Economic Security and Strategic Rivalry: Industrial Policy and the U.S.–China Security Dilemma

Authors

• Nurielle Rahav, Colby CollegeFollow

Abstract

In an era of geopolitical competition and technological dominance, industrial policy has reemerged as a crucial tool of economic strategy in both the United States and China. Industrial policies, particularly in the advanced manufacturing sector, were formerly understood as tools for strengthening the domestic economy. However, against the backdrop of the U.S.–China trade war, new industrial policies carry significant geopolitical implications. This paper argues that industrial policy intensifies the U.S.–China security dilemma, as both governments increasingly interpret economic self-sufficiency in advanced manufacturing as a matter of national security. Through an analysis of two cases, the U.S. CHIPS and Science Act and China’s Made in China 2025 initiative, this paper illuminates how policies intended to bolster domestic sectors are perceived by competing states as direct threats. As tensions escalate between the United States and China, and as the race for dominance in the manufacturing industry advances, industrial policy will continue to be used as an essential tool for geopolitical competition.

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Recommended Citation

Rahav, Nurielle (2026) "Economic Security and Strategic Rivalry: Industrial Policy and the U.S.–China Security Dilemma," Bates College Journal of Political Studies: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: https://scarab.bates.edu/bjps/vol3/iss1/8