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To Remember, To Forget: Political Actors' Use of Collective Memory During Democratic Transitions in Spain and Chile

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Political Actors' Use of Collective Memory

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Abstract

Why do some countries choose to remember past civil conflicts while others choose to forget? Following the Francisco Franco dictatorship, Spain institutionalized forgetting through the Pact of Forgetting. In contrast, Chile chose to remember civil conflict under Augusto Pinochet through multiple truth and reconciliation commissions. Through analysis of political actors' arguments during periods of constitutional challenges and maintenances, I seek to answer how political actors use or chose not to use collective memory to make constitutional arguments. Spain and Chile provide key case studies given their contrasting institutional memory choices. To conduct this analysis, I examine newspaper articles, speeches, and advertisements from conservative and liberal sources. I will analyze two different periods: the 1980s and the 2010s/2020s. Specifically, the days leading up to and following the 1981 attempted coup in Spain, the 1988 Chilean plebiscite, the 2017 Catalan Independence Movement, and the 2020 Chilean plebiscite. I will examine the intersections between political conditions, the choice to remember, constitutions, and national identity. I suggest that the political conditions of potential transitions impact political actors' decisions to utilize collective memory. Political actors employ collective memory to appeal to social cleavages when the state legitimizes potential transitions in state-codified referendums. However, when coups unconstitutionally threaten the stability of the nation, political actors suppress mnemonic narratives of civil conflict to unify the nation.

Chapter 1: A Theoretical Study of The Politics of Remembering and Forgetting

Why is it that some countries transitioning to democracies choose to remember conflict during dictatorships while others choose to forget? Who makes this decision and why? Throughout my college experience, I have been fascinated by the use of collective memory to construct national identity. Particularly, how is collective memory used to create a founding national narrative. After studying collective memory of civil conflict in Spain and Chile in two different papers, I began to wonder why each country was able to successfully transition to democracy even though political actors employed vastly different strategies of remembrance.

I was particularly interested in the connection between national identity, constitutions, and collective memory. Constitutions are the foundation for democracy and reflect the vision for the nation. The values of the nation are embedded in the constitution and in what people choose to remember. What society chooses to remember, perhaps even enshrine in their constitution, shapes national identity. When a constitution is challenged, how does that simultaneously challenge national identity and the narrative? Given that collective memory or forgetting is a common tool utilized in transitioning to democracy, an analysis considering its impact on constitutional arguments will offer understanding on discourse around a nation's founding document and therefore the construction of the nation. I will analyze the intersection between remembering, forgetting, and how political actors use the constitution to justify their vision of the nation. **I seek to answer how political actors use or choose not to use collective memory to legitimize constitutional arguments.**

The challenges to Chile and Spain's constitutions and the contrasting approach taken by political actors in each country make them key states to analyze. In addition, Spain and Chile are each critical cases regarding collective memory and democratic transitions. Spain is a critical

case because it is an example that contradicts key theories (Encarnación 2014, 17). Unlike Chile, Spain chose to forget conflict regarding the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship. Paloma Aguilar Fernandéz suggests that Spain's Amnesty Law institutionalized a *Pacto de Olvido* or a Pact of Forgetting (1996). According to transitional justice scholarship this forgetting should weaken democratic transition. However the success of Spain's democracy contradicts this theory (Encarnación 2014, 17). Unlike Spain, following the Pinochet dictatorship, Chile underwent three truth and reconciliation commissions to institutionalize national memory. Experts suggest that this extensive reflection set an example for African and Eastern European commissions beginning in the twenty-first century (Frazier 2007, 2). More recently, Chile's two attempts to rewrite the 1980 Pinochet Constitution demonstrate the strong influence of collective memory in the country and its effect on changing Chileans' views on a document that contributes to national identity. These two critical case studies suggest a puzzle: why were both countries able to become successful democracies if they chose two different collective memory routes? What are the political conditions that led each country to make these distinct choices?

Building off of the work of Pricilla Hayner and Elizabeth Jelin, I suggest that the political environment of the transition is key to understanding why Spain chose to forget and Chile decided to remember (2011; 2003). As Jelin explains, "Political transition involves a transformation of the state, a new foundational moment, with new readings and meanings given to the past" (2003, 30). In this study, I categorize potential and actual political transitions into two categories: attempted coups d'état and state-codified referendums. An attempted coup d'état refers to an unconstitutional effort to take over the government. In this essay, a coup d'état is not necessarily characterized by violent force. In contrast, when I refer to a state-codified

referendum, I mean a government backed plebiscite where voters' decisions impact the future of the nation.

To examine these political environments during transitions, I will examine two time periods in each country to study how the use of collective memory changes due to political conditions and memory work. In Spain, I will look at the 1981 attempted coup and the 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum. In Chile, I will analyze the 1988 plebiscite and the 2020 plebiscite regarding replacing the 1980 Constitution. The 1981 attempted coup in Spain and the 1988 Chilean plebiscite are moments when the people supported the transition to democracy (Ramos Arenas and Martín Jiménez 2020, 216). They are also periods where the constitution was supported or challenged. These are key and comparable moments to analyze how certain political conditions provide an opening for political actors to use collective memory to shape national identity. The 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum and Chilean 2020 plebiscite occurred following memory work instigated by the government. Analysis of these periods provides insight into the impact of grassroots and institutional memory work on political conditions and the decision to remember. Given that these movements are challenges to the governments established during the transitions, they provide perspective on the malleability of collective memory. How do political actors select narratives? When do political actors employ narratives that are suppressed by the political establishment? Do the narratives they select rely on popular memory?

Collective memory can be broken into two categories, popular and official. Both shape national identity; however, I will focus on official memory and how elites employ it. While popular memory influences official narratives and how political actors view their strategies, understanding the narratives of those in power provides perspective on the institutionalization of

national identity (Nets-Zehngut 2012, 129). Given that this study focuses on democratic transitions and the political actors who shape them, official memory is my chosen lens for my analysis; however, I will refer at times to popular memory as an influence on official memory.

The 1975 Spanish and the 1988 Chilean transitions to democracy share similarities that suggest analysis of political actors' use of memory in each country should work well in a focused comparison. For instance, Spain and Chile endured dictatorships in the mid 1900s instigated by military coups in response to progressive republics. Human rights abuses were common under both dictatorships. In addition, they share some cultural, linguistic, and religious practices. Perhaps most importantly, the transfer of power from dictatorship to democracy occurred under mostly peaceful circumstances.

However, as I got deeper into research, I discovered that the different political conditions in Spain and Chile during their transitions and in more recent years present challenges for a focused comparison. Particularly, the Basque and Catalan separatist movements in Spain complicate Spain's memory regime. Although Chile does have an active indigenous autonomy movement, it does not have the same institutional power as the regional movements in Spain. While disregarding these movements would make a focused comparison easier, analysis of separatist actors is key to understanding the political conditions that drove Spain to institutionalize the Pact of Forgetting.

Instead of using a focused comparison, this paper will draw individual conclusions for each case study and then use these insights to present broader findings. In the following chapters on Spain and Chile, I will explore how political conditions impact the choice to remember, the intersection between national identity and constitutions, and how social cleavages influence political actors' use of memory. **I will argue that collective memory is a tool for nation**

building. Furthermore, political actors use collective memory of conflict to debate the future of the nation during state-codified referendums. However, when coups challenge the stability of the nation, establishment political actors oppress narratives of civil conflict to create unity and stability. I used a visual overview of my research findings to guide the structure of my analysis. The visual overview is the table below.

The Influence of Political Conditions on Political Actors' Mnemonic Choices

POLITICAL CONDITION	POLITICAL ACTORS' MNEMONIC CHOICE	
	Remember Civil Conflict	Forget Civil Conflict
VULNERABILITY DURING ATTEMPTED COUP	2017 Spain Catalan Separatists • To legitimize their nationhood	1981 Spain Establishment political actors • To promote stability 2017 Spain Establishment political actors • To promote stability
STABILITY OF STATE-CODIFIED REFERENDUM	1988 Chile Say No Campaign • To call for new leadership 1988 Chile Say Yes Campaign • To legitimize Pinochet 2020 Chile Apruebo Campaign • To justify the constitutional convention 2020 Chile Indigenous Actors • To promote plurinationalism 2020 Chile Rechazar Campaign • To legitimize the 1980 Constitution	

Before presenting evidence to support my thesis, I will provide an analysis of existing literature to offer definitions, background, and how my observations will contribute to the ongoing discussion. I will explore collective memory generally, the connection between identity and memory, nationalism and collective memory, mnemonic actors, remembering versus forgetting, political conditions, and constitutional memory.

What Is Collective Memory?

Scholars suggest that collective memory requires a specific group to share a vision of the past. Maruice Halbwachs, often seen as the father of memory studies, explains that collective memory is influenced by individual memories and that these personal memories are transformed in the collective setting (1980, 50-51). Building on Halbwachs' work, Duncan Bell explains that collective memory requires social interaction to form a historic narrative (2003, 72). Weedon and Jordan further develop this idea of social interaction and argue that collective memories are formed by or on the behalf of groups to create identity and empowerment (2012, 143). Collective memory "shapes the story that groups of people tell about themselves, linking past, present, and future in a simplified narrative. It is what keeps the past – or at least a selective image of it – alive in the present" (D. Bell 2006, 2). For this paper, I will understand collective memory to be a narrative of the past shared by a group.

While memory is connected to history, most academics argue that they are conceptually separate and distinct (D. Bell 2006, 2). While "history is a collection of the most notable facts in the memory of man," memory is the individual recollections of living members of a group or the remembrance of these original recollections by the descendants of the original members of the group (Halbwachs 1980, 78-79). Furthermore, memory is directly linked to the tradition of

sharing stories socially, while history is what is written after the social remembrance by the group fades (Halbwachs 1980, 78-79). This does not mean that history and memory do not exist in the same space. In fact, Assmann argues that belonging to a collective group requires that the inductee "share and adopt the group's history which exceed the boundaries of one individual's life span" (2008, 52). Here collective memory and history work together to form who is included in the group. Furthermore, Wertsch writes that "official histories produced by modern states clearly include elements of collective remembering as well as history" (2009, 125). Group formation, including building nations, uses history and collective memory of the group to form exclusive boundaries. I will examine how the decision to remember or forget works to include and exclude people within a nation through appealing to certain social cleavages. By social cleavages, I mean the divisions of people within a nation by identity groups.

Furthermore, there are at least two types of collective memory, popular and official.[1] While the analysis in this paper will focuss on official memory, it is helpful to understand the difference. Nets-Zehngut defines official memory as "the representations of the past adopted by the institutions of the state" (2012, 128). Discussing the role of politicians, truth and reconciliation commissions, and laws detailing how to remember civil conflict requires looking at collective memory in the official context. In contrast to official memory, popular memory refers to the stories and narratives that the public shares or holds. Popular memory can be analyzed through public opinion surveys (Nets-Zehngut 2012, 128). Popular memory includes the stories that grandparents tell their grandchildren concerning their lived experiences and when their grandchildren tell these same stories to their children. Popular memory, like memory

[1]Popular memory is also sometimes referred to as public memory, and official memory is sometimes called elite or institutional memory.

generally, can be communicated both by the person who lived through the experience and by the people who heard it.

Official and popular memories act together and are influenced by each other (Nets-Zehngut 2012, 129). When analyzing how political actors use official collective memory to make constitutional arguments, I will also consider how they are influenced by popular memory, specifically, the early 2000s grassroots memory movement in Spain and the 2019 "Chile Woke Up" protests. However, the influence of popular memory on remembering and forgetting during democratic transition should be futher examined in future studies.

How Is Collective Memory Formed?

Social acts of remembrance form collective memory (D.S.A. Bell 2003, 65). These acts may include performative ceremonies, the employment of symbols, and examining and creating collective memory sites (Connerton 1989, 4-5; Nora 2010, X). Assmann and Shortt explain that acts of memory are always biased and involve selective choices of what to remember and forget (2012, 5). Furthermore, "Collective memories are produced through mediated representations of the past that involve selecting, rearranging, re-describing and simplifying, as well as the deliberate, but also perhaps unintentional, inclusion and exclusion of information" (Assmann and Shortt 2012, 3-4). In summary, the subjective selection of what to remember excludes certain memories and groups, while embracing others. I will consider how both the power of prexisting narratives and institutional actors exist within political conditions to influence what is remembered.

Mnemonic Actors' Role in Forming Collective Memory

Mnemonic actors can publicly promote specific historic narratives through social cultural infrastructure, such as legislation and educational curriculums (Malinova 2021, 997). Elites have the most influence in forming collective memory through these institutions (Malinova 2021, 998). Political and intellectual elites play a large part in controlling narratives because they have the ear of the public through these institutions (Schopflin 2000, 87). By forming and influencing what children are taught and what groups are prioritized by the government, elites wield significant power over what is remembered and forgotten by the public. Mnemonic elite actors include teachers, professional historians, intellectuals, journalists, poets, parents, religious leaders, novelists, visual artists, politicians, and many others (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 9).

However, being a mnemonic elite actor does not necessarily mean that the actor is part of shaping official collective memory. In my analysis, I will specifically focus on mnemonic institutional elite actors, which I will refer to, in short, as political actors. Mnemonic institutional elite actors are those who have the ear of the public and use state power to do so. Given the state influence of political elites on collective memory, I will use a top-down approach in my analysis.

In summary, political actors are elites who wield influence over the government, including politicians, political parties, monarchs, and bureaucrats. Political actors wield power through cultural institutions, the government, and state-backed educational actions. These institutions can promote and limit memories, allowing politicians to serve as gatekeepers and creators (Weedon and Jordan 2012, 150). I will build on past studies of how political actors use and influence narratives (Bernhard and Kubik 2014; Jelin 2003). In this paper, I will specifically look at how political actors utilize memory to argue to maintain or challenge the foundation of the nation institutionalized in the constitution.

Collective Memory's Impact on Identity Formation

The social aspect of collective memory contributes to the formation of identity. Identity "is established by what is remembered, and itself then leads in turn to certain pasts being remembered and others being forgotten" (Müller 2002, 21). Hale likens identity to a social radar that serves as "the set of points of personal reference on which people rely to navigate the social world they inhabit, to make sense of the myriad constellations of social relationships that they encounter, to discern one's place in these constellations, and to understand the opportunities for action in this context" (2008, 34). Collective memory is a significant tool acting within Hale's identity concept of social radar. Establishing collective identity requires an appeal to the culture and history of group understanding (Wylegala 2019, 332-333). This feeling of self-belonging within a group requires a person to identify with the group's collective memory. Collective memory further contributes to group identity by subjectively remembering narratives that encourage belonging among some but exclude others from the group's identity.

Bell explains that when identities are challenged, groups and individuals look to memory to strengthen and unify identity (D. Bell 2006). Olick further asserts that memory underwrites identity by creating stability during changing times (2003, 7). By influencing the dynamics of identity formation, collective memory produces and recreates communal identities. This contributes to understanding changes and challenges to these identities. Through these changes, memory influences political action, such as constitutional justification (D. Bell 2006, 29). I will examine how selective remembrance challenges identity and how some political actors push against this institutionalization during times of potential transition. Specifically, I will consider how political conditions impact the resurgence of formerly oppressed narratives to strengthen identities within nations along social cleavages.

The Nation and Collective Memory

Collective memory is used to build national identity and strengthen the idea of a nation. Elites often create a sense of collectivity to construct national identity (Seoighe 2016, 360). In this case, collectivity refers to being a part of a group. Scholars note the difficulty of defining a nation and some caution against it (Gellner 2006, 5-7). However, Steton-Watson defines a nation as "a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national conscious" (1977, 1). Anderson asserts that a nation is "an imagined political community — and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." It is imagined because most people in a nation are strangers, but through the idea of nationality, they are part of the same community (Anderson 2016, 6).

To strengthen the idea of the nation and further the sense of community, political actors employ nationalism. According to Gellner, nationalism is "a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (2006, 1). To accomplish this, political actors contribute to the formation of a national identity. I will explore how the link between constitutional arguments and collective memory is influenced by and builds on national identity.

What causes people to believe in a national consciousness (Hale 2008, 24)? While Hale examines this question through the lens of ethnicity, his discussion is still relevant to national identity formation through collective memory. According to Hale, identification, in this case with ethnic groups, builds a social framework that people rely on (2008, 31-32). This framed group identity provides self-esteem and belonging. When a group's identity is attacked, members see it not only as an attack on the group, but an individual threat (Hale 2008, 16-17). Through these strong identity frameworks, boundaries are formed between those who are included in the identity and those who are not. Like ethnicity, shared understanding of the past creates in-groups

and out-groups. This is often shown through which narratives a society promotes and which ones it silences. As Anthony Smith writes “no memory, no identity; no identity, no nation” (1996, 383).

As discussed earlier, collective memory is a key tool in group identity formation, including building national communities. Assmann explains that humans adopt “we” frameworks that fit their social frame by joining groups. “A social frame is an implicit or explicit structure of shared concerns, values, experiences, narratives” (Assmann 2008, 51-52). To join a social frame, such as a nation, an individual must feel a sense of belonging. This is accomplished “through shared practices and discourses that mark certain boundaries and define the principles of inclusion and exclusion” (Assmann 2008, 52). By believing and sharing the nation’s collective memory, the individual shares experiences with strangers who lived long before they did. To be included in the social frame or the nation, an individual partakes in a collective vision of the past through “cognitive learning and emotional acts of identification and commemoration” (Assmann 2008, 52). A collective understanding of the past creates a shared identity and sense of belonging by those included in the group (Weedon and Jordan 2012, 146).

Furthermore, political actors use this shared understanding to form boundaries that establish who is included in the nation’s common past and present. Political actors use symbols of collective memory, such as flags, monuments, and ceremonies, to foster a national consciousness (Schopflin 2000, 29). As Bell writes, “Memory is capable of being yoked to state power, in the name of nationalism, or employed in opposition, as to challenge dominant narratives” (D. Bell 2006, 15).

When memory is used to promote nationalism, it privileges certain stories to create a sense of national community. However, “There is no singular, irreducible national narrative, no

essentialist 'national identity'" (D.S.A. Bell 2003, 73). Furthermore, national narratives are selective and exclude stories from the framework of the nation (Jelin 2003, 27; Lazzara 2006, 2). Through selective remembrance, certain groups are included in the dominant idea of the nation, while others are excluded (D.S.A. Bell 2003, 73-74). In addition, the relative size of populations identifying with these social cleavages affects politicians' decisions whether to lean into these differences and provide a political platform for an identity group (Posner 2004, 529-530). Given this exclusion, Bell cautions memory and nationalism scholars to be careful of the simplification of memory. He argues that national identities are built within power complexes and exclude minority narratives (D.S.A. Bell 2003, 73-74). One question I will explore is how people excluded through selective remembrance use political conditions to promote oppressed narratives to legitimize new national identities.

Plurinationalism and Collective Memory

While collective memory is utilized selectively to form an exclusive national identity, plurinational narratives pose challenges to this state building exercise (D.S.A. Bell 2003; Jelin 2003; Lazzara 2006). Keating defines plurinationalism as "the coexistence within a political order of more than one national identity." Keating further argues that individuals and groups can identify under more than one nationality (2001, 26-27).

Plurinational constitutions can be a measure to include previously excluded social cleavages. However, they are sometimes viewed as inadequate by these excluded groups (Rodriguez Alvarez 2023). In this paper, I will examine how political conditions characterized by plurinationalism impact political actors' decisions to use collective memory of civil conflict to make constitutional arguments. Specifically, I will look at Catalan nationalism and separatism in

Spain and calls for increased autonomy by indigenous communities in Chile. I will examine these cases in the contexts of the plurinational Spanish constitution and Chile's attempt to establish a more inclusive constitution. I will address specific literature on these cases in their respective chapters.

The Question of Forgetting or Remembering

Why do actors choose to remember certain narratives and not others? It is not that political actors choose to universally push memories into the public sphere or into oblivion, but a power dynamic of "shifting and competing remembrances" (Rosenblum 2002, 11). Furthermore, Müller argues that memory matters in the political sphere and is directly linked to power (2002, 2). While identity and power are not interchangeable, they are connected because in the political space "identity is transactive in nature" (Hoover, Marcia, and Parris 1997, 7). Politicians use memory to promote their agendas because "images of the past commonly legitimate a present social order" (Connerton 1989, 3). Memory provides a directive tool for political actors to discuss present social crises and legitimize policies, especially those involving memory issues (Cvijanović 2018, 114). I will ask during which political conditions lead political actors to suppress narratives and which environments lead them to push narratives to legitimize nations.

Collective Memory and Silence as a Political Tools

Before making mnemonic decisions, political actors consider how their use of memory aligns with their political goals, specifically their vision for the nation (Bernhard and Kubik 2014). As Jelin explains, political actors employ memories of civil conflict to establish social recognition and political legitimacy (2003, 33). Bernhard and Kubik add in their analysis of post-

communist states in Eastern Europe that mnemonic actors consider the opinion of their target audience and use the past as a tool "to construct a vision…that they assume will generate the most effective legitimation for their efforts to gain or hold power" (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 9). When an actor chooses a political stance, they consider how it will impact their political position and act within certain constraints. They think about how their mnemonic choice will influence the responses from other political actors and the electorate (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 11). They consider the cultural implications of the decision and the cultural constraints that they work in (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 11-12). The key constraint that I will discuss is the political environment.

Bernhard and Kubik suggest that there are four types of actors: mnemonic warriors, mnemonic pluralists, mnemonic abnegators, and mnemonic perspectives (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 11). Mnemonic warriors assert that they understand the "true" vision of the past. When others disagree with them, warriors draw a sharp contrast and argue that others employ a false version of history (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 13). Cvijanović adds to Bernhard and Kubik's definition by describing warriors as not necessarily "founding fathers," but actors who "consider themselves as an extension of the founding process by recollecting and defining decisive events constitutive for national state-building" (Cvijanović 2018, 112). Given that founding documents, such as constitutions, are a key element of nation building, it is critical to examine how mnemonic warriors utilize their understanding of the "true" past to form constitutional arguments to promote their agenda. The second type of actors, pluralists, value discussion with the opposition to pursue the "truth." Furthermore, they "believe that the others *are entitled* to their own visions" (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 13). In contrast, mnemonic abnegators avoid engaging with memory because they either do not see the purpose or are uninterested (Bernhard and Kubik

2014, 14). Finally, prospective actors believe that they are the key to understanding memory and the way forward. They anchor their actions through promising a more fulfilling future (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 14). Building off of Bernhard and Kubik's framework of mnemonic actors, I will categorize actors in Spain and Chile as abnegators or warriors.

Furthermore, actors work within a fluid memory regime. A memory regime is "an organized way of remembering a specific issue, event, or process" (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 16). The salience of certain memories alters with time (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 16). Mnemonic actors influence the interpretation and prominence of distinct narratives within the memory regime depending on their interests. Therefore, the departure and entrance of actors from a memory regime affect its power structure (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 16). Depending on their interests and the changing political environment, certain memories are promoted or forgotten.

Political mnemonic actors will choose to push for remembrance or silence based on political conditions and their goals. These interests are influenced by cultural constraints, their own political power, and the identities of their constituencies. Rawski suggests that memory politics is "a set of actions used by political actors to produce stories about the national past in order to legitimize their own power over the national community" (2023, 253). Mnemonic actions are often employed to promote or silence certain narratives to appeal to social cleavages within a politician's constituency. Normally, appealing to their constituencies positively affects actors' political agendas (Posner 2004). To create this connection, politicians use speeches to appeal to being part of their constituiency's group identity (Hoover, Marcia, and Parris 1997, 4). When inserting themselves into the identity of the social cleavage, political actors utilize

collective memory. In this thesis, I will examine political actors' speech to analyze how they use memory to appeal to social cleavages and legitimize their vision of the nation.

Transitioning to a Democracy: Reconciliation through Harmony or Justice?

Scholars debate whether it is better for nations transitioning to a democracy to remember past atrocities or to forget them to promote peace and consensus. While Meier claims that societies should chose to forget past conflicts in favor of limiting anger and revenge and promoting peace, Assmann asks how a society can have peace if it is still plagued by the ghosts of its past (2012, 53 and 68). However, Margalit asserts that "memory breathes revenge as often as it breathes reconciliation, and the hope of reaching catharsis through liberated memories might turn out to be an illusion" (2002, 5). How does the fear of increased conflict impact actors' decisions to forget? What political conditions decrease these concerns?

Assmann asks and suggests that social conditions impact whether forgetting or remembering can cause harm or help to heal. She argues that the nuanced decision to favor forgetting or remembering must depend on cultural values and the historical context (Assmann 2012, 57). Furthermore, dominant reconciliatory forgetting should only occur when both sides agree to it for a mutual unburdening (Assmann 2012, 67). Prevalent "remembering can then lead to a form of coming to terms with the past with the aim of leaving the history of violence behind, in order to attain a common future" (Assmann 2012, 63).

However, when is forgetting an appropriate democratic path? Hayner suggests that truth and reconciliation commissions are not universally the best course of action (2011, 196). She explains that "Digging into the details of past conflicts can feel dangerous and destabilizing, and may disrupt fragile relationships in local communities recently returned to peace" (Hayner 2011,

196). Hayner identifies four reasons why countries choose to forget. First, people fear that addressing the past will incite or increase violence. Second, countries forget when political actors and influencers are uninterested in establishing the truth. Third, silence is chosen when the country urgently needs to rebuild and does not have the infrastructure to address the past. Finally, a country's culture may also discourage truth commissions (Hayner 2011, 196).

For this study, I will focus on the decision to forget being based in fear. Other scholars agree with Hayner's assessment that fear contributes to countries' decisions to forget. For example, Jelin explains that "fragile new democracies face difficulties in implementing truth and justice" because "there is a fear of the reaction of the guilty," specifically in the "threat of a new coup d'état and other manifestations of force and resistance" (1994, 51). It is worth noting that failing to acknowledge crimes committed under the government can lead to violence. Minow suggests that a lack of remembrance can "stoke fire of resentment and revenge" (2002, 30).

Institutionalized practices of forgetting include pardons and amnesty (Ricœur 2004, 452). Amnesty is a form of forgetting that is inherently political and is used in an attempt to interrupt a period of violence, such as civil wars, revolutions, and regime changes (Ricœur 2004, 452-453). When looking at pacts of silence, including amnesty, it is crucial to examine who is directing the forgetting and who benefits from it (Assmann 2012, 63). While amnesty is a tool used to promote societal peace, it possibly does this at the expense of truth and justice (Ricœur 2004, 456).

Democracy requires accountability and dialogue. When considering the transition to democracy, Müller suggests that at a fundamental level, democracy contains "reiterated acts of accountability." He argues that without this accountability and coming to terms with the past that "there can also be no civic trust" (Müller 2002, 34). Müller further posits that continuing and

contesting dialogue over competing memories is a part of democracy and is an essential part of a democratic transition (2002, 33). If this is the case, why was Spain able to successfully transition to democracy? What political conditions lead to forgetting being a tool for transition? How does plurinationalism impact this process?

State Memory Institutionalization: Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Truth and reconciliation commissions are a tool for institutionalizing collective memory. Hayner understands the characteristics of a truth and reconciliation commission to include being sanctioned by the government, creating a report detailing human rights abuses committed during the conflict and naming the parties responsible, recommending reform measures, and recognizing institutionally the past crimes committed during the conflict (1994, 559). Truth and reconciliation commissions are often promoted as a tool for societal peace. Many scholars argue that they provide a space for public apologies and forgiveness, helping society heal and move on (Hirsch 2012, 1-2; Verdoolaege 2007; Hayner 1994, 604). They also provide a discursive space for victims to express their suffering and for society to acknowledge "the fallibility of the human mind when it is obscured by hatred, anger, and ignorance" (Chavez-Segura 2015, 230). For example, Verdoolaege observed in her study of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission that the discursive practice of the commission provided a space for perpetrators and victims to begin to rethink the past (Verdoolaege 2007, 2). The inclusion of all South Africans in the commission served to create "an inclusive national unity" (Verdoolaege 2007, 3).

Furthermore, the value of these commissions is not merely "fact finding" (Hayner 1994, 607). Civilians normally have a decent idea of who carried out violence and who the victims of the conflict were. Instead, the importance of truth commissions is the state recognizing the truth

(Hayner 1994, 607). The value of truth and reconciliation commissions poses questions. Why do Chilean politicians value acknowledging the truth of Chile's conflict, while Spanish political actors prioritize forgetting? How do political conditions shape how societies understand truth?

While some scholars assert that these commissions are a valuable form of national reconciliation, others caution that they can cause harm (Hirsch 2012, 3; Grandin 2005). Neutral actors in countries grappling with recent conflict also explain that "investigating the past can be harmful to the future, and question the contributions of such a 'hot' report in a politically fragile environment" (Hayner 1994, 609). In addition, Grandin asserts that truth and reconcilation commisions can legitimize narratives and idelogies promoted under civil conflict, instead of estbalishing justice for vitctims (2005). For example, in Chile at the beginning of its first truth and reconciliation commission, people expected the possibility of military prosecutions to accompany the commission. However, reconciliation was prioritized over justice. Grandin argues that the commission "takes national cohesion as its starting premise and posits violence as resulting from the dissolution of that unity" (2005, 49). By prioritizing national cohesion, truth and reconciliation commissions work "as an agent of nationalism" (Grandin 2005, 64). If truth and reconciliation commissions are supposed to create unity and peace, why did Spain choose to forget?

