based on estimates from average dues payments, the National Communist Party had just under 7,000 members in 1929 and 1930, which grew to just under 10,500 in 1931, then 14,000 in 1932, and almost 23,000 in 1934. Party officials estimated actual registration was 10 to 20 percent greater than these estimates (Gregory and Flores 2015).

This was the reality in America when Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office in the spring of 1933. FDR’s New Deal, which immediately began to be implemented, contained two provisions that directly affected housing – the creation of the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration. In the June of 1933, the Home Owner’s Loan Act created the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC), which purchased mortgages that were in default using federal bonds and rewrote the mortgages on more favorable terms. Prior to HOLC, private lenders typically set mortgages to be due in two to 11 years; HOLC extended the period to 15 years. It also created the self-amortizing loan and increased the proportion of property price a loan would cover. This made it easier to acquire a loan and less likely more than one loan would be necessary. About 40 percent of eligible homeowners utilized the program

(Schwartz 2015, 71-73). The National Housing Act of 1934 established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which continued and expanded the work of the HOLC. Critically, the FHA insured mortgages from qualified lenders, removing the risk for lenders of borrowers going into default. For the mortgages it insured, it extended HOLC's 15-year repayment period, requiring 25-to-30-year terms. Additionally, loans could now cover up to 93 percent of a property's value. Finally, the FHA set minimum construction standards for new home construction and required a physical inspection before offering insurance (Schwartz 2015, 73-75). With these interventions, the state bailed out many Americans whose mortgages were foreclosed on and over their heads in debt. It also made homeownership an option for many more Americans. However, state action was also highly beneficial to capital. These interventions expanded the market for private homeownership, removed risks for lenders, and set a policy precedent that would be greatly expanded following WWII.

It is critical to understand the ways that FHA actions utilized and interacted with racist ideologies, why they promoted racial segregation, and who benefitted from those actions because of the lasting impacts on American society. As Taylor (2019, 13) explains “a key to Black housing inequality has been how residential segregation circumscribed space, inferred inferiority through special isolation, and incentivized substandard maintenance and care from property owners while driving up the costs to the better housing options for white residents.”

Understanding racial segregation in housing through the lens of racial capitalism<sup>4</sup> allows for a deeper understanding of who benefits from the material conditions in the markets that are

---

<sup>4</sup> The lens of racial capitalism comes from Cedric Robinson (2020, 9-10), who posited that racialism predated the advent of capitalism and that capitalism made use of evolving racial ideologies, broadening, and ingraining them into society.

created. Racial attitudes are exploited for the accumulation of wealth by the capitalist class by valuing certain people and the places they inhabit over others (Fluri et. al 2020).

In the financial uncertainty of the Great Depression, the government faced the challenge of stabilizing markets across many sectors. This was done through New Deal policies, which intervened in many markets for the first time. Uncertainties and volatility depressed the private real estate market and dampened lenders' willingness to back prospective homeowners, especially first-time buyers. The FHA stepped into the market to provide stability and backstop urban real estate markets, which necessitated deciding where investments would be safe and where there was danger in the market. To do this the FHA created specific criteria to assess the value of properties and whether they would be able to maintain that value over time, which they outlined in the *Underwriting Handbook* manuals. An important part of risk assessment on the part of the private real estate industry, which was endorsed in the policy of the federal government, was understanding who lived in an around a neighborhood. To understand this, it is helpful to look at HOLC maps.<sup>5</sup> Qualities that could earn a neighborhood an "A" or green designation on a HOLC map included high percentages of single-family homes, median incomes, and owner-occupancy rates, and the people that lived there were white, non-immigrant families, often of Anglo-Saxon descent. Qualities that could earn a neighborhood a designation of D or red on a HOLC map included high percentages of multi-family units, large numbers of renters, presence of undesirable immigrant groups or non-white people, or other visually unaesthetic elements. Since the "kind and social status of its inhabitants" were viewed by the real estate industry as being a core determinate of risk assessment, the presence of "adverse influences" including "infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality groups" were assumed to be

---

<sup>5</sup> The FHA had their own maps but destroyed them in 1969 in response to a discrimination lawsuit.

detrimental to the maintenance of property values (quoted in Schwartz 2015, 73). This meant the properties that could be guaranteed financing, and where real estate capital was willing to invest, were single-family homes in white middle- and upper-class neighborhoods (Schwartz 2015, 74-75; Fishback et. al. 2022). It was significantly easier to obtain a mortgage in suburban areas, which almost exclusively exhibited these “desirable” characteristics. This created a market for white suburban home ownership that did not extend to urban neighborhoods or non-white people. By ensuring that only white suburban families living in all-white neighborhoods were almost exclusively able to access the privilege of homeownership, the government created a way to private protect investments in such neighborhoods.

The Depression also inspired the creation of a public housing program. Housing construction was an employment generator, and the government hoped it would appease the widespread social unrest to have additional jobs as well as housing. On the matter of public housing, as with tenement reform, New York City was a leader; the New York City Housing Authority, established in 1934, was the first department of its kind. The Housing Act of 1937 established a way to provide subsidies from the federal government to local public housing authorities (PHAs). Comments by Langdon Post, the first chair of the NYCHA made it clear where the state felt the danger lay – ““All revolutions are germinated in the slums: every riot is a slum riot. Housing is one of the many ways to forestall the bitter lessons which history has in store for us if we continue to be blind and stiff necked”” (quoted in Marcuse 1995, 242). Housing projects such as First Houses, Harlem River Houses, and Williamsburg Houses, all in New York, were constructed with the goal of jobs for the unemployed explicitly articulated (Marcuse 1995, 242). There were a variety of reformers who worked to influence the early days of public housing, especially in New York City. These included government officials like Post,

people involved in leftist political movements, and social workers, all of whom had different thoughts on how and where to implement public housing.<sup>6</sup> These sorts of debates, as well as those around questions of race, civil rights, segregation, and later gender, would continue to play a major role in conversations around public housing construction. There was opposition to public housing stemming from two main directions. The first was ideological opposition to the use of government programs to ameliorate social ills (Marcuse 1995, 243). The second was from the private housing industry, which bristled against encroachment into their market. However, other groups of capitalists, such as the construction industry, were able to profit from public housing projects and were thus at times aligned with reformers' public housing goals.

### *3.5 World War II and Suburbanization*

New Deal programs began to arrest the decline in the U.S. economy, halting 43 consecutive months where the economy shrunk. However, the transition to a wartime system would be what most effectively reinvigorated the U.S. economy (Milward 1979). The U.S.'s gross national product as measured in constant dollars grew from \$88.6 billion before the war in 1939 to \$135 billion in 1944. War-related production grew from two percent of the GNP in 1939 to 40% in 1943 (Milward 1979, 63). New housing starts also dropped substantially and manufacturing was refocused on wartime necessities. The aftermath of the war, however, would pose two new problems: (1) how to effectively transition the economy out of a wartime economy and avoid another financial meltdown, and (2) the rising threat of communism globally. The construction of single-family homes in the suburbs offered a solution that helped address both

---

<sup>6</sup> Government looked to minimize costs. This meant first building on open land, which would then drive down costs of slum land and more public housing could then be built there more affordably. Socialists did not want to see slum landlords benefit through the purchase of their land so agreed to some extent with the government. Social workers preferred building on slum land, as social work activity was already concentrated in those neighborhoods (Marcuse 1995, 245).

challenges. New home construction not only reinvigorated the construction sector; suburban single-family homes also required products from other industries – appliances and soft goods to fill each home, and cars to travel. It also further tied the labor class, particularly the white labor class, to the system of capitalism by offering to this group for the first time on a mass scale an appreciating asset.

With New Deal programs before the war, the housing economy began to grow again, with growth in the construction of both non-farm single-family units and multifamily units. By 1941, there were just over 700,000 units under construction (Reily 1958, 859), around 70 percent of which were single-family units. Government policies through the HOLC and FHA, and subsequent increases in non-governmental entity involvement in mortgage insurance, jumpstarted a larger private housing market (Schwartz 2015; Snowden 2013). WWII brought this development to a halt. While construction was started on 619,500 private units in 1941, construction was started on 301,200 units in 1942, 183,700 units in 1943, 138,700 in 1944, and 325,000 in 1945 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1966, 18). This placed production far behind what was needed to keep up with population growth, especially in growing urban defense centers (Reily 1958, 859). There was some public housing built in major shipbuilding and defense ports that prioritized workers producing goods for the war. The housing built was often temporary. While already built under the auspices of war production, utilizing temporary structures avoided addressing the long-term viability of publicly provided housing (Marcuse 1995, 250).

The U.S. had also become increasingly concerned about the rise of communism at home and abroad. Communist party membership had risen steadily in the years leading up to the beginning of World War II. Party membership continued to rise in the war's aftermath, reaching a peak of 75,388 in 1947 (Gregory and Flores 2015). Communist involvement in the labor

movement also proved particularly concerning. The labor movement and labor militancy in the U.S. grew throughout the early 1900s. To impose control on labor systems and regulate disputes between capital and labor, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was established by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as part of the New Deal. There was a huge growth in unions after the passing of this act, along with a sustained campaign on the part of industrial capital, established union elites, and the state to crush union power (Piven and Cloward 1979, 120-165). Communist groups were heavily involved in and critical to the successes of the labor movement throughout this period, especially the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) (Piven and Cloward 1979, 120-165). The outbreak of WWII allowed the government and industry to define questions of labor action as questions of patriotism (Piven and Cloward 1979, 165). Strikes after this point became explicitly branded as communist in government rhetoric and the press. There was another significant uptick in labor strikes in 1945 and 1946, inspired by rising unemployment and decreases in real wages as overtime was cut back on, all resulting from the cancellation of war contracts and demobilization. Piven and Cloward (1979, 168) classify the danger this posed: “[b]y 1945, the CIO claimed 6 million members, the AFL claimed nearly 7 million. If ever there was a time for labor to demonstrate the force of organized numbers voting in electoral politics, a force no longer constrained by the imperatives of war and the spirit of patriotism, now was the time.” The response from capitalists to the widespread strikes in 1946 was severe; capital compelled the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act which greatly limited union activity and forced unions to expel communist party members from their ranks. Suburbanization also played a role in ensuring that there was an adequate way to stave off further union backlash by allowing an outlet for a particular subset of the working class.

Drawing comparisons to communism and fascism also became an effective way to argue against public housing programs. Politicians claimed public housing had been created in the image of a Russian program, and that those who lived in public housing were communists, agents of foreign powers, or otherwise unscrupulous (Argersinger 2010, 801). The beginning of WWII furthered these claims – “longstanding appeals to isolationism and the connection of public housing to foreign sources made more persuasive the opposition's insistence that America could remain free of foreign problems only by perusing a uniquely American commitment to homeownership” (Argersinger 2010, 803). This idea was validated by the unrest that swept urban and defense areas across the U.S. in response to housing shortages and ongoing racial discrimination, even though protesters often made comparisons between the U.S.’s segregated policies and Nazism (Argersinger 2010, 804). The end of the war in 1945 necessitated a shift in the economy and job creation for veterans returning from fighting overseas. Traditionally, there had been increases in instances of homelessness following wars, especially for veterans from those wars (Coalition for the Homeless, 2003). In the case of WWII, rapid demobilization also exacerbated the existing housing crisis. Argersinger (2010, 804-805) describes the “sorry spectacle of veterans sleeping in abandoned cars, chicken coops, and wooden crates” and quotes the American Veteran’s Committee, who stated the need for a “V-H” day to house Americans, particularly former service members, in need.

In response to these conditions, the U.S. government passed the Veteran’s Readjustment Act of 1944, commonly referred to as the G.I. Bill. The bill provided for higher education, a year of unemployment benefits, low-interest loans to start businesses, and more. Critically, it also provided veterans a government guarantee of loans to purchase homes. The Veterans Administration, rather than the FHA, insured these loans. However, the VA followed the system



set by the FHA, including using its loan Underwriting Manual, which ensured that this was disproportionately beneficial to white service members. As with the Great Depression, this spurred immense growth in housing construction. In 1945 construction was begun on 326,000 new non-farm units. In 1946, there was an almost 215 percent increase, with construction beginning on 1,023,000 new non-farm units. Between 1946 and 1964, almost 27.5 million new homes were constructed in the United States. The vast majority of these were constructed as private units, rather than as part of public housing, at a rate of nearly 40 to 1 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1966, 18). VA guaranteed loans were a significant part of this boom in the housing market. Between 1949 and 1953, on average 24 percent of the mortgage market were VA-guaranteed loans. The role of the government in the mortgage market post-depression and through the war was significant. In 1940, FHA-backed loans made up 13.5 percent of the market. In 1945 the FHA and VA combined insured 24.7 percent of loans. By 1950, the agencies combined insured 41.9 percent of all loans (Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhaut 2012, 7). Most of these houses new were built in the suburbs, rather than in cities, which encouraged the purchasing of homes outside the city. In the 1950s, roughly 70 percent of new residential construction in metropolitan areas was in the suburbs rather than cities (Reily 1958, 861). These actions opened homeownership to middle-class white Americans in a way that it had not been previously. In the early 1940s, the homeownership rate was around 43 percent. By 1960, it had increased almost 20 percent to 61 percent (Wachter and Acolin 2016). The Bureau of Labor Statistics found that buying was cheaper than renting equivalent living areas in most of the nine large metropolitan areas they studied in 1949 and 1950 (Reily 1958, 860). Not only was it advantageous in the long term for individual members of the labor class to invest in homeownership, but it was also a more practical economic choice at the time.

### *3.6 The Civil Rights Movement*

Throughout American history, Black Americans have been engaged in a continuous struggle to realize basic human, democratic, and economic rights. Starting before and continuing throughout the period described above, Black people in America engaged in consistent action against the systems of oppression produced by racial capitalism. The end of WWII helped to bring on two notable changes in the racial caste system of the U.S., which are in tension. First, the rise of communism abroad created a need for liberal racial ideology emphasizing democracy and freedom, to win over non-white newly decolonized countries abroad, which spilled into domestic life as well. This undermined some of the potency of overtly racist laws and favorably shifted the political terrain – especially at the federal level – on which the civil rights struggle was waged (Piven and Cloward 1979 193-194). Second, although segregationist policies, both governmental and private, had long maintained divisions between racial and ethnic divisions of a broader labor class, the creation of stability and prosperity for white workers helped further ingrain divides. The state was successful in placating white middle-class labor through the creation of the suburbs and access to homeownership. Different racial groups occupied different spaces and had highly differential access to homeownership – arguably the most successful process of wealth accumulation for a labor class individual – which created new differences in interests to be exploited.

Prior to the Civil War, much of the Black population in the U.S. was enslaved on plantations in the South. Even after slavery was abolished, many Black Americans remained bound to plantation agriculture by violent oppression from southern whites and the implementation of exploitative systems of sharecropping and debt peonage. However, industrialization and urbanization, particularly in Northern cities, helped facilitate the movement

of Black people to other parts of the U.S. Outmigration spiked in times of industrial growth, such as during wars, as Black people were able to access jobs in cities. Cities were highly segregated (Price et al. 1970). While this had been true to some extent in the rural south, the concentration and segregation of cities provided a measure of security and numerical advantages when organizing (Piven and Cloward 1979, 203). Groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and the Congress of Racial Equality, among others, began in primarily urban spaces. In contrast to the rural plantation south, where two factors – (1) less dense society, which resulted in relative geographic isolation from other Black people, and (2) campaigns of violent white terror to maintain racial order, as evidenced by the murders of Emmett Till, James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and many, many more – urban areas in both the North and South allowed more easily for gatherings, marches, and more. This is not to discount the extreme racism, discrimination, and violence also present in cities. It is just to note the important and visible role urban environments played as sites of organizing and action during the civil rights movement, as they did in other types of labor movements as well.

Black soldiers returned from WWII to highly segregated and racist societies, often less easily able to access the benefits of homeownership and other privileges afforded to their white peers. With the need to show capitalism's appeal to newly decolonized non-white countries, having just fought a war against a country championing eugenics and the "Aryan" race, American racism also became less easily justified. This gave Black Americans, who had long been fighting for civil rights, a political opportunity. From the end of the war through the 1960s Black Americans engaged in many mass protest actions and won numerous legal victories. Well-known major protests include the Montgomery bus boycott (1955-1956); sit-ins in

Greensborough, SC, Salisbury, NC, Chattanooga, TN, San Antonio, TX, and many other cities (beginning en-mass in 1960); the Freedom Riders (1961); the March on Washington (1963); the Mississippi Freedom Summer (1964); and more. While these were mainly in the South, there were also significant protests and unrest in the North and West. On September 4, 1966, Martin Luther King Jr and other peaceful demonstrators protested in Cicero, IL, a segregated suburb known to be particularly hostile to Black people. These sorts of protest actions precipitated larger riots in many cities. The summer of 1967, also referred to as the long, hot summer, was a time when riots erupted in cities across the U.S., including Detroit, Atlanta, New York City, Milwaukee, Newark, Cincinnati, Portland OR, and Tampa. There were several legal victories during this time as well. These included, but were not limited to, the desegregation of the military by executive order (1948); *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954); The Civil Rights Act of 1964; The Voting Rights Act (1965); and *Loving v. Virginia* (1967).

These sorts of protests cannot be divorced from the economic and housing conditions of the day, evident in the protesting choices made by organizers and the conclusions of the Federal government. The ingraining of race in American society was motivated by and key to processes of economic exploitation (Robinson 2020), and so actions in response often specifically targeted economic systems. The Montgomery Bus Boycott and sit-ins both disrupted the business of their targets and were strategies that had been used in the past by the labor class in protest (Piven and Cloward, 1979). Rioting in the summer of 1967 also led to the widespread destruction of property. The Kerner Commission was formed to investigate these riots – what had occurred, why it had happened, and what actions would prevent reoccurrence. The commission concluded that America lived as two societies – Black and white, separate and unequal. It also explicitly

outlined housing as an area that contributed to discontent and necessitated intervention to correct past injustices. A summary in the report's housing section wrote:

“Many homes were physically inadequate. Forty-seven percent of units occupied by nonwhites in disturbance areas were substandard. Overcrowding was common. In the metropolitan areas in which disorder occurred, 24 percent of all units occupied by nonwhites were overcrowded, against only 8.8 percent of the white-occupied units. Negroes paid higher percentages of their income for rent than whites. In both the disturbance areas and the greater metropolitan area of which they were a part, the median rent as a proportion of median income was over 25 percent higher for nonwhites than for whites. The result has been widespread discontent with housing conditions and costs. In nearly every disorder city surveyed, grievances related to housing were important factors in the structure of Negro discontent.” (Kerner et al. 1968, 259)

The commission indicated poverty and discrimination were the two main reasons for this disparate reality. They claimed the creation of ghettos was through market interventions, and that such conditions would not exist in a “truly free and open market” (Kerner et al. 1968, 259). Government intervention on the behalf of capital created situations favorable to capital's accumulation of wealth through the exploitation of various segments of the labor class. The commission did not mince words about what practices created this situation. It wrote:

“To date, federal programs have been able to do comparatively little to provide housing for the disadvantaged. In the 31-year history of subsidized Federal housing, only about 800,000 units have been constructed, with recent production averaging about 50,000 units a year. By comparison, over a period only 3 years longer, FHA insurance guarantees have made possible the construction of over 10 million middle and upper-income units. Federal programs also have done little to prevent the growth of racially segregated suburbs around our cities. Until 1949, FHA official policy was to refuse to insure any unsegregated housing. It was not until the issuance of Executive Order 11063 in 1962 that the agency required non-discrimination pledges from loan applicants.” (Kerner et al. 1968, 259-260)

Overall, the Kerner Commission's report indicated a developed understanding of the forces that led to rioting, created by white capitalist society, and imposed onto Black Americans. After the publication of the report, and in the immediate aftermath of Martin Luther King's assassination,

the U.S. government passed the era's final piece of major civil rights legislation. The Civil Rights Act of 1968 had several provisions, but most notable is the Fair Housing Act. The act prohibited housing discrimination in buying and renting based on race, color, religion, or country of origin. Reflecting on the Fair Housing Act 50 years on, Jargowsky, Ding, and Fletcher (2019) write: "The [Fair Housing Act] could well have been written with stronger enforcement mechanisms, but the larger reason it failed to deliver integrated living patterns is that it was undercut by the laws, regulations, institutions, and subsidies that govern and shape the production of housing." Furthermore, this was not the first time the U.S. had outlawed housing discrimination based on race – the 1866 Civil Rights Act had outlawed housing discrimination as a remnant of slave status, although did not include enforcement mechanisms (Rothstein 2017, ix).

### *3.7 The War on Poverty*

The War on Poverty also began during this time. There was an increased understanding of the prevalence of poverty and unjust conditions in America, in large part inspired by the Civil Rights Movement, although other factors included the publication of John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* in 1958 and Michael Harrington's *The Other America* in 1962 (Bailey and Danziger 2013, 5). Regardless of the exact matrix of factors that inspired the extensive welfare reform package, poverty was still a significant issue in what was generally considered a time of prosperity, and one that LBJ choose to focus on. Prior to the adoption of the official poverty measure in 1965, having an income below \$3,000 per year was the measure for poverty used by the Council of Economic Advisors. By this measure, poverty had declined since 1947, but the rate of decline slowed after 1957. In 1964, one-fifth of American families and the population as a whole were considered poor (Bailey and Danziger 2013, 5).

The War on Poverty included programs expanding healthcare, childcare, access to food, housing, and more. Johnson's primary housing goal was to ensure all American families lived in units that met minimum housing standards. In 1964, eight million U.S. households lived in substandard housing. Just over half a million families received low-income housing assistance (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 212). Johnson's early actions sought to reform and expand existing programs – his administration oversaw the construction of over a quarter-million public housing units, roughly twenty percent of all public housing units ever built. In 1965, the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act created the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which would be the central governmental actor in housing going forward. He also expanded two programs to subsidize the private construction of low-income housing, which will be further detailed in the neoliberal urbanism section below. This reform indicated the beginnings of a systematic turn towards more fully realized neoliberal housing policy tradition. Although the government was massively involved in the provisioning and management of affordable housing through LBJ's policy, partnerships with private firms, turnkey public housing projects, the leased housing program, and the rent supplement program through the 1965 Amendment to the U.S. Housing Act all mark a shift towards an increased reliance on, and not just action for, real estate capital and a free market system (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 213-217).

While this increased reliance on private entities marks a developmental shift in policy for providing affordable housing, the War on Poverty marked an ideological shift as well, which would soon have broader consequences. Historians and urban scholars have marked the Great Society and the War on Poverty and the national civil rights policy occurring concurrently, as distinct from other sorts of major national policy that came before. While policy like the New

Deal was chiefly concerned with righting economic crisis, American society was not in an economic crisis in the 1960s. During this time, Black Americans were seen as an increasingly critical part of a winning Democratic coalition (Piven and Cloward 1979, 181-258) and specific policies were crafted around the demands of Black Americans. This accounts for the passage of both civil rights legislation and policy targeted towards predominantly Black urban areas – “[d]emocratic leaders [...] responded to the demands of the civil rights movement”; and “[w]hen the largely nonviolent protests of 1960 were augmented by the urban riots of 1965 to 1968, the Democrats’ sense of urgency increased, and their focus shifted from the abolition of legal segregation in the South to the economic concerns of the Northern Urban ghettos” (Hays 2012, 92). In this way, a specific party of state power sought to strengthen its own position and ensure its continued power through the strengthening of a specific base of support among Black Americans. This also helps to explain the change in implementation mechanisms for social programs. While in much of the early twentieth century the federal government directly subsidized state governments and agencies, with civil rights and the War on Poverty it began to work directly with local government jurisdictions and non-governmental entities (von Hoffman 2013, 168). This reliance was driven by fears that state officials would fail to enforce or poorly implement civil rights laws but increased the power and influence of the federal government to the detriment of the states governments’ power (von Hoffman 2013, 168).

### *3.8 The Decline of Industrial Urbanism*

Industrial urbanism’s downfall stemmed from attempts to manage and control the labor class. As the state sought to stave off the possibility of rebellion and restart to transition the economy post-depression or war, it utilized policies that benefitted two capital groups – the construction and real estate industries. Beginning post-Great Depression and booming in the



post-WWII society, national housing policy pushed suburbanization, creating a sense of housing individualism. Crucially, homeownership and the value that could be accrued from it set homeowners as a class of mini capitalists over their own small kingdom, often in opposition to any interference by the state and apart from other members of the labor class. The state often sided with capitalists in labor struggles. Through siding with capitalists to maintain the security of the system of capitalism in America as a whole, certain choices made were to the benefit of at least certain members of the labor class. These forces, combined with the limiting of union activity through the Taft-Hartley Act, decimated the collective power held by the labor class. There was also a widespread backlash from white America to the Civil Rights Movement and the strides it made. The War on Poverty's significant spending program, untethered to depression or war, also proved controversial.

This was crystallized in neoliberal Nixon and Reagan era rhetoric that reframed debates around personal achievement and collective responsibility, ignoring the material forces at the time various political decisions were made. This was possible in large part because of the breaking of the power held by the working class, which allowed for more explicit and consistent actions on behalf of capital without backlash from labor. For all the material gains made by workers during the expansionist New Deal era, thirty years of growth- and individual-oriented housing policy ironically led to industrial urbanism's downfall. By tethering the private, uneven, creation of wealth through subsidized homeownership – most notably via the postwar project of suburbanization – industrial urbanism systematically divided and eroded its political base within organized labor. Ultimately, the Vietnam War and racialized suburban backlash to school integration drove a wedge even further into a divided working class, and created, in part, the conditions under which neoliberal urban housing policy became ascendant.

## 4. Neoliberal Urbanism

### Overview

Neoliberalism arrived as a set of ideological and policy solutions to the crisis of stagflation, arising in part from the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 and 1974 and the sovereign debt crisis. It can also be seen in part as a backlash to the expansion of civil rights and social safety nets through the War on Poverty. Neoliberal urban policy became the preeminent urban tradition beginning in the mid-1960s-1970s and continuing through today. Within neoliberal urbanism, there is waning power of industrial capital. As increased globalization and free trade made labor cheaper overseas, industry has moved out of the U.S. Simultaneously, there is a continuous rise in the power of real estate capital and its apparatus (particularly banking and investment capital), so much so that capital takes a preeminent role over the state. In contrast to industrial urbanism's centralized and balancing state, in neoliberal urbanism, the state's primary role is to make capital accumulation as efficient as possible. This is done through deregulation, privatization, austerity measures, increased reliance on free market mechanisms, public-private partnerships, and the crushing of labor organization. Labor exists to create value for capital but has little power and is disconnected internally and from the state. Housing is envisioned as a market, thus the solutions and policies implemented to correct housing issues are market interventions. In this market thinking, policies often prioritize the exchange value of real estate – often beneficial to developers, the real estate industries, banks, and other private entities – over the use value of a home as a place to live, which is first and foremost beneficial to the home's occupant (Taylor 2019).

This tradition also occurs on a political spectrum on which society travels back and forth over time. On one side, a conservative neoliberal urbanism that dominates from the mid-1970s

to the early 1990s in the style of Reagan and Thatcher; on the other, a progressive neoliberal urbanism that reemerges in the 1990s promoted by Clinton, Obama, and Biden, harking back to the Great Society programs of LBJ. These rise in nominal opposition to each other, although both continue to enforce the same power structures and ideological orientation with capital above all. Progressive neoliberalism continues the preeminent traditions of progressivism seen in industrial urbanism, which make no changes to the power structures but does assist, be it for humanistic, religious, moral, or other reasons, poorer members of the labor class in accessing some basic rights and services. Conservative neoliberalism takes a harder line against such measures, which are considered government overreach and intervention into what the free market could do better.

Within neoliberal urbanism, across both conservative and liberal administrations, the creation of affordable housing has relied almost exclusively on the government subsidizing private construction or rents to private landlords. Persistent throughout this chapter and consistent across affordable housing programs introduced under neoliberal regimes are significant issues in the preservation of affordable housing. The urban landscape also becomes an increasingly attractive investment for capital interests (Stein 2019 47-49).<sup>7</sup> Governmental responses to financial crises and capital freezes, combined with years of disinvestment created spaces for unbridled profit creation and government incentive to allow it. Under the guise of urban renewal programs, the government either implicitly or explicitly created opportunities for for-profit economic investment throughout this period. These opportunities expanded greatly in the latter half of the 1990s, continuing through the early 2000s to today (Stein 2019 47-48). This

---

<sup>7</sup> This is not an entirely new phenomenon. Earlier policies such as Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 used public funds to clear blighted urban areas which were then sold to private real estate developers at a reduced cost (von Hoffman 2013, 169).

means real estate capital always has options – utilize continuing government subsidies to provide affordable housing and/or take advantage of opportunities for investments that will reap financial returns as the real estate market grows. Taken together, these neoliberal policies have ensured housing remains squarely within the domain of private capital and the free market, and access to affordable housing remains out of reach for many. This section will trace the development of these policies through eight historical periods: (4.1) the War on Poverty; (4.2) the Neoliberal Response to Fair Housing; (4.3) Nixon’s Housing Program Freeze and its Aftermath; (4.4) Reaganomics and Housing; (4.5) the 1980s Housing Crises; (4.6) Directions of Housing in the 1990s; (4.7) the 2008 Housing Crisis and Choice Neighborhoods; and (4.8) the Covid-19 Pandemic and Housing Today.

