Introspection and the nature of desire

Authors

Lauren Ashwell, Bates CollegeFollow

Publication Title

The Nature of Desire

Document Type

Book Chapter - Open Access

Department or Program

Philosophy

Publication Date

2017

Keywords

Desire as evaluative belief, Desire as value seeming, Epistemic privilege, Introspection, Motivation, Self-knowledge

Abstract

It is common to hold that introspective knowledge of one's mental states is highly epistemically privileged. Often this is thought to be explained by introspective knowledge's directness; we somehow know our mental states "immediately," without inference from distinct states. This chapter argues that if one holds this view concerning privilege and directness about introspective knowledge of desire, then desires cannot be normative or evaluative judgments, nor can they entirely consist in appearances of value. Since motivation is one of the things we pay attention to in introspecting our desires, this implies that motivation is not an entirely separate state from the desire.

Comments

Original version is available from the publisher at: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199370962.003.0013

Recommended Citation

Ashwell, Lauren. “Introspection and the Nature of Desire.” The Nature of Desire, Oxford University Press, 2017.