Scholars argue over the morals of truth and reconciliation commissions. Minow suggests that while the law is inadequate at addressing human rights abuses, forgetting and inaction is worse because dehumanization is not condemned (2002, 20). She further argues that failure to remember is an ethical breach because "It implies no responsibility and no commitment to prevent inhumanity in the future" (Minow 2002, 30). Guttmann and Thompson add that truth and reconciliation commissions are justified through observing moral principle, perspective, and

practice that look to find common ground and mutual respect (2009, 161-162). However, Hirsch criticizes their analysis because it prioritizes reconciliation and agreement over criminal justice (2012, 2). As Chavez-Segura explains, "The goal is not to prosecute and condemn the perpetrator of a crime, but to come to terms with the past and begin a process of reconciliation" (2015, 229). Furthermore, Hayner finds in her study of 15 commissions that they rarely lead to criminal trials (1994, 604). This critique of the commissions' inability to prosecute highlights a major point of tension among scholars regarding not only truth and reconciliation commissions, but the decision to forget or remember.

Political Categorization: Victim or Perpetrator

Victimization, often articulated in truth and reconcilation comissions, is directly tied to selective remembrance through political power, identity, and nationalism. Seoighe argues that political elites produce and define who is categorized as a victim (Seoighe 2016, 359). Political actors accomplish this by utilizing victimization to create an "us versus them" narrative. Victimization can be used to solidify national identity (Seoighe 2016, 360). Müller cautions against the use of victimization by political actors because it can be used to promote aggression (Müller 2002, 21). In addition, when victimhood is used for political gain, it "does not necessarily benefit the victims nor reflect their needs or aspirations" (Seoighe 2016, 357). Elements of victimization are evident in Spain and Chile. As Aune explains, Catalan independents view themselves as a victim of Franco and use collective memory of oppression to demonstrate this victimization (2022, 89). I will explore how the narrative of victimhood by Catalan separatists serves to legitimize their claim to nationhood during the 2017 independence referendum.

Role of International Pressure in the Decision to Remember

While it is not the focus of this thesis, it is important to acknowledge that international pressure also influences the political conditions in which actors decide to remember or forget. From the 1980s through 1990s, Europe experienced a memory boom (J.L. Fuentes 2022, 138-139). There is a European community of memory that promotes "the practices of acknowledging, amends-making, and memorializing past trauma" (J.L. Fuentes 2022, 140). Furthermore, as Oriane Calligaro explains, these narratives highlight a need to remember the "dark parts" of countries' histories (J.L. Fuentes 2022, 139). Globally, international human rights law requires "states to investigate and punish violators of human rights" (Hayner 1994, 611). In 1993, the UN Security Council created a war crimes tribunal for the first time to investigate crimes in Ex-Yugoslavia, furthering the promotion of an international culture of remembering civil conflict (Neier 1998, 21 and 120). External pressure and international culture influence countries' decisions to remember (J.L. Fuentes 2022, 140).

However, establishment political actors' decisions to forget civil conflict in Spain during the 2017 Catalan Independence Movement does not fit with the European drive to remember. Given the modern push by international organizations to remember, why did establishment political actors still follow the Pact of Forgetting during the 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum? This study will suggest that the domestic political environment is also a key contributor to actor's decision to remember or forget.

Political Conditions: An Opening for Collective Memory?

Remembrance is intertwined with social conditions (Rosenblum 2002, 11; Lazzara 2006, 2; Jelin 2003). Memory is dynamic, as it responds to social forces (Lazzara 2006, 2). For example, during regime transitions, leaders are incentivized to neutralize previous leadership (*Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy* 2006, 1). In addition, Rosenblum suggests social context shapes grievances that spur action in the name of justice (2002, 11). The institutional strength of the social cleavages holding these grievances influence the political conditions in which mnemonic actors operate (Posner 2004). Transitions and political openings provide space for formerly censored and new narratives to be incorporated into the nation (Jelin 2003, 29). Furthermore, these openings lead to mnemonic confrontations, where opposing political actors use memory to craft political positions (Jelin 2003, 31).

Scholars also suggest that the nature of regime transition impacts countries' transitional justice measures (Lazzara 2006, 6; Pion-Berlin 1995). Pion-Berlin explains that the conditions of power during the change from one government to another is a key factor in how political decisions are made (Pion-Berlin 1995, 87-88). Negotiated transitions tend to be more unstable, making truth and justice more difficult to pursue. However, when transitions result from regime collapse, the former governments have less bargaining power, providing greater opportunity for criminal prosecutions (Lazzara 2006, 6; Pion-Berlin 1995). I will add to this discussion on political conditions and democratic transitions by exploring how different political environments impact actors' decisions to remember during democratic turning points.

I will categorize political conditions into two categories: state-codified referendums and attempted coups. By state-codified referendum, I mean a government-supported choice given to voters to influence the future of the nation. While the 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum

did provide voters a choice to vote on the future of the Catalan nation, it is not a state-codified referendum because it contravened the 1978 Spanish Constitution. I understand an attempted coup to be an unconstitutional attempt to take over the government. I categorize the 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum as an attempted coup because it challenged the constitution by trying to secede unconstitutionally from Spain.

Why Look at Constitutional Arguments?

This thesis will focus on actual and potential transitions when the constitution is challenged or maintained. I see constitutions as intertwined with the identity and legitimacy of the nation. I am interested in constitutional arguments because constitutions are founding documents and therefore set foundations for national identity. Aguilar Fernandez explains that "The memories that are most susceptible to being preserved by the community tend to be both heroic as well as tragic; including those that evoke the founding myths of a country… as well as the moments in which a serious rupture of the national identity occurs (for example, civil wars)" (2002, 266). Refering to the Spanish 1978 Constitution, Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek explained that "the constitution was the most important symbol of the new democratic regime" (2002, 148).

Few studies have looked at the connection between collective memory and constitutions. Siegel looks at US constitutional law, particularly the remembrance and use of the 19th Amendment. Siegel argues that constitutional interpreters create constitutional memory by using the past to influence decisions that impact the future. She explains that "they tell stories about the nation's past experience to clarify the meaning of the nation's commitments, to guide practical reason, and to help express the nation's identity and values" (Siegel 2022, 21). I will contribute

to this discussion by studying a different but connected relationship. Instead of studying the formation of constitutional memory, I will analyze how official memory is used by political actors to legitimize or challenge the constitution.

By constitutional arguments, I mean the arguments political actors make to support or challenge the constitution during periods of potential transition. This includes how actors threaten the constitution to argue for increased regional autonomy. It also can refer to political actors using the constitution to legitimize the current state of the nation. Transitions codified or challenging the constitution are a constitutional argument. Therefore, referendums and coups can be constitutional arguments.

Methodology

To answer how political actors employ collective memory to legitimize constitutional arguments, I analyzed newspapers, speeches, and ad campaigns from periods when the constitutions were challenged and supported. In total, I read over 300 newspaper articles in Spanish to study the two time periods in each country. For the first period, I looked at the 1981 attempted coup in Spain and the 1988 plebiscite in Chile. For the second period, I examined the 2017 Catalan Independence Movement in Spain and 2020 plebiscite in Chile. Since collective memory is often used to exclude certain groups from the nation, I analyzed sources from opposing political leanings.

I studied the 1981 attempted military coup in Spain and the Chilean 1988 plebiscite because these were periods when the countries decided to transition to democracies. While Spain established its new constitution in 1978, the political establishment and the public successfully maintained democracy and chose to follow its new constitution in 1981. The defeat of the 1981

coup is therefore viewed as the symbolic end of the six-year political transition to democracy in Spain (Ramos Arenas and Martín Jiménez 2020, 216). To find evidence of political actors using or not using collective memory, I read newspaper microfilm from February 17th- 28th to analyze the days leading up to and following the 1981 attempted coup.

In 1988, the Chilean people elected to change the direction of the nation through provisions in the 1980 Constitution. The 1980 Constitution called for a plebiscite in 1988 where the junta would select a leader to be presented to the population in a yes or no vote ("NDI: Standing with Democracy over Military Dictatorship - Chile's 1988 Presidential Plebiscite " 2023). The 1988 plebiscite opened a window for transition where the military and the opposition argued for competing visions of the nation (Boas 2015, 71). I looked at evidence from August 30th – October 5th using microfilm of the newspaper *El Mercurio* and arguments from the Say No Campaign because this was the period between the announcement of Pinochet's candidacy and the plebiscite (*Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988, 30).

For my second period of analysis, I studied the 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum and the 2020 Chilean plebiscite. Analysis of these two periods provides insight on how the institutionalization and challenging of mnemonic regimes impact rhetoric used by political actors. In Spain, the 2017 referendum followed the continued institutionalization of the Pact of Forgetting and challenges to it, such as the exhumation movement (Maystorovich Chulio 2022; Ferrandiz 2013). In Chile, the 2020 plebiscite was in part a result of memory work, including three truth and reconciliation commissions and grassroots memory movements (Stern 2010, 302; Ferrara 2015; Suarez-Cao 2021, 261). By examining periods following collective forgetting or memory work, this study provides insight to how political actors are influenced by mnemonic

regimes and political conditions. Do political actors change how they use collective memory after narratives are institutionalized? Does this change depend on the political conditions?

To study political actors' utilization of mnemonic narratives, I examined newspaper articles because they provide a lens into official memory. However, the media is biased and shapes narratives through its understanding of what is newsworthy and its interpretations (Ramos Arenas and Martín Jiménez 2020, 224). To account for political biases, I analyzed newspapers from both sides of the political spectrum.

For Spain 1981 and 2017, I studied articles from three newspapers across the political spectrum. I read two of Spain's leading newspapers, *El Pais* for a center-left-leaning source and *ABC* to provide a conservative perspective (Gunther, Montero, and Wert 2000, 54). *El País* was established in 1976 during Spain's transition to democracy and contributed to fostering Spain's new political process (Espantaleón Peralta 2002). Gunther et. al suggest that *El Pais* signified a significant transition in Spanish journalism because "It functioned as if there were no restrictions on freedom of the press" (2000, 45). In contrast, *ABC* was established prior to the transition in 1903 and supported the Franco dictatorship ("ABC" 2023). Furthermore, *ABC Sevilla* was criticized for failing to mention the 1981 coup the day following it (Ramos Arenas and Martín Jiménez 2020, 220). The contrasting establishments of these newspapers and their ideological leanings provide diverse insight to Spain's political opinions. To account for the regional perspective during the Catalan Independence Movement, I also read *La Vanguardia* articles from 2017. *La Vanguardia* was established in 1881 and is a liberal-leaning source based in Barcelona ("La Vanguardia Española").[2]

[2]Unfortunately, I was not able to read *La Vanguardia* articles for the 1981 attempted coup. The microfilm is rare and although I order it in October 2023 it did not arrive at Bates College until the week before my thesis was due in March 2024.

For my analysis of Chile 1988, I studied *El Mercurio* articles and advertisements leading up to the 1988 referendum, using microfilm. *El Mercurio* is a right-leaning newspaper that is considered to be pro-government (*Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988, 35). Established in 1900, it is the oldest newspaper in Chile and is widely circulated nationally (Bucciferro 2012, xx). While many newspapers were shut down following the September 11, 1973 military coup, the Junta authorized *El Mercurio* to continue publications (Comisión Prisón Política y Tortura 2004, 205). It was also one of Chile's most popular newspapers during the 1988 plebiscite (*Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988, 35). Articles in *El Mercurio* provide perspective on how political supporters of Pinochet used memory institutionalized by the regime to argue for the continuation of Pinochet's leadership. *El Mercurio* also published advertisements for the Say Yes Campaign, which I use in my analysis.

Given the censorship of opposition media, I also studied the Say No Campaign for my 1988 analysis to provide a balanced approach. Opposition reporters often faced persecution and practiced self-censorship under the Pinochet dictatorship (*Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988, 34-35).[3] While the government had an advantage during the campaign leading up to the 1988 plebiscite, the rhetoric of the Say No Campaign provides evidence for the arguments of the dictatorship's opponents (*Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988, 41). To study the Say No Campaign, I examined archived videos and arguments from political actors, who supported the campaign.

For analysis of the recent 2020 plebiscite in Chile, I studied articles from conservative *El Mercurio* and liberal *El Ciudadano*. *El Mercurio* continues to be one of Chile's most popular

[3]In 1988, 30 journalists were prosecuted under the charge of "insulting the armed forces." These cases were often argued in military courts (*Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988, 34).

news sources (Bucciferro 2012, xx). I used the archive tool on *El Mercurio's* website to examine articles from the start of the 2020 plebiscite campaign on August 26, 2020 to the day of the plebiscite, October 25, 2020 (Buitrago October 22, 2020). Since censorship of the press greatly decreased after Chile's transition to democracy, I was able to directly compare conservative and liberal newspapers (Comisión Prisón Política y Tortura 2004, 205). *El Ciudadano*, a progressive online newspaper, was established in 2005 under the Chilean democracy (Luna, Toro, and Valenzuela 2022). Unlike the other newspapers I used, *El Ciudadano* does not have a full archive section on its website. Instead, I used their self-selected archives labeled the *Proceso Constituyente Chile* (Chilean Constitutional Process).[4]

How I Examined Sources

When looking at sources, I looked for key criteria to categorize the source as evidence. First, I decided whether the source included rhetoric from a political actor. Second, I examined whether that rhetoric supported or challenged the constitution through memory. When working with microfilm, I generally made this initial decision reading the articles in Spanish without the assistance of a translator. After using this test, I translated sections of the source that included evidence using the DeepL translator.

After selecting evidence, I interpreted it by considering how the evidence fit into the memory regimes in each country. Was a political actor using an historical narrative? Did the political actor employ collective memory in accordance with the memory regime or did they work against the country's institutionalized memory? Why did the political actor use collective memory? What was their argument?

[4]*El Ciudadano's* Constitutional Process section can be found using this link: https://www.elciudadano.com/especiales/proceso-constituyente/

Furthermore, I also built my analysis off of Bernhard and Kubic's categorization of political actors. While examining sources, I categorized actors as either mnemonic warriors or abnegators (Bernhard and Kubik 2014). Using these classifications, I examined if political actors remembered or forgot and how they fit into the country's mnemonic regime. Specifically, I asked if their use of memory followed the mnemonic regime and, if it differed, why. What political conditions and goals led them to remember or forget?

Outline of the Chapters

This chapter provided the theoretical framework for my analysis, discussed the existing scholarship, and explained my methods to demonstrate how I will contribute to the ongoing discussion by answering the following question: **How do political actors use collective memory of civil conflict to make constitutional arguments?**

In this chapter, I first defined collective memory and explained that I will focus on official collective memory given the powerful role it plays in nation building. Second, I examined how collective memory is formed and who gets to shape it. I focused on the role of political actors given their influence over state institutions. Next, I explored how identity and collective memory are directly intertwined. This led to a discussion on how nationalism and collective memory work together to construct national identity. Given the plurinational political conditions in Spain and Chile, I defined plurinationalism and its intersection with inclusive and exclusive narratives. I then discussed how political actors employ collective memory, focusing on their decision of whether to forget or remember. I further discussed this decision through an analysis of the role of truth and reconciliation commissions. Next, I reviewed how democratic transitions can provide a political opening for memory use. I defined two political conditions:

attempted coups and state-codified referendums. I then demonstrated the salience of looking at how constitutional arguments connect to collective memory and are important to understanding a nation's founding. Finally, I reviewed my methodology for examining political actors' utilization of collective memory during periods when the constitution is supported or challenged.

In chapter 2, I will examine how the political conditions of the 1981 attempted military coup in Spain led political actors to abide by the Pact of Forgetting out of fear that remembering civil violence would ignite conflict between social cleavages. To understand the memories and identities involved in this decision, I will provide an overview of the establishment of social cleavages, such as regional and centrist identities, and the history of the Spanish Civil War and the Franco Dictatorship to understand how these narratives were institutionalized. Next, I will examine the existing theories concerning Spain's decision to suppress mnemonic narratives and plurinationalism. Then, I will analyze how the fragile political conditions during the 1981 attempted coup contributed to the decision to forget civil conflict and unify the nation under the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Finally, I will end with a brief analysis of the rhetoric employed by Basque political actors leading up to the 1981 attempted military coup to transition to the following chapter, focusing on the impact of regional identities on Spain's decision to forget.

In chapter 3, I will discuss how establishment political actors continued to abide by the Pact of Forgetting during the 2017 Catalan Independence Movement, despite the grassroots mnemonic movements in the 2000s. The 2000s exhumation movement suggests that there should be fracturing in the Pact of Forgetting; however, establishment political actors continue to suppress memories of civil conflict during the 2017 Independence Movement. I will argue that Catalonia's unconstitutional attempt to secede from the Spanish nation created vulnerable political conditions. This fragile political environment contributed to establishment political

actors' decision to abide by the Pact of Forgetting to unify Spain and decrease tension among social cleavages. However, I will argue that Catalan separatists employed memory of civil conflict to strengthen the Catalan social cleavage and legitimize their calls for autonomy through the mnemonic narrative of continued unjust oppression by the Spanish state. To provide context for these arguments, I will first discuss the grassroots exhumation movement in the 2000s, theoretical understanding of fractures in Spain's mnemonic regime, and background of the Catalan independence movement. I will also provide a brief note on popular remembrance during the 2017 Catalan Independence Movement to contrast it with the mnemonic decisions of establishment political actors.

In chapter 4, I will pivot to Chile and its contrasting decision to remember. I will give background on the solidification of social cleavages and mnemonic narratives through an overview of Allende's Popular Unity government, the Pinochet dictatorship, and the 1988 plebiscite. Next, I will provide a brief overview of how scholarship understands the political conditions of the 1988 plebiscite, the institutionalization of narratives under the dictatorship, and the suppression of plurinationalism. In my analysis section, I will argue that the 1988 state-codified referendum provided a stable political opening for political actors to debate the future of the nation through the use of memory of civil conflict. Both the Say Yes and the Say No Campaigns utilized mnemonic narratives to appeal to social cleavages to solidify support for their vision of the nation.

In chapter 5, I will address the recent 2020 Chilean constitutional plebiscite to examine how the challenging and solidification of the military regime's mnemonic narratives through truth and reconciliation commissions and grassroots movements impacted the political conditions. To give context for this analysis, I will first discuss Chile's three truth and

reconciliation commissions and the 2019 “Chile Woke Up” protests. I will then explore the existing scholarship on the impact of the truth and reconciliation commissions. After examining the historical and theoretical backgrounds, I will argue that the collective memory work of the commissions and the grassroots movements created a political opening for constitutional change to further separate the Chilean nation from Pinochet. I will examine how Apruebo, Indigenous, and Rechazar political actors employed collective memory differently to appeal to social cleavages and justify their vision for the nation. I will also compare how the institutional power of the Indigenous community in Chile is weaker than the systematic power of the Basque and Catalan nationalities in Spain. I suggest that this difference in political power leads Indigenous groups to demand that their nationalities be recognized in the political process and the constitutional proposal.

Chapter 2: Spain 1981 Attempted Coup - Forgetting in order to Foster Unity During Instability

The defeat of the 1981 attempted military coup is viewed as the symbolic end of Spain’s transition to democracy (Ramos Arenas and Martín Jiménez 2020, 216). Spain’s transition was fragile and characterized by multiple competing visions for the nation, from those who wanted to continue Franco’s vision to regional nationalists who sought autonomy (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, 47; Aguilar Fernández 2002, xix). There was an understanding across the political aisle of the young democracy’s vulnerability and fear that Spain would descend into chaos once more (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010, 2). This concern was strengthened by the history of violent conflict between social cleavages throughout the 19th and 20th centuries (Gunther 1991, 43; Richards 2013, 279). This worry led to the institutionalization of silence

concerning the dictatorship and civil war (Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010, 2; Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek 2002, 126; Aguilar Fernández 1996).

In this chapter, I will argue that establishment political actors pushed narratives of stability and abided by Spain's Pact of Forgetting during the 1981 attempted military coup due to extremely unstable political conditions. Not only was the period leading up to the coup a vulnerable political environment, but the coup itself challenged Spain's new 1978 Constitution. This constitutional challenge opposed the new conception of the Spanish nation, establishing the political conditions of an attempted coup. Given that the nation was challenged by the Francoist social cleavage, establishment political actors decided to suppress mnemonic narratives of civil conflict to create unity among the diverse social cleavages in Spain.

Background: Spanish National Narratives and Social Cleavages

Before analyzing the rhetoric used by political actors during the 1981 attempted coup and the political conditions that led to these mnemonic decisions, it is important to understand the narratives contributing to this moment. Spanish political actors ground the identity of the Spanish nation through different mnemonic narratives. What narratives have built distinct cultural cleavages in Spain and how have they been institutionalized? How do the different nationalities in Spain impact these narratives? I will provide chronological background on key foundational narratives, social cleavages, and critical transitions in Spanish history. I will start in the Medieval Ages with the Reconquista narrative and end with the Spanish transition to democracy in the 1970s.

The Reconquista Narrative – Spain's National Founding Narrative

Perhaps the most significant Spanish national myth is the narrative of the Reconquista. This "founding" narrative advocates for the establishment of a unified national-Catholic state tracing all the way back to the Visigoths. However, in reality Spain has always been made up of many groups, some of which rebelled against central authority (Edles 1998, 27).

The Reconquista began when most of present day Spain was under Muslim control and continued sporadically for much of the late medieval ages (O'Callaghan 2004, 21). The monarchs of Asturias-León-Castile[5] fought this crusade because they viewed themselves as the rightful heirs to the Christian Visigoth Kingdom (O'Callaghan 2004, 3).[6] O'Callaghan states that Christians understood victory to be "attributable to God's care for his people" (2004, 12). Furthermore, Spanish Christians saw this conflict to be a holy war authorized by the Church (Lomax 1978, 174).

Towards the end of the "Reconquista," King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella led the charge to create a Christian Spain that spanned most of Iberia. Under these Catholic monarchs, the opposition was viewed as "enemies of Christ" (J. Edwards 2000, 194). Laws were used to institutionalize a national Spanish identity and exclude those who did not follow it (J. Edwards 2000, 228-230). This rhetoric and these laws created the Reconquista narrative and set the foundation for two key social cleavages. The merging of these two social cleavages can be seen in the ideology of National Catholicism in the 18th through 20th centuries (Muro and Quiroga 2005, 17).

[5]These are territories in Northern Spain. In this context, these territories correspond to a kingdom controlled by Christian monarchs.
[6]The Visigoth Kingdom loosely controlled a large portion of Iberia from 589 to 711 (Fernandez-Morera 2011, 6). Under the Visigoths, religious cleavages were used to create in-groups and out-groups (J. Edwards 2000, 72).

First, the Reconquista narrative merged Spanish identity with Catholicism. This divided Spain along a religious cleavage, meaning that Catholics were included in the national identity and non-Catholics were excluded (Miley 2015, 414). Second, under the founding Reconquista narrative, the Spanish nation was ruled by central monarchs.[7] This mnemonic characterization of the Reconquista contributed to dividing Spain along a regional cleavage between a central Spanish state and regional governments (Narotzky 2019, 34). Franco pushed the centralized Reconquista narrative to legitimize his dictatorship (Muro and Quiroga 2005, 17; Miley 2015, 427). However, regional groups resisted this homogenization, highlighting the social cleavage between the central Spanish state and regional factions. These regional factions include Basque and Catalan nationalists. On the other side of the cleavage are the centralists. The centralist social cleavage evolves and includes different groups within the Spanish nation depending on the period. I will explain these nuances throughout the background section.

Formation of National Catholicism

The collective memory of the Reconquista myth and the creation of the Spanish Christian identity group contributed to the creation of National Catholicism (Ramón Solans 2021, 2). Romón Solans explains that "National Catholicism constituted the unifying factor among the Spanish right, supplying a symbolic, ritual and discursive framework" (2021, 9). Under it the identity of the Spanish nation is intertwined with the monarchy, Catholicism, and Castilian as the primary language (Muro and Quiroga 2005, 17). Furthermore, National Catholicism gives the central state legitimacy from divine authority (Ramón Solans 2021, 10). During the Spanish

[7]This is not to say that the medieval government was federal. In fact, when Ferdinand and Isabella joined their two kingdoms, the regions maintained self-governing measures (Carbonell 2019, 790). However, the narrative of the Reconquista sets the foundation for a unified vision of Spain.

Civil War and the Franco dictatorship, National Catholicism was the central political ideology that legitimized state centralization (Alvarez Bolado 1976, 194; Muro and Quiroga 2005, 18-19). The ideology was employed to justify the weakening of the Catalan and Basque governments, the promotion of Castilian, and the repression of regional cultures (Muro and Quiroga 2005, 18-19). Therefore, National Catholicism appealed to the centralist social cleavage. During the Second Spanish Republic, the Spanish Civil War, and the Franco dictatorship, I understand the centralist social cleavage to be composed of the Right, including Nationalists (the civil war) and Franco supporters (the dictatorship).

National Narratives and Social Cleavages in the Second Spanish Republic

The Second Spanish Republic from 1931 to 1936 faced deep partisanship over contrasting visions of Spain from multiple social cleavages, including centralists and Basque and Catalan nationalists. Throughout the republic, leaders grappled with how to balance a unified national government with resurgent regionalist movements, including in Catalonia and The Basque Country (Esenwein 2005, 21; Radcliff 2017, 160-161). To appeal to regional demands, the Second Spanish Republic fully restored Catalan autonomy (Payne 2012, 43; Esenwein 2005, 21).

In addition to calls for greater Basque and Catalan autonomy, the Asturias Rebellion in October 1934 is an example of violent conflict over decentralization. Socialist, anarchist, and communist miners in Asturias rose against the Second Spanish Republic to form a local revolutionary commune. Although the revolution only lasted two weeks, it demonstrates the

violent fragmentation of Spain leading up to the civil war and the increasing tension between the centralist and regional social cleavages (Esenwein 2005, 16).[8]

Following the rebellion, the center-right government, in power from 1933 to 1936, decreased regional autonomy. Under this government, municipal councils were suspended (Esenwein 2005, 21). By 1935, the center-right government suspended the Catalan Statute of Self-Government (Esenwein 2005, 272; Radcliff 2017, 175). In addition, a military governor was appointed by the central government to control Catalonia (Radcliff 2017, 175). Among increasingly influential conservatives, the idea of permitting any autonomy to regions "was anathema, not least because they believed that regionalism threatened the unity and integrity of Spain's traditional institutions" (Esenwein 2005, 21). Conservative backlash to decentralization is built on the founding narrative that Spain is a unified Christian nation and drew on support from the centralist social cleavage (Muro and Quiroga 2005, 18-19).

Violent tension continued between multiple social cleavages leading up to the civil war. While the Republic attempted to control potential right-wing insurgents, anti-Republican military officers began to plan the 1936 coup (Esenwein 2005, 21). As Esenwein notes, "a core group of army officers…were convinced that a military coup was the only way of stopping Spain from being plunged into a state of chaos" (2005, 21). According to Holguin, the generals leading the coup viewed many of the Republic's policies as anti-Spanish (2015, 1770). This categorization suggests that the generals believed that the Second Spanish Republic was delegitimate because it worked against the ideals of the Spanish nation. While tension between regional groups and the central government was only one of several factors in the breakdown of the Second Republic,

[8]The Asturias Rebellion also demonstrates the brewing conflict between economic classes and Catholics and anti-clericals (Kerry 2020, 135 and 139).

violent political tension between the centralist social cleavage and the Basque and Catalan nationalist cleavage over decentralization demonstrates the historic presence of this social cleavage in Spain (Radcliff 2017, 182).

In review, throughout the Second Republic, tensions between competing social cleavages increased and culminated into the Spanish Civil War in 1936. While the Left argued for a "new" Spain that was more secular and allowed for increased regional autonomy, the Right fought to assert their vision of a strong, centralized, Catholic state. As Esenwein notes, "the Civil War represented the culmination of decades of political instability and domestic unrest" (2005, 11).

The Spanish Civil War

The Spanish Civil War began in July 1936 and lasted until April 1939 (Romero Salvado 2013, 32). On one side, the Popular Army of the Republic, also referred to as Republicans, was led by Francisco Largo Caballero (Alpert 2013, ix; Romero Salvado 2013, 41). Throughout the war, 1.7 million Republic soldiers defended the Second Spanish Republic (Romero Salvado 2013, 35; Seidman 2002, 40). The Republicans were generally supported by trade unions, the air force,[9] Liberal Republicans, Socialists, Communists, and importantly Basque and Catalan nationalists (Romero Salvado 2013, 38 and 41). The opposing and insurgent side, the Nationalists, was led by General Francisco Franco (Alpert 2013, 1). The 1.26 million Nationalist soldiers were generally backed by monarchists, much of the military, and conservatives, including the Falange party (Romero Salvado 2013, 40; Radcliff 2017, 189; Seidman 2002, 40). During the Spanish Civil War, memory was used primarily to divide rather than unite Spain

[9]The air force was very small compared to the rest of the military that largely sided with the Nationalists (Romero Salvado 2013, 38).

(Núñez Seixas 2005, 45-46). The Nationalists and Republicans used mnemonic narratives to depict the opposing side as the anti-Spain or foreign invaders (Núñez Seixas 2005, 45-46).

The nature of fighting against friends, neighbors, and family in a civil war leads to the employment of national myths by each side to create "a stereotyped image of the other" (Núñez Seixas 2005, 45). To argue that they were the true patriots of the nation, the Nationalists and the Republicans categorized the opposing side as traitors to such an extent that the public saw their differences as irreconcilable (Núñez Seixas 2005, 45-46).