### Historical Analysis

As seen in the industrial urbanism section, specific U.S. policies, most notably the National Housing Act of 1937 and the G.I. Bill, were responsible for significant increases in homeownership and rapid expansion of the suburbs. Such policies and their implementation were heavily racialized, and when combined with white flight in response to the civil rights movement and desegregation efforts (Heathcott 2015), created unequal two societies, one Black and one white. The overall homeownership rate increased by almost 20 percent between 1940 and 1960 (Wachter and Acolin 2016, 4); but the increase was distributed unequally, with homeownership rates in 1960 under 40 percent for Black Americans and over 60 percent for white Americans (Asante-Muhammad, Buell, and Devine 2021, 6). The poverty rate was also racially divergent, with the white poverty rate under 20 percent and the Black poverty rate at more than 50 percent in 1960 (Matthews 2012). White wealth became an important base of political power, and politicians from both parties appealed to white suburban voter concerns.

While explicitly racist policies like redlining were no longer socially acceptable, new policies were often deeply racialized and unevenly distributed wealth and resources to suburban white neighborhoods while concentrating institutional violence in Black and minority communities. Many of these policies spoke to white suburbia's racialized conceptions of safety and criminality and were justified by increasingly popular ideas about individualism, personal responsibility, cultural pathology, and continued patriarchal ideals of family.

Policies, agencies, and organizations first created under industrial urbanism continued to be utilized. The most obvious example is HUD. Another that became increasingly important was the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, later renamed Fannie Mae), originally created in 1938. FNMA/Fannie Mae was created as a private organization that was authorized to issue bonds to raise money to buy FHA-backed mortgages, creating a secondary mortgage market. While not a particularly prominent force in the housing market in the 1930s through the 1960s, it is central in the expanding secondary mortgage market discussed later.

#### *4.1 The War on Poverty*

The War on Poverty sought to expand access to safe and affordable housing for poor Americans. The industrial urbanism section above outlined the ways the policies implemented as part of this effort aligned with industrial urban tradition, including significant growth in public housing and the creation of HUD. This section will discuss in more depth the ways in which the War on Poverty began to, in some of its implementation mechanisms, turn towards neoliberalism. This occurred in the expansion and creation of programs that supported the private construction of low-income housing and supplemented rents to private landlords. The end of this section will discuss American attitudes toward public housing in more depth to explain the societal rejection – aligned with neoliberal philosophy – of such strategies.

In addition to the 280,000 public housing units built, LBJ's policies also relied on increasing the share of affordable housing constructed and managed by the private market. Initially, the administration expanded two programs instituted in the late 1950s and early 1960s – the Section 202 Elder Program in 1959 and the Section 221(d)3 Below Market Interest Rate (BMIR) Program in 1961. The former authorized nonprofits to construct homes for elderly and disabled people (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 210). The latter authorized nonprofits or for-profit firms to construct homes for low-income families using FHA-insured loans, typically at three percent interest rates, from private lenders, which then were sold to Fannie Mae at face value (Schwartz 2015, 203). Both programs had significant flaws. Section 202 almost exclusively served white people in white neighborhoods. For BMIR, systems to set rent and select residents resulted in few extremely low-income families were served – eight percent of BMIR households made less than \$3,000 annually, compared to 61 percent of public housing residents. Combined, the two programs had produced less than 12,000 units before Johnson's presidency (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 210). Despite the programmatic flaws, Johnson significantly ramped up production through these programs. About 167,000 new units were begun through programs he inherited (other than public housing) under his tenure (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 213). In 1965, Johnson instituted a rent supplement program and established the Section 23 Leased Housing Program. Section 23 let PHAs rent private units then sublet them to low-income households qualifying for assistance or enter into agreements with private developers to build, rehabilitate, and manage housing units for qualifying low-income households (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 213).

Building on these concepts, in 1968 Johnson replaced these programs with the Section 235 Homeownership Program and Section 236 Rental Program. Section 235 subsidized the construction of new units and the purchase of existing homes for sale to low-income households

by subsidizing the difference between 20 percent of a household's income and total housing costs. Section 236 Rental Program subsidized construction and rehabilitation of units for low-income households with annual subsidies equivalent to a one percent mortgage (Schwartz 2015, 204 and 389). One significant issue faced by these programs was the preservation of affordable housing. For Section 236, as well as BMIR, units produced were guaranteed to remain as affordable housing only if the federally insured mortgage was in effect (Schwartz 2015, 208).

Johnson's policy emphasized public-private partnerships and private developers for a few reasons. As stated earlier, direct distributions (not to state agencies) gave the federal government more control over the implementation of programs. Another reason is fiscal. The Vietnam War and Johnson's domestic social programs were both highly costly, and there was concern federal spending would surpass the debt limit. To ensure this did not happen, Johnson chose not to fully fund Great Society programs, or to build public-private partnerships where private capital could also fund public policies and projects (von Hoffman 2013, 177). Finally, trends in the broader housing market made publicly supported private construction of affordable housing attractive to the real estate market. Interest rates in the late 1960s and early 1970s rose as housing starts slowed (Taylor 2019, 4). Additionally driving this reorientation in investment potential from suburb to city was the invention of "[n]ew financial instruments such as mortgage-backed securities, [which] produced an intense demand for homeowners and more money for home financing" (Taylor 2019, 4). Mortgage-backed securities were one tool used by LBJ to respond to budgetary constraints – Fannie Mae sold participant certificate bonds backed by its mortgage pool (von Hoffman 2013, 177).

Although Johnson was responsible a massive growth in public housing, the political tide was turning against such projects. Public housing projects were increasingly criticized as

isolated, blighted, and crime ridden. The views, heavily reliant on racialized stereotypes, were the opinion of many white Americans and were shared widely in the media (Bloom, Umbach, and Vale 2015). Public housing opponents cited examples like the demolition of Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis to support these arguments (Ludwig and Olsen 2013, 206). While the dominant narrative around public housing was of blight and disaster throughout much of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, this realistically represented a small subset of public housing. The National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1992 only identified six percent of public housing units as severely distressed (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992; cited in Bloom, Umbach, and Vale 2015, 18). Critics of public housing also failed to look at other contributing factors to its decline. White flight from cities was a loss of people and capital, lowering the tax bases of urban areas and forcing cities to adapt to tighter budgets. This also resulted in lower numbers of tenants for public housing projects, which cut into their budgets and ability to make repairs and upkeep. Critically, white flight began in part with FHA loan practices and was furthered by legislation like *Brown vs Board of Education*, well before the passage of the Fair Housing Act, so this mass white migration was assisted by FHA policies. More broadly, cities often dealt with budget crises by neglecting to provide sufficient services to low-income and minority areas (Heathcott 2015). The institutional hollowing out of inner cities and public housing created conditions that fostered neglect and disrepair. These perceptions then provided something to reject and allowed for a reorientation to other free market-based solutions to affordable housing.

#### *4.2 The Neoliberal Response to Fair Housing*

In combination with neoliberal policies, hard to enforce legislation on civil rights had negative or unanticipated consequences for the Black community. The power given to private



companies through neoliberal policy, and the inherently perverse financial incentives held by private capital made the continuation of discrimination and exploitation through housing seemingly inevitable under neoliberal urbanism. The passage of the Fair Housing Act formally ended housing discrimination but made no significant mark on the ways racial inequality and racial capitalism were (and are) embedded into the structure of the real estate market in the U.S. The demand for new homeowners and sources of funding, combined with the loose regulation and oversight, resulted in targeted and predatory reinvestment in primarily Black and low-income urban communities (Taylor 2019).

In 1970, the homeownership rate for Black Americans was 42.6 percent, just under 43.8 percent, the rate for Hispanic and Latino Americans, and the lowest of any racial group measured (Asante-Muhammad, Buell, and Devine 2021, 6). This meant low-income Black or Latino Americans were an easy population to target for expanding homeownership. The Section 235 Homeownership program provided funding for the purchase of existing homes, allowing low-income individuals to purchase these properties with a small down payment and a low-interest mortgage guaranteed by the government. However, years of redlining and other racial marginalization created conditions of poverty and distress in urban areas and for Black residents. This became an excuse for major depository banks to decline to lend to Black Americans and in such areas. This left Black Americans at the mercy of unregulated mortgage banks, often subsidiaries of larger depository banks, whose profits were based solely on volume sales (Taylor 2019, 5). Together, these factors made Black and other low-income Americans living in urban areas prime targets for what Taylor (2019) terms *predatory inclusion*.

In Taylor's (2019, 5) words, predatory inclusion "describes how African American homebuyers were granted access to conventional real estate practices and mortgage financing,

but on more expensive and comparatively unequal terms.” People targeted for predatory inclusion were disproportionately Black, female, heads of their household, and low-income. These people were targeted *because* they were likely to fall behind on mortgage payments and into foreclosure (Taylor 2019, 5). As the mortgage banks made a profit from the volume of sales, and as mortgages were guaranteed by the federal government, it did not matter how long the owner was able to stay in the home; in reality, the more turnover and mortgages that could be signed for a home the better, as it meant a higher profit for the banks. In total by 1979, 20 percent of the households originally subsidized by the section 235 Homeownership program had defaulted on their loans (Weicher 1980, 124; quoted in Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 219).

While predatory inclusion relied on policies implemented in the latter years of the Johnson administration, the practice would generally be carried out while Nixon was in office. This political shift from Johnson to Nixon represented a shift from the importance placed on the Black voting bloc towards more explicit appeals to the silent (white) majority. Critically, this was possible because of the way the Johnson administration had responded to Black Americans’ demands for fair housing with separate anti-discrimination legislation and a new mandate for housing and homeownership production (Taylor 2019, 16). This is to say, that while there are real and important differences in the lived experiences of various marginalized communities under various administrations, both democratic and republican, both operated under the broader regimes of neoliberal urbanism and contributed to the exploitation of racial minorities and the labor class.

#### *4.3 Nixon’s Housing Program Freeze and its Aftermath*

Nixon took office in 1969 having run on a campaign of New Federalism and appeals to the “silent majority” of white suburban Americans. This group was not the target of many of the

Great Society programs implemented by the Johnson administration, and by making claims of overspending and unnecessary programs, Nixon was able to gain widespread support. Nixon's election left HUD and fair housing advocates on uncertain footing. HUD and the Fair Housing Act were both quite new. The latter did not include mechanisms for enforcement the way other civil rights legislation did. Furthermore, officials such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan,<sup>8</sup> who oversaw welfare reform in the White House, posed a barrier to real progress (von Hoffman 2012, 45).

The most significant housing-related policy decision of Nixon's presidency was his housing program freeze. Responding to scandals within housing programs, questions about the effectiveness and financial constraints, Nixon instituted a housing freeze affecting all major subsidized housing programs in 1973, including Section 235, Section 236, public housing, and more. Issues with the programs' effectiveness were clear. The programs produced far fewer units than Johnson had aimed to in the War on Poverty.<sup>9</sup> It was also clear that Section 235 resulted in a high number of foreclosures. By 1975, ten percent of homes supported by the program had been foreclosed on or defaulted on mortgage payments (McClaughry 1975, 4). Similarly, 14 percent of all units produced by the Section 236 Rental Program and the BMIR program were in projects whose owners had defaulted on FHA mortgages (Schwartz 2015, 206).<sup>10</sup> Scholars have different interpretations of the housing freeze and Nixon's HUD policy.

---

<sup>8</sup> Moynihan was a sociologist famous for his notion of "cultural pathology", a deeply racist and patriarchal belief.

<sup>9</sup> Johnson's administration had set a goal to construct or rehabilitate six million subsidized units for low-income households over the decade. The largest programs were Section 235 and 236, which combined served 800,000 households at their peak (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 214). Counting the 280,000 public housing units Johnson built as well, this results in a little over one million units, well below the goal.

<sup>10</sup> Many scholars and government officials commented on these issues at the time, although there was no consensus on why the programs failed. More neoliberal (politically conservative) views of the programs noted overall failures, including high profile scandals, and noted a high percentage of foreclosures in the Section 235 program (McClaughry 1975). Republican representative William Widnall explained the high foreclosure rate as indicative that those eligible for participation in the program "were incompetent buyers of housing" (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, 220). This explanation does not account for the myriad reasons presented by Taylor and other scholars – predatory

Many see the core of the issue as financial, with the results of programs unable to justify the costs (Nathan 1996, 56-57). As oil prices in the early 1970s rose rapidly, operating costs rose faster than tenants' incomes, leaving tenants unable to afford rents and mortgages, leading to default (Schwartz 2015, 206). Scholars also see the freeze as a way to achieve additional political aims. Some argue it was to break down barriers that plagued low-income housing, such as the "iron triangle of lobbyists, Congressional committees, and federal agency officials that had grown up in housing policy" (von Hoffman 2012, 47). Others see it as a path to halt housing desegregation where Nixon could maximize a political payoff while avoiding responsibility for a controversial civil rights decision (Bonastia 2004, 38).

Whether motivated by these reasons or others, it is critical to examine what followed the freeze and who benefited most from the changes that were implemented. In 1974, two weeks after Nixon's resignation, President Gerald Ford signed the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 to replace the programs affected by the freeze. The Act instituted the Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation (Section 8 NC/RC) Program and the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. Section 8 NC/RC subsidized rent by covering the difference between a percentage of tenant income (initially 25 percent, later changed to 30 percent) and fair market rent (FMR). The government signed contracts with developers

---

targeting by the private market resulting in higher rates, a deep and enduring history of racial discrimination, and more (Olsen and Ludwig 2013, Taylor 2019). However, this individualistic, historically ignorant view does echo neoliberal understanding of personal responsibility. McClaughry (who quoted Widnall) (1975, 7-9) offered three alternatives for housing programs going forward following his critique of Section 235 and HUD. The first focused on individual aspiration to homeownership for "worthy" families; the second sought to increase production by removing artificial constraints on the housing market; and the third was a community strategy focused on neighborhood revitalization (commonly known as gentrification or its precursor processes). Other contemporary scholars highlighted other issues with the programs. Taking a more radical (politically liberal/leftist) view, Phyllis Ann Wallace (1975, 33 and 41) noted the failure of the programs to address past inequities in housing policy. This interpretation offers a very different path forward for housing, emphasizing strategies specifically designed to target those affected by racial discrimination. Wallace (1975, 44-46) also noted the high unlikelihood of this happening given national reluctance to fund a comprehensive program.

guaranteeing that unit subsidies would last for 20 to 40 years. The system was flexible, as it provided direct subsidies for individual tenants and varied based on individual incomes, but also because developers could choose how many units of a project would be devoted to Section 8 NC/RC. Developers were free to use either market rate or below market rate financing if they were able to secure it. Developers also were able to advantage of accelerated depreciation allowances which reduced their federal income taxes, making NC/RC an attractive option (Schwartz 2015, 207-211). The Section 8 Existing Housing Program provided rental subsidies in the form of rental certificates to qualifying families with household incomes up to 80 percent of the area median rent. Similar to Section 8 NC/RC, the program subsidized the difference between 25 percent (later changed to 30 percent) of tenant income and FMR. There were also stipulations for what units could be rented to ensure certain space and quality standards (Schwartz 2015, 228).

Section 8 programs also faced issues related to costs, preservation of housing, and ease of utilization. Many of these issues were embedded in the design of the programs. For Section 8 NC/SR, there were no incentives to keep costs low if fair market rents were high enough to allow for profit on top of debt service and operations costs. High rents were perpetuated yearly by HUD's annual adjustment factor, which current rents were multiplied by to determine the next year's rent. Senior housing also made up about half of all NC/SR units and had additional social services costs added which contributed to the program's expenses (Schwartz 2015, 208). These factors were further exacerbated by the high interest rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s. There were significant preservation issues faced by the NC/SR program, where guarantees of affordability expired with the end of the contracts (Schwartz 2015, 208). There were also concerns when it came to who was served and who benefited. The Section 8 NC/SR program

was successful at serving some of the poorest Americans while having a better record of financial success than public housing or earlier subsidy programs. However, the program made the tradeoff between financial risks and serving those with high need by eschewing many eligible participants and serving communities traditionally considered safe – such as low-income elderly white people living in suburban communities, (Hays 2012, 158). These issues also existed with the Section 8 Existing Housing voucher program. It was not an effective intervention for many who qualified – within the first five years a little less than half of enrolled households were able to find landlords that would accept their vouchers (Schwartz 2015, 232). The Existing Housing program was also costly for the government. Private landlords whose tenants received subsidies were able to make money from the program. While rent burdens for tenants decreased, the total dollar amount of rent subsidized for beneficiaries increased substantially. For tenants that moved to more expensive units, average total rent was 70 percent higher than their rent before participation in the program. There was also an increase in rent of 28 percent for program beneficiaries who stayed in their same unit (Hayes 2012 158-159). As tenants paid a set percentage of their income regardless of total rent, “the landlord had an incentive to raise the rent to the FMR ceiling, while the tenant had no incentive to resist such as increase” (Hays 2012, 129).

Nixon had also proposed an additional program post freeze – Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). This too was implemented under the guidance of Ford’s administration through the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. This program is still in place today. These grants were a “new concept in assistance [...] in which communities are granted broad latitude in using funds for a variety of development activities, as long as they complied with some general federal guidelines” (Jacobs et. al 1986, 255; quoted in Schwartz 2015, 268). Eligible development activities include property and real estate management activities, social

services, economic development, and conditional construction and rehabilitation of public facilities. Ineligible activities include any sorts of acquisition, construction, or rehabilitation of buildings for general government conducted activities, political activities, and with some exceptions, income payments or new housing construction (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development N.d. c; Schwartz 2015, 269). Funds are distributed primarily to large cities and urban counties, although some funds are distributed to state governments for use in smaller communities (United States Department of Housing and Urban Development N.d.c; Schwartz 2015, 269). There is also a requirement for CDBGs that at least 70 percent of grant funds should benefit people with at least 80 percent of AMI, with the remaining 30 percent to be used in the prevention or elimination of urban slums and blight or for natural disaster relief (Schwartz 2015, 269).

The 80 percent AMI requirement is controversial, as AMI for an entire metropolitan area is generally significantly higher than it is for urban core residents (Schwartz 2015, 271). Census data from 1975 helps to illustrate this issue. For metropolitan areas with populations of at least one million, the mean household income within the central city was \$12,806, compared to \$17,103 for households outside the central city. For metropolitan areas with populations less than one million, the mean household income for central city households was \$12,938, and for households outside of central cities, \$15,030 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1977, 13 and 32). One element of the program with roots in the more industrial urban tradition is the requirement for a consolidated plan, laying out the housing needs of the municipality or state and laying out specified strategies and timelines, to receive funds (Schwartz 2015, 298). Ultimately though, the grants themselves allow for broad flexibility in their implementation and encouraged devolution in the planning and implementation of housing and social programs (Schwartz 2015, 268).

Setting a high AMI bar for most of the funding and allowing 30 percent to be used towards activities without a specified income cap has the added result of allowing for projects that center on gentrification or urban renewal (Gramlich 1998, 12; cited in Schwartz 2015, 271). These often harm the lowest income households, allowing for the accumulation of capital by private entities.

All in all, while the housing freeze angered many in the housing industry, including home builders and housing interest groups (von Hoffman 2021, 46), ultimately, the replacement programs still put these groups in advantageous positions to accumulate capital. Shifting away from large production programs to cash-based directed assistance and state or local control nominally promised to cut costs and increase efficiency. In reality, the new programs created opportunities to accumulate private wealth for landlords, homebuilders, and other private corporate entities, rather than the poorest Americans, through federal subsidies and tax breaks. They were often still cost-inefficient for the government and ineffective in increasing the affordable housing supply.

#### *4.4 Reaganonomics and Housing*

The favorable position of private capital was further entrenched by reforms made during the Reagan administration. People often point to Reagan's leadership (and Thatcher's simultaneous leadership in the U.K.) as the key factor in realigning national policy priorities towards neoliberalism. His leadership certainly marked the fuller realization of neoliberal changes in the ideological debate around policy priorities, although there were roots of these changes in earlier administrations. (Hill 1983, 216). In his campaign and throughout his presidency, Reagan derided welfare, championed supply-side and laissez-faire economics, and promoted tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy. These principles would dictate his economic



policy, but they were informed and complicated by contemporary economic and social realities when Reagan took office. The U.S. experienced a crisis of stagflation in the late 1970s, with high oil prices and interest rates, and a stagnating economy with little or no growth (Wessel 2017). This took place among broader trends of deindustrialization and urban population loss (particularly in northern cities) (Bluestone 1984; Rappaport 2003), and growing trends in the “recapitalization of capital” (Hill 1983, 216). Reagan’s solutions also continued the departure from comprehensive programs and focused on individual-based solutions and triage-based approaches (Hill 1983, 212-217). Considering the notions of policymakers over who was “savable” and a continuing focus on the trifold “urban pathologies” of crime, housing abandonment, and fiscal insolvency (Hill 1983, 211), these triage approaches raise questions about who was served by urban policy. Reagan’s commitment to rewriting tax-law and pushing for small government ultimately had significant effects on the mechanisms by which low-income housing was created and the role of the government in housing.

It is important to understand which groups benefited from Reagan’s policies. One obvious way to do this is to look at tax cuts and welfare spending. Reagan instituted a sharp three-year tax cut in his first six months in office that was heavily targeted at reducing the tax burden of high-income individuals and corporations (Meeropol 2001, 3). Just after the tax cut had passed, the U.S. entered a short depression and unemployment rose to around ten percent in 1982 (Meeropol 2001). Unlike the policy response by Gerald Ford’s administration to a similarly short depression about a decade earlier (or the Keynesian spending of industrial urban precedent), the government did not extend any form of unemployment benefits. Comparisons of the two depressions and policy responses highlight this lack of benefits to unemployed workers – there was a 30-to-40-point difference in the number of unemployed people accessing benefits

between the two administrations. Furthermore, Reagan's tax cuts focused on the wealthy, which did not incentivize working-class consumption which could have helped to mitigate the depression (Meeropol 2001, 2-3). For these reasons, scholars highlight that the depression during Reagan's presidency did much more damage to the economy (Meeropol 2001, 3). However, this refusal to provide unemployment was generally commensurate with Reagan's perception of direct subsidies for low-income people. Throughout his campaign and presidency, welfare, and heavy use of stereotypes like the "welfare queen" provided a racialized and villainized opponent for Reagan that appealed to the white voters who had supported Nixon. As Susan and Norman Fainstein (1989, 42) explain, Reagan's position was that domestic crises were the result of bureaucratic regulation and non-productive domestic spending on a "bloated welfare state that diverted resources from capital accumulation but investors to consumption by the lower classes." In the administration's view, government retrenchment was an antidote to this economic malaise (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1989, 41-42). From 1980 to 1986 spending on housing as a percentage of social spending remained relatively consistent, around 2.1 percent of GDP, although social spending overall declined six points as a share of the federal budget (Bixby 1990, 13-14).

Which affordable housing programs were funded changed as well. The Reagan administration terminated the Section 8 NC/SR program in 1983 and introduced their own Freestanding Voucher program as an offshoot of the Section 8 Voucher program. This program extended flexibility, particularly as it pertained to what sorts of units could be rented. Rather than base subsidies on pre-calculated fair market rent for any given municipality, the Freestanding Voucher program allowed housing authorities to designate payment standards that acted as the maximum allowable rent. However, tenants could also choose how much they

wanted to cover. While 30 percent was standard, they could pay less if they chose a unit with rents lower than the payment standard or cover the difference if they chose a more expensive unit (Schwartz 2015, 228). Usage of vouchers did increase during the mid-1980s. While voucher utilization rates were a little under 50 percent in 1979, in 1985, 68 percent of those receiving one of the types of vouchers succeeded in using the subsidy (Schwartz 2015, 232). The increased flexibility is generally regarded as a good thing for tenants, but it also obviously expanded the number and type of units that could be rented out, which is also beneficial to private landlords and developers. The Freestanding Voucher Program also furthered devolution, placing more power in the hands of local municipalities to set rates.

In addition to beginning a new voucher program that was less reliant on the federal government's planning, Reagan's administration also addressed housing as a production issue. Reagan's administration introduced the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The act decreased income tax rates, most substantially for the wealthiest Americans, and consolidated other tax brackets.<sup>11</sup> In terms of housing finances, the act "eliminated the ability of individual investors to claim 'passive losses' (i.e. the depreciation value of assets) as a deduction against regular income," which was a critical funding component of prior housing construction programs (Hays 2012, 231). This angered private investors in low-income housing development who felt the government had "'broken its contract' with them by removing one of the major financial benefits of their previous investments" (Hays 2012, 231). It also concerned housing advocates that the production and rehabilitation of low-income housing might stop, particularly considering the preservation challenge already faced by low-income housing programs. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit was included to replace the tax break

---

<sup>11</sup> This promised to result in a seven percent decrease overall in income tax revenue that would be made up by an increase in corporate tax revenues (Auerbach and Slemrod 1997, 601).

incentives, ensuring that there was a continued financial incentive for private developers to build affordable housing. The LIHTC provides a dollar-for-dollar credit. To be eligible for the credit, at least 20 percent of the units developed needed to be affordable to households earning less than 50 percent of the area's median income (Scally, Gold, and DuBois 2018, 2). Typically, developers sell LIHTC credits to fund the initial development. Schwartz has described the numerous incentives for private investment in these projects – outside investors are rewarded with a tax credit, depreciation allowances and other tax benefits, and some portion of capital gains if the property is sold (Schwartz 2015, 137). Overall, Reagan's policies decreased welfare or declined to provide additional support to the working class in times of economic hardship. At the same time, he ensured there continued to be avenues for capital accumulation in the production of affordable housing.

#### *4.5 1980s Housing Crises: The Savings and Loan Crisis and Section 8 HUD Scandal*

The largest housing crisis of the 1980s was the Savings and Loan Crisis, which affected the system for financing mortgages of private real estate purchases. The mortgage system for private housing had remained relatively consistent from the late 1930s. New Deal reforms had created a stable mortgage system that was insulated from other financial sectors. Schwartz (2015, 75) describes this system as “two distinct circuits”. The larger of the two involved the savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks and were collectively referred to as ‘thrifts.’ These groups were the largest source of mortgages through the 1970s with lines to larger regional home loan banks, and additionally offered passbook savings accounts with deposits guaranteed by the federal government. Their profits came from the difference between the amount of interest charged on mortgages and the amount of interest paid out to account holders. The other circuit involved FHA-issued mortgages and institutions that supported them

(Schwartz 2015, 75). Interest rate volatility in the 1960s and inflation and increasing interest rates in the 1970s put thrifts under pressure. Ultimately, less funding was available for lending (Curry and Shibut 2000, 27; Sherman, 2009; Schwartz 2015, 76-77). To address these challenges, and with government encouragement and facilitation, thrifts began to increasingly rely on low-yield mortgages, adjustable-rate mortgages, selling to the second-hand mortgage market, and investment in real estate (Curry and Shibut 2000, 27; Schwartz 2015, 77). Deregulation, as well as poor real-estate investments on behalf of the industry (Schwartz 2015, 77), led to the Savings and Loan Crisis.

The crisis began in 1986 and lasted until 1995. During this time, 1,043 thrifts, almost 50 percent of all federally insured thrifts, failed or were closed (Curry and Shibut 2000, 26). At the end of 1986, 441 thrifts were insolvent and 533 thrifts had less than two percent of total assets in tangible capital. The former had \$113 billion in assets, the latter \$453 billion. Together, this accounted for almost half of the thrift industry's assets. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), the thrift industry's federal insurer was declared insolvent (Curry and Shibut 2000, 27). The government ultimately enacted the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989 to bail out the industry and correct the issues. The legislation created a structure to handle the crisis, setting an asset liquidation process for failed institutions, and new requirements and capital standards for remaining thrifts (Curry and Shibut 2000, 28; Schwartz 2015, 78). One critical piece of the legislation was a requirement to set capital standards at least as stringent as national banks. This required a specific amount in reserves for each dollar that was loaned, a requirement that many thrifts were unable to comply with. As such, thrifts increasingly sold to a secondary mortgage market, and the total share of

mortgages controlled by thrifts declined substantially. This is partially responsible for the massive growth in the secondary mortgage industry (Schwartz 2015, 77-78).

There was another housing crisis that hit at the very end of the decade, a scandal involving HUD and a Section 8 program called the Moderate Rehabilitation (Mod Rehab) program. The Mod Rehab program was different from Section 8 NC/SR or Existing Housing. The program was begun in 1987 as an additional source of repair funding to upgrade rental housing used by the Section 8 Existing Housing Vouchers (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development N.d. a). The program was relatively small and thus left in a discretionary fund overseen controlled by the HUD secretary. In April of 1989, the HUD Inspector General released a report detailing misconduct and corruption in the awarding of the funds. Richard Allen Hays, a scholar of urban housing policy describes an example of how the scam operated:

“A developer with an idea for a project would contact a former Reagan administration official, such as, in one instance, former interior secretary James Watt. For a hefty consulting fee (in Watt’s case, \$300,000), the official would call [the current HUD director Samuel] Pierce, or his top assistant, Deborah Dean, who would promise approval of the project. Then, the developer would advise the city in which the project was to be located to apply for units through HUD’s nominally merit-based application procedure. Within a few months, the city would be allocated the exact number of units, which ‘coincidentally’ corresponded to the exact number needed for the developer’s project.” (Hays 2012, 243)

The pushback was swift on both sides of the aisle, and the scandal resulted in HUD reforms including limiting discretionary funds, use of regulation waivers, and consulting fees (Hays 2012, 244). However, reflecting more broadly on this scandal and others related in some way to housing – the Keating Five, accusations against Senator Alfonse D’Amato, etc. – Hays points to certain core features of neoliberal urbanism. In the best light, such scandals suggest a particularly close relationship between private capitalists and elected politicians. Taking a more cynical stance, Hays suggests that such corruption is inherent and to be expected in a system that

relies on private, profit-motivated developers to provide affordable housing and other government services (Hays 2012, 244-245).

