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Bates College Journal of Political Studies

Bates College Journal of Political Studies

Abstract

How did the Taliban insurgency succeed in gaining control of the Afghan state in 2021 following the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001? This paper argues that the Taliban’s success resulted from two key dynamics: the weaknesses of opponents and strengths of the Taliban. The Afghan State was undermined by governance failures including the 2004 Constitution, overcentralization, lack of rural governance, corruption, and a dependence on foreign aid. These internal weaknesses were compounded by international policy failures, including the Bonn Agreement, inconsistent counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) strategies, the failed peace process design embedded in the Doha Agreement, and the rapid U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. At the same time, support from external actors including Pashtun networks, Pakistan, regional support, as well as Al-Qaeda and broader jihadist networks strengthened the Taliban insurgency. The Taliban also developed systems of rebel governance that facilitated the opium economy and established parallel institutions including taxation, judiciary, and education systems that competed with failing state institutions. Religious framing reinforced these efforts by enabling the Taliban to build legitimacy and challenge the authority of the Afghan government. Together, Afghan state failures, international policy failures, external support for the Taliban, and rebel governance allowed the Taliban to reinstitute the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 2021.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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