To start, the Nationalists used the founding narrative of the Reconquista to define national identity, legitimize their coup, and draw support from the Catholic and centralist social cleavages (O'Callaghan 2004, 19; Quiroga and Arco 2012). This narrative was intertwined with National Catholicism to tie Spanish identity to a central, Catholic state (Miley 2015, 427; Muro and Quiroga 2005, 17).[10] Given that the Nationalists were rebelling against the established government, "their legitimacy had to be based on the nation, an eternal entity that was not dependent on the existing political regime" (Núñez Seixas 2005, 55). Furthermore, the Nationalists believed that, "the new civilization born out of the war inexorably rested on the annihilation of those elements identified with the Republican regime" (Hernández Burgos 2016, 461). This included the promotion of a cohesive cultural Spain and opposition to the autonomy of regions (Núñez Seixas 2005, 58-59; Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek 2002, 133).

[10]This thesis focuses on the centralization aspect of National Catholicism and the Reconquista myth. However, the Nationalists understanding of Catholicism as central to Spanish identity was key to their mobilization, alliances, and justification (Hernández Burgos 2016). Additional studies to reference on this connection include: Quiroga, Alejandro, and Miguel Ángel del Arco, eds. 2012. *Right-Wing Spain in the Civil War Era: Soldiers of God and Apostles of the Fatherland, 1914-1945* and Miguel Ángel and del Arco Blanco, 2018. "Before the Altar of the Fatherland: Catholicism, the Politics of Modernization, and Nationalization during the Spanish Civil War." *European History Quarterly* 48 (2): 232–55.

Unlike the Nationalists, Republicans appealed to the Basque and Catalan nationalist cleavage and argued that a key part of national freedom was regional autonomy.[11] Catalan and Basque advocates sided with the Republicans to fight for a decentralized national identity (Esenwein 2005, 98-105). Republicans looked to the anti-Napoleonic provincial juntas and the more recent regional anti-fascist committees of 1935-1937 to create the narrative that the "true" Spain was a pluralistic nation (Núñez Seixas 2005, 53). They believed that "Centralism was antithetical to the most authentic Spanish tradition, which was oriented towards federalism" (Núñez Seixas 2005, 53). This assertion of decentralization opposed the Nationalist's Reconquista narrative.

In short, the Spanish Civil War was a conflict over two competing visions of Spain. Similar to the Reconquista, both Republican and Nationalist soldiers "saw the violence as a necessary social change for national rebirth" (Hernández Burgos 2016, 459). While the Nationalists viewed themselves as saviors of the unified, Catholic state, the Republicans saw a new path for Spain. Their competing visions reflect the historic and continuing tension between the Right and Left, including the centralist and Basque and Catalan nationalist cleavages.

The Francisco Franco Dictatorship

When the Spanish Civil War ended in 1939, Francisco Franco became the supreme ruler of Spain under the title of El Caudillo (Casey 2023).[12] The terror and violence did not end with the civil war (Holguin 2015). Franco, with the help of his supporters, used terror to silence political opposition. The regime pushed the narrative that it was the "true Spain" and that it had

[11]However, there were still efforts to centralize power under the Republicans (Núñez Seixas 2005, 46).
[12]This title refers to the memory of the Reconquista which was fought by caudillos (Romero Salvado 2013, 42).

saved the nation from the "anti-Spain" (Jünke 2016, 8). The dictatorship sought to eliminate all elements of the former Republic, including the Catalan and Basque nationalist social cleavage (Radcliff 2017, 239). This elimination through the use of propaganda and violence pushed the mnemonic narrative of heroic nationalists and censored memory building by opposing social cleavages (Holguin 2015, 1770). While there are many other elements of the Franco regime, I will focus on political repression and the creation of a dominant narrative through terror.

In building a new nation, Franco continued the Nationalist narrative to define Spanish identity. He claimed that the Nationalists saved Spain from anti-Spanish forces on behalf of God (Maystorovich Chulio 2022, 413). As Holguin explains "By flooding the people in all corners of Spain with an endless deluge of propaganda and by eliminating competing narratives, the Nationalists excluded the war's losers from the body politic, and more importantly from the national fold" (Holguin 2015, 1776-1777). Franco aspired to create cultural, symbolic, and linguistic uniformity throughout Spain and worked to establish this by labeling those who did not fit as anti-Spanish (Núñez Seixas 2005, 60). This homogenous aspiration included the repression of the social cleavages that opposed his vision.

To establish the mnemonic Nationalist savior narrative, the Franco regime carefully controlled the education system. The government gave its ally, the Catholic Church, unparalleled control over education. In schools, nuns taught children the importance of Catholic values and used the Bible to teach them to read (Casey 2023). Furthermore, the government approved every textbook, providing state control over history curricula, the books students read, and the ideologies they were exposed to (Aguilar Fernández 2002, 30).

In addition to education, the government controlled the media. The press promoted "a series of values and historical myths which, although they may not have been accepted by all

sections of society, did have considerable influence of the perceptions of many of its members" (Aguilar Fernández 2002, 30). Furthermore, through the Press Law of 1938 the state required journalists to get approval from the government before publishing for nearly 30 years (Gunther, Montero, and Wert 2000, 31).

To delegitimize the Republican cause, the dictatorship prohibited Republican mourning and memorialized Nationalists. Through this contrast of silence and memorialization Republican soldiers were forgotten, while Nationalist counterparts were remembered. For example, family members of deceased Republicans feared public mourning because this display of connection risked punishment (Holguin 2015, 1777). In contrast, monuments throughout the country were built to glorify the sacrifice of fallen Nationalist soldiers, such as *Valle de los Caídos* (Valley of the Fallen). These monuments simultaneously remembered the Nationalists as heroes and "negat[ed] the existence of Republican dead" (Holguin 2015, 1777). Through the silencing of Republican mourning and the veneration of fallen Nationalist soldiers, the regime promoted the narrative of the Nationalists "saving" Spain.

To further silence opposing narratives, the dictatorship used public shaming to discredit those who threatened the regime. Following the war, the government worked to "other" those who threatened the regime by forcing people to parade through towns. For example, women had their hair forcibly removed and were made to parade through their village presenting signs describing their crimes. In addition, men and women were forced to march through towns as penitents (Holguin 2015, 1775). This punishment is a continuation from the Spanish Inquisition. In the Medieval Period, it was a punishment for heretics and sinners (Holguin 2015, 1775). While some observers were sympathetic to the Republican cause, the fear established under the dictatorship led them to shun parading neighbors (Holguin 2015, 1775).

Furthering fear, the Franco regime used political repression to silence opposing narratives and actors. Laws such as the Law of Political Responsibilities and the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism "served to delineate the 'criminals' from the 'true Spaniards' and to punish those who acted against the interests of the nation" (Holguin 2015, 1774). Criminals were frequently associated with the opposition and sentenced to forced labor, including constructing monuments to fallen Nationalist soldiers. As Holguin describes, redemption through work was viewed as penitence "to redeem their anti-Spanish sins" (2015, 1774). Political repression also included fatal punishment. Under the Franco dictatorship, over 100,000 people were executed (Kazyrytski 2022, 679). Holguin suggests that political violence was used, particularly in the 1940s, to enforce "a collective public memory that included only Nationalist war sacrifices," eliminating opposing social cleavages (Holguin 2015, 1770).

Tragically, parents who were deemed "unworthy" by doctors and nuns, endured having their babies unknowingly stolen from them and given to families who aligned with the regime's interests.[13] Nationalists began abducting babies of political opponents who were murdered by Franco's firing squads and infants born from imprisoned political opponents (Casey 2023). In additional cases, parents were told lies that their children died. (Spain Confronts Decades of Pain Over Lost Babies 2011, 1777-1778; Holguin 2015). These children were then adopted by people who supported the Franco government, so the children would be raised "as patriotic Spaniards, free of the taint of Marxism, atheism, and regional nationalisms" (Holguin 2015, 1777-1778). While the number of stolen babies is still unknown, "estimates suggest tens of thousands" (Casey

[13]This unthinkable crime stems from ideas promoted by Antonio Vallejo-Nájera, a psychiatrist trained in Nazi Germany and a predominant psychiatrist counsellor to the regime. Vallejo-Nájera suggested that there is a Marxist "red gene" and that removing children of left-wing opponents from their families and giving them to conservative supporters would hamper their Marxist tendencies (Casey 2023).

2023). By stealing babies from political opponents, the Franco regime and supporters censored informal memory building and social cleavages opposing the regime.

In summary, the regime's control over the national narrative through the education system, political repression, violence, fear, and kidnapping solidified Spanish memory of the civil war and national identity. This repression served to empower the Francoist social cleavage and oppress its opposition.

The Spanish Transition to Democracy and the Pact of Forgetting

During Franco's final years, there was a question of who would succeed him. When Franco first came to power, he recognized Spain as a monarchy. However, Don Juan de Borbon, the heir to the Spanish throne and exiled in Portugal, was considered a liberal. Instead, Franco took Don Juan's son, Juan Carlos, under his wing and before his death named Juan Carlos to be his successor. While Juan Carlos swore to uphold Franco's vision, he instead helped transition Spain to a democracy (Edles 1998, 37-38).

In 1976, Juan Carlos appointed Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez. Under Prime Minister Suarez the Law of Political Reform passed, paving the way for Spain to transition to a democracy (Edles 1998, 37-38).[14] This transitional law "recognized the principles of popular sovereignty, universal suffrage, and political pluralism, and prepared for the legal abolition of the chief Francoist institutions" (Edles 1998, 6). Of the 78 percent of the electorate who voted in the referendum, 94.2 percent voted to approve it (Edles 1998, 38). Edles argues that "The Law of Political Reform paved the way for a 'period of consensus' unlike anything seen previously in

[14]Arias Navarro was appointed the first prime minister. However, Navarro's tumultuous government led to his resignation. In 1976, Juan Carlos appointed Adolfo Suarez as prime minister, who is perhaps the best known politician during the Transition. (Edles 1998, 37-38).

Spanish history - a relatively peaceful, quiescent period of moderation and reform, which resulted in the first democratic elections of June 1977, and the successful drafting of the 1978 Constitution" (1998, 38).

Following the passage of the Law of Political Reform, the Cortes, the legislature, passed the 1977 Amnesty Law (The Pact of Forgetting). The pact provided general amnesty for any political crime (Ealham and Richards 2005, 5). Politicians believed that Spain needed to forget to prevent another civil war (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; Hayner 2011; Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010, 2; Aguilar Fernández 1996). Santiago Carrillo, a leader of opposition to Franco, explained that "In our country, there is but one way to reach democracy, which is to throw out anyone who promotes the memory of the Civil War, which should never return, ever. We do not want more wars, we have had enough of them already" (Encarnación 2014, 3). Through the Pact of Forgetting, the new Spanish establishment chose to forget so as not to ignite social cleavages (Aguilar Fernández 2002, 1996).

In summary, mnemonic narratives underlying social cleavages in Spain were used throughout the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship to legitimize Republican and Nationalist causes. In response to the history of violent transition in Spain, political actors established the Pact of Forgetting (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; Hayner 2011; Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010, 2). The Pact of Forgetting was established under the belief that compromise and silence was necessary for the successful transition to democracy and the end of violence (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; J.L. Fuentes 2022, 134; Gunther 1991, 47; Aguilar Fernández 1996). The push to unify social cleavages provided the level of consensus needed to establish the 1978 Constitution (Edles 1998, 38). I suggest that establishment political actors abided by this pact due to the vulnerable political conditions during the transition. Before analyzing the rhetoric of

political actors during the 1981 coup, I will discuss how my examination fits in current scholarly discussions. I will explore the political conditions during Spain's transition, the establishment of the Pact of Forgetting, and plurinationalism in Spain. Understanding plurinationalism in Spain provides insight to the Catalan and Basque social cleavages in Spain and how these social cleavages impact the stability of the political environment under political transitions.

Theoretical Review: The Decision to Forget and Regional Social Cleavages

Spain's Successful Transition to Democracy

The Spanish transition to democracy is hailed as a success (Gunther 1991; McRoberts 2022, 74). However, at the time, political actors feared that democracy would only be a brief Spanish experiment (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; Gunther 1991, 47). Scholars suggest that the decision to forget was a compromise to maintain stability (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; J.L. Fuentes 2022, 134). This mnemonic compromise included ignoring social cleavages to create the feeling of unity within the nation. As Fuentes explains, The Amnesty Law (Pact of Forgetting) "established an official memorial discourse that sought to silence the victims of the regime in order to legitimize the central Spanish government—an official discourse that remains the dominant Spanish memory regime to this day" (2022, 135). However, the Catalan and Basque cleavages would continue to challenge this silence.

Political actors operating during the Spanish transition understood that democracy was fragile (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, 47; Aguilar Fernández 2002, xix). Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, Spain endured multiple abrupt changes in ideological power. Gunther explains that these drastic changes were embedded in the political culture, as "Spain swung back and forth between monarchy and republic, democracy and authoritarianism,

rigid centralism and regional autonomy, confessionalism and anticlericalism" (1991, 43). This characterization of Spanish instability was further established by the myth of the "Black Legend" institutionalized by the Franco dictatorship.[15] Richards explains that Franco pushed this narrative of Spain being uncontrollable and incapable of self-governance to legitimize his authoritarian government (2013, 279).

However, the Spanish transition was a lasting democratic success (Gunther 1991; McRoberts 2022, 74). Not only did Spain establish a constitutional monarchy, it also "accumulated an outstanding record of complying with international human rights conventions" (Encarnación 2014, 6). Gunther suggests that the triumph of the transition was due to the switch from disunity among political actors to consensus. He explains that extensive negotiations led to nationwide political parties recognizing the legitimacy of the 1978 Constitution and mutual respect among political opponents. Gunther continues that this respect "established through the settlement process and reinforced by more than a decade of restrained partisan conflict, have transcended formerly divisive political and social cleavages" (Gunther 1991, 40).

The Pact of Forgetting

Scholars suggest that Spain's successful democratic transition and decision to forget make it a collective memory puzzle. Encarnación highlights Spain's collective memory paradox. He argues that transitional justice scholarship views silencing the past as weakening democratic transition; however, "the Spanish case suggests the very opposite" (Encarnación 2014, 17). Furthermore, Shevel suggests that Spain's success implies that national unity can be based in a successful transition, rather than a unified vision of the past (2011, 145). Given Spain's

[15]Duncan explains that the "Black Legend" was established by Europeans in the 1500s and characterized Spaniards as "an uncivilized, greedy people who reveled in bloodshed and destruction" (1991).

successful choice to forget and national identity's close tie to collective memory, Spain is a critical case to study.

Furthermore, Paloma Aguilar Fernandéz, often considered the pioneer of Spanish memory studies, argues that Spain's 1977 Amnesty Law institutionalized a "pacto de olvido" or a "pact of silence" (1996).[16] Through the 1977 Amnesty Law, Spain's government instructed the nation to prioritize peace and reconciliation and to forget the civil war (Aguilar Fernández 2002, 193). Spain's Amnesty Law presents a unique case because the state declared institutional silence. If remembering is the key to democratic transition, why has Spain's democracy been successful? (Encarnación 2014, 17). Building off of Gunther's assessment that Spain achieved democracy through the political switch from disunity to consensus (1991), I speculate that part of what contributed to Spain's success was political actors' understanding of the fragile political conditions and their resulting decision to focus on the present and the future.

Political actors institutionalized the Pact of Forgetting out of fear that remembrance would lead to conflict (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; Hayner 2011; Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010, 2). Spanish elites agreed "to silence the voices of the bitter past" to create harmony (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx). Part of this decision was based on the fear that discussion would lead to resentment and rekindle violent conflict (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx). This fear was based on the internalized narrative of the Black Legend under Franco and the history of social cleavages challenging and overthrowing the state (Richards 2013, 279; Gunther 1991, 43). In addition, Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek explain that despite "a decline in the myth of the 'ungovernable Spaniards'" Spain still places higher value on 'peace,' 'moderation,' and 'order' than other European states, demonstrating "a phenomenon undoubtedly linked to the memory of

[16]Multiple scholars agree with Aguilar Fernandéz's assessment. See also Encarnación 2014, Jerez-Ferrán and Amago 2010, Richards 2013, and Fuentes 2022.

fratricide and the desire to avoid its recurrence" (2002, 150). Aguilar Fernández explains that these uncertainties during transition are greatest when the trauma of war is present, further solidifying the Black Legend. Furthermore, fear of revisiting trauma leads to institutional forgetting (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xix-xx). Through the Pact of Forgetting, actors operating during the transition to democracy agreed that both sides "were equally to be blamed for the barbaric events" in the civil war (Aguilar Fernández 2002, 268).

The Catalan and Basque Nationalist Cleavage and the Question of Plurinationalism in Spain

An additional factor in Spain's political instability were the historical calls for nationhood by multiple territories in Spain. Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia are considered "historical nations" (McRoberts 2022, 75). Following the suppression of regional cultures during the Franco dictatorship, Basque and Catalan political actors saw the 1978 Spanish Constitution as an opening for Spain to "reinvent" its national identity, including increasing autonomy of the "historical nations" (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, 46; McRoberts 2022, 69). This led political actors from regions including Catalonia and the Basque Country to advocate for a plurinational constitution (McRoberts 2022). Keating understands plurinationalism to be when "more than one national identity can pertain to a single group or even an individual, opening up the possibility of multiple nationalities which in turn may be nested or may overlap in less tidy ways" (2001, 26-27). I will explore how, unlike the Mapuche in Chile, Spain's 1978 Constitution provides some legitimacy to these regional nationalists.

When drafting the 1978 Constitution, social cleavages in Spain from Franco sympathizers, to socialists, to regional nationalists, fiercely debated how to settle the issue of plurinationalism (McRoberts 2022). At first, they decided to recognize the Basque Country,

Catalonia, and Galicia as 'nationalities,' whose autonomy would operate under the Autonomous Community structure that also governed Spain's 'regions' (McRoberts 2022, 79).[17] However, significant backlash from the Right led to the section of the constitution concerning 'nationality' to be preceded by the phrase "the indivisibility of the Spanish nation" (McRoberts 2022, 80). Given this phrase and the decision to use the word 'nationalities' instead of 'nations,' Spain does not operate under a plurinational constitution or formal federalism (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, 51; McRoberts 2022).[18]

However, the inclusion of 'nationalities' creates a blueprint for autonomy (McRoberts 2022, 88). The multiple terms alluding to plurinationalism demonstrate recognition by political actors of the concept of multiple nations in Spain (Moreno 2019, 6). Furthermore, Balfour and Quiroga assert that "The Spain reinvented in the 1978 Constitution was a feat of semantic engineering and political consensus, facilitating the perception that alternative narratives of Spanish nationalism and regional nationalisms could coexist" (2007, 46). The inclusion of 'nationality' allowed for regional languages, such as Catalan, to be co-official languages and "privileged accession to autonomy" for 'historical nations' (McRoberts 2022, 88).

Following the harsh repression of regional cultures during the Franco dictatorship, the 1978 Spanish Constitution is understood as creating space where Spain could "reinvent" its national identity (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, 46; McRoberts 2022, 69). This highlights why transitions and the constitutions that govern them or are created by them are critical to study. Understanding the intersection between constitutions, political conditions, and political actors' decisions to remember provides insight to the formation of national identity. Significantly, the

[17]The term 'nationality' in the 1978 Spanish Constitution is viewed as ambiguous (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, 51).
[18]Constitutional Court rulings in the 2000s limited Catalan autonomy based on the language surrounding 'nationality' (Moreno 2019, 4). This will be explored further in the following chapter.

debate over plurinationalism in Spain addresses how national identity operates in in-groups and out-groups. In this thesis, I will ask how these exclusive national identity groups affect a state's political conditions and actors' decisions to remember.

Analysis: Political Actors' Use of Memory in 1981 Spain

The 1981 Coup and its Aftermath: Establishment Political Actors Chose Forgetting

On February 23, 1981, the Congressional Palace was seized by Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero and 200 members of the Civil Guard during the investiture of Calvo Sotelo as Prime Minister. Miles away in Valencia, General Milans del Bosch took the city by military force ("El intento de golpe de estado, en vías de fracaso" 1981; Ramos Arenas and Martín Jiménez 2020, 217). Articles from the liberal-leaning *El País* and the conservative-leaning *ABC* demonstrate how establishment political actors on both sides of the ideological spectrum decided to focus on the present unity of the Spanish political establishment and continued strength of Spanish democracy during this vulnerable political environment.

I was surprised when reading articles in *El Pais* and *ABC* following the 1981 attempted coup. I expected political actors to invoke the memory of the 1936 military coup that led to the Spanish Civil War. There are direct comparisons between the two. Both were military coups that the perpetrators framed as necessary to save the Spanish nation. For example, the 1981 coup plotters "called for a military-led government to save the country from its purported slide into disorder," while the Nationalists supporting the 1936 coup legitimized themselves as the saviors of the "True Spain" (Radcliff 2017, 190 and 263; Núñez Seixas 2005, 45-46). In addition, both coups initially failed at controlling the entire country (Payne 2012, 72; Esenwein 2005, 25). So, why did Spanish political actors choose not to compare the coups to explain the dangers of the actions taken by Tejero, Bosch, and other military officers?

Unlike Spanish politicians, foreign political actors used memory to draw the comparison. Following the seizure of the Congressional Palace, French politician Maurice Duverger compared the two Spanish coups. Duverger wrote, "Compared to Franco's adventure, Colonel Tejero's is an operetta" (February 25, 1981). Not only did Duverger use the memory of Franco's grasp of power, he employed it to demonstrate the strength of Spanish democracy (Duverger February 25, 1981). While Duverger acknowledged the always-present threat to democracies, he utilized the memory of Franco to illustrate the rapid failure of Tejero's attempted takeover. If foreign political actors saw and acknowledged the comparison, why did Spanish political actors stay silent on the topic? Unlike those viewing the conflict from afar, Spanish political actors needed to be able to establish domestic compromises and work with politicians across the aisle. Politicians held differing views on Francoism. Silence regarding civil conflict was maintained out of fear of destabilizing the country further (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; Hayner 2011). Still, why did Duverger have more confidence in Spain's democracy than Spanish political actors? Franco entrenched the Black Legend during his dictatorship to push the narrative that Spaniards were incapable of peaceful governance (Richards 2013, 279). The internalization of the memory of the Black Legend contributed to fear and apprehension on the continued success of the democracy. This internalization led establishment political actors to suppress mnemonic narratives to limit questions from multiple social cleavages on the long-term ability of the Spanish democracy to maintain peace.

Under this priority of stability, establishment political actors emphasized staying calm. The vulnerability of the young democracy during the coup does not provide the environment for a political opening to use collective memory of civil conflict (Jelin 2003). These mnemonic abnegators understood the numerous social cleavages dividing Spain (Encarnación 2014, 3).

Given the fear of repeating conflict and the political condition of the attempted coup, those who favored the unity of Spain selected not to use collective memory of the dictatorship or civil war.

The attempted coup was a challenge to the 1978 Constitution. First, it forcibly interrupted a key constitutional procedure. When Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero stormed the Congressional Palace, the governing body was about to vote on the investiture of Calvo Sotelo as Prime Minister (Ramos Arenas and Martín Jiménez 2020, 217). Second, insurrectionists explained that the seizure of the Congressional Palace was an attack on the constitutional system. A member of the civil guard told reporters during the coup "This is not against you, nor against anyone but against the system" ("El gobierno y los diputados, rentenidos en el congreso" Febuary 24, 1981). Here the system refers to the democracy defined by the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Furthermore, during the capture of the Congressional Palace, a civil guard announced at the chamber's podium "In a quarter of an hour, or twenty minutes, or maybe a little more, the competent authority will come here and tell us what is going to happen. Of course, the authority will be from the military" ("El gobierno y los diputados, rentenidos en el congreso" Febuary 24, 1981). The attempted military takeover is in direct opposition to a civilian-led government. Finally, Spaniards viewed the military coup as a direct attack on the constitution. One article published in *El País* condemning the February attack ended with "Long live the Constitution!" ("¡Viva la Constitución!" February 24, 1981).[19] Furthermore, another opinion published in *El País* explained that "It [was] certain that Lieutenant General Milans del Bosch abused his powers and violated the Constitution" ("La Verdadera Trama" February 25, 1981). The attempted coup created an even more vulnerable political environment by challenging the 1978 Constitution and therefore the Spanish nation.

[19]See also for understanding of the coup directly challenging the constitution: "Con la constitution," published in *El País* on February 24th, 1981.

Given the threat to the 1978 Constitution, establishment Spanish political actors followed the Pact of Forgetting to preserve unity out of fear. The attempted coup built off of and highlighted the divide between social cleavages in Spain (Jünke 2016, 8). Therefore, the coup was not only a challenge against the constitution, but also the new, democratic national identity. The internalization of the Black Legend and the history of violent challenges to the Spanish government by multiple social cleavages drove these mnemonic abnegators to suppress memory of violence between identity groups. When the political environment was characterized by an unexpected challenge to the democratic government and national identity, political actors chose to suppress narratives of civil conflict to maintain the vulnerable nation.

In response to the attack on democracy, political actors emphasized stability and calmness throughout the country to unify social cleavages. King Juan Carlos of Spain pushed the narrative of the continuation of the Spanish Constitution and governmental control. Under the King's direction a statement published through Radiotelevisión Española by the Director of State Security explained that "no act of force will destroy the democratic coexistence that the people freely desire and that is embodied in the text of the Constitution to which civilians and military have sworn to protect" ("Rey ordena a los subsecretarios y secretarios de estado que asuman la gobernación del país" February 24, 1981). Furthermore, in a televised address after one o'clock in the morning, King Juan Carlos explained that he had "ordered the civil authorities and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take all the necessary measures to maintain the constitutional order within the legality in force" ("El Rey Ordena El Mantenimiento de Orden Constitucional" February 24, 1981). The King stated that "The Crown, symbol of the permanence and unity of the Homeland, cannot tolerate in any way actions or attitudes of persons who try to interrupt by force the democratic process that the Constitution voted by the Spanish people determined in its day

through referendum" ("El Rey Ordena El Mantenimiento de Orden Constitucional" February 24, 1981). The King's choice of words such as "maintain," "constitutional order," "legality," "permanence," and "unity" represent the broad calls for stability in Spain following the coup. In addition, the word choice demonstrates the concern over unstable political conditions. To create the appearance of unity, the King established his support for Spanish Constitution, a compromise between Spain's social cleavages, instead of drawing on past conflict, to solidify the transition to democracy following the threat of the coup.

Building off of the King's rhetoric, other political actors made calls for stability, choosing not to invoke the memory of violence between identity groups. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained that they were taking steps to reestablish constitutional order. In an official communiqué, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated "the necessary measures have been taken to repress all attacks against the constitution and to reestablish the order that the constitution demands" ("Rey ordena a los subsecretarios y secretarios de estado que asuman la gobernación del país" February 24, 1981).[20] This statement was meant to reassure Spaniards that the state would not lose control, like it had in the past. Furthermore, the fact that constitutional order had to be reestablished demonstrates the challenge against democracy and the fragile political conditions. Using memory of civil conflict here could be against the interest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it would remind Spaniards of the social cleavages that divide them.

In addition, Spanish mnemonic abnegators emphasized the partnership between the government and the military to demonstrate their continued collaboration. A communication under the Ministry of the Interior emphasized the continued balance of power between the armed

[20]See also for support of constitutional order: "Emocionada vuelta a la normalidad parlamentaria," published in *ABC* on February 26th, 1981, and written by Herminio Pérez Fernández; "Es momento para proclamar nuestra fe en el orden constitucional" published in *ABC* on February 26, 1981.

forces and the government. The communication read they "[could] guarantee their compatriots that no act of force [would] destroy the democratic coexistence that the people freely desire and is reflected in the text of the Constitution, to which civilians and military personnel have sworn protection" ("La junta de los jefes defenderá el orden constitucional " February 24, 1981).[21] Again, political actors' recognition of force attempting to "destroy the democratic coexistence" highlights the fragile political environment. By focusing on present and future protection of the Constitution, the Ministry of the Interior suggested continued unity and stability within key cleavages of Spanish leadership. The inclusion of the military's "sworn protection" to the Spanish nation worked to ease concerns over the Spanish government losing control to the military again.

Even political actors representing the "historic nations" within Spain endorsed calls for stability, demonstrating the unity among the Catalan nationalist cleavage and the central Spanish government. Jordi Pujol, the President of the Generalitat of Catalonia, shared pieces of his telephone conversation with the King at a press conference. Pujol described that the King "completely reassured me about the incidents that took place this afternoon in the Congress of Deputies in Madrid" ("El Rey Juan Carlos dijo al presidente de la generalidad: 'tranquilo, Jordi, tranquilo'" February 24, 1981). He further explained that King Juan Carlos said to him "Calm down, Jordi, calm down" ("El Rey Juan Carlos dijo al presidente de la generalidad: 'tranquilo, Jordi, tranquilo'" February 24, 1981; "Estado de alerta en todo España" February 24, 1981). Even the head of the Catalan government expressed the sentiments of stability and refrained from using collective memory.[22] Pujol was a strong advocate for reasserting Catalan autonomy

[21]See also for political actors understanding the coup as a threat to democracy: "Los Generales Milans de Bosch y Armada destuidos tras al fracaso de golpe military ," published in *El País* on February 25th, 1981.
[22]See also "La junta de los jefes defenderá el orden constitucional," published in *ABC* on February 27th, 1981 for additional Catalan actors defending constitutional order.

during the transition (Vargas 2018, 22). Pujol's restraint from using memory of civil conflict demonstrates that the priority of supporters of Spanish democracy was to maintain unity and control.