#### *4.6 Directions of Housing in the 1990s*

The urban landscape of America in the 1990s followed many larger trends from the decades prior. Urban population decline had continued in cities across the Northeast and Midwest throughout the 1980s, apart from some major metropolitan areas like New York City and Chicago. During this time, cities across the South and West grew (Rappaport 2003, 21). This is in part a reflection of industrial movement to the South and overseas because of lower unionization rates and an ability to pay lower wages (Cobb 1984; Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman 2001; Rose 2018). The elimination of lower-skilled unionized manufacturing jobs nationally and growth in non-union low wage service sector employment and high skilled employment came with a significant shift in income distribution, increasing gaps between the poorest and wealthiest Americans (Teitz 1998, 651). The overall poverty rate also increased from 1980 to 1990, from 11.6 percent to 14.5 percent (Drier and Atlas 1995, 6). These socio-demographic changes occurred contemporaneously with other socio-demographic changes as well. There was also growth in female-led and single-parent households, as well as the immigrant population in the United States (Teitz 1998, 651). This growth did not follow the idealized white, two-parent, patriarchal American family.

The housing environment of the time was characterized by a heavy reliance on private market forces to provide housing. Two-thirds of Americans owned their own homes, but there were significant issues accessing housing for low-income Americans. In 1991, 72 percent of low-income renters were cost-burdened, spending over 30 percent of their income on housing expenses. Over 40 percent of low-income renters were severely cost-burdened, spending more

than 50 percent of their income on rent. From 1970 to 1989, the number of low-cost apartments decreased by 1.3 million, all while the number of families living in poverty rose. Homelessness was also a growing issue, with more than a million people experiencing homelessness every year. Public housing had not been a significant funding priority since the 1960s, and there are around 800,000 families on waiting lists for PHA units. Out of 13.8 million low-income rental households eligible, only 30 percent received some sort of federal assistance. In total, the HUD budget was 25.6 billion (1.7 percent of the federal budget). American homeowners enjoyed more than double this amount in tax deductions on mortgage interest and property taxes (Drier and Atlas 1995, 2-7).

The broader power balance within urban planning in the 1990s was shifting as well. Planning was increasingly recognized by and reliant on public funding. This was in line with the general devolution of housing and social programs but was also a result of the burgeoning environmental movement. With the backlash to the 1960s Great Society programs and the growing environmental movement, there was increasing power in the hands of local citizenry groups, local governments, and developers (Teitz 1988 649-651). These three groups, to varying degrees, held significant power in the development decisions of their local areas. Access to such power was heavily racialized and classed, exemplified by the suburban rich's ability to build gated communities or the growth of the NIMBY movement, two examples often out of reach for poor urban residents. While the suburbs were still a significant force in housing and urban development, environmental concerns about the wastefulness of urban sprawl, threats to open space, and energy waste made higher-density urban development more attractive (Teitz 1988, 660). These anti-sprawl concerns, along with concerns about social and spatial race and income segregation, were critical in the development of the New Urbanism movement. Through high-



quality mixed-use, mixed-income, compact (often infill) developments, that supported various types of housing and relied on alternative modes of transportation, New Urbanism promised to stimulate social and economic diversity, economic activity, and create an enhanced sense of community (Garde 2020). However, many scholars look cautiously or critically towards the New Urbanism movement. They cite concerns over who is served, raising questions about gentrification (Smith 2002; Day 2003; Stein 2019).

Housing and urban policy in the 1990s responded to these factors, and there were several important changes in housing policy throughout the 1990s that are particularly critical to understanding how housing in the U.S. works today. The first important change was a reinvigorated focus on community development rather than just individual project development. This can be understood partially in response to the focus on human capital and on individual betterment as it pertains to education and specific skill production. It also reflected the adoption of New Urbanism ideals by local municipalities across the U.S., and national officials, including Henry Cisneros, Clinton's HUD secretary. The second was the growth of the secondary mortgage market and new lending practices, and the third is the legislation included in the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998. These policy developments were to some extent facilitated by the 1980s crises mentioned above but were also parts of a broader trend within neoliberal urban policy to respond to urban crises and indicative of the democrats' agenda in the White House.

In the 1990s there was an increasing reliance on community-based development strategies. These strategies allowed for local control, and designated spaces for private capital investment and accumulation, generally through processes like revitalization and gentrification.

There were several community-based grant programs established by the federal government.<sup>12</sup> Block grants were a critical funding source for community and regional development in the early 1980s and 90s, making between 60 and 90 percent of community and regional development-based federal aid to local and state governments (Finegold, Wherry, and Schardin 2004, 3). The HOPE, standing for either Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere or Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere, programs also began in the early 1990s with the goal of promoting homeownership opportunities for low-income Americans.<sup>13</sup> The largest and most prominent HOPE project was HOPE VI. Hope VI was enacted through an appropriations bill in 1993. Originally called the Urban Revitalization Demonstration, the project grew out of recommendations from the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing released in the 1992 report (Hays 2012, 271; Schwartz 2015, 184). The Commission found commonalities in distressed public housing projects, including disrepair, the need for social supports, and distress in the surrounding community (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992, 3). They suggested solutions to these issues through a set of overall policy priorities including addressing the needs of residents, the physical condition of the public housing stocks, management and operational needs, and a focus on other ‘nontraditional’ strategies. HOPE IV originally focused primarily on resident empowerment and addressing the physical condition of public housing. It aimed to replace distressed public housing with higher

---

<sup>12</sup> This included many block grants, including Community Development Block Grants, the HOME Investment Partnership Program, and Housing Opportunities for Persons with AIDS (HOPWA). HOME focused exclusively on affordable housing subsidies for low- and mid-income households (Schwartz 2015, 272), while HOPWA focused on individuals with HIV and AIDS and could be used for housing, medical care, and support services related activities (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. d).

<sup>13</sup> HOPE I envisioned the sale of public housing projects to tenet management organizations. HOPE II applied the same scheme to privately owned developments receiving public funding. HOPE III funded the construction and rehabilitation by non-profits that could ultimately be purchased by low-income Americans (Hays 2012, 247-249). HOPE IV, also known as HOPE for Elderly Independence, combined Section 8 rental assistance and support services to allow low-income elderly individuals to continue living independent of nursing communities (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. e).

quality, lower density mixed-income developments (Schwartz 2015, 184). Eventually, the program's goals became broader and more ambitious to include "economic integration and poverty concentration, 'new urbanism'; and inner-city revitalization" (Popkin et al 2004, 14; Cisneros and Engdahl 2009; quoted in Schwartz 2015, 184).

A variety of practices were put in place to enable this expanded focus on attracting capital from slightly higher-income individuals and wealthy private developers or firms. The program encouraged the use of public housing authority financing in combination with other strategies, including the use of other block grant or LIHTC funding, market-rate rentals, and homeownership opportunities to finance mixed-income development. This meant issues inherent to the funding sources, like affordability preservation concerns with LIHTC-funded units, would transfer to the new project. Concerns over resident safety – a significant issue in the systematically underfunded and neglected public housing projects – lead to a reliance on concepts like defensible space<sup>14</sup> and increasing privatization of space. The concept was lauded as the physical planning answer to social ills, enabling and empowering residents to take control of their communities (Newman 1995). In the nominal pursuit of attracting middle- and higher-income families, these projects also included more "attractive" features: lower-rise structures with porches, bay windows, gabled roofs, and amenities like central air, dishwashers, and washers and dryers. These were designed to make them look less like the monolith structures associated with public housing and to provide amenities commonplace in other market-rate units (Schwartz 2015, 185). These types of amenities often furthered privatization, as encouraged by defensible space concepts. For example, the inclusion of a porch expanded the footprint of

---

<sup>14</sup> The idea of defensible space relies on the idea that large public spaces were ones in which people did not feel responsibility for what occurred, leading to crime, and that privatization imposed a sense of responsibility on the owner and would isolate and confine the criminal by diminishing their territory (Newman 1996).

private property, and the presence of a washer and dryer in the home negated the need to go to a central laundry room or out for laundry facilities. Yes, this eliminated spaces of plausible danger for residents, but it also eliminated spaces of possible connection and community.

HOPE VI ran from 1993 to 2010. Although public housing residents were already by and large some of the lowest-income Americans, the program targeted PHAs with extremely disadvantaged residents. Over a third of the households made less than \$5,000 annually, compared to about a fifth of all public housing residents. They were also disproportionately households headed by Black women (Duryea 2006, 581). Through revitalization grants, the program was responsible for demolishing 96,226 public housing authority units (Schwartz 2015, 198). These were replaced by 107,800 units, roughly half of which are affordable for low-income families. To account for the remaining net loss of PHA units, HUD issued 78,000 vouchers (Hays 2012, 272). This was necessary because much of the housing that HOPE VI replaced, about 80 percent, although categorized as distressed, was occupied (Schwartz 2015, 188). There were also an additional 56,755 PHA units torn down as part of a demolition-only component of HOPE VI that lasted from 1996 to 2003 (Schwartz 2015, 198).

One of the most significant critiques of the HOPE VI program is that it did not adequately serve the PHA residents displaced in the revitalization process. Only 16 percent of the original residents relocated back to HOPE developments (Popkin, Levey, and Burton 2009). Newly imposed standards to qualify for revitalized housing – such as a clear criminal background check, work requirements, poor credit history, imposed one challenge to return (Schwartz 2015, 188). Another was the long timespan of the redevelopment projects, which meant that some families who moved just decided not to return. Research from 2003 found that one in five residents studied did not receive relocation assistance or new subsidies (Schwartz

2015, 189). Significant portions of the original residents did not enjoy the benefits of their specific redevelopment, and about a third were not able to gain any benefits from relocation either (Popkin, Levey, and Burton 2009, 496). While some surveys of former PHA residents who moved because of HOPE VI reported high resident satisfaction, research also raised concerns about affording utilities or groceries, disconnection from former social support systems, and whether the program truly encouraged racial integration (Popkin et. al 2004, 29-31; Schwartz 2015, 189; Kost 2012). The latter two concerns also reflect the broader neoliberal tendency to internally disconnect those with the least power.

The program also offered increased control and opportunities for financial gain by private capital. PHAs awarded HOPE VI funding often contracted out the management of the final sites and allowed each project to be managed independently. The budgetary and project tracking models were both taken from the private real-estate sector and allowed lenders to have accountability for their project-specific investments (Schwartz 2015, 187-187). HOPE VI projects also allowed for higher per-unit development costs. This created opportunities for a greater accumulation of capital for private development and building firms. These changes are particularly striking because unlike other federal subsidies that rely on private capital to develop low-income housing, this subsidy is also combined with a replacement for pre-existing, often occupied, public housing units. These changes were justified by expected lower maintenance costs from decreased vandalism and better wear on well-constructed buildings (Popkin et. al 2004, 21; Schwartz 2015, 185).

This redevelopment, and the luring of wealthier, often white residents back to urban centers has been critiqued for facilitating gentrification (Duryea 2006, 570). One report, aiming to address the effect on crime displacement, noted in addition to significantly positive effects on

crime, that areas surrounding the sample of HOPE VI projects studied saw an increase in redevelopment in areas surrounding the target sites (Cahill, Lowry, and Downey 2011, 74). Statistical analysis of a spatial gentrification index in the 250 largest metropolitan statistical areas and HOPE VI tracks show mixed results of HOPE VI's impact on gentrification within target neighborhoods. Because of the localized implementation and varying local conditions, in some places, HOPE VI had the impact of growing gentrification, while in others it reduced the degree of gentrification (Lee 2017). Another possibility is that while these changes may not have caused gentrification, it might have been the precipitating factor for HOPE investment. Scholars have argued that gentrification in areas surrounding distressed public housing, and the subsequent pressure put on local government's real estate interests and new residents provided the catalyst to address distressed public housing. Local governments then made use of HOPE VI as a tool to further assist the revitalization/gentrification process (Wyly and Hammel; Goetz, 2013; Newman 2004; quoted in Lee 2017, 17-18). Either way, HOPE VI displaced public residents from their homes, often left them without new support or subsidies, and created spaces for private housing creation of units that would serve wealthier people.

The 1990s also saw further growth in the secondary mortgage market. Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac, and Ginny Mae continued to be significant forces in the secondary mortgage market. These three government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) had strict underwriting standards for loans they bought. In the 1990s, continuing into the 2000s, other, non-GSE investment firms began issuing mortgage-backed securities, called private-label securities. These firms did not utilize the same strict underwriting standards and invested in higher-risk subprime or "Alternative A-paper" mortgages (Schwartz 2015, 82). This was possible because of the introduction of risk-based pricing. Through subprime mortgages, borrowers who were

considered a higher risk – who lacked consistent income, already had high debt, or had low credit scores – and may not have been approved for mortgages before were now able to secure one, but with higher fees and interest rates. These subprime mortgages represented a new type of predatory lending (Schwartz 2015, 85-87 and 350-354). They were disproportionately issued to minority homebuyers. By 2006, 53.4 percent of loans made to Black people to purchase homes and 52.7 percent of loans made to refinance were subprime (Schwartz 2015, 355). These mortgages were increasingly offered by mortgage banks, which were not regulated as strictly as depository banks. Mortgage banks had incentives to bond those borrowers to higher interest rates even if borrowers were qualified to receive lower rates based on their risk index, which exacerbated the issues of subprime lending. These banks also typically sold their loans to the secondary mortgage market (Schwartz 2015, 87). While the secondary mortgage market held 17 percent of single-family mortgages in 1980, that had increased to 44 percent in 1990, and 59 percent in 2000 (Schwartz 2015, 82), in part because of the growth of subprime loans.

The final significant event in the housing environment of the U.S. in the 1990s was the passage of the 1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act. The Act created the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program by combining Nixon's Section 8 Existing Housing certificate program with Reagan's Freestanding Voucher program. The system allowed PHAs to set payment standards, depending on the area, between 90 and 120 percent of FMR. It also retained the flexibility of Freestanding Vouchers, allowing tenants to choose to spend above 30 and up to 40 percent of their income on rent, and for vouchers to be used anywhere in the U.S. once awarded. It also rolled back earlier provisions to give landlords more leeway in choosing not to rent to voucher-holders (Schwartz 2015 229-231). Early in the 1990s, 81 percent of those receiving vouchers were successful in using them. However, by 2000, utilization success rates

had fallen ten percent. The voucher program continued to grow throughout this time, adding a little over 200,000 households in the four years following 1998. Part of this growth is because vouchers were used to replace other types of housing assistance, as seen in the case of HOPE VI (Schwartz 2015, 229-231). The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act further aided in creating new spaces for capital investment and accumulation in the process. The Faircloth Amendment limits the construction of public housing, prohibiting the use of public funds to construct units if it will increase the number of units a given PHA operates. It also struck down the one-for-one replacement rule, allowing the mixed-income development plans to be unrestrained by the number of units held prior (Hays 2012, 272). The passage of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act ensured affordable housing would continue to be provided by private landowners, subsidized by the federal government, and once disinvested in communities would be targeted for private capital gain.

In all, the political tide in the 1990s further prioritized creating spaces for private capital to invest safely in urban areas. Through the HOPE VI program, this wide urban renewal practice targeted occupied public housing, converting it into privately owned mixed-income developments. The curtailing of public housing was furthered by the Faircloth Amendment, which ensured the U.S. would inevitably remove itself from any state provisioning of affordable housing. Finally, the growth of the subprime mortgage industry set up the mortgage market, and the economy as a whole, for catastrophe in the decade to come.

#### *4.7 2008 Housing Crisis and Choice Neighborhoods*

There were two major events affecting housing between 2006 and 2012. The first was the Great Recession; the second, which is in some ways connected, is the continued rise of austerity politics limiting many government housing interventions. To address the recession,



this section will first discuss conditions in the housing industry and the role of subprime lending to provide context for additional discussion of the scope of the recessions' fallout and the government response. The second event must be understood through a few lenses. Austerity measures fit squarely within the realm of neoliberal policy. There was growing support for austerity measures prior (e.g. Reagan tax cuts), but the financial crisis of 2008 provided a precipitating moment to respond with such measures (Baker 2010; Peck 2012; Theodore 2020). These specific austerity measures were also a result of partisan motivated reasoning, specifically increased concern for national debt by politicians whose party does not hold the White House (Kane and Anson 2020). Importantly, in this case, it is also a reflection of the conservative backlash to the election of Barack Obama<sup>15</sup>. Conservatives vowed to block Obama's legislation from the beginning of his term. With the combination of these factors, there was an effective turn to greater austerity measures by conservatives during these years (Schwartz 2010; McGahey 2013; Williamson 2013). Post-depression recovery was slow, a result of the austerity-inspired limited response to the 2008 crisis (Baker 2010; Madowitz 2014). In the housing sector, many programs to fund housing and community development were cut significantly. Those that were succeeding in being funded aligned with a heavily neoliberal vision. This section will address one program – the Choice Neighborhood Initiative, the Obama-era HOPE VI replacement program that began in the aftermath of the recession (Schwartz 2015, 444-446) – laying out some of the broader austerity background, the roots of the program, its overall goals, and the way it is

---

<sup>15</sup> Many political commentators have referenced this backlash. Prominently, Ta-Nehisi Coates has commented extensively, including in his book *Eight Years We Were in Power*. Coates comments on the prevalent racism in America, making sure to clearly separate backlash faced by Obama from the President's moderate political stances. He wrote an accompanying article published in *The Atlantic* sharing many of the same thoughts, which can be found at <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/10/the-first-white-president-ta-nehisi-coates/537909/>.

implemented. The subsequent two chapters of this thesis will focus in-depth on Lewiston, Maine's Choice Neighborhood Implementation Plan.

The housing market had grown steadily from the 1990s until 2006. In the first five years of the decade, the value of residential real estate grew by two-thirds, from \$15 trillion to \$25 trillion. In 2006, the market began to decline by measures of prices, sales volume, and new production. Within the first 10 months of the year, annual housing starts fell by around 800,000 from a high of 2.27 million to 1.47 million (Case and Quigley 2008, 161-163). There are two dominant narratives explaining the events leading up to the recession. The first primarily concern first-time home purchases, while the second points to refinancing as the heart of the issue. Both highlight the subprime mortgage industry for its central role in the crisis (Goodman and Zhu 2018). The former argument is that subprime mortgages were allotted to homebuyers who would have failed to qualify for a prime loan and that these home purchasers then failed to repay, instigating the crisis. Depending on ones' ideological affiliation, the root cause of this is any number of things. In a more leftist to centrist take, the blame rests at the feet of the government for its policies aiming to increase the number of home buyers and the unethical practices of corporations (Lewis et al. 2010, Goodman and Zhu 2018). More conservative (and racialized and classed) takes point to the irresponsibility of borrowers who took out difficult to repay mortgages. As discussed above, these subprime mortgages were a type of predatory lending, often specifically targeting low-income, minority groups who had few other options. The other significant argument is that subprime refinancing loans played a much more significant part in the crisis (Foote et al 2008; Goodman and Zhu 2018). Although there is not extensive scholarship on why people chose to refinance, one HUD study conducted from 2001 to 2003, during the height of subprime lending and the housing boom, offers some context. First,

the analysis notes that households of all income levels took advantage of refinancing opportunities, which is aligned with other researchers' findings that subprime refinancing loans often went to those with better credit (Goodman and Zhu 2018, 3). Second, HUD approximates that 35 percent of cashed-out equity from refinancing was used for home improvements, while almost 50 percent was used to pay off high-cost consumer debt or make investments (Office of Policy Development and Research 2004, 1-2). This is indicative of the wider connections homeownership has in the American economic system and the ways that individual homeownership monetizes on the exchange value of a home.

2008 marked the beginning of the worst recession in the United States since the Great Depression. Sparked by the bursting of a housing bubble in the U.S., and the widescale defaulting on mortgages, the effects were felt worldwide. Between 2007 and 2012 over 12.5 million homes in the U.S. were foreclosed upon. In the aftermath, foreclosure rates have remained at historical highs (Schwartz 2015, 411). Subprime mortgages were delinquent and foreclosed upon at higher rates, but with significant unemployment, prime mortgages were also foreclosed on as homeowners facing lost income could no longer afford to pay (Schwartz 2015, 414). There were human consequences to the 12.5 million homes foreclosed upon. Foreclosure eliminated access to equity and damaged credit scores, which has relegated many to the rental market. Schwartz also points to increased stress, tension, conflict, and disruptions, which affect health, childhood development, and more (Schwartz 2015, 21-22). A report by the Center for Responsible Lending in 2010 quantified the demographics of the crisis up to that point. Unsurprisingly, given the disparate racial composition of subprime loan holders and the deeply ingrained discrimination and segregation of the housing market, communities of color were disproportionately impacted by foreclosure. According to this report, by 2010, nearly eight

percent of Black and Latino Americans had lost their homes to foreclosure, more than 3 points more than non-Hispanic white Americans (Bocian, Wei, and Ernst 2010, 2). On top of those already foreclosed on, more than 20 percent of Black and Latino borrowers were likely at imminent risk of foreclosure, seven points more than white borrowers (Bocian, Wei, and Ernst 2010, 3). There were also effects on the neighborhoods in which foreclosures occur. The Center for Responsible Lending estimated that foreclosure caused the value of approximately 95 million other homes in neighborhoods where foreclosures occurred to decline by around \$2.2 trillion. The average loss for families near foreclosures was a little over \$23,000, or nine percent of home value. In this loss too, the Center found that minority neighborhoods were impacted disproportionately. Minority families lost on average over \$40,000, or 16 percent of their homes' values. In total, half of the spillover loss (1.1 trillion) was associated with communities of color, reflecting the high rates of residential and class segregation (Center for Responsible Lending 2013). These estimates only accounted for losses in direct proximity to foreclosure and did not include the estimated \$7 trillion loss of home equity resulting from the crisis overall.

The government's response, which spanned two administrations, was primarily concerned with economic stabilization and preventing further foreclosures. There were three significant pieces of legislation passed in 2008 and 2009, a series of modifications to assist the anti-foreclosure efforts made between 2010 and 2012, and a legal settlement that are important to understanding the general atmosphere and trends in how the government approached the housing and financial crisis. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) provided \$300 billion to a program that helped people with subprime mortgages refinance their homes with 30-year fixed-rate FHA mortgages. It also created a block grant program for neighborhoods in for attempt to mitigate the negative effects of foreclosed properties through acquisition, renovation,

sale, or demolition (Schwartz 2015, 424). The 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act established the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP),<sup>16</sup> authorizing up to \$700 billion to purchase troubled assets, primarily from large financial institutions. Fifty billion dollars in TARP funding went to the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program launched in 2009. MHA had two pieces – the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable Refinancing Program (HARP). The former creates direct subsidy incentives for mortgage servicers to reduce debt payments of individuals at risk of default and foreclosure. The latter enabled homeowners who were current on mortgages with negative equity to refinance mortgages held by GSEs (Schwartz 2015, 424). Finally, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) was a stimulus package that had provisions for a wide array of social and infrastructure investments. At the time, the Congressional Budget Office estimated it would cost \$787 billion, which included \$13.61 billion for various housing concerns (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2010; Congressional Budget Office 2012, 1). Additional programs created between 2010 and 2012 included a fund to assist states in their foreclosure prevention programs; a program to encourage foreclosure alternatives, such as deed-in-lieu of foreclosure<sup>17</sup>; a program to modify second mortgages for homes already participating in HAMP; a program to assist unemployed homeowners in making mortgage payments; and amendments to HAMP to expand access and reduce the total amounts owed (Schwartz 2015, 429-431). The last significant piece of the political response to the foreclosure crisis came in 2012, with a legal settlement between the federal government and 49 state governments, and the five largest mortgage servicers. The agreement acknowledged the abusive and unethical lending practices the banks had engaged in and stipulated reforms to future loan and foreclosure

---

<sup>16</sup> This is what is often called the bank bailout.

<sup>17</sup> Deed-in-lieu of foreclosure is where outstanding debt is forgiven if the homeowner surrenders the property.

practices. Part of the settlement included \$25 billion paid out by the banks (Schwartz 2015 432-433; U.S. Department of Justice 2021), which was portioned out for various uses. The lion's share – \$17 billion – went to reducing the principal owed and short-sale assistance for homeowners at risk of foreclosure. A significantly smaller sum – \$1.5 billion – was allotted for households who had lost their homes due to foreclosure. There was also \$2.5 billion allotted to the 49 states. While this was supposed to go to foreclosure prevention, at least \$1 billion went to other, non-housing-related activities (Schwartz 2015, 432-433). Other legal settlements followed generally in the same vein.

There were several issues with the government's policy response, in part because of increasing calls for austerity. As programs to stop foreclosures were implemented over a multi-year period, foreclosures continued throughout the period in the absence of swift comprehensive action. Additionally, bailout legislation focused on failing banks and institutions. There was legislation enacted, most notably Dodd-Frank, that sought to prevent a similar financial meltdown in the future and protect consumers going forward. However, much of the broader policy response prioritized institutions, then homeowners, leaving renters or those already foreclosed upon with comparatively little support. When there was recourse taken against the banks whose unethical practices led to the crisis, the capital settlement still went primarily to further foreclosure prevention, and parts were used for activities totally unrelated to the foreclosure crisis. Ultimately, as Schwartz (2015, 423; partially quoting Immergluck 2013, 201) writes, the government's response to the foreclosure crisis was “tentative, marginal, and incremental” and that “[h]ad the government taken a bolder, more aggressive approach, fewer homeowners might have lost their homes.”

In the aftermath of 2008, there was another change in urban housing and community development – the introduction of the Choice Neighborhood Initiative. Choice came about in the face of significant growth in austerity politics. The election of the nation’s first Black president ignited the conservative movement, which made it their aim to block Obama’s legislative agenda. There was additional anger after the passage of ARRA, which was seen as government overreach and overspending. The government approved less than half the budgetary increase requested by HUD in 2010, and the department was awarded \$43.6 billion. This was the highest budget awarded during the Obama administration. Between 2010 and 2013, almost every federal housing program lost funding. Not accounting for inflation, public housing capital grants decreased 29 percent, and operating subsidies decreased 15 percent. CDBG block grant funding decreased almost 30 percent, while funding for HOME block grants and subsidies for the elderly and people with disabilities all fell by between 47 and 57 percent. There were increases in project-based rental assistance (a subsidy for private developers) and programs to address homelessness. Choice Neighborhoods was also granted funding, beginning in 2010 in this highly partisan and competitive atmosphere (Schwartz 2015 445-446).

Choice is the successor to HOPE VI. Explained as a continuation of the positive, bipartisan pieces of the HOPE program, the overall goals remain very similar (U.S. Congress Senate Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development 2013). The program has three core goals along three areas of focus – housing, people, and neighborhood.

The goals are:

- “1. Housing: Replace distressed public and assisted housing with high-quality mixed income housing that is well managed and responsive to the needs of the surrounding neighborhood;
2. People: Improve outcomes of households living in the target housing related to employment and income, health, and children’s educations; and

3. Neighborhood: Create the conditions necessary for public and private reinvestment in distressed neighborhoods and offer the kinds of amenities and assets, including safety, good schools, and commercial activity, that are important to families' choices about their community." (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.)

Choice maintains the emphasis on public-private partnerships, mixed financing structures, the creation of low-income housing within a mixed-income setting, and an emphasis on more holistic social services, all elements, at least in theory, of HOPE VI. There are a few notable changes. Choice expands the types of properties that can be the central housing element to include privately-owned low-income housing that received federal development subsidies. It also institutes a one-for-one replacement rule requiring replacement properties must have at least one subsidized affordable unit for every one demolished unless market analysis suggests there is not a need (Pendall and Hendey 2013, 2). There are two types of grants Choice awards. The first is planning grants that help to fund planning for revitalization around the three core goals. The second is implementation grants, which help to realize these plans as initial funding to then leverage private funds (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.).

It is difficult to draw a holistic picture of the Choice Neighborhood grantees because there is wide discretion for each applicant to present plans that align best with their needs. There has not been significant research to compare plans across the 10 years the program has run. There have been two studies looking at the first round of implementation grants. These studies found that some cities targeted public housing while others targeted private housing for replacement and that there was a large range in the number of units in these sites. The sites targeted for replacement also had very different demographic compositions, although there were high populations of minority residents, either Black, Hispanic, or foreign-born, across all sites (Pendall et al. 2015, 13-14). There were four broad conclusions drawn about housing in the neighborhoods three years after the grant was received. These were that (1) the grants had



successfully been used to begin housing redevelopment at all sites; (2) that housing quality would improve and were likely to be financially sustainable; (3) that mixed-income was developed differently at each site; and (4) that increased private interest or a weak market was effecting affordability and implementation plans in at least two areas (Pendall et al. 2015, 17). They also point to concerns in the short term about tent welfare during the transition process, and rates of attrition from replacement targets (Pendall et al. 2015, 98). In the longer term, they raise concerns around effective creation of community within the new neighborhoods, how to ensure goals are achieved, and the ways Choice interacts with local and state policy (Pendall and Hendey 2013, 12; Pendall et al. 2015, 99-100). These are only two studies, done on the earliest iterations of the program, and should not be taken as prescriptive or predictive when considering future Choice Implementation sites and plans. However, they do highlight possible points of friction within a plan, its broader goals, the broader goals of Choice, and the state of residents living in a site targeted for replacement or the community at large.

