The Costs of Selective Intervention: Why the Obama Administration Chose to Intervene in Libya Over Syria

Authors

• Rayanne Attar, Bates CollegeFollow

Abstract

This paper examines the Obama administration’s selective military intervention during the Arab Spring, comparing case studies of Libya and Syria. I argue that the decision for the Obama administration to militarily intervene in Libya but not Syria was justified because intervention in Syria was far more costly in terms of risks. In Libya, Qaddafi’s regime lacked strong external support, relied on dated military systems, and faced a fragmented opposition, making intervention politically feasible. In contrast, in Syria, Assad’s alliance with Russia and Iran, threatening air defense capabilities, and internal sociopolitical divisions made military action highly risky and unlikely to produce regime change. By examining foreign influence, defense capabilities, and the probability of post-intervention political transitions, this paper communicates how risk assessment shaped U.S. decision-making. The findings underscore that intervention is dependent on political constraints including threats of escalation and likelihood of achieving policy goals, rather than consistency. Analyzing these decisions provides understanding of patterns on selective intervention in U.S. foreign policy, highlighting the conflict between humanitarian crises and political strategy that drives military action.

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Recommended Citation

Attar, Rayanne (2026) "The Costs of Selective Intervention: Why the Obama Administration Chose to Intervene in Libya Over Syria," Bates College Journal of Political Studies: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: https://scarab.bates.edu/bjps/vol3/iss1/4