In addition, rhetoric used by people outside of the political establishment demonstrates the prevalence of the Pact of Forgetting. The Catholic Church's support for the 1978 Constitution and bishops' decisions to not comment on the past demonstrate the span of the Pact of Forgetting. Given that the Catholic Church was one of Franco's strongest supporters during the civil war and under the dictatorship, the church's support for the Republic during February of 1981 depicts the diversity of mnemonic abnegators. Reflecting on the failure of the coup, Miguel Roco, the Archbishop of Valencia, stated "it is good news" ("Preocupación e indignación entre los obispos por el golpe de estado" February 24, 1981). In addition, a young bishop explained "What hurts me the most is that with things like this they take us for a Central American republic" ("Preocupación e indignación entre los obispos por el golpe de estado" February 24, 1981). Why does the young bishop make a comparison to Central America instead of Spain's own past history of coups? The young bishop's comments demonstrate the strength of the Pact of Forgetting because he compares Spain's recent violence to countries across the Atlantic Ocean rather than history on his own home soil from less than 50 years ago. Furthermore, the press emphasized the internalization of the abnegators' narrative. Conservative newspaper, *ABC*, published an article stating, "Calm. We want to repeat this word because it is the most important word in Spain today" ("Respeto a la constitutión y calma nacional" February 24, 1981).

In conclusion, following the 1981 attempted coup, Spaniards from across the political spectrum called for constitutional order through the Pact of Forgetting. Instead of invoking the dangers of the coup by comparing it to the 1936 coup, Spanish mnemonic abnegators focused on

the present unity and stability. The vulnerable political conditions of the democratic transition and the added instability from the attempted coup limit the political opening for political actors to use memory of conflict to influence the direction of the nation. Unlike the Chilean plebiscites, which provided an opening for the use of memory, the 1981 attempted coup in Spain and the fear that remembering civil conflict would spark violence created a political environment for forgetting. Moreover, the institutionalization of the Black Legend and the history of violent challenges from multiple social cleavages contributed to the decision to forget. During this fragile period, actors, including the monarchy, the legislature, regional nationalists, and the church, prioritized unity and suppressed memories of conflict out of fear of increasing tension among social cleavages in order to solidify the Spanish nation established by the 1978 Constitution.

Mnemonic Warriors in Spain: Basque Nationalist Movement

In late February 1981, before the attempted coup, protests erupted across the Basque country following the death of prominent Basque political leader, José Arregui. Arregui was killed under torture while held by the Spanish state (Etxarri et al. February 17, 1981). These protests do not fit into the transitional political conditions of this study because they were not a state-codified referendum or an attempted coup. [23] However, the use of memory by Basque advocates for autonomy provides insight to the following chapter on the Catalan 2017 Independence Referendum through suggesting that political actors utilize memory of civil conflict when they want to draw on social cleavages. Similar to the Catalan nationalists, the divergent political goals of the Basque nationalists from establishment political actors impact the

[23]While studying the rhetoric leading up to the coup, I stumbled on this event. It led me to wonder the impact of plurinationalism on the use of collective memory.

political conditions in which they operate. In the days leading up to the coup, Basque nationalists employed collective memory to call for greater autonomy and highlight the continuation of abuses to constitutional rights. This demonstration of the persistence of torture under Spanish democracy served to shame the centralists from not living up to its democratic ideals. These mnemonic narratives functioned to fracture the state and build regional identity to foster Basque nationalism.

For example, Basque parliamentary leader Juan Maria Bandrés invoked the memory of oppression under the Franco dictatorship to argue for constitutional rights. Bandrés introduced a proposal to annul a law suspending constitutional rights. He cited “frequent violations of fundamental rights” that are protected by article 17.3 of the Constitution as evidence for repealing the law ("Euskadiko Ezkerra pedirá la derogación de la ley de suspensión de derechos constitucionales" February 17, 1981). Bandrés asserted that the probable death of Arregui by torture alone was something “a civilized a democratic community should be ashamed” ("Euskadiko Ezkerra pedirá la derogación de la ley de suspensión de derechos constitucionales" February 17, 1981). While Arregui does not directly mention the civil war or dictatorship, the discussion of torture and the failing of Spanish democracy implied the memory of Franco, specifically the torture of Basque separatists. His statement shaming the democratic community served to degrade the Spanish democracy to the level of the Franco dictatorship. This degradation asked the Basque social cleavage to remember the oppression under the Franco regime to strength Basque national identity.

Furthermore, Bandrés shared his lived experience seeing Basque people tortured under Franco, strengthening the divide between the Basque nationalist cleavage and the centralist cleavage. Bandrés explained “Since I was a young lawyer, many years ago,” he continued “I saw

for the very first time a Basque tortured in the Martutene prison, I have not doubted that torture was still going on in the Basque country" ("Los portavoces vascos denuncian que la tortura es una prática habitual" February 18, 1981). Under the Franco dictatorship, as a lawyer, Bandrés defended members of the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). In 1969, he was even confined under the state of emergency due to his anti-Francoist sentiments (Castells). When Bandrés referred to the first time he saw a Basque person tortured, he invoked his personal memory to connect to shared Basque memories of torture under the Franco regime. Through this memory he argued that the democratic government and the dictatorship shared the trait of abusing human rights. By showing this connection, Bandrés made the constitutional argument of protecting bodily autonomy in the Spanish democracy ("Constitución Española" 1978).[24]

In addition, a note published by the Basque Cabinet directly compared the democratic government to the Franco dictatorship. The Basque Cabinet stated that the government needed "to bring to completion the often proclaimed democratic reform of those bodies and institutions that, by their composition and methods, do not evidence a break with the dictatorial era" (Etxarri Febuary 18, 1981). The cabinet compared the Spanish democracy to the dictatorship to argue that the current government must change to live up to its constitution and ideals. Through this assertion, the cabinet delegitimized the central Spanish government and appealed to the Basque nationalist cleavage.

To conclude, the use of collective memory by Basque leaders suggests that the institutionalization of the Pact of Forgetting contains fractures. Throughout history, the Basque Country has leaned into its cultural differences from the rest of Spain (Núñez Seixas 2005).

[24]Article 15 of the Spanish Constitution states "Everyone has the right to life and to physical and moral integrity, without, in any case, being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. The death penalty is abolished, except as may be provided by military criminal laws in time of war" ("Constitución Española" 1978).

While the Pact of Forgetting was formed under the political necessity of Spanish unity (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; Hayner 2011; Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010, 2), the Basque separatist movement did not share the same vision. To further understand why Spanish political actors chose or chose not to follow the Pact of Forgetting, I will examine the 2017 Catalan Independence Movement. While the Catalan Independence Movement is distinct from the Basque movement, it also provides insight into how regional nationalists defy the Spanish memory regime. Importantly, unlike the previous examination of rhetoric following Arregui's death, the 2017 Catalan Referendum falls under the political conditions of this study because it challenges the Spanish Constitution at a moment of possible significant political transition.

Chapter 3: Catalan 2017 Independence Movement – Fracturing in the Pact of Forgetting?

If political actors repress memories of civil conflict during politically fragile conditions to hold the nation together, what occurs after decades of democratic strength? Although Spain underwent a grassroots memory movement in the 2000s (Ferrandiz 2013, 38-39; Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010), establishment political actors still chose not to utilize memory of civil conflict during 2017 Catalan Independence Movement. Why was it that establishment political actors decided to suppress memories of the civil war and the dictatorship when the grassroots movements fractured the Pact of Forgetting? I will argue that this continued decision to forget even in the face of popular remembrance highlights how political conditions impact political actors' choice to use memory.

While the 2017 Catalan Referendum did not use violence, I understand it to be an attempted coup because it unconstitutionally attempted to dissolve the Spanish nation (Aune 2022, 55). Given these vulnerable conditions, establishment political actors repressed memories of civil conflict out of fear of increasing tension between social cleavages and further dividing

the nation (Hayner 2011). However, Catalan separatists used the shared memory of repression during Francoism to draw on the Catalan cleavage to argue for their right to greater autonomy.

I suggest that the distinct political goals of the establishment political actors and the separatists impacted their decision on whether to use collective memory of civil conflict. Actors' decisions to utilize memory are dependent on "context-dependent strategic choices" and their political goals (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 17). Establishment political actors did not have a political opening to evoke a new vision for the nation because the Spanish nation was threatened (Jelin 2003, 29). Instead, the establishment suppressed memory of social cleavages out of fear of increasing political division in a vulnerable political environment (Hayner 2011; Aguilar Fernández 1996). However, the Catalan separatists operated under different goals in which it was advantageous to divide the Spanish nation through memory of social cleavages, particularly through what made Catalonia distinct from Spain.

Before providing an analysis on the 2017 Catalan Independence Movement, I will first provide background on the 2000s grassroots memory movement in Spain. I will then consider the scholarly discussion on the changes to Spain's mnemonic regime since the transition to democracy. Next, I will provide background on the separatist movement to understand how the Pact of Forgetting was challenged. Finally, I will briefly note the use of popular collective memory of civil conflict by everyday Spaniards during the Catalan Independence Movement.

Background: Fracturing in Spain's Pact of Forgetting

The 2000s Popular Movement to Remember

In response to the elite's institutionalization of silence, a civil society movement began in the early 2000s to challenge the Pact of Forgetting by searching for the bodies of victims buried

in unmarked mass graves under Franco (Maystorovich Chulio 2022).[25] Individuals sought to find out what happened to their missing relatives. Specifically, Emilio Silva's search for the mass grave where his grandfather's body lay led to the establishment of the Association for the Recovery of Historic Memory (ARHM) (Maystorovich Chulio 2022, 416; Sime 2013, 39). ARHM was established in 2000 to find and exhume the bodies of 13 Republicans who were executed by the Falange in 1936. Since 2000, ARHM has greatly expanded ("What is the Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory (ARMH)" 2015). Over time, through the media, the organization captured the attention of the international human rights community (Ferrandiz 2013, 43).

The public discussion of the exhumation movement challenged the Pact of Forgetting. Rubin explains that "In exhuming a mass grave, the memory movement dismantles another node in the infrastructure of the fascist state, weakening its capacity to shape Spain's future" (2018, 219). The splintering of the memory regime created a small political opening for institutional recognition of the dictatorship's victims. Under the Zapatero government in 2006, financial compensations were created for families of victims (Ferrandiz 2013, 45).

In 2007, the Cortes Generales passed the Law of Historical Memory. While the law named the Franco dictatorship as "illegitimate," it is criticized for failing to provide truth and justice (Ferrandiz 2013, 45; Encarnación 2014, 3). Furthermore, the legal system and rulings under Franco are still in place. This continuation means that court judgments ruling Republicans as guilty of rebellion still hold (Rubin 2018, 219).

[25]In the late 1900s following Franco's death and Spain's Democratic Transition, a more localized exhumations occurred. "The 'first-wave' exhumations did not follow any particular scientific protocol, but were carried out by relatives (particularly widows, although also siblings and children), friends and occasionally workers hired by local councils for that purpose" (Aguilar 2017, 406).

While the legal implications of the 1977 Amnesty Law (Pact of Forgetting) still limit justice for victims of the Franco dictatorship, the grassroots collective memory movement challenged the Pact of Forgetting and opened a path for political actors to refer to the dictatorship and the civil war (Ferrandiz 2013, 42). For example, in his 2004 inauguration speech, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) Prime Minister Luis Rodríguez Zapatero discussed his grandfather, a Republican captain, who was shot in 1936. Zapatero explained that his grandfather's story was his central inspiration for becoming a politician (Ferrandiz 2013, 45). Zapatero's rhetoric shows fracturing within the Spanish forgetting regime in the early 2000s, even among the political elite.

If political actors used memory in the early 2000s, why did establishment politicians suppress memories of civil conflict during the 2017 Catalan Independence Movement? I suggest that the political conditions of the attempted coup contributed to establishment political actors' decision to forget memory of civil conflict. Given the threat of the Catalan nationalist social cleavage to the Spanish nation, the centralist cleavage suppressed narratives of conflict out of fear that remembering a contentious past would further divide the nation and threaten the 1978 Constitution (Hayner 2011).

Theoretical Review: The Fracturing of the Spanish Mnemonic Regime

If there is a fracturing in the mnemonic regime of forgetting, it might be expected that political actors would engage with these grassroots movements and remember, so why do they continue to forget? In this section, I will examine how scholars understand the limits to this fracturing. I will also suggest that the political environment of the Catalan attempted coup destabilized the political conditions under which political actors operated. Given the

independence movement's threat to the nation, political actors repressed memories of conflict to unite social cleavages, despite cracks within the Spanish mnemonic regime.

First, scholars understand that the exhumation movement challenged the Pact of Forgetting. As Carlos Jerez-Farrán and Samuel Amago describe, the exhumed bodies are "living mementos of the power of the dead to speak beyond language as they mutely but eloquently remind the nation of the crimes perpetrated against its own people during and after the Civil War" (2010, 1). Rubin adds that the exhumation movement places the formerly forgotten disappeared in a new light where they are included in democratic society (2020). Sime concludes that the exhumation movement adds the trauma of Franco's victims to the narrative (2013, 41). In addition, through an analysis of the movement to find and exhume the body of famous Spanish poet, Federico García Lorca, Delgado argues that the exhumation movement is "a mode of public remembrance and a move toward better understanding both events of the past and the fissures of the present in a country where issues of justice have been compromised for too long by a culture of silence" (2015, 196). The public production of memoirs, TV documentaries, works of fiction, history books, and public commemorations following the exhumation movement illustrate continued public push back against the Pact of Forgetting (Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010, 5). However, political actors, particularly members of the Partido Popular, still push for silence (Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010, 2).

Scholars suggest that the official mnemonic regime that maintained Francoist narratives did not change. In 2002, at the beginning of the movement, Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek asserted that Spanish elites "even today find it difficult to articulate national discourse without the negative connotations inherited from the dictatorship" (2002, 122). Rubin adds that material objects continue to embed the Franco dictatorship in the present. For example, the government's

decision to repair the crumbling 150-meter-tall stone cross in the Valley of the Fallen demonstrated to memory activists how the dictatorship continues to be entrenched in the government's policy and financial priorities (Rubin 2018, 218).

Some scholarship critiques the 2007 Law of Historical Memory for maintaining Francoist mnemonic narratives and failing to provide justice for victims (Ferrandiz 2013, 45; Encarnación 2014, 3; J.L. Fuentes 2022, 158). Because the 2007 Law requires commemoration be done in the private spheres and fails to challenge Francoist monuments, it undermines the institutionalization of Republican narratives and continues to perpetuate the Nationalist ones (J.L. Fuentes 2022, 158; Encarnación 2014, 3).[26] Fuentes adds "the Law of Historical Memory was an attempt by Spain's national government simultaneously to assert its European belonging and to suppress and discredit narratives of Republican victimhood and conflict that threatened the dominant narrative of Spain's successful transition to democracy" (J.L. Fuentes 2022, 130).

In conclusion, the exhumation movement created a fracturing in the Pact of Forgetting, especially among the public. However, the 2007 Law of Historical Memory maintained Francoist mnemonic narratives and undermined public commemoration of Republican victims. Still, the grassroots memory movement suggests that political actors would be more likely to utilize collective memory of civil conflict during potential democratic transitions because there was a public mnemonic discussion. However, I will argue that establishment political actors continued to abide by the Pact of Forgetting during the Catalan Independence Referendum due to its challenging of the Spanish nation and 1978 Constitution.

[26]"Ironically, today in Spain only those seeking to bring former Franco officials to justice are risking prosecution in connection to the crimes of the Franco regime" (Encarnación 2014, 3). Specifically, Judge Baltazar Garzón was prosecuted for abusing his power and investigating former Franco officials (Encarnación 2014, 3).

Background: The Catalan Separatist Movement

The Catalan nationalist social cleavage has challenged Spanish centralization throughout its history. To solidify Catalan identity, these political actors utilize memories of autonomy and oppression by the Spanish nation from the Medieval period to the current democracy. An analysis of how Catalan separatists distinguish themselves from Spanish identity provides insight to the Catalan nationalist and centralist social cleavages.

Some Catalans view the nation of Spain as an imagined community historically imposed by an absolute monarchy (Fernández, Mercadé, and Oltra 1983, 27; Anderson 2016). However, under the Reconquista narrative, Franco saw Catalonia as an integral part of the Spanish nation. Through the oppression of regional cultures and languages, Franco attempted to create a homogenized Spanish nation (Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek 2002, 133). The Catalan nationalist cleavage saw this oppression as the unjust domination of the Spanish state (Fernández, Mercadé, and Oltra 1983, 27).

Some Catalans push against Franco's centralist narrative and argue for the independence of the nation of Catalonia. To legitimize the Catalan nation, supporters of independence use historic narratives of Catalan autonomy and oppression. During the Medieval Ages, Catalan counties joined the Kingdom of Aragon. Later during the Reconquista, Aragon joined with Castile to form two self-governing kingdoms (Carbonell 2019, 790). However, during the Spanish War of Succession in 1714, the Catalan Principality lost its self-governance (Carbonell 2019, 790; Dowling 2019, 305; Narotzky 2019, 34-35 and 49). This included the restriction of the Catalan language in official settings (Vargas 2018, 4). The Catalan nationalist cleavage fought against this centralization (Narotzky 2019, 34). For example, during the Carlist Wars from 1833 to 1876, advocates for Catalan autonomy defended regional rights and historic identities

(Narotzky 2019, 35).[27] Building off these historic demands for autonomy, pro-independence actors called "for the restoration of the 'true' sovereignty lost in 1714" (Dowling 2019, 305). To secessionists, the loss of the self-governing charters is a symbol of "grievance: homogenization under an increasingly liberal centralized modern state" (Narotzky 2019, 49).

Furthermore, supporters of independence use the narrative of Francoist oppression to legitimize the Catalan nation (Aune 2022, 77). According to Dowling, regional control under the dictatorship delegitimized centralized nation-making in Spain (2018, 24). The Franco regime severely limited Catalan self-government. It abolished the *Estatut d'Autonomia* (Charter of Autonomy) founded in 1932 under the Second Spanish Republic (Narotzky 2019, 38). In addition, Castilian was enforced as the only legal language of government administration and Catalan was prohibited for public use. These linguistic restrictions were perceived as a form of humiliation by Catalan speakers, which solidified the Catalan language as a critical aspect of the Catalan nation's identity (Narotzky 2019, 39). In fact, many now argue that, to be included in the Catalan nation, people must speak and use Catalan (Dowling 2023, 3).

Given the history of regional identities in Spain, political actors during the Spanish transition understood the need to consider Spain's diverse social cleavages. Political consensus regarding the 1978 Constitution understood Spain to be a "nation of nations" (Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek 2002, 134). Specifically, the constitution acknowledges Basque, Catalan, and Galician nationalities. The constitution recognizes the Spanish nation, while also consecrating

[27]See "Evidence Struggles: Legality, Legitimacy, and Social Mobilizations in the Catalan Political Conflict" by Susana Narotzky published in Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 26 #1 (Winter 2019) for the creation of Catalan national identity.

"the plural nature of Spain" (Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek 2002, 134). For Catalonia, this solidification highlights the understanding that Spain is an imposed imagined community (Fernández, Mercadé, and Oltra 1983, 27; Anderson 2016).

In addition, legal challenge to the 2006 Catalan statute of autonomy by the conservative Partido Popular (PP) and a subsequent ruling by the Spanish Constitutional Court enabled the conviction of independence supporters (Narotzky 2019, 41). In 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court struck down key provisions of the 2006 Catalan statue of autonomy, including Catalan being the only official language and provisions legitimizing the Catalan nation (Narotzky 2019, 41; Miguel and Noguer October 1, 2017).[28] Catalan resistance to this court ruling is built on their identity as a self-governing nation. Supporters of Catalan independence view the court ruling as a continuation of the imposed Spanish nation.

Following the 2010 ruling by the Constitutional Court, the conflict between elites in the centralist and Catalan nationalist cleavages increased, eventually "develop[ing] into a full-fledged institutional crisis" (Narotzky 2019, 33). As Basque leader Urkullu explained, regional nationalists recognize Euskadi[29] and Catalonia as two existing nations (Ormazabal September 24, 2017). Given this belief, the Generalitat of Catalunya called for a Catalan independence referendum on October 1, 2017 (Aune 2022, 55). Only 43% of Catalan voters participated and 90.2 percent voted in favor of independence ("Resultados definitivos del referéndum del 1 de octubre" 2017). It is important to note that "repeated elections show that Catalan citizens are divided and have very different positions regarding support for independence" (Narotzky 2019, 33). While the referendum was declared unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court,

[28]See Tribunal Constitutional, n. 31, Catalan Statute of Autonomy, June 28 2010 (Spain), URL:https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/ResolucionesTraducidas/31-2010,%20of%20June%2028.pdf
[29]Euskadi means the Basque Country in Basque.

the President of the Catalan Generalitat announced Catalan's independence on October 27th, 2017 (Aune 2022, 55). Given the Spanish Constitutional Court's ruling that the referendum was unconstitutional, I categorize it as an attempted coup. Puigdemont's declaration prompted the federal Spanish government to suspend the autonomous government of Catalonia under article 155 of the 1978 Constitution and called for Catalan elections on December 21st, 2017 (Aune 2022, 55).

A Note on Public Memory: Signs of Fracturing in the Pact of Forgetting

While this study focuses on the arguments of political actors, I found public memory that demonstrates fracturing in the Pact of Forgetting in Spain during the 2017 Catalan Independence Movement. Before discussing the rhetoric of political actors, I will briefly examine the evidence I found concerning popular memory. I speculate that the grassroots exhumation movement provided space for the public to discuss Francoism and apply these discussions to questions surrounding Spanish nationhood and regional independence (Jelin 2003).

To begin, Spanish monk Hilari Raguer referred to the 1714 narrative and compared the present Spanish government to the Franco regime. Raguer asserted that Catalonia has "300 years of repression" (Dominguez September 29, 2017). This reference builds off the narrative that Catalonia lost its self-governing status unjustly, leading to 300 years of oppression by the Spanish state (Dowling 2019, 305; Carbonell 2019, 790). This implied Catalonia's right to independence by suggesting that Catalonia had always been a separate nation from Spain. In addition, Raguer added "These days remind me of late Francoism, because the dictatorship in the end was no longer of the machine gun, it was the baton (Dominguez September 29, 2017). This

statement challenges the Pact of Forgetting by remembering the Franco regime and linking its oppression to the current Spanish government.

In addition, even within the centralist cleavages, protesters used symbols of the Franco dictatorship to argue against Catalonia's right to secede. These protesters built their arguments from Franco's centralization of Spain to suggest that Catalonia was an essential part of the Spanish nation. At a protest in Madrid's Plaza de Cibeles, protesters waved flags. While many of these flags were the official Spanish flag, a small number of flags included the coat of arms of the eagle of San Juan, which was the official flag under Franco ("Miles de personas salen a la calle en toda España para defender la unidad" October 1, 2017). Furthermore, young protesters sang Cara al Sol, a Falangist anthem ("Miles de personas salen a la calle en toda España para defender la unidad" October 1, 2017). While this is only a small representation of Spaniards, their use of Francoist symbols to oppose Catalan autonomy suggests a fracturing in the Pact of Forgetting.

Analysis: Political Actors' Use of Memory During the Catalan Independence Movement

Despite grassroots memory movements in the 2000s and popular memory use by Catalan separatists and even those within the centralist cleavage, establishment political actors continued to forget memories of civil conflict. This decision to suppress memory of conflict, even within growing pressure from constituents, emphasizes the impact of fragile political conditions on establishment political actors' decision to forget in order to hold the nation together. I categorize the Catalan Independence Referendum under the political environment of an attempted coup because it unconstitutionally attempted to overthrow the Spanish state through secession (Aune 2022, 55). Given that the Catalan nationalist cleavage's actions threatened the Spanish nation and

constitution, establishment political actors decided to follow the Pact of Forgetting out of fear that memory of violence between social cleavages would further divide the nation. However, establishment political actors do employ mnemonic narratives of the democratic transition to unite the country.[30]

The goals of political actors impact how they use memory (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 17). Given that establishment political actors' goal was to unify Spain and delegitimize Catalan separatists, the memory of successful consensus and peaceful transformation serves to appeal to the country's positive collective memories of unity. In contrast, Catalan separatists' goals aligned with dividing the Spanish nation. To legitimize their calls for independence, Catalan separatists acted as mnemonic warriors and appealed to the Catalan nationalist cleavage through memories of civil conflict. They connected memories of Francoism to the present Spanish democracy to suggest that this persistent oppression justified secession. In summary, the decision to remember or forget was based on the fragile political conditions of potential transition and the distinct goals of establishment political actors and Catalan separatists.

Maintaining the Nation: Establishment Political Actors Abide by the Pact of Forgetting

Due to the threat that the independence movement posed to the Spanish nation, establishment political actors generally avoided the memory of the civil war and the Franco regime out of fear that these memories would increase tension between diverse social cleavages in Spain.[31] Often, establishment political actors' rhetoric discussed stability, legality, and

[30]While this is an example of memory use, it still follows the Pact of Forgetting. The Pact of Forgetting concerns the suppressing of memories of conflict, the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship (Aguilar Fernández 1996).
[31]While Aune found three examples of the constitutionalist party, Ciudadanos, referring to the civil war or the dictatorship, the vast majority of arguments made by establishment political actors did not reference this time period (2022, 70).

constitutionality (Narotzky 2019, 33). These topics mirror arguments made during the attempted coup in 1981. However, unlike in 1981, establishment political actors in 2017 directly referenced historic founding narratives and the more recent transition to democracy. This use of memory of peace served to appeal to much of the Spanish population. Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek suggest that "the most important source of national pride" in Spain was the transition to democracy because Spaniards "regard themselves and the king to have been the crucial actors in contributing to the peaceful and successful consolidation of democracy" (2002, 141). These memories of peace and dignity serve to unite the Spanish nation, unlike memories of civil conflict, which often work to divide.

Political opponents of Catalan independence followed rhetoric similar to that of political actors in 1981 by calling on people to respect the Spanish Constitution and national unity. When discussing the independence movement, leader of the Andalusian PSOE Susana Diáz explained "Andalusia will be where it has always been, in defense of the Constitution, the laws and our country" (Moraelsa and de Blas September 28, 2017). Diáz used present understanding of Spain's democratic system and invoked the concept of the nation to argue that the independence referendum unconstitutionally attempted to divide the Spanish nation. In addition, by describing Andalusian support for the constitution, the law, and Spain, she promoted Spanish unity. Furthermore, Alicia Sánchez Camacho, former president of the Catalan Partido Popular (PP), asserted that the supporters of independence "have been promoting an attitude that is contrary to coexistence" ("La Fundación España Constitucional defiende que sólo 'senegocie con Cataluñya cunado acate la Constitución'" September 29, 2017). Sánchez Camacho criticized Catalan separatists for dividing the nation. This criticism pleaded for unity, like the 1981 establishment political actors did. By calling for coexistence, Sánchez Camacho appealed to Spaniards to

consider their ability to live in peace despite their differences. This suggests an already existing acceptance of a plural nation, which serves to delegitimize the separatists' demands for autonomy.

Additionally, establishment political actors emphasized the illegality of the independence movement to strengthen the concept of the Spanish nation and draw support from multiple social cleavages. For example, the Minister of Defense Eduardo Serra maintained "that the Generalitat de Catalunya [should] abide by the Constitution and the law" ("La Fundación España Constitucional defiende que sólo 'senegocie con Cataluñya cunado acate la Constitución'" September 29, 2017). Spanish Minister of the Economy De Guindos added that the Catalan government was "not respecting the law and dividing Catalans" ("De Guindos desmiente que el gobierno se haya planteado negociar el cupo para Cataluña" September 29, 2017). Serra and De Guindos asserted that the government of Catalonia's actions broke the law and divided the Spanish nation. By labeling the actions of the separatists as illegal and unconstitutional, these establishment political actors acknowledged the threat to the political system, while legitimizing the Spanish nation. These decisions suggest that the establishment suppressed narratives of civil conflict to contain questions on the understanding of the nation through the legitimacy of the democratic system. These arguments of constitutionality and unity focus on the present, similar to 1981, to delegitimize the Catalan independence movement by categorizing it as a divisive, unconstitutional, and rebellious.[32]

[32]See also: "El Gobierno descarta como interlocutores tras el 1-O a Puigdemont y Junqueras" by Carmen del Riego, published by *La Vanguardia* on September 30, 2017; "Rajoy responde al desafío sobreanistacon tres nuevos recursos de inconstitucionalidad en vísperas de la consulta," published by *La Vanguardia* on September 30, 2017; "Rivera pide no participar mañana en 'el golpe a la democracia'" by Iñaki Ellakuría and published in *La Vanguardia* on September 30, 2017, "El Gobierno no negociará con la Generalitat tras el 1-O: 'A Puigdemont solo le queda dimitir'" published in ABC on September 29, 2017.