As a whole, the Choice Neighborhood program reinforces the dominant neoliberal paradigm. The program posits housing issues within communities as a market failure and proposes the introduction of limited public investment to spur broad private reinvestment. Perhaps the most significant concern here is that neighborhood revitalization and gentrification are two sides of the same coin. The sorts of “amenities and assets” important to families’ choices about neighborhoods described in the program’s goals are the same as those leading to gentrification. Choice was supposed to bridge some of the large gaps that HOPE VI had in ensuring that residents from the existing community were being served. However, Pendall et al. found that established tenants from replacement targets were losing housing assistance at comparable rates to HOPE VI (Pendall et al. 2015, 98). In terms of the neoliberal devolution of

housing management, Pendall et al. found that two of the first grantees maintained their private, for-profit model in post redevelopment management, two switched to this model from PHA management, and one grantee maintained PHA management (Pendall et al. 2015, 33).

#### *4.8 The Covid-19 Pandemic and Housing Today*

Today, housing generally operates within the broader neoliberal paradigm detailed above. Over the past 50 years increased austerity, privatization, and devolution, have recentered the production and management of housing (and its related infrastructure and social services) away from the government. In its place, is a network of private actors, some for-profit, some nonprofit has grown to fill the gaps. Anthropogenic climate change also poses an ever-increasing threat to the nation's housing. Recent events of the foreclosure and financial crisis in 2008 and the global pandemic have posed challenges for homeowners and renters. The section will first address the broad outlook of homeownership and renting, and then discuss the dominant provisions for affordable housing.

In the aftermath of the 2008 foreclosure crisis, homeownership rates declined. Homeownership was at a historic high in 2005 of around 69 percent. Rates fell for the next decade to a low of 63 percent, comparable to 1965 rates. Rates began to increase again in the latter half of the 2010s, and currently sit around 65 percent, equivalent to 1980 (U.S. Census Bureau N.d.). Throughout this time, there have remained deep racial disparities in homeownership rates. The white homeownership rate is around 70 percent, around 30 percent more than the Black homeownership rate, and 25 percent more than the Hispanic homeownership rate (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2019, 2020, and 2021). Overall, rates of housing production remained relatively low after 2008. This has resulted in low rates of housing vacancies across both owner-occupied and rental units prior to

the pandemic. This has also resulted in worsening affordability, with the median home price about four times more than the median income nationwide. In urban areas, affordability varies greatly. About one in seven metro areas had rates of more than five times incomes, while one in three had rates of less than three times incomes (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2019, 1-2). Researchers also point to issues in accessing homeownership financing. Fixed interest rates dropped substantially after 2008 (Freddie Mac 2022), but the availability of mortgages also dropped. The Urban Institute's Housing Policy Finance Center keeps a Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI). They measure reasonable lending standards for the mortgage market at around 12 percent – roughly nine percent borrower assumed risk and three percent lender assumed risk. In the aftermath of 2008, the HCAI has hovered around five percent, made up almost entirely of borrower risk (Urban Institute 2021).

Homebuying has further surged in the pandemic, adding to the strain of this already tight market. Existing home sales grew by more than 20 percent from the year before between September 2020 and January 2021. This was fueled in part by very low mortgage interest rates, although mortgage availability as measured by HCAI has also remained low. There was also a pattern of outmigration from urban centers into the suburbs for both ownership and renting (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2021, 15). There remain many financial advantages to homeownership in the U.S. Analysis shows that returns on homeownership from purchase in a normal market outperform stocks and bonds. There are also the tax incentives for homeownership. While homeownership does not represent the best option in every case, for many, it represents an opportunity to build equity and wealth. Presently, there remains a strong incentive for those that can afford the upfront costs of purchasing a home to do so (Goodman and Mayer 2018).

While about two-thirds of Americans own their homes, the remaining one-third of the country rents. From 2006 to 2016, the number of renters increased by, on average, just under 850,000 households annually. In 2016 and 2017, as homeownership rates began to grow again, the total number of U.S. renters began to marginally shrink. The actual conditions for renters though remain mixed. There has been a significant loss in low-income rental units, with a decline of four million units renting for less than \$800 a month between 2011 and 2017. Prior to the pandemic, 47.4 percent of renter households were to some extent cost-burdened, spending more than 30 percent of their income on housing expenses. For lowest-income renters (making less than \$15,000), four in five are cost-burdened. Renters, despite being a much smaller portion of the population than homeowners, made up more than half of all severely cost-burdened people in the U.S., spending more than 50 percent of their income on rent. Rates of homelessness declined nationally between 2008 and 2015 but rose significantly in high-cost states and metropolitan centers (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2019, 3-5). While there was a significant affordability crisis for renters before 2020, the pandemic has further strained many people's abilities to afford rent and other basic necessities. Disproportionately, those households most affected are low-income households and people of color. By and large, those experiencing issues affording rent and who were behind on payments also faced additional challenges. For those behind on rent and mortgage payments, almost 80 percent had difficulty affording other expenses, almost 40 percent had moderate or severe food insufficiency, and one in four struggled with inconsistent employment related to Covid-19 (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2019, 33).

The government response, in terms of both eviction moratoriums and stimulus payments, did keep people in their homes. These moratoriums, direct assistance, and rental supplements

were provided through the CARES Act in March of 2020, the Consolidated Appropriations Act in December of 2020, and the American Rescue Plan in 2021. These pieces of legislation had a significant impact. Along with state regulations and subsidies, they helped people afford basic necessities. The CARES Act first put in place a partial eviction moratorium from March to July of 2020 and a foreclosure moratorium until June of 2020. The CDC then put in place a nationwide eviction moratorium in September of 2020 (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2021, 31-32). This moratorium lasted until late August of 2021 when the Supreme Court sided with a coalition of landlords and real estate groups who argued the ban lay beyond the CDC's authority under Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 264). There is no data available on nationwide eviction rates, but some smaller subsets of data suggest how this change may have impacted evictions. Data from Princeton's eviction lab, which measures eviction rates in 31 cities, showed that eviction rates rose after the moratorium expired, but did not reach parity with historic levels in many places. To explain this, they point to a variety of factors, including rental assistance, stimulus payments, lower rental demand acting as a deterrent for landlords, changes in property management strategies that rely less on the threat of eviction, and an increase in informal evictions or lease expirations (Haas et al. 2021).

Even before the moratorium was suspended, there were issues with the policy interventions the government implemented. Dissemination of information was a large problem. Research suggests that extensions on eviction moratoriums were not well known and that renters had lower rates of awareness than landlords. There was even lower awareness (less than 50 percent of landlords and renters) of rental assistance availability (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2021, 32). There were also issues accessing government

assistance due to convoluted application processes, narrow eligibility requirements, and lack of awareness of available support (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2021, 5).

Governmental involvement in affordable housing is by and large the domain of HUD. A relatively small share of federal spending goes to programs related to housing. In 2021, HUD was allotted less than one percent of the federal budget (Data Lab 2022). With this funding, the agency oversees a variety of programs discussed in this chapter. These include insurance from the FHA, CDBG, HOME block grants, Section 8 vouchers, public housing, subsidized housing, and homelessness assistance. Programs focus on the direct provision of affordable housing, broad neighborhood improvements, the mortgage industry, and more. However, most of the department's budget is spent on the provision of affordable housing and housing for specific minority groups. The Office of Public and Indian Housing and the Office of Housing oversee most of the housing programs. Combined, these offices were allotted just over 80 percent of the agency's budget in 2021. Certain programs account for much of this spending. Section 8 Rental Assistance was allotted just over half of the budget for these two offices (around 40 percent of the overall budget) (U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development 2022a, 6). This has been even higher at times, accounting for almost 50 percent of the overall budget in 2012 (Schwartz 2015, 261). In comparison, the public housing capital fund accounted for roughly 13 percent of the 2021 budget. HUD estimates that currently, about 1.7 million Americans live in public housing, while 5.2 million receive Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2022b).

Additional affordable housing is provided through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit. LIHTC is the largest subsidy for affordable low-income housing production. From 1987 to 2018, the credit has helped construct around three million units (Scally, Gold, and DuBois 2018,

v) across almost 50,000 projects (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development N.d. b). HUD collects property and tenant data about the program, but it is administered by the IRS with tax subsidies written in the internal revenue code. The LIHTC has undergone iterations since its inception, but the current system is as follows: credits can be claimed in equal amounts for the first ten years after construction. There is a compliance period that lasts an additional five years after, where the IRS can reclaim credits if the properties are not in compliance with household affordability requirements. The federal affordability period on the credits lasts 30 years. To qualify for the credit, the project must meet one of the following affordability requirements:

1. 20 percent or more of units are occupied by tenants making 50 percent or less than the AMI;
2. 40 percent or more of units are occupied by tenants making 60 percent or less than AMI; or
3. 40 percent or more of units are occupied by tenants making on average 60 percent or less than AMI, with no units occupied by tenants making more than 80 percent of AMI (Scally, Gold, and DuBois 2018, 2).

There are currently two types of credits developers can claim. The first is commonly referred to as the “nine percent credit”, which is supposed to deliver a 70 percent subsidy and is generally granted to new construction projects (Keightley 2021, 1). The process to obtain the nine percent credits are competitive. They are awarded by state agencies with funds provided by the IRS (Scally, Gold, and DuBois 2018; Keightley 2021). The second is known as the “four percent credit”, designed to deliver a 30 percent subsidy, and generally used for rehabilitation projects that make heavy use of tax-exempt bond financing (Keightley 2021, 1).<sup>18</sup> The credits are often sold to investors, either large financial firms or corporations, who receive the tax credits in return for their investment. This results in a limited partnership where the developer builds and

---

<sup>18</sup> Despite references to nine percent or four percent, the amount of the credit is determined monthly by the U.S. Treasury based on the weighted average of “long term debt with maturities comparable for with those for tax credit projects” (Schwartz 2015, 137).

manages properties but with a relatively small percentage of ownership, and the investor is uninvolved in day-to-day activities but has a much larger ownership percentage. There is a large syndication industry that has grown up around the tax credit, with many firms specializing specifically in LIHTC investments (Keightley 2021, 5-6).

Inclusionary zoning is another strategy to provide affordable housing that is growing in popularity. Unlike many of the programs discussed in this chapter which at least originate at the federal level, inclusionary zoning is completely implemented by states and local governments. Begun in Virginia in the early 1970s, some 850 plus jurisdictions now have inclusionary zoning ordinances (Thaden and Wang 2017). Inclusionary zoning utilizes zoning ordinances to create affordable housing, but there are many different approaches to this task. Policies vary significantly by jurisdiction, with variation in whether laws are mandatory or voluntary, for rental or sale properties, amount of affordable units, time limits, definitions of eligibility, and more. Because of this lack of constancy, much of the research on inclusionary zoning is mixed. Some studies have found that inclusionary zoning raised the price of housing or discouraged development in an area, while others found no effect. Some research also suggests that inclusionary zoning increased access to economic opportunity for low-income residents living in units constructed through inclusionary zoning. However, there is still resistance out of concern about private market impacts in some places. (Ramakrishnan, Treskon, and Green 2019). With such little constancy, it is difficult to make broad judgments about inclusionary zoning policies. However, they do continue to rely on the production of affordable housing by private capital, and some mechanisms written into the ordinances – not mandating construction, providing incentives, or allowing purchase out – are particularly kind to capitalist interests.



These are fundamentally neoliberal ways of providing affordable housing. The government subsidizes and encourages the construction of low-income housing by private developers and the rents of low-income people paying for privately owned units. These subsidies are also connected – many of the families that reside in LIHTC properties, just under 40 percent based on one 2018 study, are also receiving another type of housing subsidy, such as Section 8 rental assistance (Scally, Gold, and DuBois 2018, 10). These ways are also not effective in providing housing for all that are in need. There are still many people receiving no type of aid who are significantly cost-burdened (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2019, 2020, and 2021). The cost of living has continued to grow faster than wages, worsening the issue. Median rent and utilities have grown ten percent from 2001 to 2019, while median renter household income grew only three percent in total during the same time and fell for a significant part of the period (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2022).

Recently, HUD has been increasing funding for community initiatives, possibly indicating a growing reliance on these types of strategies. In 2020, the Choice Neighborhood initiative had \$175 million in funding. This increased to \$200 million in 2021 and \$250 million in the President's Budget in 2022. For the Community Development Fund, which funds CDBGs, funding was \$3.425 billion in 2020, \$3.475 billion in 2021, and is funded at \$3.77 billion in the President's Budget in 2022 (U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development 2022a, 8). HUD is also increasingly looking toward climate resiliency efforts. This is in response to the ever-increasing risk posed by climate change. Relief from major climate disasters has become increasingly expensive, and this is by and large subsidized by the government. Aging housing infrastructure is also less energy-efficient and resilient in the face of these disasters, centering focus on the nation's aging housing stock (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard

University 2021, 6, 28, 34-35). The president's 2022 budget proposes \$800 million across a host of climate initiatives, including the \$50 million increase in the Choice Neighborhoods Program (U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development 2022a, 6). While it is critically important to address these issues, this chapter has raised concerns that these types of HUD investments are often disproportionately to the gain of private capital.

## **5. Radical Urbanism**

### Overview

While dominant traditions of housing in the U.S. have generally worked for capital and to reinforce existing state power structures, there are exceptions that take a different approach. Domestically, these more radical urban policy traditions are limited, but there are more expansive radical urban housing traditions abroad. Radical urban housing traditions reconfigure structures of power and rethink the purpose of housing. These traditions are expressed differently throughout time and place, as each tradition responds to the material conditions of a given situation. Labor takes a central role in the system, and the reproduction of urban spaces is defined by those living in them. The state may be involved in these processes, but this is not always the case. In either situation, capital is taken out of the decision-making structure; a key tenet of radical urbanism is the decommodification of housing. In this tradition, housing is a human right, and thus cannot be commodified. In radical urbanism, housing strategies are often coupled with more holistic social programs, either government-sponsored or through mutual aid networks, and other reforms. This reorientation to center labor also necessarily reinvigorates democratic processes. This may come in the form of a socialist revolution, as seen in Red Vienna, detailed below, but may also be a group of tenants making and enforcing the rules and

regulations within their building, or preventing the imposition of capital's desires by state violence.

Radical urbanism develops in opposition to dominant capitalist urbanity, in ways contingent on material conditions within time and place. As such, and because it has at no point been the preeminent way to provide housing in the U.S., this section will not move linearly like the others. Instead, it will mention five historical events or broad strategies. These are: (5.1) the Paris Commune; (5.2) Red Vienna; (5.3) American municipal socialism; (5.4) the Finnish Homebuilding Association, New Communities, Inc., and Cooper Square (to illustrate housing cooperatives, community land trusts, and community-directed planning); and (5.5) a right to housing in the 21st century. The first two subsections occur outside of the U.S., while the next three all focus on American radical housing strategies or movements. Within each of these groups, the events are generally arranged chronologically. Each section involves labors' seizure of urban decision-making process from capital and its traditions. The conditions inspiring the Paris Commune may seem far removed from present U.S. urban housing struggles, but the event was critical in the formation of a broader radical urban philosophy outlined by Lefebvre and Harvey. Red Vienna may seem similarly foreign but has been included to offer a fundamental alternative to the housing system created in the U.S. Municipal socialism offers a more radical governmental response to the issues America experienced at the end of the gilded age and the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century from industrial urbanism. The rise in housing co-ops, community land trusts, community-directed planning, and a right to housing movement has been by and large a response to the neoliberal policies instituted post-1960.

While the dominant planning mechanisms and entities of industrial urbanism did not plan in ways that centered the working classes, this dynamic has been pushed to new extremes with

the curtailing of labors power and the further rise of the real estate and financial industry under neoliberal policy. Reflecting on the 1970s to today, Stein wrote, “[n]eoconservative planners starved their cities; *neoliberals* begged capitalists to feed off them” (Stein 2019, 25). Together, these impulses worked to slowly stifle the democratic process and ideals that the U.S. professes but has often failed to embody. Reflecting on this same process, Wendy Brown notes: “neoliberalism’s accidental unleashing of the financial sector and the ways that financialization profoundly undermined neoliberal dreams of a competitive global order lightly tended by supranational institutions, on one hand, and facilitated by states fully autonomous economic interests and manipulation, on the other” (Brown 2019, 16). Private capital ensures a system that works for itself above all. The crushing of competition eliminates one of the few resources that the working class has, both as consumers and employees. In this system there is a radical impulse, led by labor, to regain control over housing – its articulation, creation, management, and control.

## Historical Analysis

### *5.1 The Paris Commune*

The Paris Commune was a revolutionary government that controlled the city of Paris from March 18, 1871, until May 28, 1871. Leftist, socialist, communist, and feminist strains underpinned the rebellion. The commune’s establishment was precipitated by the Third Republic’s attempts to remove cannons from the city, and subsequent armed fighting between members of the National Guard or other armed Parisian groups and the country’s regular forces. However, the roots of the movement were much deeper (Schulkind 1974). Paris was already much more republican and democratically leaning than the surrounding rural areas. There were many more industrialized workers in the city, making up a large population of poor and working-

class people. The city already had a reputation among the ruling class for disorder and disturbance, which they characterized as a particular urban pathology of Parisian residents, particularly coming out of the 1830s revolutionary period (Shafer 2005, 4-6). Leading up to the Commune, the city also fared poorly during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, where the Germans surrounded and besieged Paris. To aid in the city's defense, national guard units from working-class neighborhoods were called to serve. These groups became increasingly radicalized during their defense of the city. The new Third Republic government's actions increasingly isolated the city socially and politically, until the attempt at disarmament on March 18<sup>th</sup> when violence broke out. The National Guard's central committee seized control of the city, elections were held, and the Commune was established (Schulkind 1974, 19-23; Shafer 2005, 20-62).

The Commune was in power for relatively little time – just two months, one week, and three days. During this time, they instituted a variety of radical ideas, including the remission of rents from the time of the siege, among other economic and debt-related initiatives. More importantly for the purposes of this analysis is the Commune's lasting impact on revolutionary urban philosophy and critical urban theory. Scholars point to the critical development of a collectivist class identity – as urbanites, as laboring workers (Gould 1993, Shafer 2005, Gluckstein 2006) and to the ideal of “*fraternité – to a République universelle*” (Schulkind 1974, 44). Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey, among others, have drawn heavily on this camaraderie and the process of revolution and claims to governance in their writings on the right to the city, as described early in this chapter. Marx and Engels also wrote about the Commune. While they did not consider it a socialist enterprise, they concluded that the Commune was an early iteration of “dictatorship of the proletariat.” This event was seen as a significant advancement in genuine

rule by the majority (Schulkind 1974, 52-54). Subsequent revolutions and protests, such as the French May 68, have referenced the commune. It also continues to be raised in relation to current neoliberal urban crises, with scholars searching for answers to present injustice in the event (Gluckstein 2006).

### *5.2 Red Vienna 1918-1934*

Between 1918 and 1934 Vienna, Austria implemented a revolutionary social program in the city. The main components of this program were widespread production of housing and the institution of social housing in the city, as well as significant tax reform to redistribute wealth. This period termed the Austrian capital *Rotes Wien*, or Red Vienna. Conditions preceding Red Vienna were difficult for the working class. Housing in Imperial Vienna had been deeply unhealthy, resonant of the tenements that inspired progressive reformers in the United States. There were high rates of poverty, disease, and infant mortality. This was further exacerbated by a shortage of housing in the city generally (Lewis 1983, 336). Taxation was also disproportionately levied against working-class families. Estimates are that 45 to 50 percent of the municipal budget in the city came from taxes on rent, and another approximately 30 percent came from taxes on food, drink, or municipal monopoly revenue (Lewis 1983, 343). This was compounded during World War I with significant homelessness, unemployment, and hunger. By the end of the war these conditions led to rising labor, feminist, and council movements, expressed through demonstrations, striking, and ultimately elections (Duma and Lichtenberger 2017). The declaration of Austria as a democratic republic at the end of WWI established elections, allowing men and women to vote. The Social Democratic Worker's Party (SDAPÖ) won the first election in Vienna in 1919, while a coalition government of SDAPÖ and the Christian Socialist Party (CSP) made up the national government. By 1920, this coalition had

failed, and while the SDAPÖ continued to govern Vienna, it was generally in conflict with the national ruling CSP and its wealthy local supporters (Lewis 1983).

Once elected, the SDAPÖ council instituted a variety of measures to address the housing crisis. This included the immediate requisition of all empty units and unused rooms in occupied apartments, to house the homeless and housing insecure. In three years, the council was able to reallocate more than 25,000 rooms through this requisition. The city council also acquired significant amounts of land and built additional units on these sites (Lewis 1983, 338). Between 1919 and 1934, the city constructed more than 60,000 units, housing roughly 220,000 individuals (City of Vienna n.d. a.). These units were often in apartment complexes, which were considered holistically. They were planned in relation to local amenities like schools, and many also included central kitchens, laundries, childcare, and more – demands stemming from the feminist and labor movements (Duma and Lichtenberger 2017). This construction was financed through increased municipal taxation, as the national government was generally opposed to the democratic-socialist program and had relatively little capital in the national housing and settlement fund due to inflation (Lewis 1983, 337). The imperial taxation program was heavily revised – the rent tax became a progressive tax, a welfare tax was levied on employers, and a series of luxury taxes were implemented (Lewis 1983, 343-345). These housing measures and luxury taxes were heavily opposed by the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois classes. They argued that the council was “interfering in the land market and forcing down prices,” while the council argued that the land was needed for housing (Lewis 1983, 338). This dynamic is precisely what makes social housing a radical response to urban crisis. It prioritizes housing for all, rather than free market mechanisms – whether the market truly functions as such or just prioritizes any private provision of housing. Lewis (1983, 338) describes the cyclical system this provision of

housing created saying “[t]he private sector would not risk capital in building until rent restrictions were removed, something which the Social Democrat Party ardently resisted. In the circumstances the only alternative was for the city council to buy land itself and build on it.” Dollfuss fascism, growing out of the CSP and its values, effectively ended Red Vienna in 1934 when it removed the city’s administration (Duma and Lichtenberger 2017).

Although the new government after 1934 reversed much of the SDAPÖ’s policy program, and there has been some recommodification of housing in the city (Novy et al. 2001; Kadi 2015), the legacy of Red Vienna continues in the city’s current housing system. The city continues to maintain 220,000 city-owned units. There are a further 200,000 cooperative units in Vienna (City of Vienna n.d. b). This subsidized housing makes up 44 percent of the rental stock, and the city is the largest landlord. This housing is available not just to the lowest-income people, but also to those in the middle class and is funded by income taxes. The scale of social housing also has the effect of maintaining affordability even in privately owned, non-co-op units (Pecher 2021). Vienna’s model is consistently pointed to as a prime example of sustainable, high-quality, attractive, affordable housing (Schweitzer 2020; Pecher 2021; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development N.d. g).

### *5.3 American Municipal Socialism*

American municipal socialism came about contemporaneously with the progressive reform movement detailed in the industrial urbanism section. It grew out of many of the same problems – decrepit tenement housing, lack of social supports, tension between labor and capital classes. However, this was a bottom-up response which proposed different methods to address these issues. While progressive reformers were often part of an educated, wealthier, white Anglo-Saxon class (Foglesong 1986, 57; Shi 2020, 1446), municipal socialism was defined by



industrial laborers the urban working class. The municipal socialism movement grew out of broader labor movements, initially spearheaded by German immigrants in the style of European socialism in the 1870s, growing more widespread with the Knights of Labor in the early 1880s, and finally the American Federation of Labor and the Socialist Party (Judd 1989, 19-20).

Historians explain the rise of municipal socialism through both external and internal factors.

These include changes in mechanized labor that created deepening divides between management and workers which inspired labor radicalism, and the power of universal male suffrage in voicing that displeasure in the political sphere (Judd 1989, 6-7).

In 1911, the Socialist party elected more than 1000 candidates across thirty-six states and 324 municipalities. Socialists had majority control in 23 communities. Some were small communities, such as Star City, West Virginia (population 318), or mid-size communities like Martins Ferry, Ohio (population 9,133). Others were in major American cities, including Schenectady, New York (population 72,826, 77<sup>th</sup> largest city in the U.S.), and Milwaukee, Wisconsin (population 373, 857, 12<sup>th</sup> largest city in the U.S.) (Judd 1989, 19; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998). The dominant social agenda for municipal socialist politicians and organizers was “municipal control of public utilities, union labels and better conditions in city work, unemployment relief, heavier taxation for corporations, free legal and medical service for the needy, free schoolbooks, and slum housing reform” (Judd 1989, 22). The call for public ownership over utilities and transit was echoed even in cities that did not have socialist politicians in office (Radford 2003). There were efforts to socialize housing, but in many cities, socialists worked with progressive reformers on housing efforts, leading to housing alighted with progressive reformism. Several factors contributed to the decline of socialism in the U.S. These include internal rifts within various factions of the socialist party, wartime repression, the co-

opting of the socialist agenda by middle-class reformers who had a wider base of support, and the broader tide of American liberalism (Judd 1989, 1-7). Ultimately, municipal socialism in the early twentieth century shows that a grassroots base of support existed for socialist policies in America – particularly in the face of huge wealth inequality, poor working conditions, and dismal housing. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we have begun to see a revival, albeit limited, of these socialist and democratic-socialist strains in America, echoing calls for housing and economic reforms towards a more equitable system (Dreier 2013; Judis 2019).

#### *5.4 The Finnish Homebuilding Association; New Communities, Inc.; and Cooper Square*

When considering the radical housing strategies that are currently used to decommodify housing in the U.S. and maintain affordability, three come to mind. These are housing cooperatives, community land trusts (CLTs), and community-determined planning. Each of these strategies allows for determinative community control but does so in very different ways. CLTs and co-ops address the provision of housing specifically.<sup>19</sup> Community-determined planning aims to effect resident-led change within a broader community. This often involves housing, sometimes utilizing co-ops or CLTs, and has direct effects on affordability. I will expand below on the model of each strategy, and briefly mention the history of such measures in the U.S. These three strategies are largely localized. While they have proved quite successful on a local scale for residents, these strategies have not been implemented on a mass scale through any widespread nationalized policy or program. This is likely in part a reflection of the high level of community control. However, these strategies also significantly disrupt the real estate apparatus and directly challenge the conceptualization of housing and land in the dominant neoliberal housing paradigm in the U.S. today.

---

<sup>19</sup> Both are also used for non-housing purposes as well.

Housing cooperatives are a system of housing where residents collectively own their building. Through the pooling of individual members' resources, the collective significantly increases its buying power. In the long run, this is beneficial, as the residents then have the ability to determine rents, make building improvements, and more, while keeping individual costs lower than in a unit rented from a private landlord or developer. When purchasing into a co-op, rather than purchasing an individual unit, residents purchase a share in a corporation that owns real estate. This share comes with certain expectations, generally around paying rent or abiding by some building-wide contract. It also entitles that resident to a unit in the building, and a say in the democratic decision-making process (Sazama 2000; National Cooperative Law Center 2017a). There are some additional distinctions within types of housing cooperatives, including limited equity cooperatives, or specific restrictions such as affordability restrictions limiting re-sale to those in certain income brackets (Sazama 2000). For the purposes of this brief history, these distinctions are largely unimportant. What is critical to understand is that this is a strategy that grants communal ownership and democratic choice to the building's residents, removing and isolating them from the system of housing commodification. This can mean the avoidance of mortgages, rent hikes, and other threats to traditional homeowners and renters.

The earliest cooperatives were established in the UK during the mid-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and were primarily consumer cooperatives. One of these cooperatives, located in Rochdale, created a set of governing tenants.<sup>20</sup> Many subsequent cooperatives were organized aligned with these principles. The first housing cooperatives came about in Germany and Scandinavia in the mid-1800s (Sazama 1996, 2000). In the United States, the first housing

---

<sup>20</sup> These were: (1) open membership; (2) democratic control – specifically one member one vote; (3) distribution of surplus in proportion to trade; (4) payment of limited interest on capital; (5) political and religious neutrality; (6) cash trading – no credit extended; and (7) promotion of education (National Cooperative Law Center 2017b).

cooperatives were established in New York around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The earliest iterations were “home clubs” that catered to luxury clients, providing the advantages of homeownership with little of the responsibility (National Cooperative Law Center 2017b). The first true affordable housing cooperative in the U.S., adhering to the Rochdale principles, was the Finnish Homebuilding Association. It was established in 1918 in Brooklyn New York but a group of Finnish artisans. Subsequent affordable cooperatives were established on behalf of workers in various industries to provide affordable housing in New York and other American cities. These early affordable housing cooperatives fared well through the Great Depression, but housing cooperatives were not a strategy that was given significant attention in the aftermath of WWII. However, in 1960 and beyond, there was a resurgence in cooperatives formed to provide for middle and lower-class housing.

Housing cooperatives today are often associated with large cities like New York, but exist in urban and rural areas, large and small throughout the U.S. Raise-Op Housing Cooperative, in Lewiston, Maine is one such example. Federal policy has been used to support cooperatives at different times. Federal policies discussed in the other urbanisms section, including BMIR, Section 8, and other state and national programs, were used to fund housing cooperatives in the 1960s and 1970s. There have also been conversions of public housing to cooperatives as part of increased neoliberal privatization. This occurred in the 1980s and 1990s and was funded by the federal government. However, the promotion of housing cooperatives has never been a widespread part of national policy strategy, and funding for these endeavors has often come from community organizing, unions, or nonprofit funders. (Sazama 1996, 2000).

