Superficial dispositionalism

Publication Title

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Document Type

Article

Department or Program

Philosophy

Publication Date

2010

Abstract

Dispositional ascriptions do not entail the counterfactuals we might expect, as interfering factors may be poised to prevent the disposition from manifesting in its very stimulus conditions. Such factors are commonly called finks and masks. It is thought, however, that finks and masks cannot be intrinsic to the disposition bearer; if an intrinsic property of the object would prevent a particular response in certain conditions, the object fails to have the corresponding disposition. I argue that we should accept intrinsic finks and masks if we think there are finks and masks at all, and also if we maintain that paradigmatic dispositions are intrinsic. This last point is particularly problematic for the claim that there cannot be intrinsic finks and masks, for if paradigmatic dispositions are not intrinsic then the central argument for the impossibility of intrinsic finks and masks is undermined. © 2010 Australasian Association of Philosophy.

Comments

Original version is available from the publisher at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400903352892

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