Establishment political actors employed the memory of the 1981 coup to depict the Catalan referendum as unconstitutional and undemocratic to unify the Spanish nation (Aune 2022, 70). Albert Rivera and Inés Arrimadas urged Catalans to not support the referendum because it was the "biggest blow to Spanish democracy" since the 1981 attempted coup (Ellakuría September 30, 2017). Furthermore, Rivera labeled the leaders of the independence movement, Puigdemont and Junqueras, as "coup plotters" (Ellakuría September 30, 2017). By using the memory of the 1981 attempted coup, the political establishment reminded the centralist social cleavage that Spain successfully put down attempts against the 1978 Constitution in the past. The memory of the defeated 1981 coup served to delegitimize the independence referendum by painting it as a threat to democracy and an attempt to unconstitutionally overthrow the state. Furthermore, Rivera and Arrimadas' rhetoric labeled those who supported the referendum as undemocratic and as threatening the Spanish nation.

Political actors invoked the founding of the Spanish nation to solidify the centralist cleavage and delegitimize Catalan separatists' assertion that they had a historic right to independence. PSOE leader Felipe González used this founding narrative to argue for the inclusion of Catalonia within the Spanish nation. González asserted that "Spain is a shared public space, a historical reality with more than 500 years in its current perimeter, one of the oldest nations in the world" (González September 29. 2017). When González referred to 500 years, he referenced the Reconquista. González used the Reconquista narrative to legitimize the Spanish nation and Catalonia's essential continued inclusion in it.

In addition, political opponents to Catalan independence employed the memory of the successful transition to democracy to delegitimize Catalan's independence movement and strengthen support from the centralist cleavage. As Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek suggest,

the memory of the transition is a unifying source of pride for much of the Spanish population. This use of memory of peace appealed to much of the Spanish population (2002, 141). Felipe González evoked this collective memory of pride, stating, "Since [the 1978] constitutional pact, Spain has experienced the longest period of coexistence in freedom, modernization and the most brilliant political, economic and social development in history" (September 29. 2017). González used the narrative of successful coexistence to demonstrate the success of Spanish democracy to unite the Spanish nation. Through this memory of effective unity, González worked to delegitimize calls for division.

In addition, establishment political actors suggested the pluri-national lean of the Spanish nation to characterize demands from the Catalan nationalist cleavage as unreasonable. González stated that Spain is a place where "different languages coexist with Spanish such as Catalan, Basque and Gallaecian" (September 29. 2017). The specific inclusion of language serves to demonstrate that the pluri-national lean in Spain already meets one of Catalonia's central independence demands, language autonomy.

In summary, establishment political actors suppressed memory of civil conflict to unify the Spanish nation when it was unconstitutionally challenged by the Catalan nationalist cleavage. In addition, these opponents to Catalan secession employed memory of the founding of the Spanish nation and the more recent democratic transition to unite Spaniards through the long history of the Spanish nation and the dignified transition to democracy. Through these peaceful mnemonic narratives, establishment political actors worked to delegitimize the Catalan Independence Movement as an unconstitutional and unreasonable demand to destabilize the nation.

Calls for Catalan Nationhood: The Use of Memory of Civil Conflict by Catalan Separatists

Catalan separatists challenged the Pact of Forgetting to appeal to the Catalan nationalist cleavage by demonstrating repression by the Spanish state. Secessionists used memory of the Franco regime and the 1978 democratic transition to delegitimize the Spanish nation established by the 1978 Constitution and defend the Catalan nation. Unlike establishment political actors, challenging the Pact of Forgetting is in the interest of advocates for Catalan independence because their goal is to fracture Spain and solidify Catalan national identity. While the political condition was unstable, because the Catalan separatists were the destabilizers they operated differently within this political environment. Their goal of dividing the Spanish government contributed to their strategic decision to remember civil conflict (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 17). Through mnemonic narratives of violence, Catalan political actors acted as mnemonic warriors and appealed to the shared memories of oppression by the Catalan nationalist cleavage.

The decision to hold the referendum on the 1st of October was a mnemonic choice, invoking the start of Francoist oppression. On October 1st, 1936, Franco declared himself El Caudillo (Aune 2022, 75-76). Catalan political actors' decision to hold the referendum on the same day that Franco named himself El Caudillo suggests that the referendum was a response to the oppression under the Franco regime. Furthermore, pro-independence *Diputado* Gabriel Rufián, asserted that Franco had risen, but that the referendum on October 1st would kill the dictator again (Bassets September 20, 2017). By stating that Franco had risen, Rufián implied that the current Spanish democracy continued to impose Francoist oppression. In addition, Rufían related Francoist tyranny to the repression of Catalan autonomy when he explained that the referendum would kill him again. As Aune explains, separatists utilized collective memory to

argue for the legitimacy of Catalan resistance by tying the present democratic government to Franco (2022, 75-76).

In addition, supporters of Catalan independence linked the 1978 Spanish Constitution to the Franco regime to appeal to the Catalan nationalist cleavage through collective memory of oppression to delegitimize the current Spanish state. Barcelona politician Jaume Asens explained "The time has come for us, we are feeling that the chains of the 78 regime are being broken" (Ríos September 30, 2017). In addition, Catalan President Carles Puigdmont labeled the Spanish government an "authoritarian state" (Ríos September 30, 2017).[33] The word choices of "regime" and "authoritarian" were buzz words to signal to the Catalan nationalist cleavage that the then-present, central Spanish government was not drastically different from the Franco regime. Calling the 1978 Constitution a regime suggested that the Spanish government continued to oppress regions (Aune 2022, 85-86). In addition, Asens' statement that Catalans were feeling the regime's chains being broken implied that voting for independence would free Catalonia. Political supporters of Catalan independence compared the current democratic government to the Franco regime, employing Catalan collective memory of Francoist oppression to solidify Catalan identity and divide Spain.

Supporters of independence labeled opponents as fascists invoking the memory of Franco's dictatorship to appeal to the Catalan nationalist cleavage's shared memory of oppression (Croft 2017). The President of a municipal PP group, Dolores López, explained "The softest thing [independence supporters] call you is 'fascist' or 'go to your country'" (Marcos

[33]See also: "ETA aplaude el desafío catalán y anima a replicarlo en Euskadi ," written by Mikel Ormazabal and published in *El País* on September 27, 2017. The article provides perspective on additional separatist groups in Spain comparing the democratic government to a regime.

October 1, 2017).[34] By calling López a fascist, secessionists used the memory of Franco to connect centralists to their oppressors under the Franco dictatorship. The label of fascist suggested that like the Franco regime, establishment political actors unjustly occupied the Catalan nation.

Building on this mnemonic narrative of oppression, pro-independence actors argued that the referendum was a tool to fully achieve democracy. Catalan politician, Joan Joseph Nuet explained in a statement in support of the referendum that "This is not about independence, it is about democracy" (Ríos September 30, 2017). A statement by the sympathetic ETA read "The process constitutes a process in favor of democracy, since not having allowed them a democratic way to aspire to independence, in the end they have had to undertake a pro-independence path to access democracy" (Ormazabal September 27, 2017).[35] By suggesting that the referendum was a tool to achieve democracy, supporters of independence argued that the then-current Spanish government was not a full democracy. This argument built off the earlier narrative that the current government was the heir of Franco's military government (Aune 2022, 75). The argument of the referendum bringing democracy to Catalonia also suggested that, unlike establishment political actors, separatists did not view the political conditions as challenging the democratic state. Instead, Catalan separatists saw the independence movement as combating oppression. This highlights how the different goals of political actors impact how they use collective memory (Bernhard and Kubik 2014, 17).

[34]See also: "El País de los Facistas", written by Carlos Yánoz and published in *El País* on September 30, 2017; "Tierra de nadid," opinion by Isabel Coixet and published in *El País* on October 4, 2017 (example of public's use of the term fascist to label opponents)
[35]See also: "Catalunya afronta la pureba del 1-0 ," written by Isabel Garcia Pagan and published in *La Vanguardia* on October 1, 2017.

In conclusion, Catalan separatists employed the memory of Francoist oppression and the 1978 democratic transition to appeal to the Catalan nationalist cleavage and suggest that the current Spanish democracy continued the unjust and illegitimate repression of the Franco dictatorship. Unlike establishment political actors, supporters of Catalan independence utilized collective memory of civil conflict because their goal was to divide the Spanish nation and solidify Catalan national identity to legitimize Catalan secession.

Conclusion on Rhetoric Used by Political Actors during the 2017 Independence Movement

Despite evidence demonstrating fractures in the Pact of Forgetting, establishment political actors generally avoided discussing the Spanish Civil War and the Franco dictatorship. Interestingly, the political establishment used arguments that mirrored statements following the 1981 attempted coup. Like the 1981 attempted military coup, the Catalan Independence Movement unconstitutionally challenged the Spanish nation. Given this vulnerable political environment, establishment political actors abided by the Pact of Forgetting out of the belief that memory of civil conflict would increase tension between social cleavages in Spain and threaten the democratic nation. In addition, these opponents of Catalan independence used the collective memory of the defeat of the 1981 coup, successful transition to democracy, and the founding of the Spanish nation to delegitimize the calls for Catalan independence and unify the Spanish nation.

In contrast, supporters of Catalan independence employed the collective memory of oppression under the dictatorship to argue for the right to Catalan independence. They argued that the imposed Spanish nation and 1978 Constitution were a continuation of the unjust and cruel tyranny of the Franco regime to appeal to the memories of the Catalan nationalist cleavage.

Pro-independence political actors were not afraid of challenging the Pact of Forgetting because their goal was not to unify Spain, but to permanently separate from the Spanish nation. Given that Catalan separatists acted as the destabilizers of the political environment, they utilized memory of civil conflict to draw support from the Catalan nationalist cleavage and legitimize their challenge to the Spanish nation.

Chapter 4: Chile 1988 State-Codified Referendum - Using Memory to Construct Competing Visions for Chile's Future

In contrast to the Spanish Pact of Forgetting, Chile's mnemonic regime during the 1988 plebiscite was dominated by mnemonic warriors. Political actors across the ideological spectrum employed memory of civil conflict to draw on social cleavages to gain support for their vision of the nation. For the chapters on Chile, I will focus on ideological social cleavages, including the leftist and neoliberal cleavages. Unlike Spain, where the attempted coup challenged the 1978 Spanish Constitution, the 1988 Chilean plebiscite was a state-codified referendum. Chile's 1988 plebiscite's political conditions are categorized as a state-codified referendum given that it was constitutionally mandated and planned.[36] In transitions to democracy, Chile's 1988 referendum provides a contrasting political environment to 1981 Spain because the constitutionally-supported transition created a more stable situation in Chile.

While the military and its supporters had significantly more strategic power during the plebiscite campaign, the referendum provided a legitimate political opening to define the future of the nation (*Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988). Unlike Spain, where the political conditions led to the suppression of memories of civil conflict, the

[36]This is not to say that there was a fair, equal political environment for debate. The plebiscite was still held during a dictatorship. However, the plebiscite provided a constitutionally mandated space, and its fairness was impacted by international forces (*Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988).

1988 plebiscite allowed for a political opening. During a political opening, mnemonic warriors use memory to legitimize competing views of the nation (Jelin 2003, 31; Bernhard and Kubik 2014). The constitutionally mandated referendum provided more stable conditions and therefore a political opening because it was supported by a constitutional path. Moreover, in the 1988 plebiscite, political actors advocating for the Say No or Say Yes campaigns utilized memory because the referendum provided a conducive environment for arguments over the future of the nation. These political actors were able to draw on social cleavages solidified under Allende's Popular Unity coaltion and the Pinochet military regime through the use of memory. While these social cleavages are complex, I will simplify them along two ideological and economic lines. The Say Yes Campaign generally appealed to conservatives supporting Pinochet's economic and social neoliberal model. In contrast, the Say No Campaign appealed to those suppressed under Pinochet. I will detail in the background section of this chapter how the political conditions under the Pinochet dictatorship allowed for the institutionalization of narratives and the suppression of rival social cleavages through propaganda and state violence (Stern et al. 2006, 33-39).

During the plebiscite, the two campaigns used contrasting memories to appeal to their social cleavages. The Say Yes Campaign advocated for a continuation of the military regime through a non-negotiable mnemonic understanding of Pinochet saving Chile from violence and chaos. In contrast, the Say No Campaign argued for a change in the country's leadership by contrasting the collective memory of the brutality of the military regime to the hope of a brighter future (Stern et al. 2006, 358; Quilter 1989, 298; *Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988). Interestingly, both sides suggest that the founding of the Chilean nation was 1973 when Pinochet took power in a military coup. I suggest that the dictatorship

successfully internalized the military coup as the founding of the modern Chilean nation.[37] Furthermore, this internalization created an unbalanced political environment for the campaign.

In this chapter, I will provide background on the political conditions and social cleavages, a theoretical discussion of the institutionalization and challenging of mnemonic narratives under Pinochet, and evidence for my analysis of the use of memory during the 1988 plebiscite. Before discussing analysis, it is helpful to understand the political conditions under Allende's Popular Unity government (1970-1973), the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1989), and the 1988 plebiscite.

Background: Chilean Solidification of Left and Neoliberal Cleavages

The Popular Unity Government (1970-1973)

On September 4, 1970, Salvador Allende was elected president of Chile under the Popular Unity (UP) ticket (Ensalaco 2000, 5). President Allende was the first socialist "to be democratically voted into office in the Western Hemisphere" (Kornbluh 2004, 1). Allende was a Marxist who wanted to peacefully transition Chile to socialism. Specifically, the Popular Unity platform sought to nationalize the copper sector, build a socialized sector of the economy, and continue agrarian reform (Ensalaco 2000, 5; Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 302). The coalition was composed of five diverse Marxist and progressive parties, including the Socialist Party and the Communist Party of Chile (Ensalaco 2000, 5; Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 302). Popular Unity's broad ideological range contributed to tension within the coalition as the radical and more moderate wings of party conflicted over policies (Robles-Ortiz 2018, 607).

In addition to internal tension, the coalition faced outside opposition from the left and right. Further to the left, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) was skeptical of the

[37]Given that political actors focus on memory stemming from the 1970s, unlike the section on Spain, I will not provide background from the medieval ages.

ability of Popular Unity to transform Chile through legal, parliamentary means (Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 302).[38] On the Right, Christian Democratic and Nationalist parties were alarmed by Popular Unity's Marxists leanings (Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 302-303). While those in the ideological left had diverse and contrasting views, I understand those who supported Chile's transition along socialist or Marxist lines to form one side of the social cleavage. On the other side of the cleavage were conservatives who opposed this change and eventually supported Pinochet's neoliberal model. These leftist and neoliberal social cleavages were solidified through memory suppression under Pinochet.

In the first year of his presidency, despite a divided government and diverse coalition, Allende implemented many of his economic goals. The banks and the copper sector were nationalized, "wages were tied to an index of prices," and land reform was underway (Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 303). Throughout his tenure, Allende also incorporated and responded to Indigenous demands (Crow 2007, 333). Specifically, Indigenous organizations contributed to drafting *Ley Indígena* (Indigenous Law) and the Institute for Indigenous Development (IDI) was managed by Indigenous peoples (Crow 2007, 333).

One of the most significant policies under Allende was land reform.[39] This agrarian transformation included the elimination of the *hacienda* system (Crow 2007, 328). The *hacienda* system was a hierarchical economic and social system in rural Chile where work done by peasants, including Indigenous peoples, centered around the landlord's estate (Kay 1978, 103-104; Jara et al. 2018, 489-490).[40] These large estates (*latifundios*) and satellite smaller holdings

[38]MIR "was an ultra-leftist political movement and party inspired by Marxist ideology and Che Guevara's theoretical and practical contributions to guerrilla warfare in the context of the Cuban Revolution" (Amat 2024, 517).
[39]Land reform began under President Eduardo Frei in his "Revolution in Liberty" program (Ensalaco 2000, 5).
[40]Indigenous populations were often categorized and homogenized as peasants under Pinochet and the truth and reconciliation commissions (Jara et al. 2018, 489-490).

(*minifundios*) characterized rural Chile for three centuries (Winn and Kay 1974, 135). Popular Unity worked to end the *hacienda* system through expropriation, including seizing lands that had previously been taken from the Mapuche people (Winn and Kay 1974, 141-142). The coalition's "agrarian reform program was calculated to bring about a major political change – the creation of peasant power" (Winn and Kay 1974, 140). However, the Right saw Allende's land reform measures as property seizures, contributing to strong opposition to the Popular Unity government (Stern et al. 2006, 14).

By 1972, Allende's government was characterized by economic collapse and conflict (Ensalaco 2000, 1; Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 303). Global copper prices dropped significantly, contributing to an increase in Chilean national debt, rising inflation, and food shortages (Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 303). In addition, Chile faced multiple strikes in the face of Allende's economic policies (Ensalaco 2000, 1-2). Politically, conflict from within and outside the Popular Unity coalition presented challenges for effective governance (Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 302-303). The radical MIR group posed additional obstacles as it practiced a violent transition to Marxism (Ensalaco 2000, 10-11). In addition, the conservative opposition blamed Popular Unity for the worsening economic conditions (Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 303). Economic decline and contentious political divide weakened Allende's government (Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 303; Read and Wyndham 2016, 18-20; Ensalaco 2000, 1). Additionally, the opposition's large influence over the media allowed it to control the narrative against Popular Unity through propaganda (Blumler and Álvarez Fuentes 2020, 303). In an attempt to strengthen his government, Allende called for a national plebiscite to be held on September 11th, 1973 to demonstrate public support for his administration (Read and Wyndham 2016, 19-20).

The Augusto Pinochet Dictatorship (1973-1988)

However, on the date of the scheduled plebiscite, the Chilean military overthrew the Allende government with the support of US President Richard Nixon (Lazzara 2006, 11; Kornbluh 2004, 1-3).[41] For Pinochet, the coup was a necessary action to save Chile from chaos and prevent it from moving ideologically further to left (Read and Wyndham 2016, 1). While the coup initially resulted in a military junta that was run by multiple military leaders, including Pinochet, by 1974 Pinochet was named "Supreme Chief of the Nation" (Kornbluh 2004, 162-163).

To legitimize its power, Pinochet's regime pushed the narrative that it had saved the nation from descending into violent chaos. As Stern et al. explains:

> The violence of the Left, [the military] asserted, far exceeded that which anyone could have imagined. In this view the framework of salvation developed by the Left in 1973—its argument that the nation had to be saved from civil war—was not mere rhetoric. It exposed a political subculture obsessed with violence. Allende's Left was so enthralled by violent means in politics, so willing to use violence to impose a dictatorship, that only continual vigilance by a protective state on a war footing could prevent the reemergence of danger. Chilean order and tranquility had quickly been restored after September 11th (2006, 35-36).

After the coup, the military dictatorship used propaganda and violence against political opponents to create a homogenous nation. Through violent censorship, Pinochet worked to suppress rival social cleavages and their contrasting vision for the Chilean nation.

The military regime used its influence over the media to institutionalize its narrative that it had saved Chile from radical Marxism. The military permitted the conservative newspapers, *La Tercera* and *El Mercurio* to resume publishing two days after the coup. The publications emphasized images of "arsenals of arms, directly tied to Allende and Allendismo" (Stern et al. 2006, 39). In addition, television and radio reports furthered this narrative (Stern et al. 2006, 39).

[41]President Nixon viewed Allende as a threat to the US's sphere of influence during the Cold War and worked to destabilize Allende's government and ultimately supported the coup that led to Pinochet's rise in power (Kornbluh 2004,1-3).

The media emphasized that Allende did not plan on bringing socialism to Chile peacefully or legally, but instead was manipulating the population and planning for "violent dictatorship" (Stern et al. 2006, 39). The propaganda served to delegitimize the ideologically left cleavage and justify the military's control.

"Plan Z," a conspiracy theory developed by the dictatorship, set up the narrative pushed throughout 17 years of Pinochet's regime that the left, including Popular Unity, was brutal and willing to use mass violence (Stern et al. 2006, 50). Shortly following the 1973 military coup, the media and the military spread the narrative that Popular Unity, MIR, and foreign extremists [Marxists] were working together to destroy the Chilean military through mass assassinations (Stern et al. 2006, 41-42). *Crónica* explained that "The targets included not only military officers and judges but also prominent lawyers, doctors, journalists, and leaders and activists in professional and trade associations, in Right and Center political parties and in Patria y Libertad" (Stern et al. 2006, 43). Stern et al. describes the media campaign as "Like a horror movie in which the frightening early scene turns into prelude for a more terrifying fright, the cascade of revelations kept uncovering new layers of perversity" (2006, 44). The media pushed stories that children, parents, and wives of these leaders would also be murdered by the Left (Stern et al. 2006, 42-43). "Plan Z" begged Chileans to ask if their family would have been assassinated if the military had not intervened (Stern et al. 2006, 42). The conspiracy story implicated all major leftist groups including, "Communists, Socialists, Mapucistas (members of the mapu, Movement of Unified Popular Action), and Miristas" (Stern et al. 2006, 42). The publication of the "White Book" articulated the official narrative to Chileans and the international community. The "White Book" explained that "The military had spared the Chilean people of a Left so demonic it defied belief" (Stern et al. 2006, 46). Through the internalization of "Plan Z," the military dictatorship

solidified the narrative that they saved the country from an evil, violent government. This narrative entrenched the cleavage between the Left and Right by suggesting that liberals were willing to kill thousands of Chilean families to control the government.

In addition, academics, such as Jaime Guzmán, provided intellectual backing to support Pinochet's narrative that he had saved the Chilean nation from leftist brutality. Jaime Guzmán was "a deeply conservative legal scholar and admirer of Spain's Francisco Franco" (S. Edwards 2023, 124).[42] Guzmán supported the *gremialismo* political philosophy that supported the "drastic tearing down of Chile's political culture" and legitimized Pinochet's narrative that ongoing state violence was needed to protect the country from radical liberals (Stern et al. 2006, 58). *Gremialismo* supported the delegitimization of the vision of the Chilean nation held by the leftist social cleavage.

In addition to propaganda, the military regime employed violence to oppress opponents and create a homogenous nation. Under Pinochet's leadership, around 3,000 people were murdered or disappeared, 82,000 people were arrested for political reasons, and around 200,000 were exiled (Stern 2010, xxiii). CIA reports estimate that at least 13,500 of arrested citizens were taken to detention camps in the weeks following the coup. Those arrested included members of Allende's Popular Unity government, labor unionists, factory workers, political activists, and people living in shanty towns (Kornbluh 2004, 161-162). Some of these people were brutally murdered and victims of torture (Kornbluh 2004, 161-162). Stern explains that credible estimates for the number of people tortured under the military dictatorship ranges from more than 100,000 to 400,000 (2010, xxiv). The military dictatorship justified its violence through the "Plan Z

[42]Guzmán was also selected to draft the 1980 Constitution (S. Edwards 2023, 128).

[narrative] and its echoes created an ongoing war environment, a vision of Chile constantly in danger of falling into the hands of the sick fanatics [the left] who created a near miss with genocide" (Stern et al. 2006, 53). By murdering political opposition, the Pinochet dictatorship silenced those articulating competing narratives. As Stern et al explain:

> A policide project, aimed at changing the fundamental political mentality of Chileans, implied not only subjecting this large national sector to persecution and fear and excising it from images of the unified nation. It also implied a widening circle of fear and repression. Over time the regime would have to repress centrists who pushed for a return to democratic politics and elections, or who took up the banner of human rights. Over time it would need to combat anyone who pursued the human rights question— concerned relatives of victims; persons of conscience, including Archbishop Raúl Silva Henríquez and other religious figures; and transnational networks of activists, diplomats, journalists, and Chilean exiles (2006, 75).

The targeting of the regime's political opponents demonstrates how violence was used to oppress alternative visions for the nation, suppressing the rival social cleavage.

In 1973, at the same time "Plan Z" was pushed, Pinochet authorized General Sergio Arellano Stark to kill political prisoners to "expedite" justice against political threats in what is now referred to as "the Caravan of Death" (Stern et al. 2006, 51; Kornbluh 2004, 163).[43] The disposal of the bodies of these political opponents into unmarked graves and the refusal to allow family members to bury their loved ones led to a lack of closure for family members.[44] This loss fostered a desire among victims' families to understand what happened (Kornbluh 2004, 164). This desire contributed to the later decision to create an official narrative through truth and reconciliation commissions after the collapse of the dictatorship (Ferrara 2015, 32; Stern 2010, 65-66).

In November of 1973, Chile's secret police, DINA, was formed under Lieutenant Colonel Juan Manuel Conteras Sepúlveda (Kornbluh 2004, 166). DINA directed violence towards

[43]"The Caravan of Death" occurred in October 1973. Pinochet asked General Stark to "expedite" justice of political threats in the northern provinces of Chile, including La Serena, Copiapo, Antofagasta, and Calama. Joined by five other officers, Stark oversaw the murder of sixty-eight people over the course of four days (Kornbluh 2004, 163-164).

[44]This also connects to the use of violence during the Franco dictatorship to silence political opposition.

political opponents in secret locations to obtain information from them. The organization often murdered or disappeared these opponents as well (Kornbluh 2004, 167). DINA "not only organized its campaign of secret detentions, torture, disappearances, and executions. It also established its inside game—the ongoing state-of-war mentality that justified DINA surveillance and pressure as a kind of shadow power within ministries" (Stern et al. 2006, 54). Similar to the dictatorship in Spain, the violent oppression of political opponents silenced opposing mnemonic narratives (Stern et al. 2006; Schneider 2000, 782; Adams 2019, 340). By targeting the regime's opponents, Pinochet attempted to silence the left social cleavage.

In addition, rejecting Allende's economic policies, the military government sought to "modernize" the Chilean economy through neoliberal policies (Vázquez Guevara 2019, 258). Under the advice of the "Chicago Boys," the military regime "privati[zed] the exploitation of natural resources, deliver[ed] a range of tax-cuts and eliminat[ed] constraints on free trade" (Vázquez Guevara 2019, 258).[45] Furthermore, as finance and economic ministers, the "Chicago Boys" pursued privatization initiatives, the deregulation of markets, and limited social welfare (Stern 2006, 57). For example, in the early 1980s, Chile privatized its university and pension system (Pizarro 2019). In addition, the "Chicago Boys" proposed to reverse agrarian reform, which had expropriated land (S. Edwards 2023, 89). This contributed to the solidification of prominent regional families and institutions, some of whom had lost land due to agrarian reform measures, to the neoliberal cleavage (Stern et al. 2006, 33). These families viewed the coup as national salvation (Stern et al. 2006, 33).

Promoters of neoliberalism believed that the policy had to socially change Chile to be successful. Specifically, José Piñera and Miguel Kast thought that "to consolidate market

[45]"The Chicago Boys" refers to a group of Chilean economists who studied at the University of Chicago under Arnold Harberger and Milton Friedman. (Stern 2006, 57; Pizarro 2019).

orientation and ensure freedom for future generations it was necessary to move aggressively into the cultural and constitutional terrains" (S. Edwards 2023, 123-124). Moreover, "In order to truly change Chile and to avoid it falling again into the hands of communists there was a need for a deep change in political institutions and in the nation's culture" (S. Edwards 2023, 124). With the input of the "Chicago Boys," the 1980 Constitution solidified neoliberalism as a key characteristic of the Chilean nation (S. Edwards 2023, 130). The dictatorship promoted the narrative of Chileans embracing the neoliberal economic, social model by holding a constitutional plebiscite on September 11, 1980.[46] During the 1988 plebiscite, the dictatorship used the established connection between neoliberalism and the nation to promote a narrative that its neoliberal economic policies saved Chile from disastrous Marxism.[47] The intertwining of the nation and the neoliberal model solidified the social cleavage supporting the Say Yes Campaign in 1988.

Background on the 1988 Plebiscite

Under the 1980 Constitution, the junta installed Augusto Pinochet as President of Chile for eight years. After this term, the constitution mandated a referendum to confirm the candidate put forth by the junta through a yes or no vote. While some members of the junta preferred putting a civilian candidate forward, Pinochet promoted his own candidacy and eventually was unanimously put forward by the junta ("NDI: Standing with Democracy over Military

[46]However, "The plebiscite took place under highly questionable conditions: there were no voters' registries, opponents of the new constitution were not allowed to campaign, and ballots were printed on very thin, almost translucent, paper that allowed election officials to see how people voted" (S. Edwards 2023, 130).
[47]However, economic growth was concentrated among small sectors of society. As Stern et al. explain "The lion's share of benefits from high economic growth rates, sell-offs of state property, and transition to privatized pension funds were highly concentrated…Meanwhile, unemployment averaged some 18 percent during 1976–81, about triple the 1960s average, and poverty afflicted about two-fifths of the national population, more than double the 1970 rate" (Stern et al. 2006, 169).

Dictatorship - Chile's 1988 Presidential Plebiscite " 2023). The 38-day campaign (August 30th-October 5th) enabled the military and opposition to defend competing visions of the nation (Boas 2015, 71). The Say Yes and Say No Campaigns used non-negotiable, competing understandings of memory of civil conflict. The plebiscite campaign allowed for a political environment of debate, where memory was used to draw on social cleavages to construct contrasting views of the nation. 27 of these campaign days included 15-minute free television slots for each side to make their arguments ("NDI: Standing with Democracy over Military Dictatorship - Chile's 1988 Presidential Plebiscite " 2023).

On one side, the Say Yes Campaign was composed of the military and the government to promote Pinochet's reelection. According to the National Democratic Institute, the Say Yes Campaign focused on the contrasting economic results and stability of the former Popular Unity government and the then-current military current control. The Say Yes Campaign used memory of Pinochet and Allende's governments to draw support from the neoliberal social cleavage. The military argued that, if Pinochet did not retain power, the economic gains made under the military regime would be lost. Furthermore, it cultivated fear through the narratives that the extreme left was violent and that Allende's Popular Unity government was unstable ("NDI: Standing with Democracy over Military Dictatorship - Chile's 1988 Presidential Plebiscite " 2023). As Stern et al. explain, Pinochet's supporters "tied [their] vision of a modernizing, prosperous, and peaceable Chile to memory as salvation. Chileans had suffered chaos, economic ruin, and violence before September 1973, when they reached the very edge of a bloody civil war. The junta rescued the people from this disaster, and it undertook painful policies that transformed Chile into a successful society" (Stern et al. 2006, 358).