Community land trusts are a system of creating housing affordability by decoupling the price of housing from the price of the land below. In this system, a nonprofit entity (the

community land trust) purchases the land, which they own in perpetuity. This nonprofit then leases the land and any improvements made on it to individuals. These ground leases are for quite a long time – 99 years is typical – and come with an agreement of rights and responsibilities between the two parties. Often, the owner has the right exclusive use of the plot, to make improvements, to bequeath the lease. However, if the owner wants to sell, the CLT has the right to purchase the house, so the buildings can remain affordable in perpetuity. Community land trusts are governed by boards made up of three equally balanced interests. One group represents the interest of community residents living on the CLT, another represents residents in the area who do not live on CLT land, and last are representatives of the public interest, often municipal government representatives or bureaucrats (Greenstein and Sungu-Eryilmaz 2005; Center for Community Land Trust Innovation N.d.). CLTs have often been used in high-cost areas and competitive markets to preserve affordability. However, research also suggests CLTs can be used to stabilize neighborhoods with weak housing markets (Nelson et. al 2020).

The first community land trust, New Communities, Inc., was established in Albany, Georgia in 1969 to provide farmland to poor black farmers. This CLT was a direct outgrowth of the civil rights movement. The CLT model also has deeper roots in progressive era thinking about poverty and economic progress, early land-lease communities, American conceptualizations of land stewardship, and international movements like garden cities in England and the Gramdan movement in India (Davis 2014; Center for Community Land Trust Innovation N.d.). Like New Communities, Inc., early CLTs in the U.S. were generally rural. The first urban CLT was established in 1980 in a Black neighborhood in Cincinnati, Ohio (Davis 2014, 28). Nationally, the movement grew somewhat slowly, and as said earlier remained highly localized. There were some advocacy groups, including the Institute for Community Economics,

that helped to proliferate knowledge about CLTs. This group also successfully lobbied to get the definition of CLTs included in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, enabling CLTs to receive federal funding and technical support under the HOME program (Davis 2014, 40-41). Today, there are more than 250 CLTs across the U.S. (Center for Community Land Trust Innovation N.d.). In 2019, HUD pointed to their usefulness in expanding housing affordability, particularly given the national rise in housing costs. It also noted the strategy's versatility – “the CLT model can be adapted to a range of contexts and organizational goals, from developing a praxis of communal land ownership to promoting family homeownership” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2019).

Both housing co-ops and CLTs offer solutions that ensure affordability in specific buildings. This affordability could have spillover effects into the surrounding housing market, but this is by no means guaranteed. For residents to have power in the determination of community changes and effects, there must be a democratic process in place within community planning. There are many levels of community engagement when it comes to planning. Arnstein's (1969, 217) ladder of citizen participation is often used to evaluate citizen engagement and control in urban planning. This framework has eight levels of participation, which are sorted into three further categories. At the bottom of the ladder are (1) manipulation, and (2) therapy, which are considered *non-participation* and “contrived by some to substitute for genuine participation.” Next are (3) informing, (4) consultation, and (5) placation, which are all considered *tokenism*, which involves some extent of participation by community members but continues to have ultimate decision-making ability rest at the feet of powerholders. Finally, (6) partnership, (7) delegated power, and (8) citizen control, are all varying degrees of *citizen power*,

bringing citizens to decision-making spaces in roles to negotiate or as primary decision-makers (Arnstein 1969, 217).

Common elements of participatory planning, introduced during industrial urbanism as part of the capitalist-democracy contradiction, include public comment periods, community boards, planning commissions, and more (Stein 2019, 32). These fall into the tokenism section of the ladder – Stein (2019, 31) describes many of these participatory processes as “open but rigged;” something asked of planners to ensure the veil of democracy while ultimate control rests with capital. Participatory planning is a required component of the Choice Neighborhood initiative, which will be discussed in the case of Lewiston in the next chapter. While no such analysis has been done of where Lewiston’s planning process falls onto these eight rungs, an analysis of a different Choice city concluded that the planning process did not sufficiently reach levels of citizen power (Harling 2020). What does an example of citizen power in decision-making look like? It is useful to look at the case of the Cooper Square Neighborhood in New York City. The neighborhood first organized the Cooper Square Committee in 1959 to oppose urban renewal plans. In response to these plans, committee members created their own community development plan around three basic tenets – minimized displacement, staged development, and priority in any newly developed housing for site tenants. The residents were able to force a vote on their new plan, which was officially adopted by the city in 1970 (Cooper Square Committee N.d.). This was not a case where the government came to citizens asking for their input on prior planning. In this case, residents of the community had full control over the goals and strategies of the plan, which was then brought before the relevant governmental actors.

### 5.5 A Right to Housing in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

In broad political and social discourse, a *right to housing* is a widely known, if not widely accepted, ideal. The U.S. has put forward and signed a variety of international treaties that have upheld access to safe, affordable, healthy housing as a human right.<sup>21</sup> Within the U.S., this mantle has been furthered by many housing advocates and scholars in the U.S., through protest, policy, and scholarly work. Examples include *The Right to Housing: A Blueprint for Housing the Nation* in 1989, and *A Right to Housing: Foundation for a New Social Agenda* in 2006. The former crafted a comprehensive housing program, partnered with a significant expansion in the social section, and monumental shifts in the financing, development, ownership, and management arrangement of housing (Hartman 1998). The latter lays out the importance of housing – physical, emotional, symbolic, and in the context of a broader neighborhood – before advancing the legal and institutional changes needed to make this vision a reality (Bratt, Stone, and Hartman 2006). The right to housing is advanced in response to several factors. Primary is increasing financialization and what Bratt, Stone, and Hartman (2006, 8-9) refer to as the “illusions of the market,” which asserts the best way to achieve social welfare is through the pursuit of one’s own self-interest in the market and the government stepping in only for the common defense of the nation. Additional major drivers include pervasive and persistent housing discrimination, increasing economic inequality, heavy dependence on debt and capital markets in the provision of housing, and a wholly inadequate public policy response (Bratt, Stone, and Hartman 2006, 9-13).

---

<sup>21</sup> In the 1940s, FDR’s Second Bill of Rights set out the right to a decent home, and the U.S. signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes housing as a component of adequate living to which all people have a right. In the 1960s, the U.S. signed, but did not ratify, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. This treaty set seven elements making up adequate housing. These are: (1) security of tenure; (2) availability of services, materials, and infrastructure; (3) affordability; (4) accessibility; (5) habitability; (6) location; and (7) cultural adequacy. The U.S. has also supported other, more recent, treaties upholding the rights to housing (Tars 2020).



The past 15 years primed the 21<sup>st</sup> century to be an inflection point in American housing praxis. Two major crises – the foreclosure and financial crisis of 2008 and the Covid-19 pandemic have highlighted extensive flaws in current systems of housing. These flaws have very much aligned with the factors that Bratt, Stone, and Hartmann identify, as seen in the neoliberal urbanism section of this framework. It is clear that the current housing system and social safety nets are not working for a significant number of Americans. At the same time, there are still somewhat limited opportunities for involvement in established housing co-ops, CLTs, and public housing, and dominant systems of housing continue to keep Americans tied to a financialized system of housing. The Occupy Wall Street Movement, anti-eviction protests, protests demanding the cancellation of rents, and a growing *right to housing* movement have given an outlet for people to voice their displeasure with this system. Academics, advocacy groups, and policy centers have also reestablished the right to housing as a priority in response to these crises (Tars 2020; Fallon 2021). States are increasingly adopting housing and homelessness bills of rights, and local and state representatives are introducing right to housing legislation (Tars 2020). Nationally, the still unpassed Green New Deal for Public Housing includes a provision enshrining a right to housing.

### *5.6 Radical Urbanism Going Forward*

An active decommodification of housing and decoupling from the systems of financialization could come about in several ways. This section detailed several radical housing strategies that provide alternatives to the dominant housing paradigms of today. While very different in their methods and scope, each strategy responded to similar perceptions of inequity, inequality, and disenfranchisement by granting determinative control of housing and communities back to the working class. However, as Drier and Keating have argued, localized

housing strategies have limits. Although writing in the context of Boston's urban populism, in the 1980s, many of their critiques remain true.

“Unless the federal government is fully committed to a major housing program, cities will continue to suffer housing shortages, displacement, racial discrimination, uneven development, and homelessness. [...] Only a major reordering of federal spending priorities and resolution of federal budgetary deficits could produce truly adequate resources for the federal aid necessary for local governments in progressive cities like Flynn's Boston to address their affordable housing problems in a successful and equitable way.” (Drier and Keating 1990, 214)

A lack of instituted government support keeps cities trapped by the decisive power of the real estate state (Stein 2019). Halfhearted measures or strategies that don't make fundamental changes to the provisioning of housing by seriously curtailing or eliminating the power of for-profit businesses will ultimately continue to further the same neoliberal dynamics. Any of the strategies described in this radical urbanism section, implemented on a wide enough scale and with legal enforcement behind them, would constitute a radical shift in American housing. This would be a fundamental challenge to the power of the real estate apparatus and could expand access to safe, healthy, affordable housing.

## CHAPTER II: RESULTS

In this chapter, Lewiston’s Choice Transformation Plan is examined in greater detail. As discussed in the theoretical framework, the Choice Neighborhood Program is focused on three core goals. Through the leveraging of specific and limited public dollars and additional private capital, Choice aims to (1) “[r]eplace distressed public and assisted housing with high-quality mixed income housing that is well managed and responsive to the needs of the surrounding neighborhood”; (2) “[i]mprove outcomes of households living in the target housing related to employment and income, health, and children’s education”; and (3) “[c]reate the conditions necessary for public and private reinvestment in distressed neighborhoods to offer the kinds of amenities and assets, including safety, good schools, and commercial activity, that are important to families’ choices about their community” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.). The use of public funding to replace public housing, through a process that creates opportunities for private investment, necessarily raises questions about who accrues benefits, who is empowered to make decisions, and who oversees implementation in a neighborhood.

This chapter asks these questions of Lewiston’s *Growing Our Tree Streets Choice Transformation Plan* through a review of the sections of the plan pertinent to housing – including the overall goals, core strategies, and partners – with a focus on who benefits and who is empowered to make decisions. It highlights tensions that arise around providing safe, healthy, affordable housing in Lewiston and identifies potential contradictions that could emerge from the plan’s various implementation strategies (i.e., how the plan’s goals will be accomplished) as well as from the returns on investments expected by various partners responsible for enacting these

strategies. Specifically, it highlights what these contradictions could mean for current residents' democratic control over and right to return/remain in their homes and neighborhood.

## **Study Area**

Lewiston, Maine has a population of a little over 37,000 (U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts 2020e). It is a former industrial city, with much of the downtown urban core constructed around the mills along the river. Lewiston's mills operated from the 1840s to the 1990s. The last mill, significantly downsized, closed in 2001. In the 1800s tenement housing was hastily erected for mill workers, which has left lasting implications on the area's housing today (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 26). The Tree Streets Neighborhood is a 30-block area that encompasses a significant amount of the downtown residential area and old tenements. The area is bounded to the north by Ash Street, the west by Park Street, and the east by Jefferson Street. The southern boundary is comprised of sections of Maple, Pierce, and Birch Streets (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 25). Mill closings led to a decline in population and significant poverty and unemployment. The population decline has recently been arrested by an influx of new immigrants, primarily from east and central Africa, who began arriving in 2001 (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 26).

Today, residents of the Tree Streets Neighborhood continue to face significant disadvantages. The community is very low-income, with a mean income of just over \$22,000 and a median income of under \$20,000. Ninety-six percent of residents are renters (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b, 69 and 105). Significant portions of the community are not part of the formal labor market. In a Community Household Survey done as part of the *Growing Our Tree Streets* plan, 41 percent of residents reported that they were unemployed, and 23 percent reported they were underemployed. For the former, disability was a common reason cited. More than 40

percent of respondents to the community survey report receiving SSI or SSDI, meaning large portions of the neighborhood are living on fixed low incomes (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b, 54). Less than half of residents are food secure and only a fifth are satisfied with housing in the neighborhood as it stands (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b, 53-54). A residential market assessment done as part of the planning process found that there were no vacancies in affordable and mixed-income properties, with closed waiting lists and vacancies quickly filled (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b, 124). The tight market for affordable housing is complicated by the significant issues caused by an older housing stock and low levels of replacement and rehabilitation (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b, 105). Currently, 90 percent of housing units in the Tree Streets neighborhood were constructed prior to 1978, when a ban on lead paint was instituted. The need for lead remediation is a significant issue within the community. On average from 2013 to 2017, there were 42 new cases annually of elevated blood-lead levels in children in Lewiston. More than 70 percent of these cases occurred in the Tree Streets (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 42).

## **The Plan**

Lewiston's *Growing Our Tree Streets* Choice Transformation Plan envisions a future with a safer, healthier, more welcoming, equitable, and vibrant community. The plan's language is aligned to correspond to Choice's three interconnected spheres of change – people, homes, and neighborhood. To achieve this vision, the plan sets out nine overarching goals addressing health, infrastructure, diversity, education, employment, and more (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, ii). Three goals explicitly relate to housing concerns within the neighborhood. These are Goals One, Four, and Five. Each of these goals, their core strategies, and partners are detailed below.

## Goal 1: Lead-Free

The first goal of the plan is to *grow a healthy future through a holistic lead-free Lewiston effort rooted in the Tree Streets*. This goal grew out of community action and has been an issue that galvanized significant community support in the past. To address community concerns, the goal focuses on lead remediation, increased knowledge of the dangers of lead and affected properties, and health outcomes for children. There are three subgoals:

- 1.1. Engage community navigators to increase education and screening to foster bright futures for children and families with children;
- 1.2. Remove lead from the Tree Streets Neighborhood and eliminate incidents of childhood lead poisoning; and
- 1.3. Develop resources, policies, and guidance for creating safe, healthy housing within existing properties. (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, ix)

This chapter's analysis mainly focuses on subgoal 1.2, which concerns housing-specific physical infrastructure changes. To meet this goal, the city proposes to rehabilitate or replace all of the 1,451 units built before 1950 at a rate of 70 units a year. This will include the replacement housing built as part of Goal 4. To address the many other units that will need replacement, the city proposes leveraging Choice funding and using the LIHTC or new Opportunity Zone<sup>22</sup> to fund other new mixed-income projects. For units that will be rehabilitated, the Plan proposes using batch rehab and homeowners' personal labor, or "sweat equity", to keep costs lower. The city aims to have all affected units fully converted by 2043 (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 110-113).

In this pursuit, the city names several partners. These include Lewiston-Auburn Community Housing (LACH), Community Concepts Inc (CCI), Healthy Homeworks, Local

---

<sup>22</sup> Opportunity Zones were created in 2017 by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. They are designated areas that are generally disinvested in and predominately occupied by low-income communities. Individuals or corporate entities can invest in economic growth and job creation in return for tax benefits.

developers, and Take 2 Goodwill. LACH is a subsidiary of the nonprofit Community Concepts Inc. and a HUD-recognized Community Housing Developing Organization (CHDO), which controls the sites of the Maple Knoll replacement units. Healthy Homeworks is another local nonprofit, which has been heavily involved in the community planning aspects of Choice. They also operate the “Renter 2 Owner” program, which provides paths to homeownership of healthy homes through education and sweat equity. Finally, Healthy Homeworks also oversees the Property Health Report, a comprehensive database that helps potential owners and renters understand the health and hazards of downtown properties. The Take 2 YouthBuild Goodwill nonprofit program will provide a skilled workforce for rehabilitation and replacement projects. The plan does not name specific local developers, but these entities are presumably private and for-profit (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 113).

#### Goal 4: Homes

The plan’s fourth goal reads – *Grow an inventory of healthy housing and offer housing choices for all*. This goal mainly concerns the replacement sites for Maple Knoll, the HUD-assisted property targeted as distressed and in need of replacement. All Choice grantees, as with HOPE VI before, have such a property. The construction of new homes also responds to a larger issue of a weak housing market with low rates of new construction. Along with the construction of new units, Goal Four has additional subgoals addressing other new housing and shifting policies around hard-to-house families and individuals. These subgoals are:

- 4.1. Redevelop sites in the choice neighborhoods with different types of homes and selective density;
- 4.2. Encourage strategic infill of new homes with building designs that are responsive to the neighborhood; and
- 4.3. Develop supportive housing for people experiencing homelessness and other hard-to-house persons and families. (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, xii)

New construction will de-densify housing in the Tree Streets with single-family units, in addition to some smaller multifamily units or larger apartment buildings. The sizing of these homes will respond to the needs of those living in the community – larger units with multiple bedrooms for those with children, units with elevators for those with mobility challenges – and create a more cohesive look to housing in the neighborhoods. The plan notes the need for additional serviced units for the elderly, and the need to house those experiencing homelessness, but does not plan housing constructed explicitly for the latter group (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 150- 151). The analysis will focus mainly on subgoal 4.1. Goal 4.1 includes the Maple Knoll replacement construction of apartments along the northern edge of Kennedy Park and medium-scale multifamily infill units around the intersections of Pine, Pierce, Bartlett, and Walnut streets. These units will be evenly split between market rate and affordable units. It also includes the relocation of families living in Maple Knoll, and the ultimate demolition and redevelopment of that site.

For the initial construction in goal 4.1, LACH and Lewiston Housing Authority (LHA), will partner with private developers. For the Pine, Pierce, Bartlett, and Walnut apartments, the city has selected Hebert Construction, a statewide private construction company.<sup>23</sup> Locally, Hebert oversaw the recent construction of Hartley Block. For both Maple Knoll Replacement sites, funding to purchase the land came from the John T. Gorman Foundation, a private foundation, and the Genesis Fund, a Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI). Construction will be funded by a combination of Choice funding, nine percent LIHTC funding, historic preservation tax credits, and private debt (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 152-167). Currently, LACH is a part co-owner and the manager of the properties. However, it is not yet

---

<sup>23</sup> Lewiston Housing “Lewiston Choice Neighborhood Initiative Selects Hebert Construction for First Phase of Tree Streets Transformation” press release, February 3, 2022. <https://lewistonhousing.org/lewiston-choice-neighborhood-initiative-selects-hebert-construction-for-first-phase-of-tree-streets-transformation/>



clear who will manage the properties once construction is complete and do the associated long-term monitoring once construction is complete (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 178). Other subgoals address policy changes around the housing of people struggling with substance use issues, homelessness, or in need of other services; attracting investments from small developers; and zoning changes. There is one plan to recapitalize 15 apartments at Mount David Housing for residents with disabilities or in recovery. This will be in partnership with LACH, LHA, and Tri-County Mental Health, a nonprofit service provider, and is slated for a long-term timeframe (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 168-171).

### Goal 5: Ownership

Goal five aims to *grow commitment to and influence in the neighborhood from local owners, long-term investors, and residents*. This goal addresses the lack of resident stability and ownership in the neighborhood. The three subgoals are:

- 5.1. Increase the number of long-term homeowners and community-controlled homes in the Tree Streets;
  - 5.2. Strengthen tenants' voices; and
  - 5.3. Build neighborhood leadership and organization, and increase community control.
- (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, xvi)

Responding to the overwhelming number of renters, the goal prioritizes creating systems that bolster homeownership opportunities and empowering renters in their relations with landlords and the broader housing system. The strategies to increase ownership include financial coaching, connecting first-time homebuyers to homeownership assistance programs, increasing the prevalence of rent-to-own financing structures, expanding housing co-ops, and increasing home-buying incentives. To better support tenants, the city hopes to re-establish a tenants' union and mediate issues between landlords and tenants. Finally, to increase community control, plans are set for a resident-led neighborhood governance structure, a network of block captains, and

increased resident leadership in ongoing development of the Tree Streets (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 172-178).

Partners on goals to increase homeownership are often nonprofit entities, including CCI and their subsidiary Community Concepts Finance Corporation (CCFC), LACH, New Ventures Maine, Maine Community Integration, and the Cooperative Development Institute. It also relies on the participation of local credit unions and Raise-Op housing cooperative. For strategies to increase renter voices and community control, partners are again primarily nonprofit community entities. These include LACH, Immigrant Communities, Root Cellar, Promise Early Education Center, and more. Raise-Op is also a partner in these goals. These strategies generally do not have specific funding mechanisms allotted, as in Goal Four. Rather, they rely heavily on local community nonprofits' social networks to organize these strategies, and donations to fund any labor, supplies, or infrastructure needs (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 174 – 178).

Lewiston is in some ways similar and in others dissimilar to other Choice implementation grantees in demographic characteristics and Choice proposals. It is the only city with a population of under 50,000 to have been awarded an implementation grant during the program's tenure. In Fiscal Year 2020, HUD awarded implementation grants to five cities in total. In addition to Lewiston, these were Camden, New Jersey; Fort Myers, Florida; Cleveland, Ohio; and Detroit, Michigan. Camden and Fort Myers are closest to Lewiston in size with populations of roughly 70,000 and 85,000 respectively. Cleveland and Detroit are much larger with populations of about 370,000 and 640,000 (U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts 2020a, b, c, d, and e). The grant sizes vary slightly, with Camden and Cleveland receiving awards of \$35 million each and Lewiston, Fort Myers, and Detroit each awarded \$30 million. The plans will replace between 87 and 487 units, with between 185 and 841 units. Some replace publicly owned

housing, while others replace housing that is HUD-assisted. The amount of committed financial leverage each plan brings for housing varies as well. Lewiston, which is creating the fewest units in total, has \$25.6 million in committed housing leverage. In contrast, Detroit, which has the most units slated for construction through their plan, brings \$119.7 million in committed housing leverage. In describing the target neighborhoods, three of the cities use the word “disinvestment”, while the others describe patterns of disinvestment or failed instances of opportunistic capitalist investment. Lewiston explicitly addresses its industrial past and the problems it has caused, while other industrial cities, like Detroit, generally paint a rosier picture. The Lewiston neighborhood description section mentions the diversity of languages spoken, alluding to the significant immigrant population. Part of Camden’s official plan name is in Spanish, but otherwise, no plan speaks specifically to serving diverse clientele, although in reality, they all serve a variety of institutionally disadvantaged groups (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2021).

It is also important to contextualize these plans in terms of implementation partners. The section below will go into a greater analysis of Lewiston’s partners, but this paragraph will briefly compare the implementation partners for the FY 2020 plans. These conclusions are based on publicly available information on the partners listed for each plan on the Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) released for the five grantees by HUD. More information can be found in Appendix A. As seen in Figures 1 and 2 below, when split by public, nonprofit, and private for-profit status, there is no obvious trend amongst grantees in 2020. For total partners, the two largest categories were non-profit and public partners. There were some for-profit partners as

well for at least four of the five plans.<sup>24</sup> Private partners were often involved in housing, with five of the eight total private partners being real estate investors or developers, and one being a housing co-op (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2021).




Figure 1: Choice Implementation Plan Partner Organization Types for Lewiston and Other 2020 Choice Grantees. Data gathered by the author based on HUD FY 2020 Choice Implementation Grant Awards NOFA




Figure 2: Choice Implementation Plan Partner Organization Types for Other 2020 Choice Grantees. Data gathered by the author based on HUD FY 2020 Choice Implementation Grant Awards NOFA

<sup>24</sup> While it appears that Cleveland has no for-profit partners, there was an LLC listed in the HUD NOFA that was untraceable online. It is quite likely this could have been a for-profit enterprise, but because this is unverified, it was filtered from the data used to create these figures. More information is available in Appendix A.

By and large, Lewiston aligns with other grantees in its housing partners based on the key Partners listed in HUD’s NOFA. Most grantees in other cities utilize PHAs, nonprofit housing providers, and real estate investors or developers. More notably and uniquely, Lewiston also partners with Raise-Op Housing Cooperative. None of the other plans have a comparable entity listed. Camden is the only other city that lists partners centered on democratic control of housing, listing two resident organizations or resident advocacy groups as key partners in their plan (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2021). A full table of key partners involved in Lewiston’s plan, noting housing involvement, is below.

<b>Lewiston, Maine Key Choice Partners</b>		
<b>Partner Name</b>	<b>Partner Type</b>	<b>Housing Involvement</b>
Lewiston Housing Authority <i>(Lead Choice applicant)</i>	Public Housing Authority	Involved in provision of public and public assisted housing
City of Lewiston <i>(Lead Choice applicant)</i>	City Government	No direct involvement
Community Concepts Inc.	Nonprofit Service Provider	CCI subsidiary Lewiston-Auburn Community Housing is heavily involved in housing plan
Avesta Housing	Nonprofit Service Provider	Involved in construction and management of affordable housing
John T. Gorman Foundation	Private Foundation	Has provided funding to purchase the land for Maple Knoll Replacement sites
Bates College	Private Institution of Higher ed.	No involvement
Boston Financial	LIHTC investor	Involved in the portfolio management and syndication services of LIHTC properties
Costal Enterprises, Inc.	Community Development Financial Institution	No involvement
Community Clinical Services, Inc.	Nonprofit Service Provider	No involvement
Genesis Community Loan Fund	Community Development Financial Institution	Has provided funding to purchase the land for Maple Knoll Replacement sites
L.A. Metro Chamber of Commerce	Community Development Organization	No involvement

Maine State Housing Authority	Public Housing Authority	Involved in provision of public and public assisted housing
Promise Early Education Center	Nonprofit Service Provider	No involvement
Raise-Op Housing Cooperative	Housing Cooperative	Organizes Lewiston’s first housing cooperative; named as a key partner in housing coop expansion
St. Mary’s Health System	Nonprofit Service Provider	No involvement

To understand points of possible tension between different partners’ interests in Lewiston’s plan, it is useful to explore the various expected returns on investments (ROIs), both financial and non-financial. This will inform an analysis of potential synergies and contradictions that might arise from their divergent interests, as well as how these potential conflicts may or may not be resolved through differential access to power and related questions of differing degrees of democratic control over change in the neighborhood. With Choice, HUD envisions non-financial returns on investments across people, housing, and neighborhoods. For each goal, the *Growing Our Tree Streets Plan* sets out an Implementation Matrix. This includes a condensed summary of much of the information written within each goal, but it also includes a list of non-quantified, although quantifiable, goal metrics. For Goal 1, these “returns” center on reduced rates of elevated blood lead levels in both children and adults and lay out intermediate metrics concerning quantifying progress in the creation and rehabilitation of lead-free units (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 236). For Goal 4, the plan lists the percent of housing inventory receiving a grade of Good or Better on the Property Health Report, the number of housing types, and the number of beds available within each type of housing (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 242). For Goal 5, the returns concern internal perception by residents and investors of their level of ownership and influence in the neighborhood and decision-making processes. These metrics are particularly reliant on self-declaration of these feelings and commitments (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 244).

There are also specific financial returns expected from this investment. HUD is awarding the city \$30 million. This initial investment is expected to generate at a minimum between \$100 million and \$142.8 million in additional investments.<sup>25</sup> At least \$25 million will be investments in housing (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2021). The plan also states that the LIHTC is “expected to be a primary source of funding for all multifamily residential development phases” which includes all Maple Knoll replacement units. The plan proposes using nine percent credits as subsidies for the construction of these units. To obtain the nine-percent credits, Lewiston will have to work with the Maine State Housing Authority, which grants the credits and is another key partner in the plan. It also proposes making use of the more easily accessible four percent credits, which do not have to be awarded by the Maine State Housing Authority, to enable more rapid redevelopment (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 233). The LIHTC, both nine and four percent, comes with its own set of expected ROIs. A summary document prepared by the Congressional Research Service in 2021 reports that while there is some fluctuation, the market price of tax credits is generally between \$0.80 and \$0.90 for each tax credit dollar. Investors can purchase tax credits by providing equity for LIHTC properties. What does this mean for a possible investment in a Tree Streets LIHTC property? It is useful to consider a hypothetical scenario. Suppose you are investing in a LIHTC property that has \$10,000,000 in eligible (depreciable) items. This would mean you have an eligible basis of \$10,000,000. Because the Tree Streets are designated as a qualified census tract (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development N.d. h.), this basis gets a boost of 30 percent, and your adjusted eligible basis would be \$13,000,000. If, like in the case of Kennedy Park and

---

<sup>25</sup> Francis Eanes, primary academic advisor on this thesis, gave me the number of \$100 million based on his involvement throughout the Choice process and participation in many of the planning meetings. \$142.8 million comes from the committed leverage as reported in the HUD NOFA.

the other replacement units, half of the units in the development will be designated as affordable, you will take 50 percent of the eligible basis to get the qualified basis of \$6,500,000. If you are utilizing the nine percent credit, you would be granted an annual tax credit of the qualified basis times the IRS determined current rate for the nine percent credit. Suppose that this current rate is nine percent – for this project you would be awarded \$585,000 in tax credits annually, or 5,850,000 over the full ten-year subsidy period. Suppose the market price for a credit is \$0.90. For the full ten years, you would spend 5,265,000, giving you a total savings – or profit, depending on how you consider it – of \$585,000. If the market price for the tax credit is \$0.80, this profit would be \$1,170,000 (formula from Wallace and Wilson 2018; author’s calculations). The lower the market price, the higher the ROI for the investor (Keightley 2021, 6). These are financial returns are from the tax credit alone. Research focuses on the tax credit benefits, but there may be additional benefits as well. Investors are generally passive partners but have large ownership percentages over the projects. The CRS summary report highlights that investors are often corporate financial firms reaping additional benefits through the Community Reinvestment Act (Keightley 2021, 6). Additionally, the LIHTC sets a threshold for affordability rates based on the area median income. While the credit is designed to create profits outside of rental incomes, there is nothing that ties rents to the tenant’s specific affordability range. This is to say, it is feasible that rents may increase in the units designated affordable, staying under AMI but past what is affordable for the tenant within the regulations set out by the LIHTC.

