Bates College Journal of Political Studies
Abstract
Debates over ballistic missile defense often assume that defensive capability inherently destabilizes deterrence by eroding mutual vulnerability. This article challenges that assumption by arguing that the strategic effects of missile defense are neither predetermined nor uniform. Limited and layered defensive systems generate two simultaneous pressures: stabilizing deterrence-by-denial effects against limited coercive threats and destabilizing uncertainty regarding long-term retaliatory viability. Which mechanism prevails depends not on defensive technology alone, but on policy design—specifically system scale, doctrinal framing, and integration within the broader offense-defense relationship. Drawing on classical deterrence theory, offense-defense scholarship, and contemporary analyses by Roberts, Wilkening, and Daalder, Goldgeier, and Lindsay, the article argues that missile defense can reinforce deterrence and alliance credibility when explicitly constrained and embedded within arms control frameworks, while producing hedging behavior and qualitative modernization when deployed without such limits. Strategic stability, therefore, is not undermined by defense per se, but is shaped by how states govern the uncertainty created by defensive deployments.
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Recommended Citation
Ghosh, Aanya
(2026)
"Everybody Wants to Rule the World: How Ballistic Missile Defenses Can Reduce the Risk of War,"
Bates College Journal of Political Studies: Vol. 3:
Iss.
1, Article 2.
Available at:
https://scarab.bates.edu/bjps/vol3/iss1/2