In contrast, the Say No Campaign, composed of 16 political parties, used the memory of violence under the Pinochet regime to envision a joyful, unified Chile under a new government. As a Chilean sociologist explained, the Say No Campaign understood that in addition to "concentrat[ing] on the plebiscite, they [had to] also fight fifteen years of adverse propaganda, in which a lot of things were put into Chilean heads" (Quilter 1989, 299). To illustrate its diverse political ideological unity, the Say No Campaign's logo featured a rainbow to symbolize "the unity of each of the political groupings" and the potential for happiness after a storm ("NDI: Standing with Democracy over Military Dictatorship - Chile's 1988 Presidential Plebiscite " 2023). While the Say No Campaign focused on illustrating a better future for Chileans, it also leveraged the collective memory of violence under Pinochet's dictatorship to highlight the need for change, despite the efforts of the regime to suppress it.

Interestingly, neither campaign frequently evoked memory prior to the 1900s. The Say Yes Campaign's focus on the 1973 military coup and Pinochet's government indicated that the military coup was the foundation for the modern Chilean nation. In contrast, the Say No Campaign highlighted the failures of the Pinochet dictatorship and their competing vision for a democratic future. While Say No supporters' lack of narratives referring to Allende suggest that they understood the strength of Pinochet's narratives condemning Popular Unity, they still sought to establish a new understanding of the Chilean nation. For the Say No Campaign, the foundation for the modern Chilean nation would be determined by the plebiscite. Through their use of collective memory, the Say No Campaign argued that the 1988 plebiscite laid out by the Constitution had the potential to create a new, modern, democratic Chile.

Before providing analysis of the 1988 plebiscite, it is helpful to understand the current scholarly discussion on the political conditions surrounding it. These conditions include the institutionalization and suppression of narratives under Pinochet.

Theoretical Review: Political Conditions in 1988 Chile and Competing National Narratives

Political Conditions in 1988 Chile

Leading up to the 1988 Plebiscite, the Pinochet dictatorship continued to use its control to institutionalize its narrative that the military had saved Chile from the violent, chaotic left (Stern et al. 2006, 358-360). During and leading up to the referendum, the dictatorship's institutional control gave them many political advantages (Stern et al. 2006, 358-359; *Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988). However, Stern et al. finds that the strategy to legitimize the dictatorship through the plebiscite backfired because "it set a struggle to define the true faces of Chile, past and present" (2006, 360). Through the stability of the state-codified referendum, the Say Yes and Say No Campaigns argued for competing national visions.

Institutionalization of the Pinochet Savior Narrative

Pinochet used propaganda and violence against opponents to institutionalize the narrative that he saved Chile from descending into a brutal, disorderly, socialist state (Stern et al. 2006, 35-36). As Stern et al. explain, "as the climactic campaign phase approached, the regime promoted harder and harder the memory of pre-1973 trauma. The choice came down to Pinochet versus a return to chaos and violence" (2006, 359). Adams further argues that the military regime used forced disappearances to eliminate leftists given the threat that they posed to the nation (2019, 340). Edwards finds that greater rates of repression corresponded to areas with higher political

partisanship (2022, 515). Finally, Pinochet used public displays of violence against political opposition to make Chileans fear challenging him (Schneider 2000, 782).

Challenging Pinochet's Narrative

While Pinochet's use of violence and institutional control gave the regime greater power over the national narrative, Stern et al. and Schneider describe how political actors and everyday Chileans disputed it (2006; 2000, 782). Opposing leaders called for the opportunity to challenge Pinochet in an election (Stern et al. 2006, 378 and 380). In addition, on August 29, 1988, the day before Pinochet's nomination as the plebiscite candidate, 1,000 women marched in Santiago with representations of the disappeared. In this mnemonic act, they pleaded for Chileans to not forget the victims of violence under the military regime (Stern et al. 2006, 375-377). These challenges pushed against Pinochet's narrative that he saved Chile and was the only one who could successfully lead the country.

Suppressed Narratives of Plurinationalism

In addition, the military government silenced narratives of plurinationalism and diversity (Bauer 2021, 44-46; Crow 2007, 152-153). Throughout the country's history, the central Chilean government suppressed Indigenous identity and rights (Bauer 2021, 41-43). "Mapuche territorial demands have been met with strong resistance from governing officials and elites, who argue that Indigenous peoples compromise part of the Chilean nation" (Bauer 2021, 41). However, Indigenous communities have historically been excluded from Chile's nation building project (Bauer 2021, 43). The Mapuche challenged the exclusive neoliberal model of nationality and argued for cultural and linguistic diversity (Webb and Radcliffe 2013, 337). In this section, I will

explore how a social cleavage's institutional power impacts the conditions of its political opening. How does institutional exclusion from the nation affect political actors' utilization of collective memory during transitions?

In the early 1970s, Indigenous communities utilized political openings in Chile to increase their voice in the country's official narrative. Cultural policies under the Frei government created limited political openings for the Mapuche (Crow 2013, 118). Later, the Popular Unity government created space to express the diversity of Chile (Crow 2013, 119). Crow suggests that under the Popular Unity government, Mapuche political actors added to the conversation on what Chilean national identity should be (2007, 336). This is not to say that there was a wide acceptance of plurinationality and indigenous sovereignty within Chile.[48]

However, this limited political opening was largely closed by the military dictatorship following the 1973 coup. The regime rejected plurinationality and pushed neoliberalism to solidify the identity of the Chilean nation. In 1979, in Decree 2.568, the Pinochet regime declared "Indigenous lands and indigenous landowners do not exist, because there are only Chileans" (Bauer 2021, 45). The military regime suppressed Mapuche nationality and forced homogenization of the neoliberal Chilean identity (Bauer 2021, 44-46; Crow 2007, 152-153).[49]

Analysis: Political Actors' Use of Memory During Chile's 1988 Plebiscite Campaigns

A Neoliberal Chile: The Say Yes Campaign's Use of Collective Memory

The Say Yes Campaign used the narrative that Pinochet saved Chile from brutal leftists to appeal to the neoliberal cleavage. The Say Yes Campaign suggested that a Say No win would

[48]In fact, the government continued to ignore many Indigenous demands and pursued reform out of the interest of the central government (Bauer 2021, 43-44).

[49]Crow provides an in-depth analysis of the complex history of the relationship between the Mapuche and the dictatorship. She demonstrates that the opposition to the dictatorship was not universal among the Mapuche and provides a valuable nuanced approach. See *The Mapuche in Modern Chile: A Cultural History,* Jenna Crow, 2007.

return the country to the Popular Unity's economic and political chaos. The Say Yes supporters operated in a political environment favorable to them as they controlled the government and used the dictatorship to suppress the leftist cleavage.

To start, Pinochet used collective memory of the 1973 military to coup to argue for the successful transformation of Chile. His use of collective memory appealed to the neoliberal cleavage who believed that the military brought stability and progress to the country. In an interview, Pinochet stated:

> consensus was the one that was expressed in 1973 to fight against the aggression in 1973 to fight against the totalitarian aggression and in 1980 to approve the Constitution. And that same agreement today is strengthened and is represented by a base where there is a space for everyone... except for those who seek to destroy it, for those who want to transform it in its entirety (September 4, 1988).

Pinochet established the 1973 coup as the foundation for the Chilean nation. He argued that in alignment with the public he saved Chile from totalitarianism. In addition, his inclusion that there is "space for everyone" in the nation "except for those who seek to destroy it" served to continue to divide Chile along social cleavages. Pinochet suggested that only Chileans who supported his policies were "true" Chileans because others wanted to end the nation. This exclusionary argument was built from the 17 years of dictatorship where the left social cleavage was excluded from the nation. Furthermore, *El Mercurio* indicated that Pinochet claimed "his struggle for democracy has no other objective than, precisely, to save democracy" ("Dijo President Pinochet: 'Los adversarios tendrán lugar en futura democracia" September 4, 1988). Pinochet used his understanding of the Chilean nation being founded in 1973 to exclude the left social cleavage from Chilean identity. The political conditions of the dictatorship allowed Pinochet to entrench this founding narrative and exclude the leftist cleavage from the nation. Through this exclusionary national founding narrative, Pinochet encouraged those in the neoliberal cleavage to vote yes.

Say Yes supporters further solidified the Pinochet savior narrative to shape Chilean identity around the dictator. This solidification continued to exclude the left social cleavage, including the Say No Campaign. Pablo Longueira, the leader of the UDI political party, credited the dictator for Chilean prosperity. Longueira explained “Pinochet gave us back the pride of being Chileans.” Longueira continued that “Pinochet gave Chile the course that will allow us to leave behind the eternal decades of poverty and socialism" ("Pablo Longueira: “Pinochet le dio un rumbo distinto a Chile” " September 6, 1988). By connecting national pride to the efforts of the Pinochet government to eradicate the poverty and socialism of the Popular Unity government, Longueira continued to exclude the leftist cleavage from the nation. Longueira’s mnemonic narrative excludes the leftist cleavage by implying that their economic and social models brought shame to Chile. The UDI *Diputado* appealed to the neoliberal cleavage through their shared memories of pride and shame that were entrenched under the Pinochet dictatorship.

Political actors supporting the military government continued to directly compare the Popular Unity government to the Say No Campaign to appeal to the neoliberal cleavage. The Minister of Finance, Carlos Caceres, explained “Unfortunately, when the Marxist left associates itself to groups who call themselves democratic, this shows that these groups are moving closer and closer to totalitarian situations.” He then asserted that “I don't see that the left has really changed. Who is leading the opposition [The Say No Campaign] is the left and what the opposition is offering the country is a return to Popular Unity” (Caceres September 11, 1988). By directly comparing the Popular Unity government to the then-present opposition, Caceres identified the Say No Campaign as part of the leftist social cleavage. Through this categorization, he suggested that the Say No Campaign did not represent the nation’s interests. He appealed to

the memory of the neoliberal cleavage to imply that a No victory would return the country to chaos and shame.

Furthermore, military backers built on Pinochet's national founding narrative to argue that a yes vote was the only option to continue on a democratic path. Emilio Edwards, the leader of the Radical Democracy party, used the memory of the Popular Unity government to create a non-negotiable narrative. Edwards stated "'No' only offers us to reedit the democracy of the past, the one that became a crisis in 1973" ("DR, SD y Liberales democratas: respaldan discurso del Presidente Pinochet" September 13, 1988). Furthermore, Afturo Venegas, a leader of the Social Democrats, argued that the Popular Unity government "led us to a totalitarian communist regime" ("DR, SD y Liberales democratas: respaldan discurso del Presidente Pinochet" September 13, 1988). Finally, The Independent Union of Democrats leader, Jaime Guzmán, stated that "The Popular Unity destroyed the country to place us on the threshold of an irreversible totalitarianism in faithful compliance with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine… there is no doubt whatsoever about what [The No Campaign] understand by democracy" ("UDI emplaza al PDC frente a la escalada violentista del 'No'" September 13, 1988). Through the foundation story that Pinochet saved Chile from communist chaos and extremism, mnemonic warriors backing the Say Yes Campaign argued that the Say No Campaign would return Chile to the violent Popular Unity government. This argument implied that the Say No Campaign represented the leftist cleavage. Through this categorization, Yes supporters appealed to the fears of the neoliberal cleavage.

Say Yes political advertisements published in *El Mercurio* drew towards the neoliberal cleavage by depicting the economic prosperity brought by the Pinochet government. One advertisement read "Julia's poor memory can make her go hungry." Underneath this heading,

there were two contrasting images of Julia. On one side there was a photo showing her with an empty grocery cart and the caption reading “1973: Stock shortages and queues.” In contrast, the adjacent photo depicted Julia with an overflowing cart of groceries and a caption that read “1988: Full Supply and Convivence.” At the bottom of the advertisement, it encouraged voters to “Decide Yes!!!” (Julia y La Memoria de Hambre August 31, 1988). The Say Yes Advertisement used the narrative of economic decline under Popular Unity and the economic prosperity of the military regime to encourage Chileans to vote yes. In another ad, *Sí* (Yes) was spelled out using apples and included a caption explaining how Chile had become a major exporter of fruits. The advertisement featured the slogan “Chile, a winning country” (Las Manzanas y Sí September 5, 1988). The ad asked the public to remember how the military regime fostered job growth to argue for the reinstatement of the Pinochet government (Las Manzanas y Sí September 5, 1988). In addition, the caption “a winning country” reminded the neoliberal cleavage that their pride in their nation returned under the military government.

Furthermore, politicians built off the political conditions to assert that a No win would reverse the political and economic progress made under the military’s control. Say Yes mnemonic warriors highlighted the possibility of change and the characterization of the No Campaign representing the violent left to urge voters to support Pinochet. Longueria stated:

> From that moment on, the Chilean people will be summoned to participate in one of the most transcendental events in our history. It will decide whether to continue building an authentically free society in political, economic and social terms or to return to the past of poverty, demagogy and divisions that plunged us into the great crisis that the country faced at the beginning of the 70's ("Anuncio Pablo Longueira: Movilización Intensiva de La UDI en Apoyo al ‘Si’" August 30, 1988).

Longueria emphasized to voters that the outcome of the plebiscite had the possibility to return the country to chaos. He characterized the Allende government as responsible for “the great crisis,” implying that the unnamed Pinochet was responsible for building an “authentically free society in political, economic and social terms.” Through this us versus them argument,

Longueria used memory to strengthen the social cleavage between neoliberals and the left. Building off the same narrative, ESC President Beltrán Urenda asserted that Pinochet's reinstatement would "ensure that the country continue[d] on the path of prosperity" ("Nominado Pinochet" August 31, 1988). Urenda used the implied memory of the failings of the Popular Unity government and the institutionalized savior narrative to assert that Pinochet's continued leadership was the only way for Chile to maintain its successful path. While the plebiscite provided a political opening for the opposition, the Say Yes Campaign was able to rely on their already established narratives under the dictatorship.

In addition, supporters of the Yes Campaign used the mnemonic narratives pushed by the dictatorship to associate the opposition with violent Marxists. Using these memories, supporters of Pinochet attempted to exclude Say No sympathizers from Chilean identity. Márque de la Plata argued that the "Marxist forces that lead the opposition only seek rupture and institutional breakdown… they will never lead us to democracy because they are totalitarian." Márque de la Plata continued "The forces of the 'No,' are overtaken and led by Marxist groups and can only lead to a country of Popular Unity" ("Márque de la Plata destacó calidad de líder de Pinochet" September 1, 1988). Furthermore, Segio Diez built off this narrative, explaining "every time there are 'No' demonstrations, there is a mess. The larger the gathering, the greater the acts of violence" ("Políticos repudian violencia opositora " September 6, 1988). William Thayer echoed this message stating, the opposition "does not believe in democracy, since they do not believe in expressing themselves in any other way than causing harm." ("Políticos repudian violencia opositora " September 6, 1988). Politicians supporting the Say Yes Campaign drew on the narrative pushed by the Pinochet regime that brutal Marxists led the Popular Unity government and the Say No Campaign. They used the entrenched Pinochet savior narrative to suggest that the

continuation of the Pinochet government was the only plausible way to continue democracy. The mnemonic comparison drew and furthered the ideological social cleavages. Furthermore, it implied that supporters of the No and therefore the leftist cleavage were excluded from the national identity because their violence worked to tear it apart.

Throughout the dictatorship, exile was used to suppress people who threatened the military regime and exclude them from the national identity. During the plebiscite campaign, some in exile were invited back to Chile (Stern et al. 2006, 357). Constitutional lawyer and President of the Metropolitan Command of Independents for Yes, Guillermo Bruno, explained "even the bad partisans who in their Marxist vision have denigrated the government and the country will be able to enter Chile" ("General Beneplácito por término del exilio" September 2, 1988). Bruno's characterization of Chilean Marxists as worsening the nation worked to identify the entire left as Marxist because not all of the exiles were Marxists (Stern et al. 2006, 357). Through this characterization, Bruno employed the memory pushed by Pinochet that all liberals were violent Marxists, who worked to overthrow the Chilean government. In addition, the statement worked to delegitimize the returning exiles. This delegitimization operated within the political environment of the campaign. Political actors supporting the Yes used the institutionalized memory to solidify their support from the neoliberal cleavage. This solidification was especially necessary because the opposition, such as returning exiles, had a political opening to make their case for a different nation.

The Say Yes Campaign used memory of violence under Popular Unity to categorize the opposition as the radical MIR group to encourage Chileans to vote yes to continue democracy and peace. For example, in an advertisement published in *El Mercurio*, the Say Yes Campaign reminded voters that "The true flag of the 'No'" was the red and black flag of international

violence, which today is camouflaged under the idyllic and peaceful colors of an innocent rainbow." The statement is accompanied by the opposition's rainbow symbol with the MIR flag containing a gun and the word "No" ("Cuidado con el camaleon" September 5, 1988). The advertisement built on the narrative that the left social cleavage, including the Say No Campaign, caused violence and extremism. It also served to directly associate the Say No Campaign with MIR. By directly tying the supporters of No and MIR, the Say Yes Campaign suggested that a victory for the opposition would not bring a rainbow, but instead a return of bloodshed from the radical left.

In conclusion, political actors supporting the Say Yes Campaign used the memory of Pinochet "saving" Chile from a violent, Marxist government under Popular Unity to urge the neoliberal cleavage to protect the Chilean nation by voting yes. The Say Yes Campaign took advantage of the power imbalance between the two campaigns. The political conditions of the dictatorship allowed for the solidification of the neoliberal cleavage and the exclusion of the left from the Chilean nation. The Say Yes Campaign utilized the Pinochet savior narrative entrenched through the dictatorship's propaganda and state violence. Therefore, the military regime's control over the narrative and the plebiscite gave the Say Yes Campaign an advantage. However, the constitutionally supported 1988 state-codified referendum provided a political opening for the Say No Campaign to also advocate for their vision of the nation.

Analysis of Rhetoric Used by Political Actors Supporting the Say No Campaign

Political actors supporting the Say No Campaign used the suppressed memory of violence under the military dictatorship to argue that voting to select new leadership would establish a happier, more peaceful nation. The state-codified referendum gave the leftist cleavage

the opportunity to challenge the entrenched Pinochet narratives through sharing their memories of the dictatorship and providing hope for a brighter future. The plebiscite provided a political opening to foster a new vision and national identity for Chile. To fight for this new nation, mnemonic warriors supporting Say No utilized memory as a tool to draw support for the left social cleavage.

First, the opposition's promotion of joy coming to Chile relied on Chileans, especially the leftist cleavage, believing that true happiness was not possible under Pinochet. While the Say No Campaign often focused on the possibility of a better future, they needed to establish the violent past to make this a compelling argument. To make the comparison between the bloodshed of the past and the peace of the future, the Say No Campaign shared their collective memory of oppression under the dictatorship. During their 15-minute television slot, the Say No Campaign included the stories of human rights abuses endured under Pinochet (Quilter 1989; Stern et al. 2006).

One of these memories was shared by Olga Garrido. Garrido discussed how she was tortured under the Pinochet regime and explained that she would vote no for the future of democracy. Her son, who happened to be Carlos Cazsely, one of Chile's most famous soccer stars, appeared at the end of the video and explained that he would vote no "so we can live in a free, healthy, and supportive democracy that we can all share because this beautiful lady is my mother" ("Franja politica por el NO: Carlos Caszely" 1988; Quilter 1989). The ad then turned to the ballot box and stated "No hatred, no violence, no fear. No more, Vote no" ("Franja politica por el NO: Carlos Caszely" 1988). By having the mother of one of Chile's most famous soccer stars tell the story of her torture under the military dictatorship, Chileans could connect with someone who raised a person of great national pride but was still targeted by the Pinochet

regime. In addition, the story provided a space for viewers, especially those in the leftist cleavage, to reflect on how their own lives have been affected by violence under Pinochet. The political actors behind the Say No Campaign employed Olga's story to remind Chileans that, contrary to the Say Yes Campaign's rhetoric, under Pinochet Chile had not lived under the ideals of democracy.

Furthermore, the Say No Campaign filmed an interview with a judge who discussed 30 cases of torture that he had been presented. While the National Television Council stopped the program from being aired, the compilation of the interview demonstrates how the Say No Campaign used the narrative of human rights abuses under the dictatorship to argue for needed transition (*Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988, 41). Similar to Olga's story, this segment served to demonstrate to the leftist social cleavage that fear and violence made happiness impossible for them under Pinochet. The segment drew on the leftist cleavage's collective memory of oppression during the military dictatorship.

In addition, the Say No Campaign used music and dances invoking memory of violence against families to grab the attention and appeal to the emotions of viewers. As Stern et al. details:

> On 11 September, Bañados announced that by popular demand the No would again feature Los Prisioneros, the popular protest rock group. Normally banned from television, their appearance in a franja the previous week had been too short, and people had asked for more. On 20 September, when women of the disappeared danced their adaptation of the Chilean cueca into the dance without a partner, the celebrated musician Sting followed with "We Dance Alone." (Stern et al. 2006, 369)

By turning a traditional Chilean dance into a mnemonic symbol of the lives stolen from the disappeared and their partners, the dancers and the Say No Campaign appealed to the sympathy, sadness, and fear of the left social cleavage group. Furthermore, the utilization of a traditional national dance challenged the Say Yes Campaign's argument that those associated with the left

were excluded from the nation. In addition, the plebiscite campaign provided a political opening for the oppressed social cleavage to commemorate the disappeared on national television. The mnemonic act inserted the disappeared and their families into the Chilean nation. This insertion and remembrance of the regime's brutality asserted the need to establish new leadership to create a more inclusive, peaceful nation.

Political actors supporting the end of Pinochet's leadership furthered this narrative of human rights abuses to assert the need for a new national direction. A leader in the Party for Democracy, Viera-Gallo, explained that the political parties across the ideological spectrum supporting the No Campaign were united by human rights being the foundation for democracy, unlike those supporting Pinochet ("Partido por la Democracia: 'Oposición está unida en torno a los derechos humanos'" September 6, 1988). For example, the board of the Christian Democratic Party stated "he cannot govern as a democrat who has demonstrated throughout fifteen years the mentality of a dictator, disregard for human rights and the dignity of the people" ("Designacion de Pinochet: para opositores 'No fue ninguna sorpresa'" August 31, 1988).[50] Furthermore, Racardo Lagos, the President of the Party for Democracy asserted that "Pinochet is responsible for these 15 years of tragedy and anguish for Chileans" ("Designacion de Pinochet: para opositores 'No fue ninguna sorpresa'" August 31, 1988). Viera-Gallo, the Christian Democratic Party's board, and Lagos appealed to the collective memory of the leftist cleavage. By reminding people of their memories of violence under the military government, these political actors built on the No Campaign's argument that only new leadership can bring Chileans joy. Finally, the state-codified referendum gave the suppressed social cleavage the opportunity to challenge the dictatorship and its mnemonic narratives.

[50]The Christian Democratic Party's board included Patricio Aylwin, Edgardo Boeninger, Narciso Irureta, and Gutenberg Martinez ("Designacion de Pinochet: para opositores 'No fue ninguna sorpresa'" August 31, 1988).

In addition, politicians resisted Pinochet's 1973 national founding narrative to broaden Chilean's understanding of their national memory and argue for a more inclusive nation. However, they made a strategic choice to suppress narratives of Popular Unity, given the internalization of memory under Pinochet. These mnemonic conditions created a political advantage for the Say Yes Campaign and presented difficulties for the Say No Campaign to strategically remember the Allende government. However, political actors still challenged Pinochet's founding narrative in different ways. As Germán Riesco stated:

> we do not accept the presumption of creating a Chile after 1973 because the tradition and values inherent to our nationality and the progress in which it evolved, constitute the contribution of many generations of many heroic deaths and sacrifices of many lives and not as it seems to be understood from the action of a handful of men who act today in public life, no matter how great their patriotism may be ("Germán Riesco Anunció Su Formal Apoyo al 'No'" September 1, 1988).

When Riesco explained that Chile's culture and nationality stemmed from generations, he broadened Chileans' national identity to include those who did not support the 1973 military coup. He also implied that Pinochet's 1973 national founding narrative excluded heroic and commendable Chileans. By challenging Pinochet's founding narrative, Riesco argued to the leftist social cleavage that a No victory would establish a more inclusive Chile that would include them.

Following the announcement of the return of some exiles, the opposition argued that the exiled had always been part of Chilean national identity. The president of the organization CUT, Manuel Bustos, asserted that "we are all Chileans and we deserve to live in our homeland" ("General Beneplácito por término del exilio" September 2, 1988). Mapu stated that the return of exiles was "the just recovery of a human right." Mapu added "the suffering and the disintegration of lives and families can only be left behind with the full return of democracy" ("General Beneplácito por término del exilio" September 2, 1988). Finally, Ricardo Nuñez argued that "the citizens will express themselves massively for the 'no' vote so that Chile will put an end to

arbitrariness, injustice and exclusion" ("General Beneplácito por término del exilio" September 2, 1988). The punishment of exile under Pinochet served to sever opponents from Chilean national identity. However, the opposition asserted that under new, democratic leadership, all Chileans, including the leftist cleavage, would be included and protected from state violence. The Say No Campaign utilized the conditions of the plebiscite as an opening to challenge Pinochet's exclusionary concept of the nation.

By reminding the left social cleavage of the violence and fear they endured under the military government through the television campaign and the rhetoric of political supporters, the Say No Campaign was able to argue that only new leadership could bring joy to Chile. On a final note, the No Campaign's theme song "Happiness is Coming" embodied the optimistic tone of the movement to convince Chileans that a no victory was not something to fear (*Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Presidential Plebiscite* 1988, 40). "The upbeat tune, lyrics, and visual images performed the deeper meaning of the No. Chileans of distinct walks of life, the nation of strangers once self-enclosed in sadness, walked with a musical bounce to the joy of democratic rediscovery" (Stern et al. 2006, 366). By emphasizing that happiness was coming, the Say No Campaign compared the memories of sadness and violence to the potential of a transformed nation with a bright, inclusive future. The suggestion that "happiness is coming" appealed to the social cleavage suppressed by the dictatorship because it understood that they had been violently excluded from the Chilean nation. The Say No reached out to these Chileans by inviting them to be a part of creating a more joyful Chile by voting No.

The state-codified referendum provided a political opening for the suppressed opposition to argue their vision of the nation. Political actors supporting the Say No Campaign used the violent memory of Pinochet's dictatorship to contrast their optimistic view of the future through

the triumph of the No vote. These mnemonic warriors relied on a non-negotiable understanding of the Pinochet regime as immoral and oppressive. To illustrate this narrative, they created television segments explaining human rights abuses. These stories served to remind the leftist cleavage of the use of violence to exclude them from national identity. The No Campaign offered this social cleavage the opportunity to insert themselves in the nation through voting no to transform Chile.

1988 Chile Conclusion

The 1988 Chilean plebiscite is dominated by mnemonic warriors competing for opposing visions of the nation because the political environment created an opening to argue over the future of the nation. While the Say Yes Campaign asserted that a No victory would descend Chile into leftist chaos similar to the Popular Unity government, the Say No Campaign used the memory of human rights abuses to argue that Chile needed new leadership for a joyful, inclusive future. Unlike Spain, the 1988 Chilean constitutionally mandated plebiscite provided the conditions for a political opening. Given this opening, political actors used memory to influence the future of the Chilean nation (Jelin 2003). However, the 15 years of dictatorship, created disparate power dynamics. The Say Yes Campaign benefitted from years of suppression and propaganda that established institutional memory of Pinochet as the nation's savior from the violent, Marxist Popular Unity government. Given the uneven political conditions that the campaigns operated under, the Say No Campaign made a strategic choice to suppress narratives of the Allende Popular Unity government, which had been discredited for years by the regime.

In the following chapter, I will analyze how three truth and reconciliation commissions and the 2019 "Chile Woke Up" protests created a new political opening for national change.

These mnemonic movements shifted the power balance between the two social cleavages and challenged the narratives pushed by Pinochet. Furthermore, the 2019 protests led to the creation of the 2020 plebiscite campaign (Suarez-Cao 2021, 261). I will examine how the 2020 plebiscite campaign provided the necessary political conditions for the rival campaigns to utilize memory of civil conflict to draw on the social cleavages solidified under the dictatorship.

Chapter 5: Chile 2020 State-Codified Referendum - The Decision to Remember during the Potential for Constitutional Change

The shifting power dynamics between Chile's neoliberal and leftist social cleavages contributed to the call from many Chileans, including political actors, to demand a new direction for the nation through a constitutional rewrite. The process of this attempted rewrite spanned from the 2019 October "Chile Woke Up" protests to the ultimate failure of the second constitutional proposal in December 2023. My analysis will focus on the 2020 plebiscite campaign because it represents a political opening for constitutional change. I understand the 2020 plebiscite to be a state-codified referendum because it was legally supported by the state. This recent referendum also shares similarities with the 1988 plebiscite, as both were campaigns legitimized by the government to approve or reject a new direction for the country when political actors used collective memory to make constitutional arguments.