LIHTC investing is the space we must assume Boston Financial will occupy in the implementation of the *Growing Our Tree Streets Plan*. Boston Financial describes itself as “a national leader in the [LIHTC] industry, with a proven track record in syndication services as well as asset and portfolio management” (Boston Financial Investment Management, L.P.



2022a). Nationally, the firm manages about \$15 billion of equity invested in 2,300 properties nationally. In Maine, they have just under \$188.5 million in 40 properties with just under 2,000 units across the state (Boston Financial Investment Management, L.P. 2022b). The *Growing Our Tree Streets Plan* never actually names Boston Financial, or their parent company ORIX. However, the firm is listed fifth among the key partners on HUD's NOFA. Their participation was also confirmed to me by Francis Eanes. Eanes recounted an instance where the firm's representatives attended a planning meeting at the Root Cellar also attended by Senator Susan Collins and HUD Secretary Ben Carson. Eanes said outside of this meeting, Boston Financial was noticeably absent from the planning process. This is aligned with the role private investment firms generally occupy in LIHTC investing and syndication.

Boston Financial also markets to potential clients their skill at 15-year exits from LIHTC investments. On their website, they advertise that they "have significant experience in 15-year exits" and have "completed more than 1,600 dispositions and made over \$940 million in distributions to investors" (Boston Financial Investment Management, L.P. 2022c). While LIHTC properties are supposed to remain affordable for 30 years, the tax subsidies only last for the first 15. HUD commissioned a study in 2012 to understand what happens to LIHTC properties at year 15. The study found that changes in ownership were particularly common around year 15, with limited partners (LPs) choosing to end their role when the subsidies and compliance period have ended. Generally, the LPs sell their interests to a general partner, who has been operating the property and will continue as an owner-operator (Khadduri et al. 2012, xiii). The study notes this is overwhelmingly true for nonprofit developers, but it is common with for-profit developers as well. The study found that for LIHTC properties reaching year 15 by 2009, most continued to be owned by the original developer and operated as affordable

housing. This was because there were other funding restrictions, often imposed through other funding sources like CDBG or new recapitalization with LIHTCs, or because the market was too weak to support charging higher rents. The study also found that in limited cases, rents were raised to market rates. This was generally in cases where the market was strong enough to support higher rents (Khadduri et al. 2012, xii and xiv-xvi).

## **Analysis**

Contradictions in the desired returns on investment detailed above represent plausible points of tension within Lewiston’s Choice initiative. While none of these plausible tensions represent guaranteed points of conflict – that is, this thesis aims to avoid making overly reductive and deterministic claims – it is nevertheless useful to consider critically the implications of divergent interests and differential power of those who will carry out the Choice work. These contradictions, outlined below, flow from a central antagonism between tenants and those who own housing, whether directly (e.g., owner-occupants and absentee landlords) or indirectly (e.g., financial investment firms who own stakes in larger developments). The first contradiction is between the improvement of housing quality, safety, and overall desirability of a neighborhood – literally making the Tree Streets a “choice” neighborhood, versus maintaining permanent housing affordability that ensures the right for current residents to return or remain in place. The second contradiction emerges from Choice’s overwhelming reliance on privately directed capital to finance the Transformation Plan (the \$30 million-dollar HUD grant is expected to leverage three to four times that amount in private investments), versus the Transformation Plan’s core aim of increasing community control over investment and change in the neighborhood. Although sweeping claims about how these contradictions will be resolved would be inappropriate and highly suppositional, these contradictions are unpacked below and this analysis

section closes with a closer look at the distribution of power and resources – both in the plan’s strategies and partners – to speculate about potential trajectories we might see in the neighborhood in the short and medium term.

### Increasing Neighborhood Desirability versus Right to Return/Remain

Lewiston’s Transformation Plan proposes several strategies in pursuit of a core goal of the national Choice program: “offer[ing] the kinds of amenities and assets, including safety, good schools, and commercial activity, that are important to families’ choices about their community” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.). Increasing choices in a community and offering amenities that make neighborhoods more attractive to live and work in has the capacity to greatly increase the overall quality of life for that neighborhood’s residents. The most charitable reading of this Choice program goal is that it genuinely seeks to increase the quality of life for current residents. Indeed, if the housing and neighborhood improvements envisioned by the plan – including lead remediation, the construction of new units, increased homeownership opportunities, increased investments in public spaces, neighborhood beautification, and unspecified improvements to education and other local services – are successfully implemented, they will arguably make the Tree Streets more attractive to current and prospective residents alike. Given the intensive and bottom-up community participation that went into the creation of the plan, it is both fair and important to assume that the strategies connected to these planned improvements legitimately reflect sincere community wishes rooted in broadly felt needs.

At the same time, “making improvements,” however legitimate, and increasing “choice” are critical if euphemistic components of gentrification, which is itself a somewhat euphemistic term that obscures both its underlying forces (e.g., logistics of capital accumulation) and material

effects on everyday residents. (e.g., displacement). While the Choice program as a whole aims to ensure that all families in the site targeted for housing replacement are given priority for an affordable unit in a replacement site, it doesn't lay out provisions for others in the broader community who may be affected should the neighborhood become more desirable. The Tree Streets neighborhood is not a case of a single "blighted" development (The Maple Knoll housing complex) among what is otherwise a well-resourced neighborhood with a strong-enough housing market unlikely to be affected by the redevelopment. After all, the material conditions of the neighborhood beyond Maple Knoll – 96 percent of residents are renters, many of whom are already rent-burdened and marginalized from formal employment avenues due to a variety of factors – place most residents at risk of displacement in a scenario where wealthier people with a capacity to pay higher rents begin to move into the neighborhood.

The question at the heart of this right-to-remain contradiction is this: will current residents be able to enjoy the Transformation Plan's intended improvements, or will those accrue to a future cohort of wealthier newcomers whose arrival is enabled by the displacement of current residents? There is reason to worry that the Tree Streets will experience gentrification. After all, the Transformation Plan's housing initiatives are being implemented to correct a weak housing market, with the premise that this intervention will make the housing market stronger (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 150). Curiously, however, neither the Transformation Plan itself nor the residential market survey completed prior to the plan say much about the potential (un)intended effects of this transformation – specifically the long-term affordability of the neighborhood and accompanying possibilities for gentrification and displacement. The introduction to the market survey, for example, says that estimates for the Tree Streets indicate limited future demand for housing from in-migration or the formation of

new households. Instead, the survey anticipates higher levels of demand will stem internally from the need to replace deteriorated housing stock (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020b, 98 and 118). However, it also notes that new replacement housing and ancillary improvements to the Tree Streets' housing stock overall are likely to attract residents from outside the neighborhood. These knock-on effects are cast in purely beneficial terms – i.e., as contributing to net economic growth in the neighborhood and city – rather than as exactly the sort of conditions that enable gentrification. Critically, the survey also fails to factor in the neighborhood-level effects of a massive exogenous housing market trend, such as the rapid rise in home sales and rental rates in Maine spurred by fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic. In other words, a less charitable reading of both the housing market study and aspects of the Transformation plan is that gentrifying the neighborhood by making a “weak” housing market “strong” is arguably the whole point.

The Transformation Plan's implementation metrics place significant weight on healthier housing and growing the total number of housing units in the neighborhood, but do not explicitly address affordability nor specify whether current residents will be able to still live in these “improved” and healthier housing units. For current residents to be able to enjoy these neighborhood improvements, however, maintained affordability will be a critical component. In this maintenance of affordability, conflict may arise within the central renter-landlord antagonism. Consider the properties financed through the LIHTC. Rents within a LIHTC property are determined as a percentage of area median income (AMI). This means that so long as AMI rises – whether by newer, wealthier residents or a rise in incomes for current residents – that LIHTC property becomes a more valuable asset and higher rents can be charged. For their part, and despite frequent use of mantras like “patient capital,” “social impact investing,” and the *de rigueur* “doing well by doing good,” private real estate developers and investors – including

those involved in LIHTC financing – have a material interest in maximizing the financial gains they can attain from their investment in the neighborhood. In addition to the tax break these partners gain through the LIHTC program, their profit derives from rising property values or rents collected. Although this “doing well by doing good” model of financing affordable housing allows participating investors to literally buy into a myth of advancing an urgent societal need, the existential necessity of making a profitable return on their investment elides the structural likelihood that “doing well” will often conflict with – if not subordinate – “doing good.” To a greater or lesser extent, these dynamics hold true for other property owners in the neighborhood. Whether we are speaking of DIY house-flippers, absentee landlords who hold long-term investment properties, or “mom and pop” owner-occupant landlords who own a few housing units for the purpose of supplemental income, their interests are structurally more aligned with each other than with the individuals and families who live in their buildings. Put another way, although Tree Streets renters and owners/investors all seemingly share a superficial interest in making the housing stock lead-free, rehabilitating “distressed” housing, and otherwise “improving” the neighborhood, the latter have every reason to celebrate the increased rents and property values that flow from these improvements while the former will be the ones who pay for it – either with their pocketbooks or with their displacement.

There are two core strategies the plan proposes that could exert pressure to maintain affordability. These are the creation of a tenant’s union and an expansion of housing co-operatives. Both strategies will be also considered in greater depth in the final subsection of this chapter. However, it is useful to briefly consider the ways these strategies interact with the possible gentrification forewarned above. Tenants’ unions seek to provide greater power to tenants in mediating disputes within the renter-landlord antagonism. This role is often to limit

the excess of property owners, particularly within a gentrifying neighborhood. Through protests, rent strikes, eviction prevention, and more, tenants' union actions highlight and publicize the rental-landlord antagonism. Participation in such actions has the capacity to politicize everyday renters in productive ways. Tenants' unions have been able to assist renters in purchasing their buildings from landlords and the creation of housing cooperatives to decommodify the building. Cooperative entities do not have the same drive for profit creation as the private entities outlined in the paragraph above. This means that in cases of neighborhood gentrification, there is not the same impulse to increase costs just because there are now those who can pay higher rents. Through their ability to address imbalances in determinative power, tenants' unions and housing cooperatives also relate to the contradiction around attracting privately directed investments versus increased community control over changes and decision-making processes discussed directly below.

#### Attracting Privately Directed Investments versus Increased Community Control

Goal 5 of Lewiston's plan centers around the creation of systems to increase community control. These strategies include increased ownership – either individual or collective – over homes or apartments and creating paths to direct action and decision-making roles for renters. In the context of gentrification, this will allow current residents to have a greater say over changes occurring in the neighborhood and could help to isolate residents from the increasing financial costs of gentrification. Specifically, the Transformation Plan proposes connecting residents to first-time homeownership programs, reestablishing a tenants' union, and expanding housing cooperatives. It also includes the creation of a community-based development organization (CBDO) through subgoal 5.3.d which that plan promises “will lead and promote new development in the neighborhood by connecting developers, owners, and partners with capital

resources to develop property in a manner consistent with the goals of this plan.” This CBDO “will create the terms, conditions, and support systems for property owners and lessors who access capital resources through Choice, Healthy Neighborhoods, and other programs operated and controlled on behalf of the Tree Street Neighborhood” (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 178). Additionally, in the pursuit of community input, subgoal 5.3.c calls for community participation through LACH – although otherwise unspecified – in the owner-entity of the Choice replacement housing.

This is directly contradictory to much of what is discussed in Goal 4 – both in the explicit wording of the strategies themselves and in the interests of the partners named to implement them. For example, the *Growing Our Tree Streets Plan* does not designate a specific entity to be the owner and manager for the replacement housing financed directly by Choice. Although the plan implies that this entity will be a nonprofit housing provider such as Avesta, and that there will be room for community participation (e.g., Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 156, 162, and 178), what exactly “community participation” looks like is never explicitly articulated. While Avesta or a similar housing nonprofit may in fact manage the units developed for the replacement housing, the “private development entity” who will finance and own the development will almost certainly be the unnamed Boston Financial (Healthy Neighborhoods 2020a, 156 and 162). Regardless of whoever ends up owning and managing the new housing, there are no systems concretely in place that hold these entities accountable to the desires of the tenants, let alone residents of the broader Tree Streets neighborhood. Subgoal 5.3.c. does propose community participation in the replacement housing’s owner-entity but does not detail what this would consist of. Such participation is also a challenge to the firm’s interest in their profit if it increases the power of tenants. This could heighten the renter-landlord antagonism,



particularly when considering the possibilities that could arise around increased living costs described above.

While the matter of community control over future replacement housing – and the role of nonprofit versus for-profit entities in enabling or impeding this – is important in its own right, it illuminates a broader front where the “community control” contradiction will likely manifest: the outsized role that nonprofit organizations play in the Transformation Plan’s implementation. It may be tempting to assume that the disproportionate involvement in the Transformation Plan by entities ostensibly organized around principles *other than* profit-making would bode well for bottom-up, democratic control over future development and change in the neighborhood.

Compared to (often) nameless, out-of-state *for-profit* ventures like Boston Financial, this may be true. However, the category “nonprofit” is broad and includes organizations with different aims, interests, and levels of democratic community participatory decision making in these aims and interests. These nonprofit groups generally come in with a specific mission and look to make grants based on projects or provide services aligning with that mission. These entities often operate in the absence of meaningful government intervention in those fields but do have an inherent interest in maintaining consistent sources of funding to continue their work. In an ideal world, these entities' goals and actions would grow directly from the communities in which they operate. However, this is often not the case. There may be issues that arise for both for- and nonprofit entities in creating spaces within their organizations and systems for determinative community control. At the same time, their funding and support are critical to creating the overall improvements proposed through Choice, particularly for strategies not receiving Choice funding that may not be profitable for private entities looking to make a profit.

## Explicit Funding versus General Support

Ultimately, it makes little sense for HUD to fund a plan whose interventions in the housing system seem likely to fail. As such, we must take seriously the possibility that the steps outlined in *Growing Our Tree Streets* could result in a more desirable neighborhood and a stronger housing market, and that the risk of gentrification and displacement is very real. With no additional intervention, this might include higher median incomes and an ability to charge increased rents, in tension with residents' affordability desires. As stated above, many of the housing solutions for tenants in the Tree Streets relate to increased homeownership. There are two solutions that the plan puts forward to explicitly address maintaining affordability in the long-term and increasing democratic influence by renters in the Tree Streets. These are the re-creation of a tenant's union and an expansion of housing cooperatives. As potentially effective and transformative as these two strategies could be – particularly the role of cooperatives in transcending the contradictions outlined above – it is useful to consider whether either of these strategies has been allotted sufficient funding and support to succeed.

In the plan, the housing cooperative expansion is part of goal 5.1, subgoal d. This includes a 15-unit expansion of the Raise-Op housing cooperative over five years. It also proposes that Raise-Op and the Cooperative Development Institute – a regional nonprofit that aims to increase democratic ownership in communities, housing, and business – lend their support to other homeownership programs to support the creation of new housing cooperatives. The widespread expansion of housing cooperatives, or other democratic strategies that decommodify land like community land trusts, would offer a fundamental shift in the power dynamic currently dominated by landlords. However, there is no funding set out for this endeavor, and the time frame assigned is long-term, somewhere from 5 to 25 years. The

expansion of Raise-Op itself is limited (only 15 units), and there are no specifically laid plans for new cooperatives. This creates a potentially unfortunate feedback loop, in which under-resourcing the formation of cooperatives in the near term blunts their moderating effects on neighborhood affordability, which as property values rise makes it even more resource intensive to convert existing housing into new cooperatives. Additionally, if cooperatives are being implemented once rental affordability in the neighborhood has already begun to worsen, a reactive rather than proactive measure, it may be too late to ensure that residents are not displaced.

The re-establishment of a tenant's union, Goal 5.2 subgoal a., offers a more immediate solution to this issue. Tenants' unions, and tenant activism more generally, have been a largely disconnected and underfunded movement in the US. Tenant organizing activity tends to grow during periods of internal strife but is generally tied to the other struggles faced by marginalized groups (Marcuse 1980b, Drier 1984). Recently, there has been a resurgence in tenant organizing and union activity during the pandemic. These organizations help to redistribute the balance of power between tenants and landlords. Given that 96 percent of Tree Streets residents are renters, there could be a significant amount of power in an organization that captured even a segment of this group; just as labor unions raise labor standards for non-union workers throughout a given economic sector, well-organized tenants unions can have similar spillover effects in their immediate neighborhoods. Lending the expertise of Pine Tree Legal Assistance and the networks of LACH means there are networks in place to disseminate information and gather support for a union, as well as the legal expertise around tenants' rights issues. This is not to say there will not be difficulties that could be encountered by the tenant's union. As with a housing co-op expansion, this tenants' union is unfunded through the Choice plan. This will make the

work of recruiting and hiring organizers, covering administrative costs, and other necessary elements to get such a union off the ground difficult. Both Drier and Marcuse raise additional challenges to private tenant organizing. Drier (1984, 257) mentions the reluctance of a certain class to participate in tenant's unions during the post-WWII housing boom as they considered themselves future homeowners rather than renters. The expectation of homeownership created a set of interests that preceded their interests as tenants. There are significant efforts to bring greater rates of homeownership to the Tree Streets as part of this plan, opening the possibility of homeownership to those where it may have been inaccessible before. However, as the overwhelming majority of residents are currently renters, inclusion of even a fraction of tenants into a union provides a real avenue to advocating for change. Marcuse (1980b) warns that even when tenants unions can gain power, there may be difficulties in correcting mistakes, particularly with little capital investment or significant disrepair in units. In this too, Choice offers a somewhat unique opportunity in that it has set routes to funding for remediation, and connected a variety of partners, including Raise-Op, with experience in tenant-centered management. However, with scant financial resources allocated to this task, efforts could falter or prove incomplete.

This lack of financial support stands in contrast to new housing construction in the Tree Streets. For the three housing goals, the plan explicitly funds, using Choice dollars, the construction of the Maple Knoll replacement sites. This ensures that the plan's central housing element will be built. By designating a specific investment, it is significantly easier to attract the additional capital needed. This also opens an opportunity for a firm like Boston Financial to profit from LIHTC investments in Lewiston. Whether purposefully or indirectly, this attraction of additional capital may create the conditions necessary for the displacement of current

residents in the Tree Streets. Without proper funding or policy support, it could be difficult for Raise-Op or a tenants' union to effectively counter increasing economic pressure and represent the desires of community members.

As with any contradiction and antagonism, the ultimate question relating to these contradictions and the renter-landlord antagonism in Lewiston is: how and in whose favor might these tensions be resolved? While in no way prescriptive or deterministic, the following discussion chapter explores this question by reflection on how these tensions have historically resolved in various urban traditions introduced in the theoretical framework chapter.

### CHAPTER III: DISCUSSION

The following discussion chapter addresses how the *Growing Our Tree Streets* Choice Transformation Plan's strategies and possible outcomes conform to or depart from the housing paradigms established in the theoretical framework chapter. Like the analysis presented in the results chapter, these comparisons are not meant to be predictive of Lewiston's housing future. Rather, as the theoretical framework shows, housing policy is historically contingent, with broad urbanisms responding to and evolving in consideration of different material conditions. It follows that current iterations of broad housing traditions, in the Tree Streets neighborhood and beyond, will likely respond similarly to contemporary political-economic conditions as well. This chapter also discusses broader implications of the contradictions between financial and social returns on investment, and what this says about plausible near-term housing futures in the Tree Streets. The chapter closes by considering what the dominant housing system asks us to assume or accept, and assesses whether these are indeed inevitable aspects of providing housing in a democratic society. After a brief review of the dominant neoliberal housing paradigm and contextualizing of the present housing moment, this discussion is structured around four questions. These are: (1) In what ways does Lewiston's plan echo the dominant neoliberal housing paradigm?; (2) In what ways does Lewiston's plan depart from or challenge this paradigm?; (3) What does the dominant housing paradigm ask us to assume or accept?; and (4) What do the ways the U.S. structures housing say about our society and systems of valuation writ large?

As discussed in the theoretical framework, housing and urban planning praxis in America has been primarily and disproportionately organized by private capital (principally the real estate, finance, and construction and manufacturing sectors) for its own benefit (Foglesong 1986,

Stein 2019), even as the scope of beneficiaries has widened at various historical junctures (e.g., white homeowners in the postwar era (Rothstein 2017; Nelson 2021)). As a result, today's dominant housing and related community planning paradigm consists of three core pillars. First, US policy from 1945 onwards prioritized homeownership and suburbanization as the preferred, although always exclusive and incomplete, means of providing housing – all underwritten by things like federally-insured 30-year mortgages, federal interstate highway investments, massive “urban renewal” projects, and preferential tax policy (Reily 1958; Drier 1982; Schwartz 2015; Rothstein 2017; Taylor 2019). These policies are in part what created the conditions for the ascendance of the dominant neoliberal political-economic framework guiding housing policy in America today. There were myriad reasons why these policies were put in place and perpetuated – e.g., to stimulate postwar economic growth, to encourage individual citizens to personally invest in the dominant capitalist system, to satisfy the powerful real estate lobby, to secure municipal budget solvency through increased property valuations and tax revenues, etc. (Drier 1982; Marcuse 1995; Nelson 2021). Despite significant challenges (e.g. the 2008 recession and foreclosure crisis) U.S. housing policy has continued to prioritize single-family homeownership (Goodman and Mayer 2018), with the surge in home buying purchases during the pandemic providing evidence for its persistence even today. Second, with the exception of large public investments during the interwar and WW2 periods, the provisioning of affordable housing has been done largely through the private sector (Hays 2012). Today, this system is dominated by LIHTC financing and Section 8 rent subsidy models (Schwartz 2015). Both homeownership and affordable rental units from private entities have created spaces for private corporations in various industries – construction, real estate, and finance (both investing and banking) – to accumulate wealth (Stein 2019). The day-to-day work of navigating this landscape and resolving

these contradictions has largely been left up to urban planners, who as largely unelected bureaucrats with their own funding pressures, unsurprisingly favor the needs of capital groups. Third, urban planners' dominant housing practices, particularly relating to community engagement, favor the desires of capitalists. Although capitalists and planners must contend with both the property contradiction and the capitalist-democracy contradiction, urban housing policy has long looked to create safe spaces for capital investment (e.g., redlining, HOPE VI, Choice Neighborhoods) (Foglesong 1986, Stein 2019). Even when planning has elements of community engagement, as is statutorily required in many situations (e.g., the creation of municipal comprehensive plans), levels of participation based on Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation often fall into the non-participation or tokenism categories (Arnstein 1969). At the intersection of planning and affordable housing provision lies inclusionary zoning, an increasingly popular practice to encourage or require the creation of affordable units by private markets.

While this neoliberal paradigm structures housing in the US today, there are growing calls from an increasingly broad set of constituencies for changes in these systems. The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted deep and long-standing issues with the nation's housing. Before the pandemic, many renters and homeowners already faced high housing costs, with 30 percent of all Americans cost-burdened. For renters, these rates were even higher, with 46 percent of all renters cost-burdened, and 24 percent of renters severely cost-burdened (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2020 and 2021). The pandemic further strained many families' ability to pay for housing (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2020 and 2021; Wong 2021). Although many parts of American life are returning, albeit slowly, to something resembling pre-pandemic normal, there is still significant housing insecurity. For



week 42 of the pandemic, January 26 to February 7, 2022 (the most recent publicly available data), 35.4 percent of Americans reported they were behind on their rent or mortgage with eviction or foreclosure likely or very likely in the next two months (U.S. Census Bureau 2022). Insecure housing throughout the pandemic has disproportionately affected non-white Americans, particularly Black and Hispanic Americans (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2020, 2021). The housing market also constricted significantly during the pandemic. Home sales and prices both grew to peaks of about 20 percent more than the previous year (Dowell 2021; Duca and Murphy 2021). This has put the ideal of homeownership even further out of reach for low-income Americans, who are more likely to be affected by pandemic job losses and unable to save money.

These events, as well as general housing trends throughout the 2000s, have prompted Americans to reconsider the provisioning of housing, and these failures could create an opportunity for the 2020s to become an inflection point in national housing policy. The question, though, is how and which parts of historical housing paradigms will shape today's policy solutions enabled by this opportunity. Maine, for example, is currently rethinking how affordable housing is provided in the state. Already hit by worsening affordability, particularly in southern and coastal counties, the state experienced an influx of new residents during the pandemic. Even as rates of home purchases have begun to subside, prices have stayed high. This inspired a host of new legislative actions on affordable housing, including the recent creation of the Maine Affordable Housing Tax Credit program. More legislation is working its way through the legislature now as well. A draft report by the Commission to Increase Housing Opportunities in Maine by Studying Zoning and Land Use Restrictions called for the use of more open zoning and bonuses to encourage affordable construction. The cutting of regulations for

the purpose of “freeing” the housing market follows the general neoliberal playbook, as does the prior creation of the Tax Credit program. Other measures in Maine’s draft report, including amendments to how the Fair Housing Act and the state appeals board operate, would increase state power in housing decisions in ways that echo industrial urbanism’s central government focus. The specific mention of expanding farmworker housing also follows the industrial legacy of governments’ targeting the creation of workforce housing necessitated by the needs of specific sectors of capital.

Since Lewiston’s Transformation Plan was created and adopted in 2019, large national issues around housing – e.g., clarity about who the current housing systems leave behind, and what working-class Americans are demanding from housing – are changing in significant ways. In the case of Maine, and America as a whole, safe, affordable housing is rightly thought of as an urgent need. However, these dominant neoliberal precedents for providing housing – tax credits, zoning changes, etc. – do not guarantee the creation of affordable housing. At best they create financial incentives, but other factors in housing markets, including localized rent increases, can quickly erase any motivation. For the past 50 or more years, the expectation has been that the private sector and free market will provide healthy, affordable housing. Ultimately, investments in housing by the private sector have not come at the speed or scale that is required. With the understanding that (1) changes to the housing landscape, at both the state and national level are continuing to occur in real time; (2) many of these changes continue to echo the prior neoliberal approach to housing policy; and (3) there are much more radical tendencies that continue to underpin housing-focused social movements, where are there echoes of dominant historical paradigms in Lewiston’s plan, and what does this portend for possible housing futures in the Tree Streets?

## Echoes of Neoliberalism in the Transformation Plan

*In what ways does Lewiston's plan echo the dominant neoliberal housing paradigm?*

There are echoes of the dominant housing paradigm throughout the Transformation Plan, particularly in the emphasis on homeownership and the broader structure of Choice. Goal 5 of the plan explicitly emphasizes increasing individual, long-term homeownership in the Tree Streets. Widespread homeownership has its roots in the federal government's postwar policies extending mortgages through the FHA and VA, which had the effect of pacifying large parts of the working class. In doing so, the government played a heavy hand in the creation of the American middle class, giving working Americans access to an appreciating asset they had incentive to protect from interference by the state or other individuals. This, particularly combined with the 75-year project to crush unions post-Taft Hartley, also created conditions fostering the rise of neoliberalism more broadly. Lewiston's plan seeks to extend the purported benefits of homeownership to low-income individuals through financial assistance and education. This is a group otherwise left behind in housing programs, and considering the Tree Street's relative economic and racial diversity, would mark a departure from who has historically been extended homeownership opportunities, even as the commitment to the core myth of homeownership (i.e. as a vehicle for wealth-building and upward economic mobility) remains unchanged. Even a scenario in which the homeownership myth proves true for a lucky subset of residents, could have potentially destabilizing effects in the Tree Streets.

Furthermore, the benefits of secure individual homeownership within the current socio-political landscape provide homeowners with strong incentives to oppose more radical housing change, such as the decommmodification of housing. If Lewiston experiences gentrification, having been able to purchase a home could insulate that individual from the possible

displacement experienced by renters – assuming, of course, that the homeowner is also able to cover other cost increases (i.e., cost of living, property taxes, etc.). Moreover, if one has purchased a home and can absorb these related costs, gentrification in the neighborhood will be financially lucrative for that individual. Financial benefits could accrue in the sale of the home or in opportunities to refinance. Simplistically, these financial incentives could split the interests of current working-class Tree Streets residents – those who own land and could accrue benefits, and those who are renters at risk of displacement. Creating a nascent class of owner-occupant landlords – e.g., the Transformation Plan envisions large immigrant and refugee families purchasing Tree Streets buildings for their large families and later converting the upstairs to rental units once their kids grow up – could have a similarly divisive effect, even within tightly knit communities of recently arrived immigrants. This is precisely because it gives some select subset of residents a very understandable interest in protecting a valuable financial asset, reorienting their interest to the realization of profit from this asset. This possible splitting of an idealized labor class also echoes core neoliberal tenets, even if it would arguably be an unintended outcome of the Transformation Plan and its authors.