On October 25th, 2020, Chileans voted whether to redraft the 1980 Constitution in the plebiscite. Voters who elected to approve signaled support for proposing a new constitution, while those who elected to reject wanted to keep the 1980 Constitution (Buitrago October 24, 2020). Political actors advocating for approval are categorized as Apruebo and those

campaigning for reject are labeled as the Rechazar group.[51] In the plebiscite voters also chose how the rewrite would take place. Voters could elect to have a mixed constitutional convention where sitting parliamentarians and popularly-elected members would shape the new constitution or a constitutional convention which would include only popularly-elected members (Buitrago October 24, 2020).

I suggest that political actors supporting Apruebo built off the narratives of the 2019 protests to argue that to achieve a more inclusive democracy, Chile needed to be guided by a new governing document. The Apruebo appealed to the leftist social cleavage using the mnemonic narratives of the human rights atrocities committed by the military dictatorship that were advanced by the multiple truth and reconciliation commissions and the 2019 protests. This employment of collective memory contributed to the political opening to challenge the constitutional legacies of the military dictatorship. As Ferrara argues, truth commissions "placed the problems of the human rights violations of the past at the centre of the social and political agenda and since then the issues of the past have resonated throughout Chilean public life" (2015, 12). Furthermore, the state-codified referendum created a legitimate political environment for political actors to make arguments concerning the direction of the nation. Given that collective memory is nation building tool, Apruebo actors used memory of civil conflict to justify the need for a new national founding document separate from the legacies of violence.

I will also compare the movement for Indigenous sovereignty and plurinationalism in Chile during the constitutional rewrite process to the regional independence movements in Spain. Given the large support from Indigenous political actors for the Chilean constitutional rewrite, I understand them to be a part of the leftist social cleavage. However, it is important to recognize

[51]Apruebo means I agree in Spanish. Rechazar means to reject in Spanish.

the diverse political opinions held by individual actors (Crow 2007). I suggest that the political conditions that Indigenous political groups operate under are vastly different than the ones that dictate the Catalan and Basque movements. While the Spanish Constitution legitimizes the additional nationalities in Spain, the 1980 Chilean Constitution does not acknowledge the existence of multiple nationalities (Loncón 2023). In fact, the Pinochet regime pushed the concept of homogenization in Chile (Bauer 2021, 44-46; Crow 2007, 152-153). These distinct constitutional conditions impact the groups' strategies for autonomy. In Spain, Catalan political actors used mnemonic narratives of continued state oppression to argue for independence. In Chile, Indigenous political actors utilized memory and the political opening of the plebiscite to argue for inclusion in the state through institutional recognition of diverse nationalities.

Finally, I will argue that the political environment contributed to political actors campaigning for Rechazar to utilize narratives entrenched by the Pinochet regime to assert Chile's security and economic success under the 1980 Constitution. These mnemonic narratives served to appeal to the neoliberal social cleavage to urge them to maintain the nation by preserving the current constitution. In addition, supporters of Rechazar follow the 1988 Say Yes Campaign narrative of the violent Left and the economic success resulting from the military dictatorship. These economic narratives built off the institutionalization of collective memory under the truth and reconciliation commissions, which Grandin argues entrenched neoliberal narratives (2005). The Rechazar utilized mnemonic narratives to draw on the neoliberal cleavage's shared memory of the nation preserved in the 1980 Constitution to urge Chileans to vote to reject.

In this chapter, I will first provide background on Chile's truth and reconciliation commissions and the October 2019 protests. I will then provide a brief review of theoretical

discussions concerning Chile's mnemonic regime and political conditions, including homogenization of national identity. Finally, I will discuss the political conditions and their impact on the decision to use mnemonic narratives during the 2020 plebiscite campaign. Specifically, I will analyze the Apruebo, Indigenous, and Rechazar mnemonic narratives. These three groups all acted as mnemonic warriors and employed memories of civil conflict to make constitutional arguments; however, they drew on different narratives to support their distinct visions for the nation.

Background: Chile's Democratic Transition and The Decision to Remember

Transition: The Era of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Following 17 years of military rule and the 1988 plebiscite, Patricio Aylwin won the 1990 election and returned Chile to democracy (Chavez-Segura 2015, 235). As the country transitioned to democracy, Chileans began to confront the violence endured under the dictatorship through the discovery of the graves of the military regime's victims (Ferrara 2015, 32). The discovery of the graves made national media and "the public denunciation of the abuses confirmed the absolute need to know the truth about what really happened in the country" (Ferrara 2015, 32). To address this need, President Aylwin established the first Chilean truth and reconciliation commission, the Rettig Commission,[52] in 1990 soon after taking power (Ferrara 2015, 32 and 69). The Rettig Report was eventually followed by two additional commissions, the Roundtable Dialog and the Valech Commission, together they created political openings to reconsider the Chile's collective memory of the dictatorship (Ferrara 2015, 12).

[52]The Rettig Commission is also known as the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Ferrara 2015, 32).

The Rettig Commission was assigned four tasks. First, it was directed to establish a full understanding of past human rights abuses. Second, it was tasked with finding evidence to identify victims and their fate. Third, it was charged with recommending measures for reinstatement and reparation. Finally, it was directed to provide recommendations for administrative and legal measures to ensure that human rights violations would not happen again (Ferrara 2015, 35). While the Rettig Commission was limited by the political strategy of moderation under Aylwin, "it created an authoritative and legitimate account of the human rights abuses committed under the military regime" and "provided a space for victims to tell their stories" (Ferrara 2015, 56-57).

Given the interest of diverse social cleavages, the Rettig Commission emerged as the mechanism to help Aylwin's government make a 'balanced' transition to democracy" (Vázquez Guevara 2019, 259). Referencing the work of Dezalay and Garth, Vázquez Guevara writes that "one of the main challenges…in the Transición" was "strik[ing] a balance between fostering national reconciliation and addressing the dictatorship's human rights violations (2019, 259). While there was concern among politicians over weighing justice and amnesty, a 1989 national poll found that 67.5 percent of Chileans believed that perpetrators should face justice versus amnesty (Stern 2010, 67). Despite majority support for measures of justice, the balanced political consideration was mostly due to concerns over tensions between social cleavages, such as backlash from the Right and addressing the needs of victims (Vázquez Guevara 2019, 261).

The Rettig Commission faced institutional partisan obstacles. First, some people in the Center-Left believed that the commission could be politically dangerous and lead to counter-movements (Stern 2010, 69). Interestingly, this fear mirrors some of the arguments made in Spain, as it promotes forgetting out of fear that it will ignite conflict between identity groups. In

addition, those on the right criticized the commission, including the Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI) and the Renovación Nacional (RN). The Renovación Nacional criticized the commission for its potential to breach the 1978 amnesty law (Stern 2010, 69). In addition to facing criticism from the right, perpetrators, including the army and carabineros, resisted giving the commission information (Stern 2010, 75). Branches of the armed forces condemned the report for failing to explain that their actions had been done to protect Chile from violent, Marxist authoritarianism and criticized it for trying to divide the nation (Ferrara 2015, 50-51). The reservations and criticisms from the Center-left, the Right, and branches of the armed forces demonstrate how the political conditions contributed to the transition's preliminary strategy of moderation (Ferrara 2015, 56-57).

On the other end of the social cleavage, victims of families sought information on and justice for their loved ones. Stern explains that "Survivor-witnesses, who themselves were victims of a horrifying repression, also tended to see justice as a goal of equal priority with truth, and to critique the scope, policy direction, and discursive emphasis on reconciliation that bound the Commission" (Stern 2010, 78). In addition, Ester Barría, the sister of Arturo Barría, who was taken by the DINA, explained what she wanted to gain from the truth commission, stating:

> "I want his name cleared and his memory revindicated, that he be recognized for what he was, he was an excellent teacher, a joyous human being who was the center of the family… I want to know the truth, there cannot be reconciliation without first knowing with whom we are reconciling… We want justice. We do not want vengeance, despite having been vilified, treated as crazy women looking for 'presumed detained-disappeared ones,' as they would say" (Stern 2010, 65-66).

The leftist cleavage called not just for remembrance, but for justice. These demands for justice highlight the limitations of the Rettig Commission and the opening that it created for future memory work (Ferrara 2015, 57). In addition, Grandin criticized the balance that the commission struck, explaining that "it justified the constraints in which the new democracy operated" and the continuation of Pinochet's ideologies, such as neoliberalism (2005, 57).

However, the Rettig Commission is praised by many for being the starting point of justice for victims. For example, it prompted President's Aylwin's leadership to embrace a "Never Again" culture and the creation of the 'Aylwin Doctrine' (Stern 2010, 87; Ferrara 2015, 69). The 'Aylwin Doctrine' encouraged the courts to interpret the amnesty doctrine loosely to review human rights violations judicially (Ferrara 2015, 59). Furthermore, while Moulian is critical of the commission for only being judicial and not political, he recognizes it significance, writing:

> "The fact that the final Rettig Report names victims is important in terms of restoring the honor of those who were killed or disappeared, particularly since many Chileans still believed that such atrocities had never taken place in their country. Until the Report was published, it was possible to argue that a man who had been disappeared had simply abandoned his children or left his wife for another woman" (Moulian 1998, 2-3).

The Rettig Commission opened the door for later work to uncover the truth to create institutional change (Ferrara 2015, 79-80). Furthermore, the commission began a discussion that had been put on hold for 17 years that "spurred the demand for further truth, to find the bodies that had been disappeared and to prosecute the perpetrators" (Klep 2012, 262).

Building off the work of the Rettig Commission, *La Mesa de Diálogo* or the Roundtable Dialog opened a new space to reveal the fate of disappeared victims (Ferrara 2015, 99 and 107). The Chilean government created The Roundtable Dialog, which resulted from the reignited discussion of the past following Pinochet's arrest in London in 1998 (Ferrara 2015, 99). Interestingly, Pinochet was detained at the request of Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón (Ferrara 2015, 99).[53] "The arrest of Pinochet initiated a reflection in Chile on the importance of providing justice for the human rights violations of the past as the minimum requisite for advancing the process of democratization and aiding in reconciliation within Chilean society" (Ferrara 2015,

[53]This action poses the question, why did a Spanish political actor turn his attention to atrocities committed internationally, rather than in his own backyard? While Garzón is also an advocate for justice for victims of the Franco dictatorship (Encarnación 2014, 3), I believe that the domestic political environment influenced by the tension between historic social cleavages contributed to the decision.

105). However, the reasons for the establishment of the Roundtable Dialog are disputed by Chileans. While some Chileans saw it as an opportunity "to confront the unresolved problems of the transition," some victims viewed the Roundtable Dialog as a negotiation tool for Pinochet's release (Ferrara 2015, 107). With the former in mind, the Roundtable Dialog established two key goals: to offer information on "the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and to engage in a debate about the historical circumstances leading up to the 1973 coup" (Ferrara 2015, 109).

The conclusions of the dialog's report were limited and did not truly meet its goals (Ferrara 2015; Lazzara 2006, 21). The Roundtable Dialog was composed of mostly members of the military, but also included human rights lawyers (Ferrara 2015, 107). Their final report only mentioned 200 of the over 1,000 disappeared, the whereabouts of the bodies of victims were inaccurate, and the military continued to repress information (Lazzara 2006, 21). In addition, the report failed to provide closure for loved ones of victims, as it only discussed the location of bodies and neglected to include what had happened to the disappeared (Ferrara 2015, 112).

While there were limits to the Roundtable Dialog, this commission marked "the first time since 1973 there was at least an implicit assumption of responsibility by the military" (Lazzara 2006, 20).[54] Ferrara explains that unlike the Rettig Commission, the Roundtable Dialog led "the armed forces [to condemn] the violations committed during the regime and [to promise] that such acts would never happen again. After 10 years, the truth of the Rettig Report, which had always been denied, was finally accepted" (Ferrara 2015, 110). This acceptance served as a foundation for the current general consensus across the political aisle of the immorality of human rights abuses under the military regime. In addition, the dialog led to the creation of a nine-judge

[54]However, human rights lawyers argued that the disclosures by the armed forces were an attempt to close the judicial investigations (Ferrara 2015, 112).

court that would specifically investigate "the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared" (Ferrara 2015, 110-111).

Building on the Roundtable Dialog, in 2003, the Valech Commission was created by the Chilean government to find the truth surrounding political imprisonment and torture by interviewing survivors.[55] Chilean President Lagos explained that the Valech Commission would address past atrocities not included in the mandate of the Rettig Commission or the Roundtable Dialog, specifically victims of political imprisonment and torture (Ferrara 2015, 165-166). Bishop Sergio Valech, a leader in human rights defense, was appointed the president of the commission and was widely supported by different political parties and the military (Ferrara 2015, 168). Valech was tasked to lead the commission in acknowledging those who were victims of political imprisonment or torture and proposing reparations for these victims (Ferrara 2015, 167-168).

The Valech Commission presented its findings in a massive report, which recorded 33,221 cases of arbitrary detention and recognized 27,255 victims of "political imprisonment and torture" (Klep 2012, 264; Ferrara 2015, 169). The report confirmed that 64 percent of cases of this political oppression occurred during the first three months following the 1973 military coup (Ferrara 2015, 169). The Valech Report also found that torture was used as a form of terror to oppress opposition to the dictatorship (Ferrara 2015, 170). Finally, the report proposed three different forms of reparations including, economic, symbolic, and institutional reform (Ferrara 2015, 171).

The commission contributed to Chile's pursuit of justice and reparations for victims (Ferrara 2015, 165). Importantly, the military affirmed the report. For example, General Cheyre

[55]This commission is also known as the National Commission on Imprisonment and Torture (Ferrara 2015, 165).

stated in response to the report that the army accepted its findings and would "make concrete endeavors to ensure that this never happens again" (Ferrara 2015, 178-179). General Cheyre led the creation of a seminar on human rights violations at the Military School in Santiago and expressed that the class would symbolize the improvement of civil-military relations "to advance the political democratization of the country" (Ferrara 2015, 187-188). Unlike past commissions, the Valech Report had an "unanimous positive reception" and thus "paved the way for a more inclusive common understanding of the country's recent past" (Ferrara 2015, 177).

Following the Valech Commission, public opinion across the aisle condemned the actions of the military regime. Before the Valech Commission, "In September 2003, one of four Chileans (25 percent) still affirmed [Pinochet] would be remembered by History as 'one of the greatest rulers' in twentieth-century Chile, not as 'a dictator'" (Stern 2010, 302). The Valech report contributed to the "further [weakening]of the moral and political foothold of Chile's pinochetista faction" (Lazzara 2006, 3-4). This led to previous supporters of Pinochet to politically distance themselves from him (Lazzara 2006, 3-4). Furthermore, the Valech report contributed to the decrease of support of Pinochet to only 12 percent (Stern 2010, 302). In addition, "Four of five Chileans (82 percent) now saw 'a dictator' instead of a great ruler, and they included a solid majority (60 percent) on the Right" (Stern 2010, 302). According to a CEP public opinion poll taken in December 2004, 71 percent of the people polled believed that the Valech Report was a good thing, while only 13 percent thought the opposite (Ferrara 2015, 182-183). Finally, The Fundación Futuro found that 86 percent of people who participated in their survey believed that the Valech Commission was accurate, while only 8 percent thought differently (Ferrara 2015, 184).

The large change in the country's perception of the nation under Pinochet through the Valech Commission suggests a shifting power dynamic between the neoliberal and leftist cleavages. The decrease in support for Pinochet and 82 percent of Chileans viewing him as a dictator indicates the decreasing power of the neoliberal cleavage, which was solidified under the dictatorship. Posner suggests that the size of a social cleavage affects how politicians lean into differences between different identity groups (2004, 529-530). I will argue that the increasing power of the leftist cleavage contributes to the political opening during the state-codified 2020 referendum.

Right-wing political parties supported the work of the Valech Report and criticized the Pinochet regime, differing from their previous defense of the dictatorship (Lazzara 2006, 181-182). Furthermore, the UDI, the party with the closest connection to the military, "asserted the absolute and total condemnation of the crimes narrated in the report" and announced their belief that torture is wrong under any situation (Ferrara 2015, 181-182). However, it is worth noting that they failed to recognize their complicity in these crimes and apologize (Ferrara 2015, 181-182).

The Valech Commission laid the groundwork for future initiatives and increased Chilean society's openness to memory work, like the rewrite of the constitution. Ferrara explains that "Every initiative that was implemented to deal with [the] past enabled the establishment of other measures which in turn allowed further ones to take place" (2015, 189). Furthermore, Stern argues that the Valech commission led to "an imperative dignity entangled with a grave social hurt, an understandable silence, but a necessity to break it" (2010, 294). This societal implication emphasizes how institutional efforts to uncover the truth affect how the public perceives its role in the memory process. Stern's theory that the Valech Commission increased feelings of public

responsibility to grapple with the past supports that collective memory projects helped foster the movement to change the constitution. In addition to laying the groundwork for the grassroots movement, the Valech Commission led the armed forces to be open to constitutional change. Ferrara notes that the military's change in perspective on its role in advancing democracy opened the path to amend "the authoritarian enclaves of the Chilean constitution" and create "a new framework to regulate the civil-military relations" (2015, 188).

To conclude, the Rettig Commission, the Roundtable Dialog, and the Valech Report contributed to the favorable political environment for the proposal of a new constitution. The three commissions together gradually reconsidered the dominant collective memory of Pinochet's military regime, including widespread belief that the dictatorship employed oppressive violence against its own people (Ferrara 2015). The commissions "contributed to a dramatic shift in the political elite's discourse and public opinion about the military regime" (Ferrara 2015, 14). The uncovering and discussion of human rights abuses provided an opening for grassroots movements to employ memory and advocate for constitutional change.

"Chile Woke Up": The 2019 Protests

In October 2019, demands for a constitutional convention were sparked by protests over increases in transportation fares (Ward 2020). What began as a student protest over a 30-peso increase in metro fares turned into a massive movement that called for constitutional change to address social and economic inequality. In Santiago's Plaza Italia, 5 percent of Chile's population came together in peaceful protest (Johanson 2019). However, these protests were not always peaceful. On October 18, 2019, more than 30 people died. Protesters and police engaged in

violence through the use of water cannons, tear gas, fires, and throwing rocks ("Scattered Clashes in Chile Mark Third Anniversary of Riots" October 18, 2022).

During the month long protest, many carried signs saying "*Chile despertó*" or "Chile woke up" (Johanson 2019). The slogan "Chile woke up" implies an awakening to the past and present. This would not be possible without the collective memory work of the commissions. Furthermore, Marianela Denegri Coria, a scholar at the University of the Frontier, explained that Chile "woke up realizing that we are one of the countries where people have the biggest debts in Latin America, and where fundamental social rights such as education [and] housing are not guaranteed" (Pizarro 2019). Denegri Coria remarked on Pinochet's neoliberal model, stating that these rights were "privatized and [there] are consumer goods that are increasingly hard to access" (Pizarro 2019). These calls challenging the neoliberal model changed to constitutional demands. Stephanie Díaz, a young sports instructor from a working-class neighborhood, stated that "It's 30 years since the return to democracy, but we have preserved a constitution made under the dictatorship" (Johanson 2019).

Eventually, the protest's massive scale led President Piñera to propose economic changes to meet their demands (Piscopo and Siavelis 2021). To meet these demands, Piñera introduced proposals to increase the minimum wage, slightly raise taxes on the wealthy, lower medication costs, and increase the lowest pension systems by 20 percent (Johanson 2019). However, many Chileans believed that this was not enough. Dante Contreras, Director for the Centre for Studies on Conflict and Social Cohesion, said to *Aljazeera* that "Pinera's so-called economic package is nothing of the sort. It's a temporary measure but falls short of significant change" (Pizarro 2019). Furthermore, according to Cadem, 80 percent of Chileans who responded to a survey believed that Piñera's plans were inadequate (Johanson 2019).

In the wake of the 2019 protests, politicians across the aisle called for a constitutional referendum to replace the 1980 Constitution. As Suarez-Cao notes, the protests established the political conditions for constitutional change (Suarez-Cao 2021, 261). Close to 80 percent of Chilean voters affirmed this call, voting in a referendum to draft a proposal (Vergara and Politi 2023). In addition, a poll conducted by Ipsos and Espacio Público found that 65 percent of respondents believed "the election present[ed] an opportunity for positive impacts on the country, democracy, and everyday life" (Seminario 2020). The fact that majority of respondents linked a constitutional rewrite to democracy is key. The 1980 Constitution is associated with the opposite of democracy, dictatorship. As *BBC* explained "For so many Chileans, this is exactly what [the referendum] represents: goodbye to a dictatorship-era constitution, and hello to a new beginning that people feel is more fitting for a modern democracy" ("Jubilation as Chile votes to rewrite constitution"). One Chilean celebrating the results of the referendum explained "we are giving birth to a new constitution and we are leaving behind the constitution of Pinochet and his entourage" ("Jubilation as Chile votes to rewrite constitution"). I will analyze how political actors built on this belief or pushed against it to make constitutional justifications through mnemonic arguments that appealed to social cleavages.

Furthermore, protesters linked the 1980 Constitution to the continuation of neoliberalism. During the protests, the phrase "Neoliberalism was born and will die in Chile" was spray painted in Dignity Plaza (Cortés 2020). This statement suggested that the goal of some protesters was to remove the neoliberal aspects of the 1980 Constitution from current political, social, and economic institutions. In addition, a statement released from several political parties[56] explained

[56]The political parties included the Democratic Revolution Party, Communist Party, Socialist Party, Christian Democratic Party, Party for Democracy, Green Ecologist Party, Radical Party, Equality Party, Progressive Party, Social Green Regionalist Federation, Commons Party, Liberal Party, Social Convergence Party, and Party Humanist (Opazo November 11, 2019).

that there was a "need for a New Constitution - emanating from the citizens themselves - to establish a new political, economic and social model" (Opazo November 11, 2019). Creating a new political, economic, and social model suggests replacing the neoliberal one. These political actors employed the memory of neoliberalism appealing to the leftist cleavage to argue for the establishment of a new founding document to ground the nation's democracy.

While members of the Right accepted the drafting of a constitutional proposal, including President Piñera, there was hesitance to sweeping economic change.[57] While many members of the right-wing supported the rewrite as a whole, the few who opposed it entirely believed that it would undo the economic stability created by the Pinochet Constitution (Brown 2020). These arguments appealed to the same mnemonic narratives solidified by the dictatorship that depicted the military as Chile's saviors from ineffective, violent Marxists. The Right opposed sweeping economic changes in part because they would have challenged the grounding of the nation under the neoliberal economic and social model established under Pinochet.

The Failed Outcome of Chile's Constitutional Rewrite Process

While there was bipartisan support for drafting a new constitution, Chilean voters voted against implementing two different proposals in 2022 and 2023 (Barber 2023). Some suggest that the first proposed constitution would have been the most progressive charter in the world (Barber 2023). 62 percent of Chilean voters rejected the 2022 plebiscite to implement the proposed constitution (Barber 2023). Unlike the constitutional committee that was created

[57]The 2019-2023 constitutional rewrite process was not the first time Chile put major constitutional reform on the agenda. President Michelle Bachelet proposed significant constitutional reform (Piscopo and Siavelis 2021, 45). It is worth noting that Piñera originally rejected these liberal constitutional reforms (Ward 2020). In addition, since the 1988 plebiscite, Chile implemented multiple constitutional amendments (Carvajal and Franco September 8, 2020).

following the 2019 protests, the 2023 committee was dominated by conservatives. (Vergara and Politi 2023). The 2023 neoliberal proposal was rejected by 56% of voters (Elliott and Ramos Miranda 2023; Cooney 2023). Given the 2022 and 2023 referendums' rejection of both proposals, the government signaled that it will strive to amend the constitution instead of creating a new founding document (Elliott and Ramos Miranda 2023; Cooney 2023).

In conclusion, the truth and reconciliation commissions' reconsideration of the dictatorship's mnemonic narratives created a political opening for the public to call for sweeping constitutional change. The 2019 protests were a grassroots mnemonic movement that contributed to conducive political conditions for elites to debate the direction of the nation in the 2020 state-codified referendum. Before analyzing how political actors used memory during the 2020 plebiscite campaign, I will provide a theoretical overview of remembrance of civil conflict in Chile. This summary will provide background on official narratives and who is excluded from the institutionalized memory regime.

Theoretical Review: Chile's Decision to Remember and Political Conditions

The Impact of Remembering

In contrast to Spain, Chile institutionalized collective memory through truth and reconciliation commissions. While Chileans still hold "radically divergent narratives about the past" from believing that Pinochet saved Chile from Marxism to viewing him as "a dictator who gave Chile a neoliberal market economy at the expense and endless suffering of those who dreamed of a different nation," the commissions established an official narrative regarding human rights abuses (Lazzara 2006, 2-3; Stern 2004, 7; Vázquez Guevara 2019, 280). Over time, memory movements, including the multiple truth and reconciliation commissions, created a level of consensus in the belief that human rights violations, no matter the circumstances, are

unjustifiable (Lazzara 2006, 3-4; Stern 2010, 383).[58] In contrast to Spain's Pact of Forgetting, studies suggest that the Chilean commissions created a "lawful" truth concerning the Pinochet dictatorship (Vázquez Guevara 2019, 280). Scholars suggest that Chile's institutionalization of a "lawful" truth created an example for commissions in Africa and Eastern Europe at the start of the twenty-first century (Frazier 2007, 2; Barahona de Brito 1997, 2). I will add that the shifts in how the public viewed the Pinochet regime through the commissions established a legitimate political opening for actors to challenge the legacy of the dictatorship by using memory during the 2020 plebiscite to make constitutional arguments.

Scholars disagree on the effectiveness of Chile's truth and reconciliation commissions. Ferrara argues that multiple commissions established incremental measures of justice (2015, 206). These measures show the collective understanding between political parties and the military and created a basis for institutional change (Ferrara 2015, 12-14). In addition, Chavez-Segura suggests that the Rettig Report provided the opportunity for the country to reconcile and for victims to be heard (2015, 237). However, Grandin is hesitant about the success of Chile's commissions. Grandin suggests that the focus on reconciliation limited justice and criminal prosecution and institutionalized Pinochet's neoliberal vision (2005, 49). It is worth noting that this embedded a neoliberal cultural model that continues to be challenged "not only on socio-economic but also ethno-national lines," including through Mapuche organizations (Webb and Radcliffe 2013, 337).

The political conditions of the transition to democracy impacted how truth and justice were confronted. Barahona de Brito understands Chile's transition to be restricted, negotiated, and peaceful because the leaders of the dictatorship maintained some legitimacy through their

[58]However, there are some in Chile who still strongly support Pinochet (Lazzara 2006, 4). While an official narrative may be established, there will always be multiple competing narratives (Barahona de Brito 1997, 5).

withdrawal from power (1997). Given the pluralist democracy that Chile operated under during the transition, the government had to balance the demands of victims with the military and its allies (Barahona de Brito 1997, 6). Furthermore, the power of the military presented a challenge. Political actors had to balance the calls for justice with the preservation of a key state institution that also was a perpetrator (Barahona de Brito 1997, 6). This was further complicated by the military's entrenched power, including Pinochet's continued power as army commander until 1998 and "Senator for Life" (Pion-Berlin 1995, 89-90; Stern 2004, 1). This need to balance justice and harmony continued to exclude victims from Chile's national identity by prioritizing the interests of their oppressors. However, Chile has been committed to reconciliation and democratization (Baxter 2005, 122).

The creation of a national collective memory excluded some narratives, particularly the story of Indigenous oppression under the military dictatorship. The understanding of victimhood in the truth and reconciliation commissions excluded Mapuche experiences and homogenized Mapuche victims generally as Chilean *campesinos* (peasants) (Jara et al. 2018, 489-490). Furthermore, memorials to victims and museums fail to reference Mapuche by name (Waldman 2012, 56). I will examine how Indigenous political actors pushed against this homogenous narrative and for recognition of their rights through the political opening presented by the 2020 referendum.

However, Chilean civil society organizations pushed for creating a more inclusive narrative and influenced the political conditions of remembrance. Baxter argues that civil society organizations encourage accountability from the state in remembering civil conflict (2005, 132). Stern posits that these groups keep or pry the door open regarding state recognition of the past (2010, 368). Furthermore, during grassroots movements such as the Penguin Revolution and the

2011 student movement, Mapuche youth challenged the continued homogenous conception of Chilean culture and nationality (Webb and Radcliffe 2013, 334-335). I add that civil society's decision to remember challenged indigenous exclusion from institutional narratives and provided a political opening for elite actors to utilize memory to create a more inclusive Chile.

Finally, since Chile's constitutional rewrite process failed less than a year ago, little scholarship has been written on it. However, scholars suggest that the 2019 protests increased Chileans' belief that a new constitution was the only path for real social development (Suarez-Cao 2021, 255). Furthermore, the protests created the political conditions for constitutional change (Suarez-Cao 2021, 261). In addition, Piscopo and Siavelis demonstrate how conservative politicians and parties created a successful media campaign to oppose the proposed constitution (2023, 148). Right-wing political actors even warned that it would threaten Chilean identity and the nation itself (Piscopo and Siavelis 2023, 148). Similar to Piscopo and Siavelis, I will suggest that political actors used collective memory to make arguments concerning national identity. In the next section, I will add that supporters of Apruebo and Rechazar utilized the 2020 state-codified referendum to argue for competing views of the nation by appealing to social cleavages through memories entrenched through the truth and reconciliation commissions and popular movements.