More broadly, parts of the Transformation Plan are consistent with core parts of neoliberalism because the national Choice Neighborhoods Program is deeply neoliberal. Choice as a whole is designed, much in the style of redlining and HOPE VI before it, to create safe and stable places for private investment. With a limited initial public investment, an opportunity is created for private businesses to step into a community, make investments, and then collect financial returns. The national Choice program also echoes core neoliberal values in the wording of its goals. The focus on people – “[i]mprove outcomes of households *living in the target housing* related to employment and income, health, and children’s education” (U.S. Department

of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.; emphasis added) – prioritizes those in housing targeted for replacement but doesn't extend the same goals to a neighborhood's other residents. This limits the number of residents whose right to return or remain prospects are addressed in the plan, giving a green light to the broad displacement of current residents living beyond the targeted developments. Furthermore, the focus on individual betterment through increased formal employment and wages aligns with ideas of individual responsibility, erasing the structural and systemic inequalities that disproportionately benefit some (those with privileged identities) at the active expense of others. The focus on the individual also connects back to the neoliberal goal to decimate a sense of collective identity and social commitments – *my* interests, rather than *our* interests. Choice's neoliberal philosophy is also seen in the neighborhoods goal – “[c]reate the conditions necessary for public and private reinvestment in distressed neighborhoods to offer the kinds of amenities and assets, including safety, good schools, and commercial activity, *that are important to families' choice about their community*” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development n.d. f.; emphasis added). Again, the explicit mention of family prioritizes the individual and their closest relations over a group. The use of the term choice, both in this goal and in the program's name, is also of note. The language of choice is that of people who believe in the power of markets, and of consumerism, as the arbiter of what is good or right. In this system, markets, rather than democratic processes, are where choices get made. This is critical because, unlike in the one-person-one-vote ideal of the democratic process, within markets the few with the most power and privilege can wield the accompanying wealth and influence to exert disproportionate power. Within the fetishization of choice, there is no actual unified public, only individuals making decisions aligned with their own self-interest.

## Departures from Neoliberalism

*In what ways does Lewiston's plan depart from or challenge this paradigm?*

Although parts of the Transformation Plan are consistent with core aspects of neoliberal urban policy, many other parts of the plan find roots in a more radical tradition. These more radical strategies suggest the opportunities for a very different future in Lewiston, one that while free of many of the issues the community currently faces, is not defined by the interests of private for-profit actors but by the community of current residents. The bottom-up nature of much of the community plan, the possibility of tenant organizing, and the use of housing co-ops to decommodify housing all offer a more radical departure from neoliberalism. Continued community input – aligned with one of Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation's top three rungs (partnership, delegated power, or citizen control) – would be a significant break in neoliberal planning precedent. This would be the resolution of the capitalist-democracy contradiction in favor not of capitalists, but current residents. However, it would also require significant follow-through on the part of those actors currently responsible for implementing the plan. The undefined sections of community input would need to be solidified into concrete pathways for residents to not just express their desires, but to have determinative control around how changes are implemented in the neighborhood. The results chapter discussed at length the ways in which housing co-ops and a tenants' union could help to resist changes in the neighborhood that displaced current residents. It also raised the concern that these strategies were relatively unresourced and completely underfunded, particularly compared to other more neoliberal parts of the plan. What might it take to scale up these measures? Funding is an important place to start. For the tenants' union, specific financing to hire and support the work of organizers is critical. For the expansion of housing cooperatives, funding to secure land, or

the purchase of land or buildings are both crucial steps. Additionally, this funding and land purchasing should occur as soon as possible, to avoid more costly implementation of these strategies down the line. If implemented on a wide enough scale, these two measures, particularly in combination, would exert significant pressure on private landlords to maintain affordability. The union would do this via direct action, which, coupled with the co-operative housing, would set a market standard for rents and quality of units.

### Assumptions in the Neoliberal Housing Paradigm

*What does the dominant housing paradigm ask us to assume or accept?*

As shown through many crises (e.g. the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, the 2008 financial and foreclosure crisis, and the ongoing economic fallout from the pandemic), the dominant neoliberal paradigm has been unable to provide either a stable housing system, or a system that provides safe, healthy, affordable housing for everyone. Considering this, and looking towards the future of housing, it is useful to consider what this current paradigm asks us<sup>26</sup> to accept or assume. Most obviously, current neoliberal policies and those who support them ask that the American public accept this neoliberal paradigm as the “best” way to consider and provide housing. Given this, there are two core possible assumptions based on the aforementioned crises, and on ongoing issues with affordability, homelessness, and aging housing stock. Both assumptions rely on general knowledge of these issues, but do not necessitate any sort of special education. Living in or having visited an American city, or having

---

<sup>26</sup> As a note – us, we or our, in this question and the next, refers to people with some stake in American housing – American citizens, those who live in the U.S., homeowners and renters alike. This is particularly true for those who might not have to think of housing often, who live places that are safe, comfortable, who don’t have to pay – or can easily afford – rent or mortgage payments.

exposure to mainstream media, will probably reveal a variety of these issues, implicating many “everyday” Americans in the perpetuation of these issues.

The first assumption is that it is not possible to provide safe, healthy, and affordable housing to everyone in America. If this is true, we as a society are making decisions, either explicitly or by forfeiting responsibility, about who has access to this housing. The second assumption, which is not mutually exclusive from the first, is that some people are not deserving of, or are somehow unfit for safe, healthy, affordable housing. This latter belief exposes deep prejudices, and is often reliant on deeply harmful stereotypes, classism, and racism. This also ties into the neoliberal narrative of personal responsibility – positing that somehow people must be fully responsible for their housing circumstances at any given time. This implies that housing exists in a vacuum apart from broader political-economic structures. These two assumptions also connect to and can be expanded to more general assumptions about access to safe, healthy, affordable communities. Together they create a false choice between, on the one hand, continued disinvestment in unsafe housing for the sake of preserving a de facto if pernicious affordability, and on the other hand, large-scale reinvestment that revitalizes dilapidated housing (and neighborhoods) at the expense of gentrification and displacement. This false choice obscures urban policy alternatives, including more radical and industrial approaches, where the state can play a larger role on behalf of residents of disinvested communities, both in the Tree Streets and beyond. The government could create policies to invest in disinvested in neighborhoods, through strategies that decommodify housing, support tenants’ rights, limit rents, prioritize social returns on investment, and more.



## Broader Societal Critiques Arising from Housing Systems

*What do the ways the U.S. structures housing say about our society and systems of valuation writ large?*

The radical urbanism and industrial urban sections of the theoretical framework chapter lay out two other ways to consider housing, aligned with the different power structures of idealized class types in each system. These policies advance different kinds of housing visions and policies dependent on the values of the most powerful entity. To answer this question, it can be helpful to consider historical manifestations. In industrial urban policy the state utilized housing – public housing, and access to private housing through state-backed mortgages – for the creation of jobs, economic growth, and more. This thesis has argued that this was all with the ultimate aim of controlling the middle class and perpetuating the State’s more centralized role. In radical urbanism, housing is articulated as a basic right, which is provided by and for the common person, as seen in the case of Red Vienna, Cooper Square, CLTs, and housing co-ops. These strategies and systems have come about in response to the failure of private capital to act in labors’ best interest and provide this housing. In a system of neoliberal urbanism, housing is another market to accrue wealth for the capital class. If this doesn’t provide for the needs of many in the labor class, there is no recourse, as nothing holds capitalists democratically accountable to labor. This places value wholly on the ability of an asset – in this case housing – to appreciate, centering on the exchange value of an object. Consider the assumptions that are outlined above. If one’s view of housing is that it should be a basic right for all people, rather than a market to encourage capital accumulation, not only are the assumptions neoliberal policy asks society to accept unacceptable, but there are better examples, contemporary and historic, for how to realize this vision of housing. More radical housing visions – social housing, CLTs,

housing co-ops, and more – prioritize the use value of housing – as a home, as part of a broader community, not as a purely financial asset.

What might this mean for the 2020s as an inflection point in American housing praxis? Considering changes to housing going forward will require honest answers about larger societal implications of the ways we structure housing and communities. It will also require deeper introspection by American society about what we owe each other, where our collective values lie, how those are expressed in policy. Does the current paradigm reflect our collective values? Are we comfortable with the way that American housing policy has structured society, both historically and today? The answers to these questions concern all levels of American society, but for those privileged enough to live in stable housing and communities, this question is especially pertinent. Those already affected by housing insecurity are already fighting against neoliberal policy and the valuation systems that allow it. Continued ignorance, deliberate or not, among more wealthy elites allows for continued isolation from housing struggles. However, isolation from is not erasure of. The issues inherent in neoliberal housing will continue to persist without deliberate action to address these issues and their consequences, historic and contemporary.

## WORKS CITED

- American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. 2017. *AFL-CIO Labor Commission on Racial and Economic Justice Report*. Washington DC: AFL-CIO.  
<https://s3.amazonaws.com/dev.unionhall.files/img/RaceReport.pdf>
- Arnstein, Sherry R. 1969. "A Ladder of Citizen Participation." *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 35, no. 4: 216-224.
- Asante-Muhammad, Dedrick, Jamie Buell, and Joshua Devine. 2021. *60% Black Homeownership: A Radical Goal for Black Wealth Development*. Report: National Community Reinvestment Coalition. <https://ncrc.org/60-black-homeownership-a-radical-goal-for-black-wealth-development/>
- Attoh, Kafui. 2011. "What *Kind* of Right is the Right to the City?" *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 35, no. 5: 669-685.  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0309132510394706>
- Auerbach, Alan J. and Joel Slemrod. 1997. "The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986." *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 35, no. 2, June: 589-632.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2729788>
- Bailey, Martha and Sheldon Danzinger, eds. 2013. *Legacies of the War on Poverty*. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.
- Baker, Dean. 2010. "The Myth of Expansionary Fiscal Austerity." *Center for Economic and Policy Research*. <https://cepr.net/documents/publications/austerity-myth-2010-10.pdf>
- Barreyre, Nicolas. 2011. "The Politics of Economic Crises: The Panic of 1873, the End of Reconstruction, and the Realignment of American Politics." *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*, Vol 10, no. 4, October: 403-423.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781411000260>
- Bassett, Edward, Irving Hiatt, John Ihlder, Morris Knowles, Nelson Lewis, J. Horace McFarland, Frederick Olmsted, and Lawrence Veiller. 1922. *A Zoning Primer by the Advisory Committee of Zoning*. United States Department of Commerce. Washington Dc: U.S. Government Printing Office. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-C13-cf208d8ed0dda43ed677acd6cad8be81/pdf/GOVPUB-C13-cf208d8ed0dda43ed677acd6cad8be81.pdf>
- Belcher, John, and Deborah Rejent. 1993. "Using Company-Owned Housing and Workforce to Fill the Need for Low-Wage Workers: A Solution or Step Backward?" *Social Work*, Vol. 38, no.3, May: 297-304. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23716934.pdf>
- Bennett, Sari. 1983. "The Geography of American Socialism: Continuity and Change, 1900-

- 1912.” *Social Science History*, Vol. 7, no. 3, Summer: 267-288.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/1171188>
- Berthold, Dana. 2010. “Tidy Whiteness: A Genealogy of Race, Purity, and Hygiene.” *Ethics and the Environment*, Vol. 15, no. 1, Spring: 1-26.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/ete.2010.15.1.1>
- Biles, Roger. 2012. “A Mormon in Babylon: George Romney as Secretary of HUD, 1969-1973.” *Michigan Historical Review*, Vol. 38, no. 2, Fall: 63-89.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5342/michhistrevi.38.2.0063>
- Bixby, Ann Kallman. 1990. “Public Social Welfare Expenditures, Fiscal Years 1965-87” *Social Security Bulletin*, Vol. 53, no. 2, February: 10-26.  
<https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v53n2/v53n2p10.pdf>
- Bloom, Nicholas Dagen, Fritz Umbach, and Lawrence J. Vale. 2015. *Public Housing Myths: Perception, Reality, and Social Policy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Bluestone, Barry. 1984. “Is Deindustrialization a Myth? Capital Mobility versus Absorptive Capacity in the U.S. Economy.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol 475, no. 1: 39-51.  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002716284475001004>
- Bocian, Debbie, Wei Li, and Keith Ernst. 2010. “Foreclosures by Race and Ethnicity: The Demographics of a Crisis.” Research Report: Center for Responsible Lending. June 18.  
<https://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf>
- Bonastia, Chris. 2004; “Why Nixon Killed HUD’s Desegregation Efforts.” *Social Science History*, Vol. 28, no. 1, Spring: 19-52. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40267832>
- Boston Financial Investment Management, L.P. 2022a. “Home” Accessed March 2, 2022.  
<https://www.bfim.com>
- . 2022b. “Portfolio” Accessed March 2, 2022. <https://www.bfim.com/portfolio.aspx>
- . 2022c. “Asset and Portfolio Management” Accessed March 2, 2022.  
<https://www.bfim.com/asset-management.aspx>
- Boyer, Richard, and Herbert Morais. 1972. *Labor’s Untold Story*. New York: United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America.
- Bratt, Rachel G., Michael E. Stone, and Chester Hartman. 2006. *A Right to Housing: Foundation for a New Social Agenda*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Bui, Quoc Trung. 2015. “50 Years of Shrinking Union Membership, In One Map.” *NPR*. February

23. <https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02/23/385843576/50-years-of-shrinking-union-membership-in-one-map>
- Cahill, Meagan, Samantha Lowry, and P. Mitchell Downey. 2011. "Movin' Out: Crime Displacement and HUD's HOPE VI Initiative." Research Report: Urban Institute Justice Policy Center. [https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/27481/412385-movin-out-crime-and-hud-s-hope-vi-initiative\\_1.pdf](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/27481/412385-movin-out-crime-and-hud-s-hope-vi-initiative_1.pdf)
- Case, Karl E., and John M. Quigley. 2008. "How Housing Booms Unwind: Income Effects, Wealth Effects, and Feedbacks Through Financial Markets." *UC Berkley: Working Papers*. June 1<sup>st</sup>. <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1j05j7t5>
- Center for Community Land Trust Innovation. N.d. "What Is a Community Land Trust?" *Center for Community Land Trust Innovation*. Accessed March 18, 2022. <https://cltweb.org/what-is-a-community-land-trust/>
- Center for Responsible Lending. 2013. "2013 Update: The Spillover Effects of Foreclosures." Research Analysis: Center for Responsible Lending. August 19. <https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/2013-crl-research-update-foreclosure-spillover-effects-final-aug-19-docx.pdf>
- Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 2022. "Federal Rental Assistance Fact Sheets." *CBPP Housing*, updated January 19. Accessed March 10, 2022. <https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-10-19housing-factsheet-us.pdf>
- Chambers, Matthew, Carlos Garriga, and Don Schlagenhauf. 2012. *The New deal, the GI Bill, and the Post-War Housing*. Working Paper, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper\\_1050.pdf](https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2012/paper_1050.pdf)
- Cisneros, Henry G. and Lora Engdahl (eds.). 2009. *From Despair to Hope: Hope VI and the New Promise of Public Housing in America's Cities*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- City of Vienna. N.d. a. "Municipal politics: 'Red Vienna' – a success story." *Culture and History*. Accessed March 15, 2022. <https://www.wien.gv.at/english/history/commemoration/housing.html>
- . N.d. b. "Rented flat types." *Living, Housing, & Working*. <https://www.wien.gv.at/english/living-working/housing/renting/flat-types.html>
- Coalition for the Homeless. 2003. *War and Homelessness: How American Wars Create Homelessness Among United States Armed Forces Veterans*. Briefing Paper. [https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Briefing-War\\_and\\_Homelessness-03-2003.pdf](https://www.coalitionforthehomeless.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Briefing-War_and_Homelessness-03-2003.pdf)
- Cobb, James C. 1984. *Industrialization and Southern Society, 1877-1984*. Lexington: University

Press of Kentucky.

Commission to Increase Housing Opportunities in Maine by Studying Zoning and Land Use Restrictions. 2021. "Draft Report." <https://legislature.maine.gov/doc/7578>

Congressional Budget Office. 2012. *Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output from October 2011 Through December 2011*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office.  
<https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/02-22-ARRA.pdf>

Cooper Square Committee. N.d. "Our Historical Accomplishments." *About Us*. Accessed March 19, 2022. <https://coopersquare.org/about-us/our-historical-accomplishments>

Councilor, K.C. 2017. "Feeding the Body Politic: Metaphors of Digestion in Progressive Era US Immigration Discourse." *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, Vol. 14, no. 2, June: 139-157. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2016.1274044>

Curry, Timothy, and Lynn Shibut. 2000. "The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences." *FDIC Banking Review*, Vol. 13, no.2: 26-35.  
[https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/fdicbnkrv13&id=60&men\\_tab=srchresults](https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/fdicbnkrv13&id=60&men_tab=srchresults)

Data Lab. 2022. "Federal Spending by Category and Agency: Spending by Source Categories and Agency in 2021." *USA Spending, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury*. Accessed March 10, 2022. <https://datalab.usaspending.gov/americas-finance-guide/spending/categories/>

Davis, John Emmeus. 2014. *Origins and Evolutions of the Community Land Trust in the United States*. <https://community-wealth.org/sites/clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/report-davis14.pdf>

Day, Kristen. 2003. "New Urbanism and the Challenges of Designing for Diversity." *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, vol 23: 83-95.  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0739456X03255424>

Dowell, Earlene K.P. 2021. "Remote Working, Commuting Time, Life Events All Affect Home Buyers' Decisions." *U.S. Census Bureau*, October 4. Accessed March 22, 2022.  
<https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/10/zillow-and-census-bureau-data-show-pandemics-impact-on-housing-market.html>

Dreier, Peter. 1982. "The Status of Tenets in the United States." *Social Problems*, Vol. 30, no.2, December: 179-198. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/800517>

---. 1984. "The Tenants' Movement in the United States." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 8, no.2: 255-277. <http://www.peterdreier.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/The-Tenants-Movement-in-the-US.pdf>

- . 2013. "Radicals in City Hall: An American Tradition." *Dissent Magazine*, December 19. [https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online\\_articles/radicals-in-city-hall-an-american-tradition](https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/radicals-in-city-hall-an-american-tradition)
- Drier, Peter, and John Atlas. 1995. "US Housing Problems, Politics and Policies in the 1990s." *Housing Studies*, Vol. 10, no. 2: 1-29. <https://web.p.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=18c9381e-352b-4a06-91fb-509aa2d03314%40redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWwhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#AN=9506203900&db=a9h>
- Drier, Peter, and W. Dennis Keating. 1990. "The Limits of Localism: Progressive Housing Policies in Boston, 1984-1989." *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 26, no.2, December:191-216. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/004208169002600204>
- Duca, John V., and Anthony Murphy. 2021. "Why House Prices Surged as the COVID-19 Pandemic Took Hold." *Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas*, December 28. Accessed March 22, 2022. <https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2021/1228.aspx>
- Duma, Veronika, and Hanna Lichtenberger. 2017. "Remembering Red Vienna." Trans. Loren Balhorn. *Jacobin*, February 10. Accessed March 15, 2022. <https://jacobinmag.com/2017/02/red-vienna-austria-housing-urban-planning>
- Duryea, Danielle Pelfrey. 2006. "Gendering the Gentrification of Public Housing: HOPE VI's Disparate Impact of Lowest-Income African American Women." *Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy*, Vol. 13, no. 3, Fall: 567-593. [https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1632&context=journal\\_articles](https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1632&context=journal_articles)
- Fainstein, Susan S. and Norman Fainstein. 1989. "The Ambivalent State: Economic Development Policy in the U.S. Federal System Under the Reagan Administration." *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 25, no.1, September: 41-62. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/004208168902500105>
- Fallon, Kathrine. 2021. "Naming Housing as a Human Right Is a First Step to Solving the Housing Crisis." *Urban Institute: Housing Matters*. December 8. Accessed March 19, 2022. <https://housingmatters.urban.org/articles/naming-housing-human-right-first-step-solving-housing-crisis>
- Finegold, Kenneth, Laura Wherry, and Stephanie Schardin. 2004. "Block Grants: Historical Overview and Lessons Learned." *Assessing the New Federalism: An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies*, Series A, no. A-63, April. [http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310991\\_A-63.pdf](http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310991_A-63.pdf)
- Fishback, Price, Jonathan Rose, Ken Snowden, and Thomas Storrs. 2022. "New Evidence on

- Redlining by Federal Housing Programs in the 1930s.” Working Paper: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. <https://www.chicagofed.org/~media/publications/working-papers/2022/wp2022-01-pdf.pdf>
- Fluri, Jennifer, Abby Hickcox, Shae Frydenlund, and Ridge Zackary. 2020. “Accessing Racial Privilege Through Property: Geographies of Racial Capitalism.” *Geoforum*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2020.06.013>
- Foglesong, Richard. 1986. *Planning the Capitalist City: The Colonial Era to the 1920s*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Foote, Christopher L., Kristopher Gerardi, Lorenz Goette, and Paul S. Willen. 2008. “Just the facts: An initial analysis of subprime’s role in the housing crisis” *Journal of Housing Economics*, Vol. 17: 291-305. <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.528.9924&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Freddie Mac. 2022. “30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgages Since 1971.” *Freddie Mac*. Accessed February 26, 2022. <https://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30>
- Garde, Ajay. 2020. “New Urbanism: Past, Present, and Future.” *Urban Planning*, Vol. 5, no.4: 453-463. <https://www.cogitatiopress.com/urbanplanning/article/view/3478/3478>
- Greenstein, Rosalind, and Yesim Sungu-Eryilmaz. 2004. “Community Land Trusts: Leasing Land for Affordable Housing.” *Lincoln Institute of Land Policy*. Accessed March 19, 2022. <https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/community-land-trusts>
- Glaeser, Edward, and Jesse Shapiro. 2001. “Is There A New Urbanism? The growth of U.S. Cities in the 1990s” Discussion Paper: Harvard Institute of Economic Research. June. <http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2001papers/2001list.html>
- Gluckstein, Donny. 2006. *The Paris Commune: A Revolution in Democracy*. London: Cambridge Printing.
- Goetz, Edward. 2003. *Clearing the Way: Deconcentrating the Poor in Urban America*. Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute
- Goldberg, David Theo. 1993. “‘Polluting the Body Politic’: Racist Discourse and Urban Location.” In *Racism, the City, and the State*, eds Malcolm Cross and Michael Keith, 45-60. New York: Routledge.
- Goodman, Laurie S., and Christopher Mayer. 2018. “Homeownership and the American Dream.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 31, no. 1, Winter: 31-58. [https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/96221/homeownership\\_and\\_the\\_american\\_dream\\_0.pdf](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/96221/homeownership_and_the_american_dream_0.pdf)



- Goodman, Laurie S., and Jun Zhu. 2018. "What Fueled the Financial Crisis? An Analysis of the Performance of Purchase and Refinance Loans." *Journal of Fixed Income*.  
[https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/97746/what\\_fueled\\_the\\_financial\\_crisis.pdf](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/97746/what_fueled_the_financial_crisis.pdf)
- Gordon, Colin. 2017. "The Legacy of Taft-Hartley." *Jacobin*. December 12.  
<https://jacobinmag.com/2017/12/taft-hartley-unions-right-to-work>
- Gramlich, Ed. 1998. *CDBG: An Action Guide to the Development Block Grant Program*. Washington D.C.: Center for Community Change.  
<http://www.campusactivism.org/server-new/uploads/cdbg.pdf>
- Gregory, James, and Rebecca Flores. 2015. "Communist Party Membership by Districts 1922-1950." University of Washington Mapping American Social Movements Project. Accessed November 5, 2021. Chart: National Membership by Year.  
[https://depts.washington.edu/moves/CP\\_map-members.shtml](https://depts.washington.edu/moves/CP_map-members.shtml)
- Guest, Avery. 2005. "Frontier and Urban-Industrial Explanations of US Occupational Mobility in the late 1800s." *Social Science Research*, Vol. 34, no. 1, March: 140-164.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2004.01.001>
- Haas, Jacob, Jasmine Rangel, Juan Pablo Garnham, and Peter Hepburn. 2021. "Preliminary Analysis: Eviction Filing Trends After the CDC Moratorium Expiration." *Eviction Lab*. December 9. Accessed February 28, 2022.  
<https://evictionlab.org/updates/research/eviction-filing-trends-after-cdc-moratorium/>
- Haines, Michael. 1994. "The Population of the United States, 1790-1920." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. h0056: 93, table 2. "Population By Race, Residence, Nativity, Age, and Sex, United States, 1800-1900."
- Harling, Stephanie Lynn. 2020. "A Case Study of Citizen Participatory Planning Within the City of Milwaukee: the Choice Neighborhood Initiative." *Theses and Dissertations*. 2515.  
<https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/2515/>
- Hartman, Chester. 1998. "The Case for a Right to Housing." *Housing Policy Debate*, Vol. 9, no. 2: 223-246.  
[https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10511482.1998.9521292?casa\\_token=RzkZVQ50a7QAAAAA:N1OB6B9KGn3rFaeD1hT8bWDj5sH5Lt\\_Bh3gRmLW56ZwdIyRdsKr2EYEt8017\\_hi8ppFg0uZy\\_T7RkTw](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10511482.1998.9521292?casa_token=RzkZVQ50a7QAAAAA:N1OB6B9KGn3rFaeD1hT8bWDj5sH5Lt_Bh3gRmLW56ZwdIyRdsKr2EYEt8017_hi8ppFg0uZy_T7RkTw)
- Harvey, David. 2001. *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography*. New York: Routledge.
- . 2013a. *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to Urban Revolution*. New York: Verso.
- . 2013b. "The Political Economy of Public Space." In *The Politics of Public Space*, 23-188. <https://davidharvey.org/media/public.pdf>

- Hays, R. Allen. 2012. *The Federal Government and Urban Housing: Third Edition*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Heathcott, Joseph. 2015. "Public Housing Stands Alone." In *Public Housing Myths: Perception, Reality, and Social Policy*, eds. Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Fritz Umbach, and Lawrence J. Vale. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 31-46.
- Healthy Neighborhoods. 2020a. *Growing Our Tree Streets: A Choice Neighborhood Transformation Plan for Downtown Lewiston*. <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pV4-wjOs9lHlmD0wwQXiAXh6z5LVkoSC/view>
- . 2020b. *Growing Our Tree Streets: A Choice Neighborhood Transformation Plan for Downtown Lewiston APPENDIX*. [https://www.lewistonmaine.gov/DocumentCenter/View/10528/APPENDIX\\_FINAL\\_091119\\_lowresforweb](https://www.lewistonmaine.gov/DocumentCenter/View/10528/APPENDIX_FINAL_091119_lowresforweb)
- Hill, Dilys M. 1983. "Urban Policy in the 1980s." *Social Policy and Administration*, Vol. 17, no.3, Autumn: 204-219. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1467-9515.1983.tb00189.x>
- Hirsch, Barry T., David A. MacPherson, and Wayne G. Vroman. 2001. "Estimates of Union Density by State." *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. 124, no.7, July: 51-55. [http://unionstats.gsu.edu/MLR\\_7-01\\_StateUnionDensity.pdf](http://unionstats.gsu.edu/MLR_7-01_StateUnionDensity.pdf)
- Hirschman, Charles, and Elizabeth Mogford. 2009. "Immigration and the American Industrial Revolution from 1880 to 1920." *Social Science Research*, Vol 38, no. 1, December: 897-920. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2009.04.001>
- Immergluck, Dan. 2013. "Too little, too late, and too timid: The federal response to the foreclosure crisis at the five-year mark." *Housing Policy Debate*, Vol. 23, no. 1: 199-232.
- Jackson, Kenneth. 1987. *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jacobs, B.G., K. R. Harney, C.L. Edson, and B.S. Lane. 1986. *Guide to Federal Housing Programs: Second Edition*. Washington D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs.
- Jacobs, Jane. 1962. *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Vintage.
- Jargowsky, Paul A., Lei Ding, and Natasha Fletcher. 2019. "The Fair Housing Act at 50: Successes, Failures, and Future Directions." *Housing Policy Debate*, Vol. 29, no. 5, 694-703. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10511482.2019.1639406>
- Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. 2019. *State of the Nation's Housing*

2019. [https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard\\_JCHS\\_State\\_of\\_the\\_Nations\\_Housing\\_2019%20%281%29.pdf](https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2019%20%281%29.pdf)
- . 2020. *State of the Nation's Housing 2020*.  
[https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard\\_JCHS\\_The\\_State\\_of\\_the\\_Nations\\_Housing\\_2020\\_Report\\_Revised\\_120720.pdf](https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_The_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2020_Report_Revised_120720.pdf)
- . 2021. *State of the Nation's Housing 2021*.  
[https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard\\_JCHS\\_State\\_Nations\\_Housing\\_2021.pdf](https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_Nations_Housing_2021.pdf)
- Joseph, Antoine. 1989. "The Formation of Class Factions in the Gilded Age." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 12, no. 4, October: 490-511
- Judd, Richard W. 1989. *Socialist Cities: Municipal Politics and the Grass Roots of American Socialism*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Judis, John B. 2019. "The Socialist Revival." *American Affairs*, Vol. 3, no. 4, Winter.  
<https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/11/the-socialist-revival/>
- Kadi, Justin. 2015. "Recommodifying Housing in Formerly 'Red' Vienna?." *Housing, Theory, and Society*, Vol. 32, no. 3: 247-265.  
[https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14036096.2015.1024885?casa\\_token=t6uzLPtABhwAAAAA:wQLJoqeVMPudTy4pU38j0xyYHEmcNJAIfxiYXczus4Pfe8S9NoSmNyjRr3cx7jOp\\_zEXNgS\\_RbmjN8Q](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14036096.2015.1024885?casa_token=t6uzLPtABhwAAAAA:wQLJoqeVMPudTy4pU38j0xyYHEmcNJAIfxiYXczus4Pfe8S9NoSmNyjRr3cx7jOp_zEXNgS_RbmjN8Q)
- Kane, John V. and Ian G. Anson. 2020. "Deficit Attention Disorder: Partisan-Motivated Reasoning About Government Overspending." *American Political Science Association PrePrints*. <https://preprints.apsanet.org/engage/api-gateway/apsa/assets/orp/resource/item/5fc0947cf9fdb80017e21442/original/deficit-attention-disorder-partisan-motivated-reasoning-about-government-overspending.pdf>
- Kerner, Otto, John Lindsay, Fred Harris, Edward Brooke, James Corman, William McCulloch, I.W. Abel, Charles Thornton, Roy Wilkins, Katherine Peden, and Herbert Jenkins. 1968. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders*. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.  
[https://belonging.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/kerner\\_commission\\_full\\_report.pdf?file=1&force=1](https://belonging.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/kerner_commission_full_report.pdf?file=1&force=1)
- Keightley, Mark P. 2021. "An Introduction to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit." RS22389. Washington DC: Congressional Revenue Service.  
<https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RS22389.pdf>
- Khadduri, Jill, Carissa Climaco, Kimberly Burnett, Laurie Gould, and Louise Elving. 2012.

- “What Happens to Low-Income Housing Tax-Credit Properties at Year 15 and Beyond?.” *U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy and Development Research*. [https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/what\\_happens\\_lihtc\\_v2.pdf](https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/what_happens_lihtc_v2.pdf)
- Kost, Thomas C. “Hope after Hope VI-Reaffirming Racial Integration as a Primary Goal in Housing Policy Prescriptions.” *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 106, no.3: 1379-1418.  
<http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/Kost%20C%20Hope%20After%20Hope%20VI%3F.pdf>
- Kristeva, Julia. 1982. *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*. Trans. Leon Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press
- Kumar, Vasanth. 2021. “The American Austerity Playbook.” *The Berkley Economic Review*. March 4. Accessed March 25, 2022. [https://econreview.berkeley.edu/the-american-austerity-playbook/?utm\\_source=rss&utm\\_medium=rss&utm\\_campaign=the-american-austerity-playbook](https://econreview.berkeley.edu/the-american-austerity-playbook/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-american-austerity-playbook)
- LaGrand, James. 2020. “Understanding Urban Progressivism and the City Beautiful Movement.” *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, Vol. 87, no.1, Winter: 11-21.  
<https://muse.jhu.edu/article/750079/pdf>
- Lee, So Young. 2017. “Understanding of Relationship between HOPE VI and Gentrification.” Doctoral Dissertation, Ohio State University.  
[https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws\\_etd/send\\_file/send?accession=osu1483290431708558&disposition=inline](https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=osu1483290431708558&disposition=inline)
- Lefebvre, Henri. 1996. *Writings on Cities*. Trans. and eds. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.
- Lewis, Jill. 1983. “Red Vienna: Socialism in One City, 1918-27.” *European Studies Review*, Vol. 13: 335-355. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/026569148301300303>
- Lewis, Victor, Kenneth D. Kay, Chandrika Kelso, and James Larson. 2010. “Was the 2008 Financial Crisis Caused by A Lack of Corporate Ethics?” *Global Journal of Business Research*, Vol. 4, no. 2: 77-84. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1633638>
- Madowitz, Michael. 2014. “What Have We Learned About Austerity Since the Great Recession?.” *Center for American Progress*, May 30. Accessed March 25, 2022.  
<https://www.americanprogress.org/article/what-have-we-learned-about-austerity-since-the-great-recession/>
- Maisano, Chris. 2021. “When America’s Red States Were Red.” *Jacobin*. July 8.  
<https://jacobinmag.com/2021/07/socialist-party-red-states-debs-ameringer-history-rural-socialism>

- Marcuse, Peter. 1980a. "Housing in Early City Planning" *Journal of Urban History*, Vol. 6, no. 2, February: 153-176
- . 1980b. "The Rise of Tenant Organizations" In *Housing Urban America: Updated Second Editions*, eds Jon Pynoos, Robert Schafer, and Chester W., Hartman, 51-56. New York: Aldine Publishing Company.
- . 1995. "Interpreting 'Public Housing' History." *Journal of Architectural and Planning Research*, Vol. 12, no. 3, Autumn: 240-258.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/43029165>
- Martinot, Steve. 2000. "The Racialized Construction of Class in the United States." *Social Justice*, Vol. 27, no. 1 (79), Spring: 43-60. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/29767190>
- Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. 1933 [1848]. *The communist manifesto*. League for Industrial Democracy.
- Matthews, Dylan. 2012. "Poverty in the 50 years since 'The Other America,' in 5 Charts," *The Washington Post*. July 11.  
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/07/11/poverty-in-the-50-years-since-the-other-america-in-five-charts/>
- McClaughry, John. 1975. "The Troubled Dream: The Life and Times of Section 235 of the National Housing Act." *Loyola University Chicago Law Journal*, Vol 6, no. 1, winter: 1-47. <https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2347&context=luclj>
- McGahey, Richard. 2013. "The Political Economy of Austerity in the United States." *Social Research*, Vol. 80, no. 3, Fall: 717-748. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24385690>
- Meeropol, Michael. 2001. *A Tale of Two Tax Cuts: What recent history teaches about recessions and Economic Policy*. Issue Brief: Economic Policy Institute. <https://files.epi.org/page/-/old/issuebriefs/ib157/ib157.pdf>
- Milward, Alan. 1979. *War, Economy, and Society, 1939-1945*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Muller, Edward. 1991. "Review: The Origins of Practical Planning." *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies*, Vol. 58, no. 1, January: 62-70.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/27773423>
- Nathan, Richard P. 1996. "A Retrospective on Richard M. Nixon's Domestic Policies." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 26, no. 1, The Nixon Presidency, Winter: 155-164.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/27551555>
- National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. 1992. *The Final Report of the*

- National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- National Cooperative Law Center. 2017a. “The Characteristics of Housing Cooperatives.” *Pentiuk, Couvreur, and Kobiljak, P.C.* Accessed March 18, 2022. <https://nationalcooperativelawcenter.com/what-is-a-housing-cooperative/the-characteristics-of-housing-cooperatives/>
- National Cooperative Law Center. 2017b. “A History of Housing Cooperatives.” *Pentiuk, Couvreur, and Kobiljak, P.C.* Accessed March 18, 2022. <https://nationalcooperativelawcenter.com/national-cooperative-law-center/the-history-of-housing-cooperatives/2/>
- Nelson, Garrett Dash. 2021. “Redlining, Race, and the Color of Money.” *Dissent Magazine*, July 8. [https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online\\_articles/redlining-race-and-the-color-of-money](https://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/redlining-race-and-the-color-of-money)
- Nelson, Kathrine, James DeFilippis, Richard Kruger, Olivia Williams, Joseph Pierce, Deborah Martin, and Azadeh Hadizadeh Esfahani. 2020. “The Community Effects of Decommodification: Community Land Trusts and Neighborhood Property Values.” *Housing Policy Debate*, Vol. 30, no. 5: 823-842. [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10511482.2020.1768573?casa\\_token=Ie8a6XOC6cgAAAAA:Ycbs9rk\\_d38aTm-2MQWywMz\\_OOqkc4KpXlAgzoQ1N2o1wmpxiFVfspSuHYILTZHmbZCAIIV6MBZ\\_G9w](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10511482.2020.1768573?casa_token=Ie8a6XOC6cgAAAAA:Ycbs9rk_d38aTm-2MQWywMz_OOqkc4KpXlAgzoQ1N2o1wmpxiFVfspSuHYILTZHmbZCAIIV6MBZ_G9w)
- Newman, Kathe. 2004. “Newark, Decline and Avoidance, Renaissance and Desire: From Disinvestment to Reinvestment.” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol 594, no. 1, July: 34-48. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002716204264963>
- Newman, Oscar. 1995. “Defensible Space: A New Physical Planning Tool for Urban Revitalization.” *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 61, no. 2: 149-155.
- . 1996. *Creating Defensible Space*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of Policy Development and Research. <https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/def.pdf>
- Novy, Andreas, Vanessa Redak, Johannes Jäger, and Alexander Hamedinger. 2001. “The End of Red Vienna: Recent Ruptures and Continuities in Urban Governance. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, Vol. 8, no. 2: 131-144. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/096977640100800204>
- Office of Policy Development and Research. 2004. “An Analysis of Mortgage Refinancing, 2001-2003.” *U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development*. November. <https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/mortgagerefinance03.pdf>

- Olsen, Edgar, and Jens Ludwig. 2013. "Performance and Legacy of Housing Policies." In *Legacies of the War on Poverty*. eds. Martha Bailey and Sheldon Danzinger. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. 206-234.
- Olzak, Susan. 1989. "Labor Unrest, Immigration, and Ethnic Conflict in Urban America, 1880-1914." *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, no. 6, May:1303-1333.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2780961>
- Peacher, Amanda. 2021. "In Vienna, public housing is affordable and desirable." *Marketplace: Marketplace Morning Report*, May 3. Accessed March 15, 2022.  
<https://www.marketplace.org/2021/05/03/in-vienna-public-housing-is-affordable-and-desirable/>
- Peck, Jamie. 2012. "Austerity Urbanism: American Cities Under Extreme Economy." *City*, Vol. 16, no. 6, December.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13604813.2012.734071>
- Pendall, Rolf, and Leah Hendey. 2013. "A Brief Look at the Early Implementation of Choice Neighborhoods." Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute.  
<https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/24126/412940-a-brief-look-at-the-early-implementation-of-choice-neighborhoods.pdf>
- Pendall, Rolf et. al. 2015. "Choice Neighborhoods: Baseline Conditions and Early Progress." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.  
<https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Baseline-Conditions-Early-Progress.pdf>
- Peterson, Jon. 1976. "The City Beautiful Movement: Forgotten Origins and Lost Meanings." *Journal of Urban History*, Vol. 2, no. 4, August: 415-434.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/009614427600200402>
- Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard Cloward. 1979. *Poor Peoples Movements: Why They Succeed How They Fail*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Popkin, Susan J., Bruce Katz, Mary K. Cunningham, Karen D. Brown, Jeremy Gustafson, and Margery Austin Turner. 2004. "A Decade of HOPE VI": Research Findings and Policy Challenges." Washington DC: The Urban Institute and The Brookings Institution.  
[https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/43756/411002\\_HOPEVI.pdf](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/43756/411002_HOPEVI.pdf)
- Popkin, Susan J., Diane K. Levy, and Larry Burton. 2009. "Has HOPE VI Transformed Residents' Lives? New Evidence from the HOPE VI Panel Study" *Housing Studies*, Vol. 24, no. 4, July: 477-502.  
<https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdf/Popkin%20research%20report.pdf>
- Price, Daniel, Joseph Himes, Philip Hauser, C.R. Lawrence, James Teele, Preston Valien, Daniel

- Thompson, G. Franklin Edwards, K.E. Taeuber, Frank Notestein, Reynolds Farley, Elliot Liebow, and Irene Taeuber. 1970. "Urbanization of the Blacks." *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, Vol. 48, no. 2, Part 2: Demographic Aspects of the Black Community. Proceedings of the Forty-Third Conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund Held at the Carnegie Endowment Institution Center New York City, October 28-30, 1969: 47-67. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3349115>
- Radford, Gail. 2003. "From Municipal Socialism to Public Authorities: Institutional Factors in the Shaping of American Public Enterprise." *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 90, no. 3: 863-890. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/3660879>
- Ramakrishnan, Kriti, Mark Treskon, and Solomon Green. 2019. "Inclusionary Zoning: What Does the Research Tell Us about the Effectiveness of Local Action." *Urban Institute Research to Action Lab*. [https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99647/inclusionary\\_zoning.\\_what\\_does\\_the\\_research\\_tell\\_us\\_about\\_the\\_effectiveness\\_of\\_local\\_action\\_2.pdf](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99647/inclusionary_zoning._what_does_the_research_tell_us_about_the_effectiveness_of_local_action_2.pdf)
- Rappaport, Jordan. 2003. "US Urban Decline and Growth, 1950 to 2000." *Economic Review – Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City*, Vol. 88, no.3: 15-44. <https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/1131/2003-U.S.%20Urban%20Decline%20and%20Growth,%201950%20to%202000.pdf>
- Reps, John. 1965. *The Making of Urban America: A History of City Planning in the United States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Riley, H. E. 1958. "Evolution in the Worker's Housing Since 1900." *Monthly Labor Review*, Vol. 81, no. 8, August: 854-861. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41833974>
- Robinson, Cedric. 2020. *Black Marxism, Revised and Updated Third Edition: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Rose, Stephen J. 2018. "Manufacturing Employment: Fact and Fiction" *Urban Institute*. August. [https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/97776/manufacturing\\_employment\\_fact\\_and\\_fiction\\_2.pdf](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/97776/manufacturing_employment_fact_and_fiction_2.pdf)
- Rosenfeld, Jake, and Meredith Kleykamp. 2012. "Organized Labor and Racial Wage Inequality in the United States" *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol 117, no. 5, Spring: 1460-1502. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/663673>
- Rothstein, Richard. 2017. *The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America*. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation.
- Rugkhanan, Napong Tao. 2014. "Narrative in Urban Theory." *Agora Journal of Urban Planning and Design*, Vol 8: 120-129. [https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/120397/Rugkhanan\\_NarrativesInUrbanTheory.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/120397/Rugkhanan_NarrativesInUrbanTheory.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)



- Sazama, Gerald. 1996. "A Brief History of Affordable Housing Cooperatives in the United States." *Economics Working Papers*. 199609.  
[https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1337&context=econ\\_wpapers](https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1337&context=econ_wpapers)
- . 2000. "Lessons from the History of Affordable Housing Cooperatives in the United States: A Case Study in American Affordable Housing Policy." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 59, no. 4, October: 573-608.  
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1536-7150.00045>
- Scally, Corianne Payton, Amanda Gold, and Nicole DuBois. 2018. "The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: How It Works and Who It Serves." Report: Urban Institute.  
[https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98758/lithc\\_how\\_it\\_works\\_and\\_who\\_it\\_serves\\_final\\_2.pdf](https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98758/lithc_how_it_works_and_who_it_serves_final_2.pdf)
- Schmid, Christian. 2011. "Henri Lefebvre, The Right to the City, and the New Metropolitan Mainstream" Trans. Christopher Findlay. In *Cities for People, Not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City*, eds Neil Brenner, Peter Marcuse, and Margit Mayer, 40-63. New York: Routledge.
- Schulkind, Eugene. 1974. *The Paris Commune of 1871*. New York: Grove Press, Inc.
- Schwartz, Alex. 2015. *Housing Policy in the United States: Third Edition*. New York: Routledge.
- Schwartz, Joseph M. 2010. "White Populist Opposition to the Obama Administration: The Persistence of Conservative Racialized Politics in an Allegedly Post-Racial Age." Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association Working Paper.
- Schweitzer, Ally. 2020. "How European-Style Public Housing Could Help Solve the Affordability Crisis." *NPR: WAMU* 88.5, February 25. Accessed March 15, 2022.  
<https://www.npr.org/local/305/2020/02/25/809315455/how-european-style-public-housing-could-help-solve-the-affordability-crisis>
- Scott, Mel. 1971. *American City Planning*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Shafer, David. 2005. *The Paris Commune*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sherman, Matthew. 2009. "A Short History of Financial Deregulation in the United States." *Center for Economic and Policy Research*.  
<https://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/dereg-timeline-2009-07.pdf>
- Shi, Linda. 2021. "From Progressive Cities to Resilient Cities: Lessons from History for New Debates in Equitable Adaptation to Climate Change." *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 57, no. 5: 1442-1479. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1078087419910827>

- Skelton, Kathryn. 2021. "20 years gone, Bates Manufacturing is still weaving a legacy." *Sun Journal*. April 4. Accessed March 24, 2022.  
<https://www.sunjournal.com/2021/04/04/weaving-a-legacy/>
- Smith, Michael E, and José Lobo. 2019. "Cities Through the Ages: One Thing or Many?." *Frontiers in Digital Humanities*, Vol. 6, no. 12: 1-10.  
<https://doi.org/10.3389/fdigh.2019.00012>
- Smith, Neil. 2002. "New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Strategy." *Antipode*, Vol. 34, no. 3: 427-450. <http://www.overgaardtonnesen.dk/TEKSTERNE/05-Smith-New-Globalism-New-Urbanism-Gentrification.pdf>
- Snowden, Kenneth. 2013. "Mortgage Banking in the United States, 1870-1940." *Research Institute for Housing America Research Paper*.
- Stein, Samuel. 2019. *Capital City: Gentrification and the Real Estate State*. New York: Verso.
- Sundstorm, William. 1992. "Last Hired, First Fired? Unemployment and Urban Black Workers During the Great Depression." *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 52, no. 2, June: 415-429. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2123118>
- Tars, Eric. 2020. "Housing as a Human Right." *NLIHC: Advocates Guide*.  
[https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-2021/01-06\\_Housing-Human-Right.pdf](https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/AG-2021/01-06_Housing-Human-Right.pdf)
- Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahtta. 2019. *Race for Profit: How Banks and the Real Estate Industry Undermined Black Homeownership*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press
- Teitz, Michael B. 1996. "American Planning in the 1990s: Evolution, Debate, and Challenge." *Urban Studies*, Vol. 33, nos. 4-5: 649-671.  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00420989650011771>
- Thaden, Emily, and Ruonju Wang. 2017. *Inclusionary Housing in the United States: Prevalence, Impact, and Practices*. Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
- Theodore, Nik. 2020. "Governing Through Austerity: (Ill)logics of Neoliberal Urbanism After the Global Financial Crisis." *Journal of Urban Affairs*, Vol. 42, no. 1: 1-17.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/07352166.2019.1623683>
- Urban Institute. 2021. "Housing Credit Availability Index." *Urban Institute Housing Finance Policy Division*. Last updated November 5, 2021. Accessed February 26, 2022.  
<https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/housing-finance-policy-center/projects/housing-credit-availability-index>
- U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1966. *Housing Construction Statistics: 1889 to 1964*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

- . 1977. *Household Money Income in 1975 and Selected Social and Economic Characteristics of Households*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.  
<https://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-104.pdf>
- . 1998. "Table 14. Population of the 100 Largest Urban Places: 1910." Published June 15. Assessed March 14, 2022. <https://www2.census.gov/library/working-papers/1998/demo/pop-twps0027/tab14.txt>
- U.S. Census Bureau. 2022. "Household Pulse Survey." *Interactive Mapping Tool*. Accessed March 22, 2022. <https://www.census.gov/data-tools/demo/hhp/#/?measures=EVICTFOR&areaSelector=st&periodSelector=42>
- . N.d. "Homeownership Rate in the United States [RHORUSQ156N]." *Graph*. Retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed February 25, 2022.  
<https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RHORUSQ156N>
- U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts. 2020a. "Camden city, New Jersey." U.S. Census Bureau. Accessed March 7, 2022. <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/camdencitynewjersey>
- . 2020b. "Cleveland city, Ohio." U.S. Census Bureau. Accessed March 7, 2022.  
<https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/clevelandcityohio>
- . 2020c. "Detroit city, Michigan." U.S. Census Bureau. Accessed March 7, 2022.  
<https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/detroitcitymichigan>
- . 2020d. "Fort Myers city, Florida." U.S. Census Bureau. Accessed March 7, 2022.  
<https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fortmyerscityflorida>
- . 2020e. "Lewiston city, Maine." U.S. Census Bureau. Accessed March 7, 2022.  
<https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/lewistoncitymaine>
- U.S. Congress Senate Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development. 2013. *The Choice Neighborhoods Initiative: A New Community Development Model: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation, and Community Development*. 112<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Session. March 27.  
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112shrg75713/pdf/CHRG-112shrg75713.pdf>
- U.S. Department of Commerce and Bureau of the Census. 1949. *Historical Statistics of the United States 1789-1945: A Supplement to the Statistical Abstract of the United States*. Bureau of the Census and Social Science Research Council. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.  
[https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1949/compendia/hist\\_stats\\_1789-1945/hist\\_stats\\_1789-1945.pdf](https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1949/compendia/hist_stats_1789-1945/hist_stats_1789-1945.pdf)

- U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2010. “HUD Implementation of the Recovery Act.” *Recovery: About*. Published July 7. Accessed February 23, 2022. <https://web.archive.org/web/20100707180620/http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/recovery/about>
- . 2019. “Community Land Trusts and Stable Affordable Housing.” *PD&R Edge*, November 4. Accessed March 19, 2022. <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr-edge-featd-article-110419.html>
- . 2021. “Choice Neighborhoods FY 2020 Implementation Grant Awards.” [https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PA/documents/FY20\\_Choice\\_Neighborhoods\\_Implementation\\_Project\\_Summaries.pdf](https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PA/documents/FY20_Choice_Neighborhoods_Implementation_Project_Summaries.pdf)
- . 2022a. “Budget in Brief: Fiscal Year 2022.” [https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/2022\\_Budget\\_in\\_Brief\\_FINAL.pdf](https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/CFO/documents/2022_Budget_in_Brief_FINAL.pdf)
- . 2022b. “Picture of Subsidized Households.” *Dataset – Assisted Housing National and Local*. Accessed March 10, 2022. [https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/assthsg.html#2009-2021\\_query](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/assthsg.html#2009-2021_query)
- . N.d. a “Moderate Rehabilitation” *Office of Public and Indian Housing*. Accessed Jan 21, 2022. [https://www.hud.gov/program\\_offices/public\\_indian\\_housing/programs/ph/modrehab](https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/modrehab)
- . N.d. b “Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)” *Dataset*. Accessed Jan 21, 2022. <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html>
- . N.d. c. “CDBG Entitlement Program Eligibility Requirements” *CDBG Entitlement Program*. Accessed Jan 23, 2022. <https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cdbg-entitlement/cdbg-entitlement-program-eligibility-requirements/>
- . N.d. d. “HOPWA Eligibility Requirements” *HOPWA: Housing Opportunities for Persons With AIDS*. Accessed January 30, 2022. <https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/hopwa/hopwa-eligibility-requirements/>
- . N.d. e. “Hope for Elderly Independence (HOPE IV)” *Program Description*. Accessed January 30, 2022. <https://www.hud.gov/programdescription/hope4>
- . N.d. f. “Choice Neighborhoods: Overview” *Choice Neighborhoods*. Accessed February 13, 2022. <https://www.hud.gov/cn>
- . N.d. g. “Vienna’s Unique Social Housing Program.” *PD&R Edge*. Accessed March 15, 2022. [https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr\\_edge\\_featd\\_article\\_011314.html](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr_edge_featd_article_011314.html)
- . N.d. h. “2021 and 2022 Small DDAs and QCTs.” *Dataset*. Accessed March 16, 2022. [https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sadda/sadda\\_qct.html](https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sadda/sadda_qct.html)

- U.S. Department of Justice. 2021. "National Mortgage Servicer Settlements." *Consumer and Creditor Information*. November 24. Accessed February 23, 2022. <https://www.justice.gov/ust/national-mortgage-settlements>
- von Hoffman, Alexander. 2012. "History Lessons for Today's Housing Policy: The Political Processes of Making Low-Income Housing Policy." *Housing Policy Debate*, Vol. 22, no.3: 1-67. [https://jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w12-5\\_von\\_hoffman.pdf](https://jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w12-5_von_hoffman.pdf)
- . 2013. "Calling upon the Genius of Private Enterprise: The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 and the Liberal Turn to Public-Private Partnerships." *Studies in American Political Development*, Vol 27, no. 2, October: 165-194. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/32454907127307DFF30A3CB6C70E9C5F/S0898588X13000102a.pdf/calling\\_upon\\_the\\_genius\\_of\\_private\\_enterprise\\_the\\_housing\\_and\\_urban\\_development\\_act\\_of\\_1968\\_and\\_the\\_liberal\\_turn\\_to\\_publicprivate\\_partnerships.pdf](https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/32454907127307DFF30A3CB6C70E9C5F/S0898588X13000102a.pdf/calling_upon_the_genius_of_private_enterprise_the_housing_and_urban_development_act_of_1968_and_the_liberal_turn_to_publicprivate_partnerships.pdf)
- Wachter, Susan and Arthur Acolin. 2016. *Owning or Renting in the US: Shifting Dynamics of the Housing Market*. Brief: Penn Institute for Urban Research. [https://www.penniur.upenn.edu/uploads/media/Owning\\_or\\_Renting\\_in\\_the\\_US\\_-\\_Shifting\\_Dynamics\\_of\\_the\\_Housing\\_Market.pdf](https://www.penniur.upenn.edu/uploads/media/Owning_or_Renting_in_the_US_-_Shifting_Dynamics_of_the_Housing_Market.pdf)
- Waldron, Jeremy. 1993. *Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wallace, Dirk, and Sue Wilson. 2018. "Housing Credit 101: Eligible Basis and Credit Calculations." *Presentation: National Council of State Housing Agencies Housing Credit Connect*, June 19-22. <https://www.ncsha.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Eligible-Basis-and-Credit-Calculations.pdf>
- Wallace, Phyllis A. 1975. "A Decade of Policy Developments in Equal Opportunities in Employment and Housing." M.I.T. Working Paper 3767-75. January. <https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/1892/SWP-0767-02072058.pdf?sequence=1>
- Weicher, John C. 1980. *Housing: Federal Policies and Programs*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Wessel, David. 2017. "What we learned from Reagan's tax cuts." *The Brookings Institution*, December 7<sup>th</sup>. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/12/08/what-we-learned-from-reagans-tax-cuts/>
- Wheelock, David. 2008. "The Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from the Great Depression." *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Lewis Review*, Vol 90, no.3, Part 1, May/June: 133-48. <https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/review/08/05/Wheelock.pdf>

- White, Eugene. 2009. "Lessons from the Great American Real Estate Boom and Bust of the 1920s: Causes and Consequences." *Rutgers University and National Bureau of Economic Research*, October. <http://econweb.rutgers.edu/ewhite/w15573.pdf>
- White, Richard. 2020. "Gilded Ages" *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*, Vol. 19, no. 2, April: 314-320 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781419000756>
- Whitnall, Gordon. 1931. "History of Zoning." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol 155, Part 2: Zoning in the United States, May: 1-14. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1018849>
- Williamson, Vanessa. 2013. "The Tea Party and the Shift to 'Austerity by Gridlock' in the United States. Chicago: American Political Science Association Working Paper. [https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/williamson/files/investment\\_or\\_austerity\\_in\\_the\\_united\\_states\\_williamson\\_apsa.pdf](https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/williamson/files/investment_or_austerity_in_the_united_states_williamson_apsa.pdf)
- Wong, Kristin. 2021. "Housing Insecurity and the COVID-19 Pandemic." *Consumer Financial Protection Bureau*, March. [https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb\\_Housing\\_insecurity\\_and\\_the\\_COVID-19\\_pandemic.pdf](https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_Housing_insecurity_and_the_COVID-19_pandemic.pdf)
- Wyly, Elvin K., and Daniel J. Hammel. 1999. "Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal: Housing Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification." *Housing Policy Debate*, Vol 10, no. 4: 711-771. <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.196.8346&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

## APPENDIX A

The data on key partners for the fiscal year 2020 Choice Implementation grantees displayed in Figures 1 and 2 and the Table in the Results Chapter (pages 125-126) is based on the HUD Choice Implementation Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2021). The NOFA listed 99 total key partners or lead applicants across the five cities.

1. Lewiston, Maine had 15 (two applicants and 13 partners);
2. Fort Myers, Florida had 22 (two applicants and 20 partners);
3. Detroit, Michigan had 16 (one applicant and 15 partners);
4. Cleveland, Ohio has 27 (two applicants and 25 partners); and
5. Camden, New Jersey has 19 (two applicants and 17 partners)

Based on the names of applicants or partners provided for each of the five; the author then gathered data on each entity. Data was recorded on:

- The *name of the entity*;
- the *city* they were affiliated with for the grant;
- the *fiscal year* (2020 for all observations);
- the *type of organization* (coded by “public”, “nonprofit”, or “private for-profit”);
- the *specific partner type* (coded by “City Government”, “Public Housing Authority”, “Government Agency or Program”, “Real Estate Investor or Developer”, “Community Development Financial Institution”, “Institution of Higher Ed.”, “Nonprofit Services Provider”, “Foundation”, “Consulting Group”, “Housing Co-ops or Community Land Trusts”, “Resident Organization or Advocacy Group”, “Community Development Organization”, or “Private Corporation (other)”);
- the *sector* (coded by “housing”, “some housing”, or “other”);
- the organization’s *geographic scope* (coded by “local”, “state”, “regional” (meaning multi-state in the same region of the country), “national”, or “multinational”); and
- whether or not the entity was a *lead applicant* (coded by yes/no)

The *name of the entity*, *city*, *fiscal year*, and *lead applicant* variables were all gathered from the NOFA. The *type of organization*, *specific partner type*, *sector*, and *scope* were all determined by googling each of the entities.

Data was available on all but two key partners or lead applicants. These two were NeighborhoodGreen, LLC, named as a key partner for the city of Cleveland, and Ablett Village Resident Council, named a key partner for the city of Camden. As such these two entities were not included in the data displayed in Figures 1 and 2 (page 125).

In the course of researching key partners, there were four other notable mentions of changes or differences from the HUD NOFA. Three were name changes. The entity listed as “The Sky Family YMCA” in the NOFA is now called the “YMCA of Southwest Florida.” The Southwest Florida Community Foundation is now called “Collaboratory.” Finally, the Coopers Ferry Partnership’s name was changed to the Camden Community Partnership. Additionally, the entity

listed as the “Economic Development Corporation” as a key partner for the city of Detroit is assumed to be the Michigan Economic Development Corporation.