Analysis: Political Actors' Use of Memory Leading up to the 2020 Plebiscite

Challenging the Legacies of Pinochet: Political Actors Supporting Apruebo

The 2019 protests created a political environment that supported challenging the legacies of Pinochet (Loncón 2023). Political actors supporting the Apruebo campaign utilized the opportunity presented by the 2020 plebiscite and the grassroots mnemonic movement to justify the establishment of a constitutional convention. Apruebo supporters appealed to the leftist

cleavage through their employment of collective memory to connect the 1980 Constitution to Pinochet to legitimize the calls for a new constitution to create a more inclusive nation.

The 2019 "Chile Woke Up" protests and the state-codified campaign gave Apruebo political actors an opening to challenge the political systems created under the dictatorship to call for a new national era. Supporters of Apruebo argued that the constitutional convention would provide an opportunity to strengthen Chilean democracy. For example, Beatriz Sánchez, a representative for Frente Amplio, explained that the plebiscite was "the gateway to a more democratic future for Chile" (Jorge Soto and Monrroy October 18, 2020).[59] This statement suggested that Chile had failed to fully transform into a democracy. It appealed to the leftist social cleavage, who considered the 1980 Constitution as the continuation of inequality and exclusion.

Furthermore, Apruebo backers built on this memory and labeled the 1980 Constitution as Pinochet's legacy to suggest that Chile needed a new constitution separated from the dictatorship. *Diputado* Boris Barrera explained that the rewrite process would allow for "the end of the Pinochet Constitution" (Opazo September 2, 2020). Furthermore, political actors accused Rechazar supporters of maintaining the legacies of the military government. For example, PS *Diputada* Maya Fernandez explained "they want to perpetuate Pinochet's Constitution" (Marchant September 19, 2020). In addition, Jorge Ramirez, President of Partido Comunes, posted on X that RN *Diputados* supporting Rechazar are trying "to preserve the Constitution of Augusto Pinochet" (Marchant September 19, 2020). By referring to the 1980 Constitution as a

[59]See also for political actors calling for change within Chile's political identity: "El gesto de Lavín a su partido: 'La UDI es un camino para servir a Chile'" published in *El Mercurio* on September 12, 2020; "Cecilia Bravo, del frente sindical NO+AFP: 'El proceso constituyente se trata de volver a esperanzarnos'" published in *El Ciudadano* on October 21, 2020; "Oposición rechaza propuesta de mantener normas que no logren 2/3 en Convención Constitucional" published in *El Mercurio* on September 19, 2020. For demands from non-political actors see: "De la ilusión modernizadora y la ceguera política, a la urgencia de una nueva democracia " published in *El Ciudadano* on October 5, 2020.

legacy of the dictatorship, Apruebo supporters built off the memory of authoritarianism to argue that the constitutional convention was a way to strengthen democracy.[6061] When political actors referred to the constitution as continuing the legacies of the dictatorship, they appealed to the collective memory institutionalized in the truth and reconciliation commissions. This includes memory of brutal oppression and the institutionalization of the neoliberal model. I will expand on how political actors understood the legacy of the military regime.

For example, Apruebo supporters justified the constitutional convention through the argument that the 1980 Constitution continued the dictatorship's exclusion and oppression.[62] They suggested that because the 1980 Constitution was a legacy of Pinochet, the constitutional convention would provide hope for a more democratic and inclusive Chile. For example, the Mayor of Paillaco, Ramona Reyes, affirmed that "today we are saying forcefully that it is enough to have a state where women and indigenous peoples have been left behind, and where sexual diversity and the disabled are not being considered; it is time to build a different Chile" (Alvarez December 17, 2019). Furthermore, leader of the DC group, Carmen Frei, asserted "We need a country with opportunities for all and that is why we need a Constitution of dignity and hope" (Jorge Soto and Monrroy October 18, 2020). Political actors legitimized creating a new governing document through the promise of a more inclusive nation.[63] This argument built on the

[60]See also for calls from non-political actors on the de-legitimacy of the 1980 constitution: "Sigue debate sobre rol de militares en proceso constituyente: Deliberación cívico-militar hoy" published in *El Ciudadano* on October 8, 2020.
[61]See also "The Mapuche Struggle for the Recognition of its Nations" by President of Chile's Constitutional Convention, Elisa Loncón, and published in *ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America*. While the article was written after the rejection of the first proposal, it provides perspective on using collective memory to delegitimize the 1980 constitution as a legacy of Pinochet.
[62]I will expand on how Indigenous political actors challenge the 1980 constitution as continuing historic oppression later in this chapter.
[63]For additional articles on creating a more inclusive nation see: "Unidad Para el Cambio propone que la propia Asamblea Constituyente defina su quórum " published in *El Ciudadano* on November 27, 2019 and "Comandos del Apruebo y Rechazo afinan cierre de campañas del plebiscito del 25-O" published in *El Mercurio* on October 18, 2020.

memory of Pinochet homogenizing Chilean identity through brutal violence. By arguing for a more inclusive nation, Apruebo supporters drew on the leftist social cleavage, which the dictatorship silenced.

In addition, political actors used the memory of the neoliberal model, which is embedded in the 1980 Constitution, to legitimize the need for a new founding document separated from the national identity established under Pinochet. The President of a political workers organization supporting Apruebo, Horacio Fuentes, employed the memory of the Popular Unity government and the then-current economic crisis to justify a different economic model. Fuentes explained that pioneering economic policies were "cut short by the 1973 coup d'état" (August 27, 2020). By using the memory of the 1973 coup, Fuentes reminded the leftist cleavage of the undemocratic and violent manner under which the current neoliberal model was formed. Fuentes challenged the neoliberal narrative continued by the Rettig Commission to argue that the Popular Unity economic models were never given the opportunity to succeed (Grandin 2005). Through this challenge, Fuentes appealed to the shared memories within the leftist cleavage of the violent imposition of neoliberalism.

In addition, political supporters of Apruebo compare the 1988 plebiscite to the 2020 referendum to suggest that establishing a new constitution will create hope for the Chilean nation. Socialist Senator Paulina Vodanovic explained that the 1988 referendum "offered to bring joy in the face of the prolonged dictatorship" (October 18, 2020). In the same statement, she connected the 1988 and 2020 referendums and stated "Today's plebiscite is one of hope" (Vodanovic October 18, 2020). By connecting the 1988 plebiscite and the 2020 referendum through hope, Vodanovic employed collective memory to imply that a new constitution would bring a better national era. Furthermore, mentioning that the 1988 plebiscite provided hope in the

face of brutal dictatorship employed the collective memory of civil conflict to suggest that Chileans should vote to approve the constitutional convention to continue the democratization process started in 1988. Through linking the Apruebo vote to a new Chilean era, political actors justified that a new constitution would establish a more democratic and inclusive nation because it would separate Chile's founding document from the legacies of the military dictatorship.

In conclusion, supporters of the Apruebo built on the mnemonic narratives of the 2019 "Chile Woke Up" grassroots movement to argue for a constitutional convention to establish a new chapter for the nation. The institutionalized memory of the atrocities committed by the military regime established by the truth and reconciliation commissions changed the balance of power between the neoliberal and leftist cleavages. This power shift provided a mnemonic opening during the state-codified referendum for supporters of Apruebo to delegitimize the continuation of Pinochet's conception of the nation through the 1980 Constitution. Supporters of Apruebo argued that a new constitution would separate Chile from the military dictatorship's economic and social neoliberal model. Through the political opening of the 2020 campaign period, Apruebo political actors asserted that leaving behind the 1980 Constitution would bring hope for a stronger more inclusive, democratic Chile.

Indigenous Communities Calling for Recognition of Plurinationality

Indigenous political actors used the plebiscite as an opening to advocate for recognition of plurinationality and autonomy in Chile.[64] While I understand Indigenous political actors to largely support the Apruebo campaign, I will highlight the rhetoric that they employed

[64]This is not to say that all Indigenous political actors called for plurinationality and autonomy. Members of the Indigenous community hold different views on policies (Estrada 2006). However, the newspaper articles I read suggest that this was a key demand of many Indigenous political actors.

independently to understand how the distinct political conditions that the Chilean Indigenous population and Catalan and Basque separatists operated under. This independent analysis will provide a fuller picture of how the institutional political power of nationalities impact their goals during potential constitutional transitions. Unlike Spain, the 1980 Chilean Constitution does not recognize multiple nationalities. In fact, its neoliberal ideology fails to recognize the rights of Chile's Indigenous population (Loncón 2023). Given this lack of recognition, Indigenous groups in Chile operate in a different political environment than separatist groups in Spain. I suggest that the state-codified referendum presented a political opening for Indigenous political actors to use memory of exclusion to demand to be recognized through a plurinational constitution.

Although I read over 105 newspaper articles on the constitutional rewrite using liberal and conservative sources, I came across less than 15 articles on Indigenous demands, and even fewer included statements from the Indigenous community. Given this low number, I thought I must have missed articles, so I did more specialized searches. I searched for the political party, Wallmapu, and Mapuche and found only one additional article. This lack of reporting presents a substantial gap in coverage, especially since emphasis was put on the inclusion of Indigenous communities in the constitutional convention (Disi Pavlic 2024, 1). While I recognize that this presents challenges to this research, I will provide analysis through the few articles I was able to examine. Given the small pool of articles from the 2020 plebiscite period, I also include analysis of key articles discussing support for a new constitution following the 2019 protests.

Following the 2019 October protests, the Coordination of Native Nations of the Metropolitan Region (CONORM) advocated its support for a new constitution to establish political self-determination, recognition of plurinationalism, and protection of cultural and linguistic rights (Labbé Yáñez October 28, 2019). CONORM stated that they sought to

"radicalize, deepen and contribute to democracy in Chile through the instrument of political self-determination of the peoples, an internationally recognized right that does not imply secession, all within the framework of a Plurinational State" (Labbé Yáñez October 28, 2019). Similar to additional actors in the Apruebo campaign, CONORM viewed the new constitution as a tool for strengthening democracy. This argument is built on the narrative that the 1980 Constitution is a legacy of dictatorship. Additionally, CONORM advocated for recognition and protection of Indigenous nationality. Unlike, Basque and Catalan separatists, they advocate to be included in the state. I suggest that the lack of institutional recognition of the legitimacy of Indigenous nationalities contributed to this distinct goal. I speculate that when the state does not acknowledge a nationality it is more difficult for nationalities to advocate for full autonomy.

In addition, Indigenous groups tied Pinochet's neoliberal model to the perpetuation of colonialism. CONORM called for "the end of an unjust economic system" (Labbé Yáñez October 28, 2019). Furthermore, CONORM stated:

> neoliberalism is a reformulation of historical colonialism, which currently combines the extractivism of our territories, the oppression of our peoples, of nature, of women and multicultural folklorisation. This implies a model of governance that plunders nature and blocks the political capacity of the peoples. We rebel against this model, towards the construction of a dignified life and a good way of living (Labbé Yáñez October 28, 2019).

As supporters of Apruebo, the Indigenous group viewed the constitution as the continued imposition of Pinochet's economic model. In addition, they employed memory of exclusion and oppression to depict neoliberalism as perpetuation of colonial oppression. By asserting that the 1980 Constitution continued subjugation under the military dictatorship and centuries of colonialism, CONORM justified the need for a new constitution to establish a government that promotes "a dignified life" through a plurinational system (Labbé Yáñez October 28, 2019).

Leading up to the plebiscite campaign, political actors advocated for indigenous inclusion in the constitutional process through the memory of exclusion and historic territorial presence. A

legislative director for Diputada Emilia Nuyado, a Mapuche legislator, explained that "it is necessary that one of the focuses and paths be precisely the political participation of the Indigenous peoples who have been excluded for centuries in the country's political discussion" (Valencia August 8, 2020). The legislative director utilized the memory of exclusion, drawing on social cleavages, to argue that historic political oppression demonstrated the need for a more inclusive foundation and process. Furthermore, the legislative aid, utilized the historic presence of Indigenous people in Chilean territory to support their inclusion, explaining "If it is a question of the new constitution, of the Magna Carta, what better than for the indigenous people themselves to say what kind of society and state they want to share this territory with, given that they are the first nations to inhabit this territory before the Chilean state was formed" (Valencia August 8, 2020). The memory of the historic oppression of the Indigenous peoples worked to justify the need for a plurinational constitution that recognized communities living on the territory for longer than the existence of the Chilean nation.

Indigenous political actors criticized their lack of inclusion despite the Apruebo rhetoric that emphasized the importance of including them in the 2020 political process (Buitrago October 13, 2020, October 28, 2020). Indigenous political groups advocated for their presence and condemned their exclusion. In a letter, 40 Indigenous organizations stated:

> We have been waiting for a hearing for weeks, just like other indigenous organizations, and we think it is disrespectful to vote without listening to us. We legitimately ask ourselves, then what is the purpose of the hearing mechanism? There has not even been indigenous consultation on this project, which already generates the international responsibility of the State, and now the Quechua people, an entire people, are being discriminated against (Buitrago October 28, 2020).

While the letter did not invoke collective memory, it demonstrated to political actors the continued suppression of Indigenous political voices. Furthermore, the letter acknowledged the inclusion of the "authorities and academics who claim to carry the voice of the native peoples" (Buitrago October 28, 2020). By asserting their then-current exclusion, the Indigenous groups

demonstrated to those claiming to care about Indigenous concerns their right to be heard in the constitutional process. By illustrating this continued discrimination, the groups asked their audience to remember their historic oppression. Furthermore, this demonstration contributed to justifying calls for plurinationalism in the proposed constitution because it demonstrated the systematic discrimination within political institutions.

Unlike Catalan separatists, Indigenous political actors in Chile demanded to be included in the constitutional process through plurinationality. On the day of the plebiscite, the President of ENAMA[65] called for the proposed constitution to establish a plurinational state. Hugo Alcamán asserted that:

> we are a Cosmo of different visions, therefore, we have to be recognized as different. This must be born from the recognition that the State of Chile is a plurinational State. We consider the figure of a nation to be a failure. Today we are 11 nations of the peoples of Chile: 10 of the original peoples, plus the Chilean nation. We are a plurinational country. ("¿Qué debería incluir una nueva constitución?" October 25, 2020).

By calling for the recognition of the plurinational state, Alcamán explained that the 1980 Constitution failed to acknowledge the 10 additional nations. The lack of recognition of the 10 Indigenous nationalities in Chile impacted the political environment that Indigenous groups operated in. Furthermore, Diputada Nuyado asserted that the Indigenous Nations composed of almost 13% of Chile's population and demanded that these nations be included in "writing a new Plurinational Constitution" (Opazo October 21, 2020b). Nuyado also stated that Indigenous inclusion in the constitutional rewrite process would "seek to prevent the historical exclusion of indigenous peoples from continuing in constituent decisions and political deliberation" (Opazo October 21, 2020b). Nuyado invoked the collective memory of Indigenous oppression, including under the military dictatorship, to argue for a more inclusive political process through the creation of a plurinational constitution written with the input of the Indigenous nations. Given

[65]ENAMA is "a Mapuche group that encourages local businesses and advocates social change" (The Associated Press January 17, 2018).

the historic exclusion of Indigenous people from the Chilean nation and political process, Indigenous political actors fought to strengthen their political power through asserting the need to create a plurinational constitution.

Indigenous political actors utilized narratives of historic oppression to legitimize the need for a plurinational, inclusive state. I suggest that the different levels of political power held by Indigenous groups in Chile and Spanish separatists contribute to their distinct goals and the political environments in which they operate. Unlike the Basque and Catalan separatists, Indigenous communities in Chile were not recognized as nationalities in the 1980 Constitution. Given the lack of recognition of nationalities by the 1980 Chilean Constitution and the continued oppression of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous actors employed memory of oppression to advocate for inclusion in the political system through the creation of a plurinational constitution. In the end, the first constitutional convention was led by Elisa Loncón, a Mapuche woman (Loncón 2023). The convention proposed a plurinational constitution that some commentators believed to be one of the most progressive in the world (Barber 2023; Loncón 2023). However, the plurinational constitution was rejected by Chilean voters (Loncón 2023).

Utilization of Entrenched Narratives: Rechazar's Constitutional Arguments

Given the state's legitimation of the plebiscites, political actors supporting the Rechazar campaign and the maintenance of the 1980 Constitution used similar mnemonic narratives to the Say Yes Campaign in 1988 Chile. While supporters of the Rechazar did not always call out the military government or Popular Unity by name, they utilized neoliberal narratives entrenched under the Pinochet regime and in the Rettig Commission to emphasize the dangers to the nation if the 1980 Constitution was replaced (Grandin 2005). Both the Rechazar and Say Yes campaigns

employed the mnemonic narratives describing the violent left and economic success to appeal to the neoliberal social cleavage. They suggested that the leftist opposition was violent and that Chile's strength, particularly in the economy, was due to the policies guided by the 1980 Constitution.

The National Renewal (RN) party, a conservative group supporting Rechazar, appealed to the neoliberal cleavage by employing the mnemonic characterization of the Left as violent radicals. RN's President, Rafael Prohens, argued that maintaining the 1980 Constitution was the best path for Chile. *El Mercurio* reported that Prohen would "deliver a message of unity to the militancy, given the differences between the 'Apruebo' and the 'Rachazo', with the message 'We want the best for Chile'" (A. Monrroy August 26, 2020). This characterization of Apruebo as militant aligned with Pinochet's narratives, specifically, the mnemonic narrative that the Popular Unity government and the Say No Campaign would bring violent, chaotic, radical change. Furthermore, the slogan of the RN rejection campaign changed from "Reject to Reform" to "To change Chile I vote Reject" (A. Monrroy August 26, 2020). While the conservative party's recognition of the need for some change reflected the widespread desire for reform in Chile, their slogan implied the need for incremental, non-radical change. The RN asserted that gradual reform, rather than sweeping constitutional change, was the best path for the nation.

Following 2020 protests demanding constitutional change, the Rechazar campaign utilized the mnemonic characterization of the Left as violent to appeal to the collective memory of the neoliberal cleavage.[66] While the truth and reconciliation commissions established the atrocities against Pinochet's opponents, Rechazar supporters still indicated that an Apruebo win

[66]For additional articles connecting the plebiscite and the Apruebo to violence see: "Kast llamo a votar por el rechazo pese a prohibición de propaganda" published in *El Ciudadano* on October 25, 2020; "Volverán las oscuras golondrinas" published in *El Mercurio* on August 27, 2023; "Oposición advierte que violencia puede ahuyentar al electorado y aboga por manifestaciones pacíficas" published in *El Mercurio* on October 18, 2020

would lead to leftist chaos. RN Diputado Tomás Fuentes stated that "While 'Chile Vamos' for Apruebo sectors say that violence is not about Approval and Rejection, it doesn't matter, because in the end the violent ones say they are for Approval" (J Soto, Monrroy, and Aninat October 20, 2020). Similar to the Say Yes Campaign in 1988, Fuentes tied the opposition and their vision to violence. By using this argument entrenched under Pinochet, the RN *diputado* implied that those supporting the Apruebo were incapable of establishing stability and peace. Furthermore, the Independent Democratic Union (UDI), a right-wing political party, published an advertisement in *El Mercurio* with multiple men in ski masks standing in front of a trashed street with a large fire behind them. In front of one of the men were the words "Rechazo… Rechaza… Rechazamos!!!" (I reject... She rejects... We reject!!!). Additionally, at the bottom of the advertisement it stated "This Sunday on the 25th, all of the UDI will reject for a Chile without hate and without violence" ("UDI Rechazar Violencia AD" October 22, 2020). The UDI ad used the deeply rooted narrative of the Left causing violence to emphasize the need to reject a constitutional convention to maintain stability and peace.

Unlike those advocating for the Apruebo, RN President of the Chamber of Deputies, Diego Paulsen suggested that Chile's strength stemmed from the constitution created by the military dictatorship. Paulsen explained that "Chile is clearly a better country than 40 years ago: this Constitution has allowed a stability in the social, political and economic areas. Undoubtedly there are problems, such as the lack of greater power to the regions, but this Constitution is the one that has allowed millions of Chileans to move forward" (E. Monrroy September 12, 2020). Unlike many actors advocating for approve, Paulsen situated Chile's growth under the 40 years mark instead of 30 years. While 30 years refers to the transition to democracy, 40 years signifies the establishment of the 1980 Constitution. By establishing the creation of Chile's growth in

1980, Paulsen attributed the country's strength to Pinochet's policies, instead of the transition to democracy. Specifically, he highlighted economic stability since the creation of the 1980 Constitution to draw support from the neoliberal cleavage. This built on the same mnemonic narrative that the Say Yes Campaign articulated in 1988, by suggesting that the neoliberal model brought prosperity.

In conclusion, political actors supporting Rechazar used similar narratives to the 1988 Say Yes Campaign. These mnemonic narratives characterizing the Left as radical and brutal were entrenched during the Pinochet dictatorship (Stern et al. 2006). Furthermore, Rechazar juxtaposed this characterization by using neoliberal narratives institutionalized through truth and reconciliation commissions to legitimize the 1980 Constitution (Grandin 2005). Rechazar political actors followed the 1988 Say Yes Campaign mnemonic narratives of civil conflict to appeal to the neoliberal social cleavage and earn their vote. The state-codified plebiscite campaign provided the political environment for debate, prompting Rechazar actors to employ memory to draw support from the neoliberal cleavage to reject constitutional change.

Chile 2020 Conclusion

The institutionalization of the memory of human rights abuses under the Pinochet dictatorship through truth and reconciliation commissions and grassroots movements contributed to public demand for constitutional change (Suarez-Cao 2021, 261). The 2019 "Chile Woke Up" Protests pushed political actors to hold a state-codified referendum on constitutional reform. The plebiscite campaign provided a conducive political environment for mnemonic warriors to use memory and draw on social cleavages to gain support for their view of the nation. Politicians supporting Apruebo delegitimized the 1980 Constitution by connecting it to Pinochet and the

memory of civil conflict. Furthermore, they built on the narrative of oppression under the military dictatorship to argue that drafting a new constitution would establish a more democratic, inclusive Chile.

In addition, Indigenous actors supporting Apruebo drew on narratives of colonial and pinochetista oppression to demand recognition through acknowledgement of plurinationality. Due to the lack of recognition of Chile's diversity in the 1980 Constitution, Indigenous actors operated in a different political condition than Catalan and Basque separatists. While Catalan and Basque separatists functioned in a political environment where their constitution recognized their nationalities' differences from other Spanish regions, the homogenization of Chilean national identity under Pinochet failed to acknowledge Indigenous communities. Given this lack of recognition, Chile's Indigenous communities operated under weaker political power, which contributed to their decision to demand the acknowledgement of plurinationality in the constitutional convention. Despite their different goals, both Indigenous political actors in Chile and Catalan and Basque separatists employed memories of oppression to legitimize their nationhood.

Finally, Rechazar supporters utilized entrenched narratives pushed by the military dictatorship and the 1988 Say Yes campaign. To delegitimize significant constitutional reform, politicians supporting Rechazar depicted the Apruebo as a radical, violent left. In conclusion, during the state-codified referendum, Apruebo, Indigenous, and Rechazar political actors all utilized mnemonic narratives of civil conflict to legitimize their arguments regarding constitutional change through appealing to social cleavages' understanding of the Chilean nation.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis explored why political actors decide to remember or forget when making constitutional arguments. I focused my analysis on official memory and elite actors, specifically political actors. I examined the different political conditions that led political actors to make distinct mnemonic choices in Spain and Chile. I found that establishment political actors operating under fragile political conditions, such as an attempted coup, are less likely to draw on collective memory of civil conflict. Fear of reigniting violence when the nation is challenged deters political actors from employing narratives that invoke social cleavages. However, in more stable political conditions such as when the state backs debate over the direction of the nation, political actors use memory of civil conflict to solidify social cleavages to justify their vision for the nation.

During the 1981 attempted coup in Spain, establishment political actors chose to forget, following the Pact of Forgetting, and emphasized continued constitutional order. The transition to democracy was tenuous and comprised of several competing visions for the nation from Franco sympathizers to Catalan nationalists who sought increased autonomy (Balfour and Quiroga 2007, 47; Aguilar Fernández 2002, xix). Across the ideological spectrum, political actors worried that Spain would break out into conflict again, especially given the historic violence between social cleavages (Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010, 2; Richards 2013, 279; Gunther 1991, 43). Fear of the return to violence led political actors to suppress narratives of the civil war and Franco dictatorship and instead focus their narrative on the government's strength and stability, due to the vulnerable political conditions following the 1981 attempted coup. (Amago and Jerez Farrán 2010, 2; Aguilar Fernández 2002, xx; Hayner 2011).

This study also briefly examined the use of memory by Basque political actors following the death of José Arregui by torture. While this event did not fall under the political conditions of this study, it provided insight to why Basque and Catalan nationalists challenge the Pact of Forgetting. Unlike the establishment political actors in Spain, Basque and Catalan separatists are not afraid of breaking up the Spanish nation. In fact, it is in their interest to fracture the state through invoking memories of civil conflict to solidify Basque or Catalan national identity.

Following a grassroots memory movement and the 2007 Law of Historical Memory, Spanish establishment political actors continued to oppress narratives of conflict during the 2017 Catalan independence referendum. In contrast, Catalan separatists utilized narratives of continued Spanish oppression to justify their right to independence. I suggest that establishment political actors continued to follow the Pact of Forgetting because the independence movement created a vulnerable political condition that challenged the 1978 Spanish Constitution and the Spanish nation. I understand the Catalan Independence Referendum to be an attempted coup because it unconstitutionally challenged and attempted to overthrow the Spanish government through secession. While establishment political actors choose not to invoke memories of civil conflict and focused on narratives of unity, Catalan separatists employed memories of civil conflict because their goals led them to operate under different political conditions. Unlike establishment political actors, Catalan separatists wanted to divide the Spanish state. To justify this division, separatists drew on linguistic and cultural social cleavages to highlight the differences between Spain and Catalonia. By using mnemonic narratives of Spanish oppression of their autonomy, Catalan political actors worked to solidify a national Catalan identity to legitimize secession.

In contrast to Spain, Chilean political actors across the ideological spectrum decided to remember. The 1988 plebiscite provided an opening for political actors to debate the future of the Chilean nation through the stability of a state-codified referendum. Given that the referendum was supported by the 1980 Constitution and prompted a political campaign, the political conditions encouraged actors to present arguments for Chile's future. To justify their stances, political actors on both sides drew on mnemonic narratives and social cleavages to support their vision of the nation. The Say Yes Campaign employed narratives of civil conflict of Allende's Popular Unity government and asserted economic growth under Pinochet. In contrast, the Say No Campaign utilized memory of human rights violations under the Pinochet regime to suggest that a new government would bring peace and happiness. The Say Yes and Say No campaigns both employed memories of civil conflict; however, the narratives that they drew on differed in who perpetuated the violence. They used different understandings of civil conflict to appeal to social cleavages and legitimize their individual visions of the nation.

In 2020, following three truth and reconciliation commissions and 30 years of democracy, Chileans challenged the 1980 Constitution. Chileans held another plebiscite to decide whether to hold a constitutional convention to replace the 1980 Constitution. The plebiscite was grounded in a collective memory grassroots movement where Chileans called on the nation to "wake up." Political actors supporting the Apruebo built off the narratives of the 2019 "Chile Woke Up" protests and argued that a constitutional convention would provide a new chapter for Chile. To appeal to the leftist cleavage, Apruebo political actors justified the need for this new era by labeling the 1980 Constitution as exclusive and a legacy of the dictatorship. In contrast, political actors supporting the Rechazar continued to utilize narratives of civil conflict internalized under the Pinochet dictatorship to maintain the 1980 Constitution. The Rechazar

supporters depicted Apruebo as violent leftists drawing on the same mnemonic narratives of the 1988 Say Yes Campaign. The political conditions of the state-codified 2020 referendum provided a stable environment for opposing actors to draw on distinct memories to appeal to their historic social cleavages and campaign either for the status quo of the Chilean nation or a new direction separate from the legacies of Pinochet.

In addition, I suggested that the distinct political conditions of the Indigenous communities in Chile and the regional movements in Spain contributed to different approaches to nationality during these democratic transitions. The Spanish Constitution's inclusion of a "nation of nations" legitimizes additional nationalities and provides a political opening for dialog concerning autonomy (Aguilar Fernandez and Humlebaek 2002, 134). However, in Chile, Pinochet homogenized national identity. In addition, the 1980 Constitution fails to recognize the legitimacy of Indigenous groups. Given that Indigenous nationalities are not acknowledged under the 1980 Constitution, Indigenous political actors in Chile used the 2020 plebiscite as a political opening to gain institutional recognition of autonomy and plurinationality. The institutional recognition of nationalities impacts how groups seeking autonomy draw on memory and use political conditions to increase independence. Despite the differences in political power, both Indigenous political actors in Chile and Catalan and Basque nationalists in Spain employed memories of oppression to legitimize their calls for greater autonomy.

In conclusion, I suggest that political conditions impact actors' decisions to remember or forget. When the nation is challenged and vulnerable during an attempted coup, establishment political actors suppress narratives of civil conflict to stabilize and unify the nation. In contrast to this, during the stability of state-codified referendums, political actors use the opening to debate and articulate their vision for the nation. They utilize memory of civil conflict to appeal to

different social cleavages and to gain support for their envisioned future. While this thesis focused on official memory by political actors, the mnemonic environment is influenced by grassroots movements as well. Future studies should analyze how popular memory during political conditions, such as state-codified referendums and attempted coups, impact the use of memory of civil conflict by political actors to make constitutional arguments.

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